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Mapping Global Digital Cultures
Aswin Punathambekar and Sriram Mohan
July Boys (Sonti 2006), a documentary film about a software company in 
Bangalore that develops content for mobile phones (e.g., games and movie 
clips), opens on a gleaming, high- tech office space in which five young 
men discuss strategy for their latest software project. We learn that the 
headquarters of this company, July Systems, is in Santa Clara, California, 
and that many of the engineers and executives leading the product devel-
opment office in Bangalore have lived and worked in Silicon Valley before 
moving back to India.
In exploring the cultural and business logics at work in this software 
company, the film focuses largely on the office interiors and situates the 
team’s work routines within a transnational network involving tech capitals 
in India, the United States, and Western Europe. Glimpses of the world 
outside the office— shots of a noisy streetscape crowded with vehicles and 
pedestrians— cut quickly to an air- conditioned interior with a tastefully 
designed break room, neatly ordered cubicles, and a gleaming restroom 
with a waiting area that has a comfortable couch and a television set. In 
this swanky interior space, one that seems completely disembedded from 
the rest of the city, the founder and chief executive officer (CEO) Rajesh 
Reddy declares that people like him are “geography agnostic.” Other men 
working in the company also wax eloquent about entrepreneurial ener-
gies being unleashed and, on the whole, offer explanations of India’s digital 
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revolution that rest on stories of individual talents and merit. Of course, 
Reddy- like figures are hardly unique to South Asia and emerge in accounts 
of digital culture in China, Ghana, and other parts of the world as well.1
If this kind of narrative of global mobility, seemingly unburdened by 
any economic, political, or sociocultural factors reveals one imaginary of 
the digital, another comes into view in the American television comedy Sil-
icon Valley. In an episode titled “Daily Active Users,” we get a rare glimpse 
into the world of click- farms located in, as one article bluntly put it, “some 
third world country (think India or Bangladesh)” (Edwards 2016). Toward 
the end of the episode, a scene of a phone conversation involving the mar-
keting manager of a digital platform start- up asking for “one thousand us-
ers every day for the next week” cuts to a shot of a South Asian man waking 
up in a shared hostel. As he gets ready for work and winds his way through 
bustling streets on his bicycle, electric wires, cables, air conditioners, and 
other banal things that make up life in urban South Asia come into view. 
Just as the nameless man sits down in front of a computer and we imagine 
a lone user in a dimly lit cybercafe, the camera zooms out to reveal a cav-
ernous warehouse filled with hundreds of men and women working assidu-
ously to generate and boost the number of daily active users, clicks, likes, 
tweets, and impressions for global digital companies.
Such starkly contrasting narratives and representations offer the 
dominant imaginaries for understanding digital cultures outside the An-
glophone West— tech capitals, unfettered mobility, an expanding middle 
class, and the support of a neoliberal state, or, on the other hand, as sites 
for cheap and low- level software testing, call centers, pirate networks, and 
click- farms. Either way, geography and time seem to become irrelevant as 
do the historical, political- economic, and social dimensions of the media 
infrastructures, platforms, and varied user- practices that define digital cul-
tures anywhere in the world today. If the jet- setting software entrepreneurs 
in July Boys imagine a “flat world” à la Thomas Friedman, American tele-
vision’s take on contemporary digital culture conceives of the rest of the 
world largely in terms of immense distance and difference.
Steering clear of these distressingly familiar modes of apprehending a 
world marked by all manner of technological, financial, and cultural flows 
and frictions, this book analyzes the emergence and development of on-
line cultures and, more broadly, the unfolding impact of digitalization in 
South Asia as constitutive of our global and digital present. Delinking the 
Internet from its North Atlantic trajectory, we argue that the digital revo-
lution marks a decidedly global shift with distinct yet connected histories 
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and inevitably different trajectories, meanings, and effects depending on 
which part of the world one looks from. Positioning South Asia as part of 
an ongoing global transformation rather than as an exception or a site of 
cultural variation, we show that as with other moments of media transition, 
digital cultures in varied national and regional contexts are also shaped by 
transnational circulations of ideas, people, technologies, and capital, and 
are caught up in deeper histories than popular or academic discourses care 
to admit.
Building on what Guobin Yang (2015) calls “deep internet studies,” this 
book brings together a diverse group of scholars to examine the role of 
digital media technologies in reconfiguring the social, cultural, and po-
litical contours of South Asia and its diaspora. Collectively, we examine 
digital cultures in South Asia by situating the development of digital infra-
structures, platforms, and users/publics within regional and global contexts 
while retaining a keen awareness of how the particularities of national, re-
gional, and border- spaces open up opportunities to generate more nuanced 
accounts of how the digitalization of cultural production, consumption, 
and circulation are remaking our world.
Since the early 2000s, state and private investments in digital infrastruc-
tures (and communication technologies more generally) have led to deep-
ening access to the Internet and a vibrant digital culture across South Asia. 
With the second largest number of Internet users in the world and grow-
ing exponentially as users go online via widely available smartphones with 
inexpensive data packages, it is no exaggeration to suggest that users across 
South Asia and the South Asian diaspora will play a critical role in shap-
ing the trajectory of digital platforms, cultures, and politics in the coming 
years.2 Indeed, the meteoric growth of local language Internet users— just 
in the Indian context, from 42 million in 2011 to 234 million by 2016— also 
signals the emergence of vernacular practices that challenge our Anglo- 
centric understandings of digital cultures (“Indian Languages— Defining 
India’s Internet” 2017). South Asia thus serves not so much as a strictly 
defined geographic region, but rather as a site from which to examine the 
intersections of local, national, regional, interregional, continental, and 
global forces that shape contemporary digital culture(s).
Playing up the global and interconnected nature of the development 
of digital cultures seems all the more important at this historical conjunc-
ture when digital studies programs are securing both institutional space 
and legitimacy not only in the American, European, and Australian acad-
emies but also in increasingly well- resourced universities in Asia. In the 
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academic marketplace, scholars in a number of disciplines have come to 
regard digitalization as key to understanding the present. As Gere (2008, 
15) suggests, “To speak of the digital is to call up, metonymically, the whole 
panoply of virtual simulacra, instantaneous communication, ubiquitous 
media and global connectivity that constitutes much of our contemporary 
experience.” The emphasis on all things digital is reflected in the prolif-
eration of journals devoted to the study of digital media, the formation 
of new scholarly associations (the Association of Internet Researchers, for 
example), and the emergence of new divisions and interest groups within 
established and powerful scholarly organizations such as the Society for 
Cinema and Media Studies and the International Communication Asso-
ciation. The ferment surrounding the study of digitalization implies not 
only diverse theoretical and methodological perspectives but also a grow-
ing compartmentalization of digital studies in different disciplines across 
the humanities and the social sciences.
In relation to this ferment, we wish to position the study of digital cul-
tures in relation to global media studies, an interdisciplinary formation that 
takes seriously the multiplicity of media cultures as a way to combat the 
universalizing tendencies of Anglo- American discourse (Parks and Kumar 
2003). If the phenomenal expansion of television during the 1980s and 
1990s sparked heated debates over how the globalization of media and 
communication was transforming societies, then Kraidy (2017) is surely 
right to ponder if it is time now to rewrite the term as “global digital cul-
tures.” This not only entails reframing our understandings of media and 
cultural imperialism, dependency, heterogeneity, resistance, cosmopolitan-
ism, and hybridity but also contending with keywords and concepts in-
cluding precarity, data, affect, circulation, and sharing that have acquired 
new valences in an era of digitalization.3 As Ted Striphas and others have 
pointed out, the word culture itself “has taken on new inflections . . . many 
of which embody its association with digital computational tools” (2016, 
78). Situated within this broader media studies terrain, this book makes the 
case that regionally grounded studies of digital media are crucial for lay-
ing a strong historical foundation for understanding how digitalization is 
reshaping culture and communication in the 21st century.
Approaching Global Digital Cultures
One way to approach a topic as maddeningly broad as digital cultures is 
to start by acknowledging the historicity of, say, the Internet in specific 
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national and regional contexts. We could thus begin by narrating the story 
of the Internet from the mid- 1990s when digital communication infra-
structures and devices began to acquire greater visibility with the launch of 
dial- up access in major metropolitan centers across South Asia. Of course, 
this was initially limited to a very small number of people, but by the early 
2000s cybercafés had become as integral to the urban environment as pub-
lic telephones.
The growing prominence of the Internet and other digital media 
technologies was linked to a discernible shift in national imaginaries that 
saw governments and market forces in South Asia and across the Global 
South come to regard digital infrastructures as central to national devel-
opment. And nowhere was this new imaginary more pronounced than in 
“vision” documents produced by global consultancy firms such as KPMG 
and McKinsey that aligned the goals set by international organizations like 
the World Summit on Information Society with those of national govern-
ments that had embraced neoliberal market reforms as the path to global-
ization. This trajectory has been well documented in the Indian context 
including in accounts by Sundaram (2000) and Chakravartty (2001) who 
map how the personal computer and the network became iconic to new 
visions of progress in the late twentieth and early twenty- first centuries. 
As Chakravartty (2004) shows, this was the period when the fabled cor-
relation between science and the state unraveled, and a move was made 
toward “combining the discourse of techno- nationalism with the logic of 
markets” (236).
The idea that robust digital infrastructures held the key to a nation’s 
fortunes in the 21st century is by no means limited to the Indian context 
and in fact, emerges as commonsensical to state and market actors across 
South Asia. For instance, “Digital Bangladesh,” an initiative promoted by 
the Awami League regime as a part of its Vision 2021 development goals, 
places the digital at the center of the state’s ambitions for the nation’s place 
in the global order (Zaman and Rokonuzzaman 2014; Bashar 2017). This 
is also the foundational premise of large- scale citizen data and biomet-
ric identity projects undertaken by India (Unique Identification Authority 
of India) and Pakistan (National Database and Registration Authority)— 
initiatives that are part of a longer political history of enumeration and 
identification in postcolonial nations.4 Further, when we reflect on the 
history of information and communication technologies in South Asia 
and other non- Western regions, we also see how dominant paradigms of 
modernization that informed efforts to harness media (radio and television, 
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most prominently) for developmental purposes since the 1950s continued 
into the digital era as well. Perhaps more crucially, we can discern how user 
practices very quickly supersede the imaginations that shaped information 
and communication technologies for development (ICTD) interventions.
Consider the experience that one of us had while observing computer 
and Internet use at info kiosks in a semirural part of the state of Tamilnadu 
in south India. Less than a 45- minute bus ride from a large coastal town, 
these info kiosks were part of an ambitious ICTD initiative funded by a 
major Indian nongovernmental organization (NGO) in partnership with 
a global development agency. When a project coordinator discovered that 
a group of young men had been using the computers in the info kiosk to 
use software for activities related to a fan club devoted to a film star, the 
kiosk was closed for a few days. If the young men could not understand 
that these kiosks were for their munnetram (progress) and valarchi (growth 
or development), the kiosk would be shut down permanently and set up in 
a neighboring village where people understood and appreciated its value. 
From the perspective of the predominantly urban and middle- class profes-
sionals overseeing this development project as well as the leaders of the 
village panchayat (local council), watching films and toying around with 
Microsoft Paint to design a fan club poster were activities to be frowned 
upon and disciplined.5
Looking back now, we are struck by the fact that academics and policy 
makers in ICTD circles during the late 1990s and early 2000s could not 
anticipate that their particular desires and anxieties about the digital divide 
would be rendered quaint in less than a decade.6 In 2002, public telephone 
booths were the primary means of long- distance communication. By 2004, 
when one of us returned to Tamilnadu for a second round of field research, 
portents of the mobile phone transforming the communication landscape 
were there for all to see. Project managers and kiosk operators had begun 
communicating predominantly via SMS, and conversations with young 
men at info kiosks revolved around casting votes for contestants on this 
or that reality TV program. Investments in mobile network infrastructure, 
new and inexpensive feature phones, and an increasingly competitive tele-
communications sector had made mobile communication accessible for a 
growing proportion of people in semirural areas and, in the process, en-
sured that the development- oriented info kiosk and other such ICTD in-
terventions were no longer the only point of entry into the digital world.
If we step out of the development communication frame, we can also 
detect the outlines of a history of user practices that have creatively negoti-
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ated technological, financial, and sociocultural constraints and affordances 
that every platform— from USENET newsgroups, chat portals, and SMS 
to blogging services, social networking sites, and smartphone- oriented 
instant messengers— necessarily arrives with.7 Indeed, most online plat-
forms have been sites where everyday uses and creative expressions have, at 
times, intersected with and reshaped the political in new and unpredictable 
ways. The 2007 lawyers’ strike in Pakistan, the anticorruption movement 
in India in 2011– 12, the Shahbag protests in Bangladesh in 2013, and the 
mobilization of anti- Muslim and anti- Tamil sentiment in Sri Lanka over 
the past decade are but the most prominent and recent instances when the 
defining role of digital and mobile media technologies and practices in the 
political domain have become apparent.
While certainly limited in both historical and geographic scope, any 
such attempt at outlining trajectories of digital infrastructures, platforms, 
and their role in shaping economies, polities, and cultures does help us 
reflect on the incredible pace of change that marks the digital and more 
generally, all media, in regions like South Asia. But more importantly, such 
accounts suggest that even as we acknowledge the newness that is strik-
ing and worth careful study, we need to move away from well- worn nar-
ratives of speed and time— of Asian, African, or Latin American societies 
“catching up” to the developed West or leapfrogging the industrial era to 
join the digital present. The contributions in this book all underscore the 
importance of situating ourselves in particular places and times as a way to 
escape the dominant scholarly and popular tendency to cast the digital out-
side the North Atlantic region as elsewhere and elsewhen: that is, outside 
the proper and well- worn paths of technological development. For this is 
where we inevitably end up when we begin with well- intentioned attempts 
to internationalize Internet studies and pay attention to strikingly different 
trajectories of the Internet and, more generally, digital media in the non- 
Western world.
To be sure, we do not question the importance of attending to the impli-
cations of the Internet no longer being a predominantly English- speaking 
technoscape. Goggin and McLelland (2009) are right to argue that despite 
the global diffusion of the Internet, we are yet to “systematically chart what 
is now most salient and significant about the Internet: its great cultural and 
linguistic variety” (5). However, this call for internationalization is a famil-
iar one to media scholars who have struggled against the methodological 
nationalism that has haunted film and television studies and is now cast-
ing a shadow in the emergent domain of digital studies as well. As Lotte 
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Hoek’s work on South Asian film cultures so powerfully demonstrates, 
“The shared historical roots, institutional beginnings, aesthetic vocabular-
ies, technological preferences, and competitive forces of South Asia” all 
reveal the limits and dangers of relying on the nation- state as a container 
(2013, 8). If our efforts to internationalize digital studies always begin out-
side the Anglophone West, we will have little choice but to reproduce what 
Anita Chan (2013) calls “digital universalism,” an imaginary that positions 
elite tech centers (Silicon Valley) and Western Anglophone cultures as the 
purveyors of digital futures that the rest of the world will, in the fullness of 
time, merely imitate and adapt.8
So instead of offering up an account of difference from one region of 
the world, our goal here is to understand the ongoing digitalization of me-
dia, communication, and culture in South Asia as part and parcel of global 
transformations. We take our cue from Kavita Philip (2016, 276) who has 
argued eloquently for moving away from notions of “core and periphery, 
originality and diffusion” and to better understand the “heterogeneous 
temporal and transnational dynamics” that shape contemporary tech cul-
tures. What, then, do we stand to gain by positioning the “digital” between 
two powerful keywords— “global” and “culture”— that have animated the 
study of media in different disciplines?
Situating Digital Cultures: A Global and Intermedia Framework
First, a focus on global interconnections allows us to acknowledge and ac-
count for digital media as having emerged from and as part of processes 
of economic and cultural globalization that have unfolded since the late 
1970s.9 We are less concerned about defining limits on what constitutes the 
“digital” than with insisting on an implicit recognition that digital media 
anywhere in the world are caught up in a world- historical process in which 
social, cultural, and economic exchanges are transnational, multidirectional, 
and driven by a multipolar and predominantly capitalist media system.
The work that media scholars have done in integrating insights from 
political economy, cultural geography, and cultural studies to understand 
the complex spatial dynamics of media production and circulation dur-
ing the global turn of the 1980s and ‘90s thus remains pertinent to the 
study of digital formations (Curtin 2003; Govil 2009; Massey 1994; Sassen 
2002). By the early 1990s, when the multinodal media world that we are 
familiar with today was beginning to take shape, David Morley and Kevin 
Robins argued that a “social theory that is informed by the geographi-
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cal imagination” (1995, 6) was crucial to understanding changes in media 
and communication. Surveying the political and economic transformations 
that had transformed national economies across the world since the late 
1970s, they focused in particular on the increasingly complex spatial rela-
tions that the mobility of capital had engendered as the “essential context 
for understanding the nature and significance of developments in the me-
dia industries” (6).
This perspective helps us see that the spatial coordinates of the digi-
tal in a particular place in the world will always exceed the boundaries of 
specific cities, regions, or nations. In fact, it would be ludicrous to examine 
the formation and global impact of Silicon Valley by remaining within the 
boundaries of the United States. After all, San Francisco’s emergence as a 
global tech hub cannot be grasped without mapping its connections with 
other nodes of finance, technology, and human capital such as Bangalore, 
Shenzen, and Accra (Avle 2014). At the same time, there can be no doubt 
that digital media are increasingly central to the production of a meaning-
ful sense of cultural belonging and locality for people the world over. Un-
derstanding the dynamics of digital cultures, then, calls for a renewed focus 
on the changing relations between economy, culture, and space without 
privileging the national as the dominant, pregiven, and uniformly imagined 
framework and scale of analysis, while remaining attentive to the creative 
ways in which nation- states have exerted control over digital infrastruc-
tures, platforms, and users.10
Second, a global and cultural perspective foregrounds the fact that digi-
tal cultures are shaped by distinct and at times disjunct temporalities within 
the same nation- space (Appadurai 2000). It is worth reminding ourselves 
that the digital turn during the late 1990s and early 2000s was defined as 
much by the ups and downs of venture capital backed dot- com econo-
mies in cities like Mumbai and Bangalore in India as by ICTD projects 
bankrolled by organizations including the World Bank and the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development. An emphasis on 
the temporal dimensions of technological and institutional change assumes 
even greater importance in the context of postcolonial media cultures 
given that at a quite basic level, the digital cannot be seen as neatly follow-
ing on after broadcasting, film, and television and video cultures. As Sunda-
ram (2013, 12) points out, the 1980s and 1990s in India were marked by a 
“frenetic media multiplicity” when cassette culture, color television, VCRs, 
cable and satellite broadcasting, and the Internet all arrived with hardly any 
temporal gaps. The story unfolds along similar lines in Pakistan as well. In 
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a richly detailed account of new television genres and their impact on po-
litical culture, Hashmi (2012) recounts that in less than a decade after the 
ban on private media ownership was lifted in the early 2000s, there were a 
total of 54 satellite channels, more than 50 radio stations, 151 dailies, and 
68 monthly publications in place.
The study of digital cultures on a global scale thus cannot simply adopt 
medium- specific trajectories and their attendant disciplinary boundaries in 
the Anglophone West. The story of digital media in South Asia is, on the 
one hand, about the phenomenal expansion of communication infrastruc-
tures since the mid- 1990s. In the span of a decade, industry discourse in the 
digital and mobile media sectors shifted from educating new consumers 
about devices and data services to a generation “born for the Internet.”11 
And the ups and downs of state censorship and regulation notwithstand-
ing, the digital media economy has become tightly integrated with the ad-
vertising, marketing, print, film, radio, and television industries across the 
subcontinent. Moreover, the interwoven nature of the arrival of different 
technologies and media forms— for instance, the uptake of color television 
and the desktop computer during the mid- 1980s— suggests histories of in-
termediality and media convergence that do not register in mainstream 
scholarship on digital media.
Indeed, this is precisely the historical amnesia that John Caldwell cau-
tioned against when he argued for an approach to digital media and tech-
noculture as “historical formations animated by continuities as much as 
invention” (2000, 3). Caldwell’s historicizing impulse— to situate the social 
and cultural logics of digital media in relation to histories of electronic 
and broadcasting media— is one we embrace here to avoid framing global 
digital cultures within the familiar straitjackets of technological novelties 
that travel the world from some select centers to various peripheries or as 
inaugurating a decisive break from other media forms.
Third, a focus on global cultural dynamics allows us to think more ex-
pansively about digital media as part of the ceaseless remediation of public 
cultures across South Asia and other regions. Instead of relying on a se-
ries of binaries and ruptures— between zeroes and ones, between the digi-
tal study of texts and the study of digital texts, between the Internet and 
other media forms, and so on— a focus on publics and public cultures fore-
grounds processes of mediation and the continual production of a “zone 
of cultural debate” (Appadurai and Breckenridge 1996, 5). In their influ-
ential formulation, Appadurai and Breckenridge pointed out that public 
culture(s) could take many forms and identified cinema, television, sport 
spectatorship, and museums as creating a densely interlinked and interocu-
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lar arena in countries like India. While this critical reworking of “publics,” 
“publicity,” and “public sphere(s)” inspired numerous studies of media cul-
tures in an era of economic liberalization and cultural globalization across 
the postcolonial world (Larkin 2008; Mankekar 1999; Mazzarella 2003), 
we have yet to fully grasp the implications of the current phase of digital 
culture, one marked as much by vibrant participatory cultures as it is by 
state and corporate surveillance and data mining practices.12
As we pointed out earlier, the terms and debates about globalization 
and culture have hardly been resolved. But instead of casting those debates 
as belonging to the quaint world of radio, film, and television, we would do 
well to revisit and recast them. This is not to suggest that we simply revive 
discussions of media imperialism- as- cultural homogenization in the era of 
globally dominant digital platforms (Google, YouTube, Facebook, and so 
forth). And we are not advocating for a return to the at- times celebratory 
accounts of cultural hybridity and cosmopolitanism either. Rather, we need 
sustained engagement with the emergence of new public cultures in rela-
tion to digital media, by taking into account the connections between, say, 
social media and satellite broadcasting that transform the production and 
circulation of news, entertainment, and other media genres (Alexander and 
Aouragh 2014; Sangeet Kumar, this volume).
Such an intermedial approach is crucial for engaging with the implica-
tions of algorithmic processes that now structure the production, circula-
tion, and consumption of various cultural forms (Striphas 2015). But, again, 
instead of approaching the algorithmic production and curation of culture 
as marking a clean break, we would argue that digital media cultures the 
world over are best understood as the product of combustible encounters 
between emergent data- driven and algorithmic processes, on the one hand, 
and representational logics that continue to hold sway in the news and en-
tertainment media industries, on the other. To grasp these dynamics calls 
for engagement with theoretical paradigms and methods that grapple with 
the specificities of digital infrastructures and platforms while continuing to 
draw on media and cultural studies scholarship focused on representation, 
identity, culture, and power.
A Framework for Studying Global Digital Cultures: 
Infrastructures, Platforms, and Publics
Drawing inspiration from Julie D’Acci’s (2004) circuit of media study, a 
heuristic developed for a cultural and materialist analysis of global televi-
sion, we develop an analytic framework here that allows us to study global 
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digital cultures as formed at the intersections of infrastructures, platforms, 
and publics. Of course, it is conceptually daunting to draw neat boundaries 
around a specific media infrastructure, platform, or a particular formation 
of a public. And although all the authors focus on a specific infrastruc-
tural dimension (for example, the digitalization of Indian television) or 
the operations of a particular platform company (Tinder, for instance), the 
analyses reveal how digital infrastructures and platforms evolve in complex 
interaction with other media ecologies, and how publics and politics are 
shaped by these changes. More broadly, we approach the three organizing 
concepts as pointing to a set of porous and interlinked sites, and suggest 
that they are best understood by taking an integrated, conjunctural ap-
proach that accounts for the economic, political, and sociocultural forces 
at work in each site. In what follows, we engage with recent scholarship on 
media infrastructures, platforms, and mediated publics before providing an 
overview of the book.
Infrastructures
“Which developing nations have interesting tech stories at the moment?” 
In the summer of 2017, a podcaster posed this question on Hacker News, a 
news aggregation website focused on digital technology and entrepreneur-
ship. The most upvoted response was titled “India | Telecom | 110M sub-
scribers on- boarded in 100 days” (erbdex 2017). The user in this case was 
referring to Reliance Jio, an Indian mobile network operator that launched 
4G services in September 2016 and claimed to have orchestrated the fastest 
ramp- up by any mobile network operator anywhere in the world, with 16 
million new subscribers added within the first month (Indian Express 2016).
In what was subsequently termed by the press as a “data war” (Business 
Standard India 2017), Jio’s entry into the telecom market was marked by 
the slashing of prices and an explosive rise in data consumption.13 The re-
sponse on Hacker News summarized some of these record- breaking devel-
opments and ended with yet another stunning claim— “this infrastructure 
[emphasis ours] as the physical layer coupled with the fact that India has 
40% YoY14 growth rate in Internet penetration . . . has opened up a fintech 
opportunity in a $50B market that BCG15 and Google estimate . . . to be 
in the tune of $500B+ by 2020” (erbdex 2017). The language of layers and 
market opportunities animating such responses point to the centrality of 
digital media infrastructures in shaping new imaginaries of development, 
progress, and economic growth.
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The question of media infrastructures that undergird digital cul-
tures, however, has not received the kind of scholarly attention accorded 
to audiences, films and television programs, industries and institutions, 
and even policy and regulation. Even in non- Western contexts, where 
infrastructure(s) are marked by their hypervisibility, scholars have tended 
to ignore the profound impact that a whole range of communication 
infrastructures— towers, cables and wires, devices, repair practices,16 and so 
on— has had on processes of mediation. In focusing on infrastructures as key 
sites for understanding global digital cultures, this book joins the recent 
infrastructural turn in media studies and other cognate disciplines includ-
ing science and technology studies, anthropology, and critical information 
studies (Parks and Starosielski 2015; Larkin 2008; Peters 2015; Graham 
and Marvin 2001).
Following Larkin (2013, 328), who understands infrastructure as “built 
networks that facilitate the flow of goods, people, or ideas and allow for their 
exchange over space,” the chapters in this book foreground the imaginaries 
and contingencies that digital infrastructures unleash as they become a part 
of everyday life in South Asia. Infrastructures are composed of both techni-
cal, material things (e.g., mobile phones, SD [Secure Digital] cards, set top 
boxes, satellites) and the “soft” cultural practices that shape the formation 
of social collectivities and the circulation of media objects, ideas and so 
on. Further, where digital media in South Asia is concerned, we are yet to 
fully grasp their historicity in terms of postcolonial states’ infrastructural 
dispositions, the aesthetic and affective power that infrastructures wield in 
public culture (e.g., dams, highways, cinema halls, cell phone towers), and, 
crucially, the layering and convergences of different media infrastructures. 
Indeed, once we look past the technical and systems- level aspects of infra-
structures, it becomes clear that grasping the emergence of digital media 
as infrastructural to contemporary social, cultural, political, and economic 
worlds calls for paying attention to the role of imagination— the fantasies, 
desires, and anxieties about the present and future that provoke, as Larkin 
puts it, “such deep affectual commitments, particularly, but not only, in 
developing societies” (2013, 332).
We cannot do justice here to the rich scholarship on infrastructures 
and work through ideas of scale, relationality, affect, and other issues that 
Parks and Starosielski (2015) and others have elaborated as critical for 
understanding media infrastructures in particular. However, approaching 
the Internet as an infrastructure (Sandvig 2013) encourages us to take into 
account its built and constructed nature, the ongoing environmental im-
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pacts including everything from devices to cloud servers (Hogan 2015), 
its political potentials (Aouragh and Chakravartty 2016), and, of course, 
the manifold ways that identity work (along caste and gendered lines, for 
example) now happens (Gray 2009; Brock 2012; Nakamura 2002).
Building on this scholarship and beginning with the understanding that 
global digital cultures are structured by profoundly uneven power rela-
tions, the chapters in this book align with the conceptual shift from infra-
structure to infrastructuring that Niewöhner (2015) has proposed. What 
this allows us to do is focus on the work of producing, maintaining, re-
pairing, and reusing digital infrastructures as an ongoing and continual 
assembling of technologies, business logics, organizational structures, state 
practices, and crucially, competing imaginaries. For our purposes, this con-
ceptual and methodological shift enables us to situate digital infrastruc-
tures in relation to a longer history of the production of techno- citizens, 
particularly state- run media projects across the subcontinent (Abraham 
and Rajadhyaksha 2015; Arora and Arnaudo, this volume).17 Further, infra-
structuring highlights the challenges of drawing clear conceptual bound-
aries around a particular media infrastructure. Intersections with other 
media forms and systems are crucial as the formation of public cultures 
cannot be understood without carefully tracing the ways in which existing 
media infrastructures and digital systems are entwined. For instance, the 
history of media practices involving videocassette recorders (VCRs) and 
color televisions in the subcontinent is one that involves tapes spooled with 
ballpoint pens as much as 8- bit cartridges and “video” computers.18
Finally, a focus on infrastructuring as an ongoing process helps us explore 
how a range of platforms are mobilized in specific instances of political 
work and, in some contexts, begin to acquire the veneer of infrastructures 
themselves (Plantin et al. 2018). From the perspective of nation- states, 
infrastructuring is as much about enabling and sanctioning some perfor-
mances of citizenship (e.g., getting a biometric identity card for yourself) 
as it is about actively disconnecting entire regions from global Internet and 
mobile infrastructures (for instance, in the recent spate of media blackouts 
in Kashmir).19
Platforms
That a handful of digital platforms have become gateways to everyday so-
cial life and to the worlds of commerce and politics was the animating con-
cern for José Van Dijck’s keynote address at the annual conference of the 
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Association of Internet Researchers in 2016. Building on Gillespie’s (2010) 
foundational work on the politics of platforms, Van Dijck (2016) raised the 
possibility of developing and sustaining public values in platform societies, 
where public expression is increasingly hosted and organized by digital 
intermediaries. Given the influence that platforms like Google, Facebook, 
Twitter, and Amazon now wield on a global stage, Van Dijck’s framing of 
digital platforms as public goods marked an important addition to debates 
on “platform capitalism” (Srnicek 2016) and “platform imperialism” (Jin 
2013). While such attempts to outline the role of technology companies 
and digital intermediaries as global economic actors in capitalist modes 
of production are valuable, they seldom allow for granular, experiential 
engagement with state, industry, and user practices coalescing on these 
platforms.
In fact, as Plantin et al. (2018) point out, media scholars’ early interest 
in digital platforms emerged in part from what they afforded user com-
munities in terms of connection, creativity, customization, and exchange, 
usually evidenced through the rise of “Web 2.0” in the mid- 2000s. The 
excitement around these possibilities was tempered by calls to pay atten-
tion to the political economy of these platforms, that is, their ability to 
profit from vast quantities of data generated through their use, and their 
increasing influence in determining and shaping legitimate use. Van Dijck 
and Poell (2015) even assert that the reshaping of public and private com-
munications by social media platforms’ commercial imperatives amounts 
to a transformation of the political economy of the media landscape. But 
even a sweeping definition of political economy, as the “study of control 
and survival in social life” (Mosco 2009, 24– 25), does not make space for 
the full range of moral and cultural resources mobilized on and by these 
digital platforms every day.
This is further complicated by the tensions between studying platforms 
as computational systems designed and controlled by a few and approaching 
them as bridges between independently developed and maintained com-
munities of practice. As Brock (forthcoming 2019) argues, critical political 
economy scholars attempt to account for some of the possibilities that lie at 
these intersections but continue to undervalue the linkages between desire 
and user practice. Drawing on Jean- François Lyotard, he adopts a libidinal 
economy approach, urging scholars interested in digital culture to think 
about jouissance as the enjoyment of use and contending that the libidi-
nal energies accrued through use- as- “play” drive the operations of digital 
media platforms. These different approaches to studying digital platforms, 
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their uses, their maintenance, and their influence, however, are united in 
their focus on practices by various actors, indexing dynamic webs of histori-
cal, cultural, political, socio- technical, and commercial concerns.
If, following Uricchio (2003), we approach media as cultural practices 
that envelop technologies, texts, and institutions, then the questions about 
public values and social good in the age of Google and Facebook must be 
framed in relation to the affordances of networked media platforms and 
what states, corporations, and users actually do with them. Further, re-
centering enduring concerns like localization in computational platforms 
reveals the tensions between the “global” and the “local,” and how these 
tensions continue to be negotiated by policy makers, industry actors, and 
users across the world on a day- to- day basis.
As we contend with platforms moving from one cultural and industrial 
context to another, Gillespie’s (2010) approach to understanding platforms 
as being composed of four interlinked semantic categories— architectural, 
computational, figurative, and political— is useful to understanding tech-
nological considerations and processes of localization. In this regard, our 
understanding of localization, hybridity, and the circulation of formats in 
relation to film and television is a helpful basis (Kraidy 2005; Kumar 2005; 
Shahaf 2014; Waisbord 2004). Scholarship on MTV’s hybrid avatars across 
the world has shown that localization is a far more complex process in-
volving cultural translations and exchanges that can at times be politically 
fraught (Fung 2006; Cullity 2002). These accounts also foreground how 
localization is a multiscalar process whereby shifts in industrial and mana-
gerial logics (for instance, producing content locally) go hand in hand with 
highly charged representational moves that build on and often challenge 
dominant norms, values, and aspirations in relation to class, caste, gender, 
and sexuality (Kumar and Curtin 2002; Mankekar 2004). Thinking about 
localization would allow us to understand, for instance, the cultural shifts 
that Tinder as a “dating” app needs to straddle in the Indian market (see 
Das, this volume) or how Facebook becomes shorthand for the Internet 
at large in Myanmar (see Arnaudo, this volume). Indeed, when assessed in 
relation to this longer media and cultural history, it is evident that platform 
localization cannot be merely about local language implementation, sub-
titling, or technological tweaks that respond to concerns like data speeds 
and cost.
YouTube’s trajectory in Pakistan— from its entry as a global platform in 
2006, its censorship and outright ban in 2008, the protracted civil society 
struggle, and, finally, the lifting of the ban after the launch of a local version 
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in 2016— offers an instructive case in platform localization that has global 
effects. Following the republication of caricatures of the Prophet Muham-
mad and the reproduction of purportedly non- Islamic content on YouTube 
in 2008, the Pakistani state ordered local Internet providers to block access 
to the platform, with a configuration error then shutting off the site to us-
ers across the world for a couple of hours.
Such moments of breakage reiterate how a collection of regional In-
ternets come together to support the discursive and socio- technical ar-
rangement of the Internet as a global network. Digital intermediaries like 
YouTube are increasingly central to scholarly efforts to read the “coming 
together” of such regional webs rather than the “taking apart” of a global 
monolithic network of networks. A culturally grounded approach is cru-
cial if we are to ensure that the study of digital media remains alive to 
regional characteristics and histories while being responsive to transna-
tional exchanges and relays (Venegas 2009). Further, thinking through the 
lens of platform localization nuances understandings of the enmeshing of 
algorithmic and representational politics, and their volatile and uncertain 
implications.
For instance, the lack of a localized YouTube implementation (and con-
sequently, the lack of control experienced by the state in its efforts to moni-
tor and moderate content) was repeatedly mobilized as the reason for the 
blanket ban on the platform in Pakistan. The tensions between the state’s 
impulse to censor content that it deemed blasphemous and Pakistani civil 
society’s opposition to such heavy- handed control of digital and news me-
dia then played out through persistent calls to reinstate platform access. 
A key example here is #KholoBC (kholo meaning “open” and BC being 
an acronym for an expletive), a campaign opposing state censorship and 
content regulation on the Internet. Sparked by a “viral” rap song featuring 
comedian Ali Gul Pir and rapper Adil Omar, #KholoBC indexed a range of 
discontents about the limiting of the freedom of expression in Pakistan us-
ing religion and national security as smokescreens, culminating in a call to 
action specifically focused on removing the YouTube ban.20 #KholoBC also 
involved a video shot on the streets of Karachi featuring a person wearing 
a YouTube- branded cube walking the streets holding a sign reading “hug 
me if you want me back.” Men and women are shown approaching the 
friendly cube for hugs, as cries of “I love YouTube” and “God, please open 
YouTube” punctuate the soundtrack.
The routinization of practices that come to define digital media plat-
forms and the sociality that sometimes exceed the platform and spill over 
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into public life are, in the first instance, carefully engineered. The thor-
oughgoing “datafication” and “commodification” of every social interac-
tion we have online is undoubtedly a concern that states and various civil 
society groups worldwide are grappling with. But as the chapters in this 
book show, the “coded structures” (Van Dijck 2013) that shape our interac-
tions are more than just technical and commercial ones. Moreover, when 
we situate digital platforms within a broader media matrix in regions like 
South Asia and the ongoing and contested blurring of boundaries between 
personal, public, and private realms, the question of how and when publics 
cohere cannot be answered by focusing solely on one specific platform and 
its technological affordances. Rather, examining political cultures marked 
by networked and mobile publics that shift shape as events unfold involves 
taking into account processes of media convergence and tracing how par-
ticular artifacts (e.g. GIFs, memes, and sound bites), ideas, and discourses 
move across media platforms, gather publics, and mediate the political.
Publics
No account of public political discourse in contemporary South Asia is 
possible or complete without accounting for the role of digital media and 
processes of media convergence. Since the mid- 2000s, scholars in mul-
tiple disciplines have focused on the many astonishing instances of digitally 
mediated activism around the world, asking what constitutes meaningful 
participation (Papacharissi 2014; Jenkins 2006; Postill 2014; Yang 2009; 
Qiu 2014; Kraidy and Mourad 2010; Zayani 2015). Mapping the world 
of networks, hashtags, memes, sonic cues, and their complex circulation 
across media systems, this scholarship has been valuable for understanding 
new forms of mediation that now lie at the center of political life.
Of course, the current phase of social media– fueled political participa-
tion is not without precedent. E- mail listservs and bulletin boards were 
foundational to the formation of transnational “cyberpublics” during the 
1990s that intersected with various social and political movements in South 
Asia including the right- wing Hindutva movement (Rai 1995), the for-
mation of new feminist and queer collectives, and environmental justice 
groups (Gajjala and Gajjala 2008; Shahani 2008). What is clear now, how-
ever, is that the qualifier “cyber” no longer seems necessary to understand 
the role of digital media in shaping the formation of publics around various 
issues. That said, in every instance of popular participation that intersects 
with and spills over into the political, popular, and academic discourse ends 
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up focusing on the strictly political dimensions and the implications that 
such moments and zones of participation hold for our understanding of the 
tenets of normative political theory.21
Departing from the well- worn tradition of appraising whether this 
or that communication platform is conducive to activities that fit within 
norms of rational discourse in public domains, the chapters in this book 
probe how digital media use on a routine, daily basis might help us discern 
new imaginations of the “political” that are emerging in South Asia and 
across the world.22 It is only when we comprehend how digital media use 
and everyday life are braided together that we can meaningfully pose ques-
tions about political impact and, in the process, develop more complex and 
textured accounts of publics that cohere in and through the digital. Con-
sider, if only briefly for now, two events that unfolded in parts of South Asia 
that have been roiled by political conflict for well over three decades now.
In early 2016, fears of ethnic tension arose once again in Sri Lanka 
as graffiti marked the walls and gates of some Muslim- owned homes in 
Negugoda, a densely populated suburb of Colombo. The words “Sinha 
Le” (“lion’s blood”) were spray- painted in Sinhalese, as a sign of Sinhala 
Buddhist dominance in the island nation. This was not the first time that 
Sinha Le had found its ways into the streets of the Sri Lankan capital. A 
more stylized logo, featuring the sword- bearing lion from the national flag 
and the word le colored red to denote blood, had already started appear-
ing in stickers on buses and motorcycles (including police motorcycles). 
Photos of the stickers circulated on social media, with some Sinhala Bud-
dhist youth even drawing the symbol on their arms and posting selfies on 
platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. As civil society groups 
expressed concern about the campaign indexing intimidation of and in-
tolerance toward ethnic and religious minorities in Sri Lanka, mainstream 
news media outlets continued to track its rapidly growing popularity and 
its links to the efforts of ultranationalist groups like the Bodu Bala Sena. 
When Sinha Le is situated amid long- standing concerns around majoritar-
ian angst, perceived dispossession, and ethnic purity, its global resonance 
becomes immediately apparent. But in tracing the circulation of the logo 
on digital media and tracking how it gets embodied and integrated into the 
built environment, it is possible to see how ideas like Sinha Le enter digital 
culture, gather publics, and transmute the terms of politics.
For a different and fleetingly hopeful imagination of the political, con-
sider the events surrounding the third season of the reality television pro-
gram Indian Idol. In September 2007, as the contest reached the final stages, 
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news reports began focusing attention on how people in the northeast In-
dian state of Meghalaya had cast aside decades- old separatist identities to 
mobilize support for finalist Amit Paul. While some fans set up websites 
and blogs to generate interest and support from the rest of the country and 
the diaspora, others formed a fan club and facilitated efforts by a range of 
groups and organizations to sponsor and manage public call offices (PCOs) 
in different parts of Meghalaya, distribute prepaid mobile phone cards, and 
set up landline voting booths. Recognizing the ways in which these activi-
ties were beginning to transcend long- standing ethnic, religious, linguistic, 
and spatial boundaries, state legislators and other politicians soon joined 
the effort to garner votes for Amit Paul, with the chief minister D. D. La-
pang declaring Amit Paul to be Meghalaya’s “brand Ambassador for peace, 
communal harmony and excellence.” It seemed that this campaign around 
a reality television program could set the stage for a remarkable refashion-
ing of the sociocultural and political terrain in Meghalaya.
In both these instances, focusing on the explicitly political was under-
standable given the intensity and seemingly intractable nature of ethnic 
conflicts in these parts of the world. However, instead of evaluating these 
kinds of mobilization solely through the question of “effects,” we could ask: 
What happens when such phases of participation fade away? What are the 
cultural and political implications of zones of participation that last a few 
weeks or months at best? The answers are more likely to be found in the 
terrain of daily life, which, in turn, forces us to rethink our understanding 
of “public” and “public life” in ways that are not beholden to Habermasian 
ideals (see Hashmi, Mankekar and Carlan, in this volume). Avoiding the 
theoretical impulse to explain such moments of participatory culture solely 
in relation to the realm of formal politics is crucial if we are to understand 
why and how the everyday- ness of watching a reality TV show and send-
ing a text message or putting a sticker on a motorcycle and circulating that 
image via Instagram becomes deeply meaningful.
Without a doubt, the question of digital platforms’ democratic and de-
motic aspects— the ongoing debate over the extent to which digital plat-
forms shape news and information flows (e.g., rumors, fake news)— is a 
crucial one. We know that such moments of participation are never en-
tirely autonomous from the interests of the state, media corporations, and 
various religious, political, and civil society groups with their own vested 
interests. What such cases suggest is the potential for quotidian digital me-
dia use to move beyond a particular media event or location into other 
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times and spaces to generate, in the process, an altogether new kind of 
public that does intersect with broader civic and political issues and move-
ments. For it is worth keeping in mind that the world of “public life” is not 
limited to questions of citizenship or civic engagement but, in fact, can be 
better understood through the lens of sociability, which suggests not just 
willingness to talk and engage with others but also the desire for shared ex-
periences (Barker 2008; Weintraub and Kumar 1997). Spaces of everyday 
interaction such as the street corner, balconies and verandahs, the public 
phone booth, the cybercafé, and, now, WhatsApp and Facebook groups 
have been, as Shanti Kumar (2010, 23) points out, “spaces of sociability that 
are neither public nor private in the liberal- economic sense of state versus 
market forces, or in the civic sense of communitarian responsibilities and 
citizenship, but constitutes the heart of public life” across South Asia.
Progressive ideals and expectations about participatory culture(s) en-
couraging and informing civic/political engagement in conflict- ridden sit-
uations are well and good, but only if they are grounded in an understand-
ing of and deep appreciation for what an immense challenge it is to create 
and sustain spaces of sociability. Pakistani activist Sabeen Mahmud fought 
to create precisely this sort of community space when she started The Sec-
ond Floor, a coffee shop in Karachi that also doubled up as a discussion 
forum for activists, artists, and academics. In April 2015, when a prominent 
university canceled an event titled “Unsilencing Balochistan,” citing pres-
sure from the government, Mahmud invited many of the same speakers, 
largely Baloch activists, to The Second Floor (or T2F). As the discussion 
about the “disappearing” of thousands of Baloch nationalists wrapped up 
with a question- and- answer session, Mahmud thanked everyone and left 
T2F in her car, only to be shot dead soon after by armed motorcyclists at 
a traffic signal.
In the weeks that followed, global news media outlets carried multiple 
stories about the threat to free speech in Pakistan and Mahmud’s role in 
fighting for accountability, pluralism, and secularism. Tributes flowing in 
from activists and journalists touched upon these achievements, but also 
thanked her for imagining T2F as a space to conduct hackathons, organize 
film screenings, discuss poetry, and have conversations about the growing 
centrality of digital media in Pakistani culture and politics. One of Mahmud’s 
greatest contributions, it appeared, was to have created a space for sociabil-
ity that wove the digital into Karachi’s urban culture and, in the process, 
imagined new relationships between media, culture, and the political.
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Scope of the Book
Global Digital Cultures is organized into three parts. The first section joins 
a broader debate on the emergence of media infrastructures as key sites for 
the exercise of state and corporate power, the production of citizenship in 
a digital era, and a new kind of technopolitics that users are increasingly 
embroiled in whether or not they like it. In doing so, these essays also focus 
on the link between infrastructures and imaginaries, and explore how far- 
reaching infrastructural changes hinge on cultural mediations of techno-
logical and institutional shifts.
State- sponsored identity projects— be it Aadhaar in India or the Na-
tional Database and Registration Authority in Pakistan— are arguably the 
best sites from which to begin exploring how the promises of big data are 
being mobilized to design new information infrastructures that fundamen-
tally alter state- market– civil society relations. Payal Arora’s chapter in this 
section thus explores the biometric identity project in India by first situat-
ing it in relation to colonial histories of information gathering and surveil-
lance as well as caste and communal dynamics that have shaped the state’s 
approach to governance in the postcolonial era. Outlining technological 
shifts beginning in the mid- 2000s, in particular the swift expansion of mo-
bile communication and the convergence of old and new media systems, 
Arora argues that projects like Aadhaar are one part of a larger scale datafi-
cation of political communication including the rapidly evolving landscape 
of broadcast television and the creative data- driven uses of social media 
platforms by politicians.
Arora’s emphasis on media convergence is taken up in next chapter 
in which Shanti Kumar examines the digitalization of television follow-
ing a major policy decision in 2011 that made it mandatory for analog 
cable TV networks to switch over to a new Digital Addressable System by 
2014. Tracking policy and industry discourse surrounding this policy deci-
sion, Kumar shows how digital addressability was offered up as the data- 
oriented solution that would solve the television industry’s long- standing 
woes regarding audience metrics and advertising in particular. Moving past 
well- worn critiques of how such moves only serve to consolidate industry 
power in a capitalist media economy, Kumar situates television’s digital 
transition within the discourse of “Digital India” that has come to define 
the right- wing Bharatiya Janata Party government’s agenda. At a broader 
level, Kumar’s essay reveals the value of bringing a historically grounded 
television studies approach to illuminate the workings of emergent digital 
platforms and their affordances.
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Concerned with the emergence of new technologies, and the many de-
sires, anxieties, and uses that swirl around them, Rahul Mukherjee explores 
the cultural meanings of mobile technology by beginning with mainstream 
advertising and Bollywood films. Through close, thematic readings of 
landmark advertisements and filmic depictions of mobile phone use over 
the course of a decade, Mukherjee outlines how a range of media indus-
try professionals imagined and crafted the very idea of a cellphone “user.” 
Delving into the world of informal and pirate networks, Mukherjee shows 
how vernacular mobile phone use emerges at the intersection of key me-
diating personas (mobile phone shop owners), specific technologies (small 
and portable micro- SD cards), and practices of circulation and sharing that 
remain largely invisible and illegible in digital studies scholarship. Finally, 
Mukherjee explores public controversies stemming from deep- seated anxi-
eties (cellular radiation, for instance) to foreground the “affective encoun-
ters between human bodies and infrastructures” that mark our engagement 
with new communication technologies.
In the final chapter in this section, Daniel Arnaudo offers a critical sur-
vey of the development of digital media in Myanmar and specifically the 
emergence of a networked public sphere in relation to the transition to-
ward a democratic political system. Outlining the control and censorship 
regimes in place for several decades (1961– 2010), this essay identifies the 
formation of the Burmese Internet in exile as having laid the foundation for 
the modern, largely mobile Internet culture that is now in place. Not sur-
prisingly, the development of digital media in contemporary Myanmar is 
symptomatic of wider conflicts that structure political culture, particularly 
along ethnic, religious, and gendered lines. Moreover, the development of 
mobile and digital infrastructures in Myanmar reveals the profoundly un-
equal relations of power that shape digital cultures and, in particular, the 
dominance that platforms like Facebook wield. In a context marked by low 
literacy levels, low levels of ICT use, and poor regulatory oversight, initia-
tives such as Facebook Zero (offered by Telenor starting in 2014), which 
allowed individuals to use Facebook without using their data, result in an 
exceedingly narrow view of being online and indeed, what the Internet is.
The second section of this book thus focuses on the relations between 
digital infrastructures and specific platforms, and in particular the range 
of industry and user practices indexing social, cultural, economic, and po-
litical concerns ranging from intimacy to immigration. The section be-
gins with Vishnupriya Das’s chapter tracing how local and international 
smartphone- based dating apps like TrulyMadly and Tinder mediate pos-
sibilities for intimacy in urban India. Through close readings of texts like 
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brand- sponsored online videos and television commercials, and in- depth 
interviews with industry actors, Das situates the politics of desire and 
discovery— both social and sexual— in notions of “dating” mobilized by 
these platforms. Her work points to the importance of such platforms in 
negotiating the pleasures and anxieties of gendered performances of sexu-
ality and selfhood.
Shruti Vaidya and Kentaro Toyama’s chapter broadens the remit of the 
platform- oriented study of digital media by examining the personaliza-
tion of hearing aids and the everyday experiences of deaf young adults. 
By providing students of a Mumbai- based nonprofit academy with such 
digital devices and encouraging some of them to decorate and personalize 
their devices in collaboration with an artist, Vaidya and Toyama unravel 
how designing for display, instead of designing for discretion, can affect 
one’s relationship with the hearing aid. Their work attempts to remedy the 
omission of day- to- day negotiations with disability as a focus area for those 
interested in the emergence of digital devices as key platforms for self- 
expression and the reinforcement of identity. Joyojeet Pal examines another 
dimension of self- presentation, surveying the use of Twitter as a channel 
for political branding in the case of Indian politician Narendra Modi. Pal 
argues that Modi was able to project himself as a tech- savvy leader and 
signal a careful embrace of modernity through his tweets, thereby wresting 
control of the narrative from mainstream news media outlets. In doing so, 
Pal also draws attention to how platforms such as Twitter help embody no-
tions of entrepreneurial uplift into technoscience- based promises of social 
transformation.
In the final chapter in this section, Sangeet Kumar evaluates the at-
tempts to produce audience interactivity via Twitter on television news 
channels in India and focuses on how networked publics on social media 
platforms can torpedo the goals of institutionally imagined participatory 
viewing. In examining hashtag wars as a terrain of audience engagement 
and discursive struggle, Kumar shows how the immediacy and simultaneity 
afforded by platforms like Twitter can reshape television’s “liveness” and 
speak back to notions of convergence mobilized by media industries.
In the next section on publics, the chapters trace the impact that digital 
media, their complex entanglements with established media systems and, 
crucially, the ongoing blurring of lines between the personal, the private, 
and the public have had on political culture(s) across South Asia. Purnima 
Mankekar and Hannah Carlan’s chapter focuses on convergences between 
digital platforms and other media (television in particular) to analyze how 
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the arrest of a student leader in Delhi contributed to the virulent and 
deeply affective form of nationalism that has come to define Indian public 
culture. Tracing the movement of news, images, and sounds across media 
platforms, they draw attention to the circulation of specific affective re-
sponses (e.g., a set of tweets, a particular newscast) as fueling the broader 
public conversations about national identity. Drawing on a rich body of 
feminist scholarship, Mankekar and Carlan develop a more expansive un-
derstanding of the idea of remediation and show that the convergence of 
old/new media and the intertextualities that shape contemporary public 
cultures the world over lead to a thoroughgoing reconfiguration of Hindu- 
Indian nationalism.
Sahana Udupa’s chapter continues this focus on acrimonious debates 
about nation and national belonging on social media in urban India. De-
fining confrontational verbal cultures as “online nation- talk,” Udupa ar-
gues that such talk contributes to the development of nationalism as an 
exclusivist ideology. Analyzing discursive continuity and disjuncture in the 
nation- talk mobilized by middle- class actors on Twitter around a specific 
hashtag (#ModiInsultsIndia), Udupa shows how self- proclaimed liberals 
and Hindu nationalists make claims about what the nation ought to mean 
and to whom.
Middle- class publics in Pakistan becomes the focus for Mobina Hash-
mi’s chapter in which she examines a range of Pakistani online publics to 
ask how the performance and presentation of Pakistani identities is shaped 
by a negotiation between norms of private and public behavior. Situating 
her analysis of online publics in the historical context of two earlier forms 
of Pakistani media publics— the official state- centric version produced by 
PTV (Pakistan Television Corporation) from the 1960s to the early 1990s, 
and the early years of the postliberalization media explosion— Hashmi 
shows that new online publics are, by contrast, messy and varied. Explor-
ing official websites of television channels such as Aaj TV and Geo News, 
blogs linked with newspapers such as the Friday Times, and amateur videos 
of weddings, dance parties, encounters with sex workers, and a range of 
discussion forums, Hashmi details how these online spaces publicize the 
intimate and private spaces of conversation, opinion, and socializing.
Muhammad Nabil Zuberi develops thematic readings of a set of manip-
ulated images that went “viral” and provoked radically different responses 
during an episode of political violence in Bangladesh in 2013. The focus 
here is on a particular manipulated image of Allama Sayeedi, a charismatic 
Islamic orator and a popular leader sentenced to death by the Bangladeshi 
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government for war crimes committed during 1971. Zuberi explores the 
reasons the image produced such different responses from people who had 
a common history, religion, and nationality, as well as the role that digital 
media played in reconfiguring the boundaries between fact and fiction in 
contemporary political culture.
Finally, Wazhmah Osman explores the circulation of pictures of Afghan 
and Pakistani women in the aftermath of 9/11 and critically evaluates their 
framing as victims and as contentious symbols of nationhood. Through a 
case study of four Af- Pak women activists, all named Malalai, she shows 
how these images are mobilized by local and international power elites 
who often benefit, materially and culturally, from the conflict and instabil-
ity in the region at the expense of human rights.
Conclusion
Since media and communication studies began in the 1970s, its object of 
study has changed in fundamental ways. Media were, at first, thought al-
most wholly within the frame of the nation- state, its national politics and 
culture. Since then, the diffusion of continuing technological innovations, 
driven by the world economy, has changed the media landscape beyond 
recognition, producing the digital and globalized world that we inhabit 
today. Drawing inspiration from Appadurai and Breckenridge’s (1995) 
statement on global modernity, we have worked with the premise that the 
digital is now everywhere, it is simultaneously everywhere, and it is inter-
actively everywhere. But it is not only everywhere, it is also in a series of 
somewheres, and it is through one such somewhere, South Asia, that this 
volume engages with the cultural dimensions of digitalization.
In conversation with recent efforts to grapple with the global character 
of the Internet and the plurality of digital cultures (Goggin and McLelland 
2017), our goal here has been to bring together scholars with a shared inter-
est in the rise of digital and mobile media technologies, the ongoing trans-
formation of established media industries, and emergent forms of digital 
media practice and use that are reconfiguring sociocultural, political, and 
economic terrains across the Indian subcontinent. It goes without saying 
that the media landscape in a region like South Asia is simply too vast and 
diverse for any one book to carefully map.23 Moreover, the India- centricity 
of South Asian studies remains a challenge. However, we do hope that, col-
lectively, the chapters here map considerable new terrain and set the stage 
for more regionally grounded explorations of global digital cultures.
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Notes
 1. See Avle and Lindtner (2016).
 2. According to various reports that track Internet use across the world, South 
Asia accounts for 615 million users. See, for instance, “Internet Usage in Asia” 
(2018). Further, 74 percent of the Internet user population reside in the Global 
South, including Asia (48.7%), Africa (10.9%), Latin America (10.5%), and the 
Middle East (3.9%). Only 26% of the world’s Internet users live in the Global 
North: Europe (17%), North America (8.3%), Oceania (0.7%) (“Internet Users in 
the World” 2018).
 3. See Peters (2016b).
 4. See Breckenridge (2005) for debates on South Africa’s HANIS (Home Af-
fairs National Identification System) Project.
 5. Referring to ICTD projects in India, Mazzarella (2010, 783) argues that 
“although the discourse of development helped to legitimize the Internet as an ‘ap-
propriate technology,’ its emphasis on functional solutions also helped to obscure 
the Internet’s more ambiguous emergent potentials.”
 6. The newer forms of digital inequality unleashed by these transformations, 
however, continue to remain on the research agenda of scholars across disciplines. 
See Robinson et al. (2015).
 7. For pathbreaking work on queer life- worlds in the digital era in Asia, see 
Shahani (2008), Dasgupta (2017), and Yue (2012). Also see Risam (2015) and the 
special issue on ‘Gender, Globalization and the Digital’ in Ada: A Journal of Gender, 
New Media & Technology.
 8. It is becoming increasingly clear that our understanding of digital culture(s) 
in Anglo- American contexts has been structured by the specificities of White tech-
noculture. As Faye Ginsburg (2006) points out in her account of digital media prac-
tices in indigenous communities, “concepts such as the digital age have taken on 
a sense of evolutionary inevitability, thus creating an increasing stratification and 
ethnocentrism in the distribution of certain kinds of media practices, despite prior 
and recent trends to de- Westernize media studies” (129).
 9. For a more detailed account of digital culture emerging as a response to 
the demands of mid- 20th century warfare and Cold War politics, see Gere (2008). 
Elton and Carey (2013) also point out that online services were being imagined in 
several countries besides the United States. Benjamin Peters’s (2016a) rich account 
of the Soviet Union’s plans to build a nationwide computer network also reveals 
the importance of decentering the United States when it comes to writing global 
Internet histories.
 10. In an important study, Wu and Taneja (2016) show that the world’s Internet 
traffic flows have become increasingly “regionalized” rather than tied to Anglo-
phone media capitals and circuits.
 11. See, for instance, this advertisement for MTS, a prominent telecom player 
in multiple national and regional markets: https://www.youtube.com
 12. See Philip (2005). Also see Schwarz and Eckstein (2014) for a wide- ranging 
set of essays on the issue of pirate media cultures and global modernity.
 13. One gigabyte (GB) of high- speed Internet data was made available for as low 
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as 76 cents, making it the world’s cheapest Internet data plan. Consequently, total 
mobile Internet data consumption in the country reportedly skyrocketed from 0.2 
billion GB per month pre- Jio to 1.2 billion GB per month, with Jio subscribers 
alone using up to 1 billion GB (Bhattacharya 2017). This is also said to have led to 
a massive surge in the use of the Internet for video streaming (Akolawala 2017).
 14. Year over year (YOY), in this context, refers to the comparison of Internet 
penetration at one particular time period with that of a similar time period, on an 
annualized basis.
 15. BCG refers to the Boston Consulting Group, a management consulting firm 
with offices worldwide.
 16. For more on cultures of recycling, repair, and reuse, see Sundaram (2010).
 17. For scholarly accounts of state- run media projects, see Roy (2007) on the 
Films Division of India, Mankekar (1999) and Rajagopal (2001) on state- run televi-
sion in India, Hashmi on television in Pakistan (2012), and Abu- Lughod (2004) on 
television and nationhood in Egypt.
 18. Further, given the dominance of textual and visual approaches to under-
standing media cultures, it is hardly surprising that the sonic dimensions of the 
digital turn have received comparatively less attention. We outline the importance 
of bringing a sound studies perspective to South Asian media studies in an essay 
focused on sonic cues and political cultures (Punathambekar and Mohan 2017). 
Also see the Sounding Out blog for a series on gendered soundscapes in South Asia, 
curated by Monika Mehta and Praseeda Gopinath (https://soundstudiesblog.com).
 19. See Rao (2016).
 20. See http://pakistanforall.org for more details on this media campaign.
 21. For an overview of scholarship on publics and politics in relation to the 
digital, see the annotated bibliography on “Networked Publics: Inter- Asian Per-
spectives” by Padma Chirumamilla, available online at http://tvri.ssrc.org-content/
uploads/2016/11/InterAsia_Padma_Chirumamilla_Annotated_Bibliography-CM-
review.pdf
 22. Among the various theoretical frameworks that have been developed to de-
scribe transformations in South Asian public culture, and particularly where ongo-
ing changes in media and communications are concerned, perhaps the most influ-
ential one has been Appadurai and Breckenridge’s statement on public culture in 
India (1995). There is now a rich body of scholarship that has built on critiques of 
Habermas’s original theorization of the public sphere (see, for example, Warner 
2005), particularly in relation to mediated public cultures in a range of postcolonial 
societies. It is beyond the scope of this introduction to review the scholarship on 
media, publics, and politics in the South Asian context, but our contributors draw 
on a range of work in this tradition in mapping how digitization poses new chal-
lenges to this area of study (Mankekar 1999; Cody 2011; Rajagopal 2009).
 23. Given that the foundation of “South Asian” media studies is largely English 
and Hindi- language centric film and television in India and the Indian diaspora in 
the United Kingdom and North America, if all we produce are Indian accounts of 
the digital in South Asia, we will miss making connections across places and spaces 
that do not feature prominently in contemporary geopolitical maps. We regard 
this anthology as part of wider efforts to think regionally. See, for instance, Banaji 
(2011). Further, there have been a number of interventions in the past two decades 
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in the humanities and the social sciences to take seriously historical networks of 
exchange that do not recenter North Atlantic perspectives. One such influential 
formation is the Inter- Asia framework, which approaches Asia as a dynamic and 
interconnected formation spanning Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, South-
east Asia, the Middle East (including Turkey), and Russia. See, for instance, Kuan 
Hsing- Chen’s Trajectories: Inter- Asia Culture Studies and various projects under the 
InterAsia program of the Social Science Research Council (https://www.ssrc.org). 
For a detailed consideration of the media studies– area studies impasse in relation to 
the study of digital cultures, see Lamarre (2017). Also see Shome and Hegde (2002) 
on the importance of acknowledging that we all write from somewhere as a way to 
decenter Anglo- American scholarship.
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Politics of Algorithms, Indian Citizenship,  
and the Colonial Legacy
Payal Arora
In the last decade, much research has focused on the impact of digital me-
dia technologies within the political sphere. Social media is a game changer 
in the way governments engage with their citizens and big data is a key 
instrument in the understanding and the shaping of political audiences. 
Having lived through Barack Obama’s first campaign, the so- called Twit-
ter revolution, and Trump’s Facebook campaign, few people today would 
question that data politics is the new norm. Datafication has moved from 
data gathering to strategic filtering and segmenting, relating political clus-
ters to social issues (Burns 2015). However, much of this research is con-
centrated on advanced industrialized countries, negating the global South, 
60 percent of whose residents have incomes below the poverty line (Arora 
2016b).
One of the persistent concerns is social inequality, seen as a major hin-
drance to political participation, suppressing the voices of the poor in policy 
making (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). In the last five years, afford-
able mobile technologies and a plethora of prepaid cell phone plans have 
brought much of this citizenry into the digital sphere for the first time. To-
day, even the poor are digitally connected. For instance, in India, 6.5 mil-
lion cell phones are sold every month. Besides mobile phones, the govern-
ment has promoted access to the Internet via its community information 
centers, digitally connecting all of its 600,000 villages (Arora 2016a). These 
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efforts have served as an important digital platform to launch e- governance 
initiatives, connecting citizens to local and national government schemes 
online. Given the failing social systems in such terrain, it is no wonder 
there is much faith in this algorithmic leapfrogging of current bureaucra-
cies, including the conventional mechanisms of political communication.
We need not look further than the ambitious Biometric Identity Proj-
ect in India which provides a unique identification number (UID) to every 
citizen through a consolidation of 1.2 billion of its citizens’ fingerprints, 2.4 
billion iris scans, and 1.2 billion photographs (Sarkar 2014). This project 
has received much media attention, with discourse leaning toward the em-
powerment of the marginalized. R. S. Sharma, secretary of the Department 
of Electronics and Information Technology in India, declared that “digital 
India is not for rich people . . . it is for poor people” (Toness 2014, para. 3). 
Media sources such as the BBC provide further endorsement where “[the 
poor] with no proof to offer of their existence will leapfrog into a national 
online system, another global first, where their identities can be validated 
anytime anywhere in a few seconds” (Rai 2012, para. 2). An expressed vi-
sion by leaders spearheading this initiative is that this project can serve as 
a platform for numerous mobile applications to create transparency, open-
ness, and a two- way communication between political representatives and 
their people. At the time of this writing, the UIDAI project has come un-
der intense criticism from academics, journalists, and civil society groups 
(Abraham and Rajadhyaksha 2015).
While these new events and visions promise a more energized political 
sphere in India, there is still a dearth of scholarship on how big data shapes 
citizenship in the Global South, particularly for those at the margins. To 
gauge the impact of big data within the realm of politics in India, we need 
to attend to the social context within which these technologies are devel-
oped and implemented, and the actors behind the designing and deploying 
of these tools. This chapter argues that we cannot indiscriminately apply 
existing Western data- based frameworks to this emerging political public. 
By embedding the argument in the case study of India and its contem-
porary sociopolitical ecology, several factors come into play. The colonial 
heritage of information infrastructures, the communal and caste politics 
unique to much of the South Asian region impacting the old and new mass 
media systems, and a development legacy of welfare schemes tied to po-
litical group representation must be considered to create a more tailored 
understanding of data politics in this underexamined region.
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Political Audiences in the Big Data Era
Big data has disrupted the traditional conceptualization of political audi-
ences. A popular perspective is that big data fosters new ways of entrench-
ing political group membership through algorithmic clustering. Pariser 
(2011) calls this the “information bubble” or “filter bubble”— a continuous 
exposure to like- minded worldviews envisioned to create a monolithic and 
even more divisive political public. While this concept has captured the 
popular imagination and persisted over a decade, there are surprisingly few 
studies that substantiate this notion with empirical evidence. Few stud-
ies point to how social media disrupts conventional channels of audience 
interaction with political agencies. For instance, Maireder, Weeks, Zúñiga, 
and Schlögl (2017) empirically analyzed the extent to which political actors 
connect with diverse audiences on these digital networks. They found that 
language, geo- identity, and political orientation are key factors in influ-
encing such connective action. Also, nongovernmental organizations and 
activists are more likely to reach diverse audiences as compared to conven-
tional political organizations on digital platforms. However, to date, the 
extent to which the digital sphere deters diverse political networks remains 
understudied.
On the other side of the spectrum is the belief that we are experienc-
ing postmodern politics that is “less centered, less easily contained and 
brokered” (Axford and Huggins 2001, 23; De Mul 2015). This signifies a 
serious shift from modern politics of representation of fixed identities, pri-
marily through political parties, to an era of micropolitics based on issues 
and interests that often transcend traditional social relations. The ability 
of personalization has enabled big data to move beyond the usual suspects 
of sociological construction in examining political audiences: age, location, 
past political affiliation, race, and education. A recent report from Netflix 
on big data analytics of their audiences has a provocative conclusion that 
their usual categories of geography, age, and gender need to be “put in 
the garbage heap” (Morris 2016, para 2). The company found that it was 
far more useful to group people by common taste and that “the variation 
within any population group is much wider than the collective difference 
between any two groups” (para 3).
In other words, broad categories like race or location cannot be reliable 
in assessing audience preferences. The question remains how this applies 
to political audiences and whether conventional divides such as the Global 
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North- South, or the West and the “Rest” are less relevant in this big data 
era. Would marginalized groups across borders share common political 
tendencies and grievances as compared to other groups within their own 
nations? To illustrate, if we look at the hashtag publics of the ‘blacklives-
matter’ twitter campaign, we see global digital flows of engagement and 
empathy between black communities in Baltimore and those in Palestine 
that have been targets of systemic racism (Endong 2018). This creates a 
temporal digital political cluster across borders. Another example is the 
state surveillance systems of welfare mothers in the United States and 
the digital monitoring systems of refugees entering Europe. Both welfare 
mothers and refugees experience and express acute privacy violations that 
can justify a bridging between these two disparate groups. In essence, there 
is more commonality in the struggle for the right to privacy between these 
disadvantaged groups than with populations in their own local confines.
Postmodern politics as such liberates us from the imagined boundaries 
of conventional affiliation, but at a cost. This kind of pluralism can under-
mine chronically marginalized groups that may require continued targeted 
intervention to legitimize their voices. Take caste politics in India. Dalits 
and other lower- caste groups have faced historical and insurmountable 
prejudice compared to other member groups entrenched in poverty. The 
dilemma posed here is to continue to cluster them with other low- income 
groups or to give them special privileges due to historically discriminatory 
practices. These decisions influence how we digitize these publics, con-
solidating their identity online for simplified governance. Another instance 
is the casual usurping of the colonial discourse to describe new forms of 
exploitation such as user- generated “free” labor. This unifying effort is a 
double- edged sword. It can in fact undermine neocolonized subjects that 
have long withstood the brunt of these destructive legacies.
Marginalization and social justice, while neglected in the early days of 
big data, is now gaining significant traction. From obsessing about the size 
of the data, we are moving toward issues of diversity, agency, and inclusion 
through digitization (Taylor 2017). The politics of algorithms is essentially 
the politics of representation. Marginalization is particularly important in 
the policy arena, where political action can be triggered by insights drawn 
from algorithmically mediated data (Samarajiva and Lokanathan 2016). 
People and problems not represented in the data are often neglected. In 
other words, the attention to political causes and groups are becoming 
more contingent on their digital visibility. In India, where the vast majority 
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have only recently gained access to the digital sphere, it begs the question 
of who is representing India’s vast populace via these data- based public 
constructions.
This situation is further inflamed by the emergence of bots, web robots 
that serve as automated scripts to perform repetitive actions that allow for 
an unprecedented degree of synthesis in compiling, sorting, and analyzing 
data on the Internet. In other words, they are “amalgamations of code that 
mimic users and produce content” (Woolley and Howard 2016, para. 1). 
In the political sphere, the rise of political bots has created a new layer of 
computational propaganda on social life, gaining a newfound influence on 
the shaping of public opinion. This has shifted conversations over the last 
two decades about datafication, challenging assumptions of algorithmic 
neutrality and authenticity of citizen representation online.
Prominent scholars such as Helen Nissenbaum have been advocating 
for inscribing values in the design of today’s information infrastructures 
to counteract systemic manipulation and obstruction of universal human 
rights through technical innovations. While today, scholars for the most 
part are on board with the principle of technology embodying values, it 
continues to be tremendously difficult to reify this through the conscious 
engineering of these systems. Take, for instance, feminist bots, a growing 
movement to counter gender bias online in the values in the design field. 
The challenge arises even prior to the technical embedding, as we need to 
decide whose version of feminism gets to be inscribed. By default, West-
ern notions of feminism become the normative value system imposed on 
the rest of the world, creating the unintended marginalization of other 
women’s voices across the borders.
Clearly, there is a disjuncture between intent and practice. In the West, 
big data from poverty mapping is used to heighten the efficiency of ser-
vice delivery to underserved populations. Yet this very information can be 
used against these neglected demographics through “redlining,” the refusal 
by companies to cater to them due to the possibility of losses. Given that 
big data can also map ethnic and racial identity to these geographic areas 
far more precisely than conventional data collection methods, this can be 
deemed unconstitutional. As big data becomes more accurate in identifying 
and discriminating against political audiences, legal systems stand as pro-
tective measures to check such algorithmic discrimination. However, most 
regions of the global South, including India, provide little legal recourse 
to citizens when their data has been compromised or used against them to 
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further alienate them (Arora 2016b). Hence, when constructing political 
audiences today, we need to pay heed to this spectrum of unresolved chal-
lenges to create a more equitable digital political sphere.
Datafication of Politics beyond the West: Factors to Consider
Datafication is defined as “transforming a phenomenon into a quantified 
format that allows it to be measured and analyzed” (Mayer- Schönberger 
and Cukier 2013, 78). Most of the big data tools used today are designed to 
harvest vast amounts of data on each individual, with the implicit assump-
tion of constant connectivity within data rich environments. However, as 
we shift gears to the “data poor” and “dumb phone”’ of the global South, 
we cannot assume that what we scrape from the big data feed in these con-
texts gives us adequate insight into the complex lives of the poor, in this 
case, in India.
The Colonial Heritage of Information Infrastructures, 
Welfare, and Communal Politics
The Biometric Identity Scheme or “Aadhaar” project is popularly framed as 
unprecedented in connecting India’s historically marginalized citizenry to 
the government. Big data is intended to liberate rather than confine. Liber-
ation is from corruption where welfare benefits valued at approximately 60 
billion dollars are siphoned off by middlemen using fake identities, leaving 
the anonymous poor helpless in the face of such acts (Arora 2016b). How-
ever, this apparatus of empowerment is built on information infrastructures 
with a deep colonial lineage. Information and control after all have a long- 
standing relationship (Beniger 2009). During the mid- 19th century, to po-
lice colonies, the British pioneered biometric surveillance through finger-
printing (Thomas 2014). The fear of an uprising was a constant motivator 
to identify and track their “unruly” subjects. To mask its intrusiveness, fin-
gerprints were sold to the public as an efficient way to access services such 
as the pension system. It is not a coincidence that the biometric identity 
project was initiated to track Bangladeshi migrants coming into India, but is 
marketed as an empowering tool for the marginalized majority.
Furthermore, the British colonial administration leveraged the exist-
ing ethnic and caste politics in their colonies including in India through 
their “divide and rule” policy. By creating privileged positions within the 
political structure along lines of caste, they perpetuated and deepened caste 
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divisions that pervaded postindependence. For instance, data on land re-
cords in Karnataka not just captures information about tenancy and the 
type of land titles, but also the age, caste, political registration, and reli-
gion of owners and tenants (Raman 2012). While caste politics continue 
to pervade the Indian political sphere, the power dynamics are shifting 
somewhat. Indian politics is immersed in the game of giving special favors 
to scheduled castes and tribes and “other backward castes” in exchange for 
votes (Sharma 2014). Hence, citizens have a high stake in being digitized 
as one of these special categories. This enables them to maximize state 
benefits such as access to coveted government jobs and university positions 
through the quota systems in place.
The problem with digitizing political audiences in India along lines 
of caste is that it does not take into consideration the dynamism of such 
groupings. For instance, the collective political bargaining of caste groups 
in India typically happens by promising group loyalty and alliances to par-
ticular political parties. However, contrary to conventional assumptions 
of caste groups being divided, the Dalits (the “low caste”) have repeat-
edly partnered with the Brahmins (the “high caste”) to strengthen their 
bargaining position with political parties (Mitra 2015). Hence, intercaste 
hierarchy and evolving political arrangements between caste groups create 
a challenge in the digitization of these group identities and the linkage to 
special state benefits.
Further, current day realities defy conventional notions of caste and class 
as being mutually exclusive. Numerous protests by Jats (a long- privileged 
group of land- owning peasants) have pressurized the Indian government 
to include them in the “Other Backward Caste” category so they can be 
guaranteed university places and government jobs. The Jats have taken to 
the streets in large numbers, causing ongoing social unrest as they find 
themselves excluded and alienated from the growing digital economy in 
India. Another example is the “female Brahmins” as a category— while high 
caste, they are often deeply vulnerable as they are more bounded by social 
rigidities than females of lower castes. Yet, given they are Brahmin, they 
will likely to be demarcated as exempt from the traditionally exploited gen-
der group.
Hence, the digitization of the Indian citizen promises to freeze privilege 
along lines of communal politics strengthened during the British Raj over 
two centuries. In light of this, open government movements and projects 
such as the biometric identity scheme fail to consider the constructed na-
ture of data and the mobility within the caste system. Hence, information 
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justice can be improved by identifying the reproduction of social privilege 
within conventional data sets to prevent its transfer to new forms of data-
fication. In other words, what is required is a “set of moral inquiries that 
can be used to evaluate the justness of data practices, and another exploring 
the practices and structures that a social movement promoting information 
justice might pursue” (Johnson 2014, 266).
Lastly, in this social media era, there is much expectation of political 
audiences being active agents rather than passive consumers of political 
messages. Of course, this is not to imply that just because audiences are 
now participating in the political game, they can thereby affect the political 
process. Contrary to the optimism expressed by the likes of Saskia Sassen 
and Ashis Nandy on grassroots politics radically reconstituting political 
institutions in places like India, a more reserved stance should be taken. 
Datta (2015) argues that big data continues to be in the hands of the Indian 
elite for the most part, and thereby is more likely to serve the interests and 
agendas of this reigning segment. In the context of digitization, the elite 
and upper class and upper castes continue to find ways of manipulating the 
data- based systems to their favor through a combination of political lobby-
ing and pressuring of governments to tailor the biometric machine to the 
needs of the upper classes and castes.
The Old and New Mass Media and Political Ideology
It is well known that mass media is a critical tool for the government to 
communicate with their political audiences. The advantage of social me-
dia, however, is its ability to tailor political messages to diverse audiences 
simultaneously and to track responses and sentiments through big data. 
Given the omnipresence of mobile phones in the Global South including 
in India, one would assume that political communication has shifted from 
the television to the mobile phone and has opened up to diverse political 
views. On the contrary, the “old” media systems continue to exist and even 
thrive as in the case of India. Communal and language politics play a key 
role in the shaping of political communication through Indian media sys-
tems that appear to carry over to the digital sphere.
The Indian broadcasting industry has changed dramatically in the last 
two decades due to the privatization and liberalization policies of their me-
dia systems. Today, the Indian mass media industry comprises 300 tele-
vision channels, reaching 112 million households, including the poorest 
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sections of society (Sharma 2014). Doordarshan, the national television 
network, comes with 22 channels, albeit managed by private companies. 
Given the diversity of language and regions (22 official languages) and a 
plethora of private media actors at play today, the media industry in India 
is unlikely to follow the pathway of convergence as in the United States or 
European markets (Chakravartty and Roy 2013).
Furthermore, the networks, in concert with political parties, have 
launched special channels to propagate particular communal ideologies. 
For instance, the fundamentalist Hindu party Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh (RSS), the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Marxists of Kerala, the 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) of Tamil Nadu, the Congress Party, 
and even the Catholic Church have their own TV channels. Hence, diver-
sity here is not necessarily conducive to sociopolitical inclusion as would 
be commonly perceived. Given that all these networks have a growing and 
competitive online presence, they foster the continuity of political bal-
kanization within the digital media sphere.
While there is no consolidated policy and system of state censorship, 
sedition laws established during British colonialism have experienced a re-
surgence in the last two decades (Kalhan et al. 2006). The British criminal-
ized citizens for speech and public collective organization aimed at dis-
rupting and resisting the established order, which were seen as subversive 
acts as early as 1870. This colonial machinery continues to pervade the 
current Indian constitution and has been used to target individuals who 
have expressed themselves against communal interests, including on social 
media. In particular, “fundamentalist groups (Hindu, Muslim and Chris-
tian) across the country enforce their beliefs and cultural values through 
sheer muscle power. Such groups threaten to disrupt law and order if their 
demands are not met” (Chakravartty and Roy 2013, 82).
In just the first three months of 2016, there were 17 cases of censorship 
in the “old” media system and eight cases of digital censorship on Google, 
Facebook, Instagram and YouTube (Kractivism 2016). For instance, a 
“Pakistan Ki Jai” WhatsApp message expressing sympathy toward Paki-
stan resulted in the jailing of two Mangalore- based students. An Instagram 
picture with the caption “Kashmir hearts beats only for Pakistan” was re-
moved instantly from the site. Another incident involved the blocking of 
Internet services and social media sites in the state of Haryana to deter the 
spread of the Jat community’s protest marches demanding special reserva-
tions within state institutions. Hence, this crafting of media politics along 
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communal, caste, and religious lines gains legitimacy through the revival 
of colonial laws and demonstrates its reach in the digital realm. In other 
words, with social media, communal politics extends to data politics.
Additionally, not all political actors and groups are digital aficionados. 
Certain leading political parties such as the BJP and its politicians, such as 
the current prime minister of India, Narendra Modi, have done better than 
many others in leveraging these digital tools. For instance, Modi, with his 
“Obama style” social media campaigns, broke new ground in the way poli-
tics in India play out, successfully reaching India’s remote and vast political 
audiences. On Twitter, Modi has the largest following among political ac-
tors, even more than any mainstream news media channel or journalist in 
India. With a combination of accessible language, humorous and sarcastic 
jibes at his opponents such as calling Sonia Gandhi “madam” and her son 
“shahzada” (prince) or “Rahul babu” (boy) (Pal 2015,17), and his casual 
selfies with celebrities, he has managed to capture the attention of a vast 
political public.
Moreover, Modi’s humble beginnings as a son of a tea seller gives hope to 
the majority of the Indian citizens who fall within the low- income bracket. 
That being said, it is worth noting that Modi’s first political footing was in 
the right- wing Hindu social organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, 
a fundamentalist wing of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Furthermore, Modi 
comes with a tainted history of being the sitting chief minister during the 
bloody communal violence in Gujarat in 2002. These recent histories take 
a backseat as Modi reinvents himself as the people’s man through these 
new data politics.
While undoubtedly Modi is ingenious in extending his charisma online 
through such communication strategies, he does not leave much to chance. 
He has harnessed an army of bots to connect with his constituency and 
simulate vibrant political communication and participation. For instance, 
there is a legitimate concern that more than half of his Twitter followers 
are fake (“60 Per Cent” 2018). Almost half of them do not have a profile 
picture, many of them have never tweeted and their Twitter IDs carry five 
or so numerals, all indicators that they are spam bots to create the illusion 
of political popularity. This has serious consequences today in the field of 
journalism. Conventional mass media industries are shaping their political 
news by what is trending on Twitter. Twitter trends are seen as proxies for 
public interest. The practice known as astroturfing, the creation of fake 
grassroots support, is now a growing problem as politicians compete with 
one another in this new information battlefield. This blurs the genuine 
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with the fake political audiences, and puts the power more in the hands of 
those who are best able to control bot armies.
In fact, today’s political communication is a new kind of branding with 
a novel kind of public relations rising up to meet these needs. The focus 
today is on the channels of delivery more than the substance of the con-
tent. Modi is a brand and citizens are a prospective fandom community. 
Take Net Solutions, an application development agency in India. They 
have launched the NaMo ChatBot, a bot on Facebook messenger, one of 
the most popular and most frequented platforms in India. This bot en-
ables Modi fans to search for all information relating to him including his 
speeches, podcasts, meeting points, videos, and blogs. This is fast becoming 
a new political dream for leaders in the United States to Mexico (Wool-
lacott 2014)— to be seen and heard and be marked as a political celebrity of 
today with a little help from our bot friends.
To conclude, the datafication of political communication in India should 
take heed of both the old and new media to gain a more comprehensive 
picture of the influence of mass media on emerging political audiences. 
Media diversity does not necessarily result in political inclusion. Colonial 
legacies such as sedition laws have made a comeback, spurred by social 
media affordances and reinforced by the savvy bots that have the ability to 
track and trace citizen identities online as well as fake collective grassroots 
participation. The trend of communal politics seeping into old and new 
media channels further fragments political audiences. This is alarming and 
should be investigated through research that is more empirically grounded.
Exceptionalism in Digital Political Cultures?
In shifting our attention away from the West, there is a tendency to read 
this as the building of exceptionalism and maybe even self- exoticism. The 
label of the “South Asian” scholar can at times be a barrier to one’s scholar-
ship as it becomes encased under “area studies,” pushing its influence away 
from mainstream academic theories it seeks to influence and reshape. The 
“other” is often intended to be on the periphery or to serve as fodder for 
the reflexivity of the core.
This kind of knowledge- making unsurprisingly has its roots in colo-
nialism as the Western anthropologist would go to study the natives, so 
as to “translate” their “exoticness” to the so- called civilized cultures of the 
West (Cohn 1996). It was a novel form of narcissism of the time as it cre-
ated “reflexive opportunities to expand, even challenge by the contrast, the 
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outsider’s understanding of his or her own society and culture” (Szanton 
2004, 3).
In spite of the tainted trajectory of such scholarship, we scholars seek-
ing to broaden the normative understandings that continue to be domi-
nated by Western ideas and ideologies take this risk. The focus on the “In-
dian” case is meaningful by itself as it reveals the granularity of a vast and 
for the most part understudied arena and aspects of the everyday lives of 
its people. This corpus of knowledge is intended to be juxtaposed against 
pervasive understandings on datafication, digitization, and social justice, to 
create a much- needed academic humility, as, in this case, on digital politi-
cal culture.
Take for instance the idea of digital privacy. Rigorous debate surrounds 
this important topic, with disproportionate attention on data ownership 
(Taylor 2017). The EU with their well- meaning goals of spreading their 
“gold standard” on privacy rules worldwide, fails to acknowledge the fact 
that the term “privacy” has no direct translation in most of the world’s lan-
guages and that there are few studies on what this essentially means to the 
world’s global public as they come online, share passwords, become visible, 
and at times stay anonymous (Miller et al. 2016).
There is another exceptionalism this chapter may evoke: the argument 
that classifications of persons— as sources of state- based data sets— are po-
liticized because they are linked to the control of resources is not a new one. 
Thereby, as this chapter unpacks the problematics of caste classification 
and big data, it may be seen as the age- old conversation being “rebottled” 
on governance and surveillance through the lens of the digital. However, 
this criticism is not novel either. With every new technology intervention 
into society, there is the demand to not get carried away with deterministic 
utopias/dystopias driven by novelty. While this voice creates a balance to 
the other side of the pendulum, it can be just as obstructive in the pursuit of 
the new forms of social life that emerge through the dialectic of the histori-
cal and the future, the old and the new. With that approach, this chapter 
underlines that indeed caste categorizations as an instrument of control 
have been deeply investigated but few works so far have brought this into 
dialogue with the spectrum of intersectionality that big data affords and 
the often unintended outcomes that emerge, in this case, in Indian politics.
Conclusion
Datafication of India’s citizens promise visibility, representation, and over-
due justice to the majority of its undocumented and marginalized publics. 
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Anonymity gives way to sociopolitical identity, intended to pave the way 
for a more inclusive polity. Given the deep inequality, the long- standing 
communal divisiveness, and the pervasive bias toward the Indian elite, trust 
is at the heart of how these digitization projects unfold in the making of 
a vibrant political sphere. Strong and fair legal infrastructures enable the 
overcoming of distrust. Unfortunately, the dearth of strong privacy laws 
in India to protect individuals from data harms stand as a serious obstacle 
to the materialization of these political ideals (Arora and Scheiber 2017).
In many ways, India has made tremendous strides in the last few de-
cades. Much like other countries in the Global South that emerged from 
colonialism, there is less interest in dwelling on their subjugated past and 
more motivation in fostering ideas of national reinvention particularly 
through new technologies. However, it would be a mistake to dismiss the 
colonial apparatus still in place and its extension to the digital sphere. After 
all, only through recognition of these structures can we start to dismantle 
them. Revealing the inherent and systemic divisiveness of communal and 
caste politics, which were strategically utilized as a means of control in the 
days of the British Raj, is essential if we are to break away from the past. We 
need to become more cognizant of the reproduction of power inequalities 
through the digitization of traditional communal categories and group-
ings. Otherwise, this will constitute a freezing of progress through the per-
manence of communal data politics.
The sedition law has proven to create a neocolonialism of the Indian 
digital sphere, criminalizing freedom of expression, especially along lines 
of caste and religion. In the growing field of values in design, the Global 
South needs to become more visible and active if we are to contest whose 
values get programmed into algorithms and transmitted by transnational 
global companies like Facebook, Amazon, Twitter, and Google or global 
policy directives such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation that 
intends to export its “gold standard” on privacy rules worldwide.
The Indian mass media empire appears to not just stand but also to ex-
pand and diversify, more as an archipelago of communal interests. The old 
and new media systems work in concert to fragment the political sphere, 
online and off- line. It appears that the information or filter bubble comes 
to fruition not just within the social media sphere but also within the tra-
ditional channels of mass media such as television. This is so particularly 
along lines of communal interests and political capital. Modi is the new 
political hero, shedding his tainted history, proving that politicians can re-
claim their brand through social media. The political conversation can be 
controlled through a potent mix of social tools such as compelling digital 
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narratives, humor, and personalization as well as technical tools such as 
the employment of Twitter bots. The political sphere is a public relations 
sphere. When we speak about visibility, people and bots compete in this ex-
panding realm. In other words, political audiences encompass not just the 
social but also the technical. While the BJP appears to have gained a head 
start in data politics, we can only hope that nonprofit agencies and activists 
step up their game to contest the dominant political narrative.
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Digital Television in Digital India
Shanti Kumar
Television in India is on the threshold of a major transformation as the 
nation has embarked upon a massive project to completely replace all ana-
log systems of broadcasting and cable television with a digital addressable 
system (DAS). DAS comprises a set of digital hardware and software tools 
used in broadcasting, satellite, and cable industries for the transmission of 
television channels in encrypted form to their subscribers. All subscribers 
get a digital set top box with authorization to access free broadcasting, 
paid, or on- demand content through encrypted channels on a broadcast-
ing, satellite, or cable network.1
As per the deadlines mandated by International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), all member countries are required to completely shut off 
their analog transmissions and shift to DAS systems by no later than 2020. 
Many countries have already completed the digital switchover, others like 
India are in the process of completing the conversion, and a few countries 
have missed deadlines, or have not started moving from analog to DAS.2 
In India, the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Amendment Act of 
2011 made it mandatory for all analog cable television systems to switch 
over to a new Digital Addressable System by December 2014. As per the 
consultation paper issued by the Telecommunications Regulatory Author-
ity of India (TRAI) in 2011, the shift to DAS was scheduled to take place in 
a phased manner across the country. The four metro areas of Delhi, Mum-
bai, Kolkata, and Chennai were expected to switch over by June 30, 2012. 
The second phase covered cable TV households in 38 major cities with 
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population over 1 million. The third phase focused on implementation in 
smaller towns and urban areas with municipal corporations. In the fourth 
phase, all villages in rural areas were to be digitized by 2014.3
However, due to several delays in implementation and over 60 legal 
challenges to the policy in different parts of the country during the vari-
ous phases of DAS, the sunset date for digitization in Phase IV was moved 
to March 31, 2017 by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting in 
a notice released on December 23, 2016.4 While analog signals were of-
ficially switched off by all broadcasters and cable companies in India on 
March 31, 2017, there are still many rural areas where digitization has not 
been completed as scheduled in Phase IV. The overwhelming challenge 
of switching over from analog to digital in thousands of small towns and 
villages dispersed across several states is a major priority not only for the 
government of India but also for many big and small players in the In-
dian media industries who see vast potential for growth and profit in rural 
areas. Therefore, governments at the central and state levels along with 
corporate media industries are devoting considerable resources to digitize 
the nation’s aging media infrastructure through a flagship program called 
“Digital India.” Launched with great fanfare by Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi on July 1, 2015, the primary objective of Digital India, as stated on 
the program’s website, is to “transform India into a digitally empowered 
society and knowledge economy.”5
With a catchy slogan— “the power to empower”— the Digital India 
program focuses on three key vision areas: (1) the development of digital 
infrastructure as a public utility, (2) the electronic delivery of services and 
software on demand, and (3) the digital empowerment of citizens in all 
walks of life. Reflecting on the achievements of Digital India at the in-
augural forum of the Digital India Foundation titled “Create4India” held 
in August 2017, R. S. Sharma, the chairman of TRAI, claimed that the 
program has advanced rapidly in the vision area of creating software appli-
cations and services. However, he felt that the program badly lags behind 
in the area of hardware and infrastructure.6 Sharma lamented that while 
Indians get 93 percent of their data from mobile and only 7 percent from 
fixed lines, the world on an average gets 46 percent data from fixed lines 
and 54 percent from mobile. Since it would be impossible to immediately 
build the new fixed lines necessary to bring India closer to the global aver-
ages, Sharma has for long advocated for the use of already built up infra-
structure in cable television and broadband networks to enhance fixed line 
connectivity.7
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Sharma predicts that DAS in the television industry, in conjunction 
with BharatNet— a high- speed fiber optic broadband national network— 
will enable a high level of digital connectivity in both urban and rural ar-
eas. While the implementation of DAS in the television industry is near-
ing completion, the government of India’s ambitious project to connect 
all 25,000 gram panchayats (village councils) through BharatNet has been 
plagued by several delays. However, BharatNet— also known as Bharat 
Broadband Network Limited— when complete will be fully interoperable 
with DAS in the television industry, and with other digitally addressable 
satellite and mobile networks in Digital India. As the primary fixed line 
infrastructure of Digital India, DAS and BharatNet, Sharma argues, are 
crucial for achieving the government’s goal of delivering digital services in 
three key areas in every citizen’s life: What I know (my fingerprint or Iris), 
What I have (credit or debit cards), and What I am (Biometrics). Thus, 
contrary to the popular belief that the rise of digital, mobile technologies 
signals the end of television technologies, the chairman of TRAI proclaims 
that the already built up infrastructure of DAS is the aadhaar (foundation) 
of Digital India.8
In this chapter, I critically evaluate how the switchover from analog to 
digitally addressable systems in television is taking place under the aegis 
of the Digital India program. In the first section, I analyze media indus-
try debates, government policy reports, and popular cultural discourses in 
terms of a growing consensus in favor of the digital switchover in Indian 
television. In the second section, I discuss how the digital switchover in 
India is taking place in relation to the International Telecommunications 
Union’s policies of harmonization being promoted on a worldwide scale 
to maximize the benefits of digitization for all member countries. In the 
third section, I critically evaluate how the implementation of the switcho-
ver from analog to digital television is occurring in conjunction with simi-
lar transformations in other media and allied industries through the rapid 
harmonization of state agendas, market forces, and civil society interests. 
In conclusion, I outline the political, economic, and cultural implications of 
harmonization in public and private arenas of life in Digital India.
Television and Digital Addressable Systems in India
According to a study conducted by Chrome Data Analytics, the number to 
TV households in India was estimated to be around 180 million in 2017. 
The study claims that about 89.5 million TV households were successfully 
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switched over to digital in the first three phases of DAS switchover. How-
ever, more than 40 percent of the remaining 90 million or so TV house-
holds in rural India had not been digitized by the sunset date of March 
31, 2017.9 The installation of mandatory digital set top boxes in all cable 
television households in India thus poses an enormous set of challenges for 
cable operators, broadcasters, advertisers, consumers, and TRAI and other 
associated governmental agencies. Among the major challenges are con-
cerns about the timely installation of digital set top boxes in all television 
households; questions about the availability of necessary funds for the pro-
curement of new digital cable boxes, particularly by local cable operators 
in smaller towns and villages; lack of proper communication with viewers 
about the implications of the shift to digital television; confusion about 
the new regime of revenue sharing agreements among television program-
mers, advertisers, cable operators, and so on.10 There still remains a great 
amount of confusion and uncertainty about Phase IV of the digital swi-
tchover in rural India, and critics have wondered whether the digitization 
schedule has been created in haste without adequate preparation both in 
the industry and among consumers.11
However, advocates of digitization see it as revolutionary change that 
is long overdue in Indian television.12 They argue that the shift to DAS— 
however expensive, confusing, and cumbersome— is not only essential but 
inevitable because what constitutes “television” today is very different from 
what it was when Doordarshan, the government- sponsored network, was 
the only broadcasting service in India till the 1990s. Although Doordar-
shan is still the only terrestrial broadcaster in the country, since the ear-
ly1990s several commercial television channels like CNN, MTV, and the 
BBC— and later Indian language channels such as ZEE TV, SUN TV, and 
ETV— became available on local cable networks in India. Television view-
ers in many cities, towns, and villages were willing to pay a local cable 
operator— known as the cablewallah— anything from 40 to 100 rupees per 
month for a variety of programming in English, Hindi, and other Indian 
languages. For much of the paying audiences in India, cable television and 
not broadcasting soon became the dominant mode for the delivery of pro-
gramming content. The local cablewallah not only controlled the supply of 
television content into the viewers’ homes but also dictated which chan-
nels were part of the “bundle” and where each channel would be located 
in the programming lineup. During the late 1990s and the early 2000s, 
as satellite and cable television began to spread rapidly across India, the 
business of cable distribution rapidly shifted from the early disorganized, 
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entrepreneurial phase of the cablewallahs toward a more corporate structure 
that emphasized rationalization of business practices, efficiency of scale, 
professionalization of management and technical expertise, transparency 
in billing systems, and standardization of choice and customizability of ser-
vices across local operations.13
According a report released by TRAI on the status of the cable televi-
sion industry in 2010, the number of cable television subscribers in India 
grew from 410,000 in 1992 to more than 91 million by the end of 2009. 
The number of satellite television channels grew from literally a handful 
in 1992 to around 550 channels in 2010. The cable distribution industry, 
which began as an entrepreneurial venture of enterprising cablewallahs in 
the early 1990s, rapidly grew to 6,000 multi system operators (MSOs), and 
60,000 local cable operators (LCOs). Now competing with the cable op-
erators for distribution of television channels are direct to home (DTH) 
satellite TV operators and several Internet Protocol television (IPTV) ser-
vice providers.14
DTH and IPTV services in India are already compliant with the new 
regulations for digitization because they are distributed through encrypted 
signals that can only be received through a digital addressable box at the 
consumer end. In addition to transmitting a digital signal, DTH and IPTV 
also provide a variety of HD (high definition) channels and 3D features 
that many MSOs and LCOs in the cable industry did not, particularly in 
smaller towns and villages. During the switchover from analog to digital 
cable, DTH providers like Videocon, Reliance Digital TV, TataSky, and 
Dish TV launched advertising campaigns to highlight that cable signals 
were not really HD, whereas the DTH HD signal is the “asli” (real) deal. 
For example, in an ad campaign launched in July 2013, Videocon promoted 
its d2H platform with the tagline “Demand2have the Asli Picture” in an 
effort to position itself as “the” provider for high quality digital television 
in India. The campaign also highlighted options like recording, rewinding- 
forwarding, pausing live TV, and providing a 3D viewing experience for 
the viewer that were not offered by competitors in the cable industry.15
Other DTH providers like Reliance Digital, Dish TV, and Tata Sky 
were also quick to capitalize on the seemingly chaotic transformation to 
digital in the cable industry, and have been running ads in newspapers in-
viting cable subscribers to switch to DTH, and providing incentives to 
owners of LCO in the cable industry to switch their allegiance to a more 
stable DTH industry. IPTV has been a success in some of the major met-
ros and cities but it is currently seen more as a delivery system with great 
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potential as broadband connections become available in other parts of the 
country. More importantly, the success of DTH and IPTV forced MSO 
and LCO cable operators to hasten the transformation of the cable indus-
try from the old analog system to the new digital system.
While cable, DTH, and IPTV providers are competing with the cable 
industry for primacy in the digital television marketplace, India’s only ter-
restrial television network, Doordarshan, has also taken rapid strides in its 
quest to offer digital terrestrial television (DTT) in the country. Doordar-
shan’s analog broadcasting services cover almost 90 percent of the country, 
but constraints of bandwidth and poor signal quality have forced the Prasar 
Bharati Corporation, which oversees Doordarshan and All India Radio, to 
invest heavily in the digitization of the nation’s public service broadcasting 
infrastructure and programming services. As of 2017, Doordarshan offers 
DTT services in 16 cities and plans to expand its digital network to more 
than 60 cities by 2019. Unlike digital cable and commercial DTH provid-
ers who require viewers to pay a subscription fee to access their services, 
Doordarshan’s DTT services are over the air and free of charge. There-
fore, the Prasar Bharati Corporation is also experimenting with offering 
radio, television, and other digital services on its DTT network that can be 
accessed for free on mobile phones and other electronic devices, especially 
in rural areas that do not have access to cable television, commercial DTH 
services, or IPTV.16
As the many limitations in the cable industry have led policymakers, 
industry leaders, and media consumers to look for alternative television 
delivery systems, DTH and DTT have emerged as viable alternatives in 
many rural and urban areas in India. Much of the debate in the industry 
and policy circles has focused on whether the digital switchover will be 
a revolutionary transformation in the delivery of programming services, 
as its proponents claim, or a mirage the Indian television industry will be 
chasing in futility for years to come, as critics argue. The advocates of digi-
tization view DAS as the key to overcome the problems posed by the an-
tiquated analog systems in Digital India, and to allow content providers in 
the television industry and their audiences the ability to directly interact 
and communicate with each other. It doesn’t matter whether you get your 
TV through broadcasting, cable, direct- to- home satellite systems, or the 
Internet, DAS seems to be the fix- it- all solution to problems of analog tele-
vision like limitations of bandwidth, delivery of digital HD, 3D, interactive 
services, targeted advertising, standardization of TV rates, reliable billing 
practices and so on.17
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For the critics of DAS, the elevation of digital addressable system as a 
technical fix to all the problems in Indian television is rather problematic. 
Their criticism of the DAS policy has at least four dimensions to it. The first 
is an argument about the inherent difficulties in uniformly implementing 
DAS as a new technology in a politically, economically, culturally, and lin-
guistically diverse country like India. The second strand of criticism comes 
from those who question the assumption that giving the television industry 
greater access to television households through DAS will automatically im-
prove the quality of services for the viewers. The third strand of criticism 
comes from those who argue that the kind of “choice” proposed by the ad-
vocates of DAS is a menu- driven format of click- and- choose options that 
does not fully exploit the interactive potential of digital addressability. The 
final strand of criticism is that the menu- driven format of choice does not 
promote the interests of the television viewer at home, but instead serves 
the commercial interests of the powerful media industries and the statist 
interests of political leaders in the government.18
Although advocates and critics in the media industries differ in their 
assessments of the ways in which the new DAS regime is being imple-
mented in India, there seems to be little disagreement in these circles about 
the potential of new digital technologies to overcome the many problems 
posed by the old analog mode of delivering broadcasting and cable televi-
sion services. Therefore, not surprisingly, much of the debate on the shift 
to DAS in India has been framed in terms of the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of digital set- top boxes over the current analog cable tech-
nologies. Underlying this consensus about the ills of the analog world is a 
common view that the attempt to realize the full potential of the broad-
casting revolution of the 1970– 1980s and the satellite television revolution 
of the 1990s is being hindered by the inability of media content providers 
to directly address the audiences at home.
In the overall context of the growing consensus about the need for an 
overall switchover toward digitization in India, I argue that the “digital” in 
digital television must be analyzed not merely in terms of the technologi-
cal advantages and disadvantages of the switchover from analog systems. 
Instead, digitization must be understood in relation to the international 
politics and policies of “harmonization” being promoted by supranational 
organizations like the ITU and being aggressively implemented in televi-
sion and other allied industries by member countries like India. As defined 
in the policy reports of the International Telecommunications Union, har-
monization refers to an internationally coordinated process of digitizing a 
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range of public and private infrastructures of life in order to maximize the 
benefits of broadcasting and new media technologies around the world. 
In the next section, I move the debate on digitization away from the fo-
cus on the pros and cons of the digital switchover as a technical fix- it- all 
solution for the problems of the outdated analog cable systems. Instead, 
I seek to pay closer attention to the global discourse of harmonization in 
digital addressable systems, and critically analyze the political, economic, 
and cultural implications of the wholesale shift toward digitization in all 
walks of life.
Television, Harmonization, and Digital Dividends
According to the ITU, television is at the heart of a new global experiment 
of harmonization that is now under way to reap the benefits of a “digital 
dividend” around the world. ITU defines the concept of digital dividend 
“as the amount of spectrum made available by the transition of terrestrial 
television broadcasting from analogue to digital.” The ITU report states:
The digital dividend may be used by broadcasting services (e.g. provi-
sion of more programmes, high definition, 3D or mobile television). 
It may also be used by other services, such as the mobile service, in 
a frequency band which could be shared with broadcasting (e.g. for 
short range mobile devices, such as wireless microphones used in 
theatres or during public events). It may also be used in a distinct, 
harmonized frequency band to enable ubiquitous service provision, 
universally compatible equipment and international roaming (e.g. 
for International Mobile Telecommunications, IMT).19
The ITU Report (released in August 2012) is a 72- page document 
that details a whole range of technological issues involved in the switcho-
ver from analog, and calls for an international consensus on the use and 
management of the digital dividend through harmonization. In India, as 
in many other countries around the world, the switchover from analog to 
terrestrial broadcasting has freed up valuable spectrum space for other uses 
like wireless and mobile communications in ultra- high frequencies in the 
range of 698– 862 MHz (megahertz, bandwidth that was formerly used for 
analog broadcasting). The opening up of the 698– 862 MHz bandwidth is 
considered particularly significant in India. The GSM Association, a trade 
group representing the global mobile industry, has recommended that the 
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698– 862 MHz bandwidth should be allocated for mobile services. While 
the mobile communications industries can use higher frequencies ranging 
from 900 to 3600 MHz to provide high- speed cell phone services in India, 
the lower frequencies are considered critical for expanding the telecom-
munications infrastructure into rural areas and other underserved regions 
of the country. The GSM Association estimates that it is almost 70 percent 
cheaper to provide mobile broadband coverage at around 800 MHZ than 
at over 2100MHz. Therefore, the GSM Association predicts that mobile 
and broadband services could be offered at much cheaper rates to consum-
ers at around the 800 MHz range, particularly in rural areas where the 
major players in the telecommunications industry have been rather unwill-
ing to enter.20
Given the crucial role of the telecommunications infrastructure in the 
Indian government’s developmental agenda in the 21st century, major po-
litical parties, policymakers, and industry professionals all agree that the 
digital switchover is a once- in- a- lifetime opportunity to reorganize the 
newly freed up UHF frequencies in more economical, efficient, and prof-
itable ways, particularly for offering new wireless and mobile services in 
rural areas. There have been innumerable policy documents, industry re-
ports, and recommendations by consulting firms and think thanks allied 
with specific media and telecommunication industries advocating for what 
they see as the best practices for the use of the “digital dividend” and other 
frequencies in the spectrum space.21
The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) has 
also developed many policy proposals to auction off the spectrum space to 
commercial media and telecommunications companies. One of the biggest 
challenges in the auction process has been the need to balance the public 
service mission of the government’s broadcasting and telecommunications 
agencies with the commercial interests and profit motives of the private 
media companies bidding for the newly released frequencies. The bidding 
process has also been mired in controversy as TRAI has been accused by 
some of corruption, and others have complained that the government has 
set the auction rates too high in its attempts to raise massive revenues to 
fill its coffers. The quality of the spectrum space released in the auction 
process has also been a point of contention between the Indian govern-
ment and industry advocates. While government has set aside large parts 
of the spectrum— particularly in the high- quality ranges— for military and 
national security uses, some business leaders in the telecommunications 
industry claim that the high- quality frequencies reserved for defense pur-
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poses are underutilized, and could be put to better use by the private sector 
to provide 3G (third generation) and 4G (fourth generation) cell phone 
and broadband services to rapidly growing numbers of fixed broadband 
mobile users in the country.22
Since the spectrum space is a limited resource, the debate on the al-
location of spectrum frequencies for use by various telecommunications 
industries has historically been a very contentious one both at national and 
international levels. All ITU member states have the legal right to exercise 
their sovereignty on how the spectrum is allocated within their borders. 
However, since airwaves naturally transcend national borders, it has al-
ways been necessary for nation- states to coordinate through the ITU how 
various frequencies are allocated regionally and internationally in order to 
avoid interference in signal transmissions. Thus, international and regional 
harmonization of the spectrum space has once again emerged as a crucial 
policy issue in debates on the best use and management of the digital divi-
dend within and beyond national borders.23
The discourse of harmonization is, of course, not completely new in 
international affairs. Nor is it entirely restricted to the debate over digi-
tal dividends that is shaping national policies for harmonization on global 
scale under the aegis of the ITU. As the noted German social scientist 
Franz Rothenbacher points out, the creation of supranational organiza-
tions like the United Nations after World War II necessitated the interna-
tional standardization of concepts, definitions, and methods for collecting 
data, and for coordinating social research and policy making within and 
beyond nation- states in the new global order. Rothenbacher argues that 
the globalization of standards at the United Nations worked through two 
interrelated aspects: harmonization and synchronization. Harmonization, 
he argues, refers to the ability to compare standards while synchroniza-
tion refers to the need to compile the standards simultaneously. Further, 
Rothenbacher distinguishes between two types of harmonization: ex- ante 
harmonization and ex- post harmonization. The first refers to making 
standards comparable from the inception, and the second refers to mak-
ing standards that are different in many respects comparable as much as 
possible. Rothenbacher refers to several cases where these two types of 
harmonization are used in social science research, and examine how data 
is gathered and standardized using statistical methods in the analysis of 
population census, labor force surveys, and household budget surveys in 
Western Europe.24
In the digital context, however, the harmonization of national policies 
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has some important differences from earlier approaches devised in the so-
cial sciences and policy research in the post– World War II era. For exam-
ple, while Rothenbacher’s analysis defines harmonization and synchroniza-
tion as two different aspects of standardization, in the digital context of the 
switchover from analog, harmonization and synchronization are two sides 
of the same coin. In the aforementioned ITU Report on digital televi-
sion, harmonization is promoted as an essential part of a global strategy for 
member nation- states, transnational corporations, and consumers alike to 
harvest the benefits of digitization. Similarly, while the ITU Report makes 
it amply clear that without synchronization, the potential for reaping the 
digital dividend would be minimized for all nation- states, it grants consid-
erable autonomy to each member nation- state to set its own standards for 
the implementation the digital switchover, and for managing the benefits 
of the digital dividends. In other words, the policy of digital harmonization 
is as much based on ideals of ex- ante harmonization (establishing interna-
tional standards for digital switchover from the beginning) as it is on ex- 
post harmonization (making very diverse national and regional standards 
for digitization as comparable as possible). Therefore, in the case of digital 
switchover from analog, harmonization cannot be easily equated with or 
subsumed under the category of standardization due to the synchronicity 
and simultaneity of digitization in a range of applications within and across 
national and international contexts. Instead, I argue in favor of a much 
broader definition of harmonization as a way to critically analyze a more 
generalized process that is currently under way on a global scale for build-
ing new digital infrastructures through highly differentiated yet extremely 
coordinated actions by governments, businesses, and civil society organi-
zations to promote digitization in all walks of life. In the next section, I 
will examine how the digital harmonization of broadcasting, cable, satellite 
television, and mobile communications is taking place in conjunction with 
similar transformations in other allied industries under the banner of Digi-
tal India promoted by the Indian government.
Harmonizing the Digital India Project
The primary objective of the Digital India project is to “transform India 
into a digitally empowered society and knowledge economy.” On the gov-
ernment of India’s website for Digital India, the program’s goal of har-
monization is encapsulated through slogans such as “IT (Indian Talent) 
+ IT (Information Technology) = IT (India Tomorrow).” Capturing the 
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postcolonial desire to rewrite the orthographies of harmonization through 
the futuristic vision of Digital India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is 
quoted on the website saying, “Our ancestors used to play with snakes, we 
play with mouse.”25
While the tech- savvy Modi is being hailed by his supporters as a vision-
ary for championing the cause of Digital India, the reality is that govern-
mental agenda for digitization in India has a long history. It emerged in the 
1990s through the discourse of e- governance on the Internet, and through 
the establishment of the National e- governance plan in 2006. There were 
31 mission projects in the e- governance plan in areas ranging from agri-
culture, land records, health, education, passports, police, courts, municipal 
records, taxes, and so on. Many of these projects have been implemented 
in full or in part in the past decade, and others— such as e- Kranti 2.0— are 
being modified and translated to reflect the Modi government’s current 
priorities for Digital India. There are many versions of the priority areas 
of Digital India in the many different departments and ministries in the 
Indian government. One version promotes the vision in terms of the nine 
pillars of digital India: (1) broadband highways, (2) universal access to mo-
bile connectivity, (3) public Internet access program, (4) e- governance— 
reforming government through technology, (5) e- Kranti— electronic de-
livery of services, (6) information for all, (7) electronics manufacturing, (8) 
IT for jobs, and (9) early harvest programs. The various aspects of Digital 
India are coordinated through the Ministry of Electronics, Information 
and Technology or MeitY. Formed in July 2016, MeitY’s main objective 
is to provide common branding and to harmonize diverse aspects of gov-
ernance through the extensive use of digital technologies in public and 
private realms of social relations.26
The goals of harmonization in Digital India are most prominently vis-
ible in the very ambitious and rather controversial government- sponsored 
project called “IndiaStack.” With an impressive tagline of “Technology for 
1.2 Billion Indians,” the website indiastack.org describes IndiaStack as a set 
of application programming interfaces (APIs) “that allows governments, 
businesses, start- ups and developers to utilize a unique digital Infrastruc-
ture to solve India’s hard problems towards presence- less, paperless, and 
cashless service delivery.”27 IndiaStack was created in 2013 by a group of 
digital evangelists, software entrepreneurs, and executives of Indian IT 
companies under the banner of iSpirt— the Indian Software Product In-
dustry Roundtable— to help facilitate the growth of software companies, 
products, and applications in Digital India. Since then, the iSpirt group has 
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been aggressively positioning itself as an indispensable interface between 
software companies and governmental agencies involved in the various 
programs of the Digital India project. Advocating for policy changes to 
support software start- ups, holding boot camps and hackathons to across 
the country to help product developers create new apps and interfaces, and 
connecting software buyers, sellers, and entrepreneurs through its online 
portal “Product Nation” are some of the stated goals of iSpirt. Additionally, 
iSpirt is responsible for hosting the website for IndiaStack.
Sometimes described as Aadhaar 2.0, IndiaStack builds on the unique 
identification number system called Aadhaar being implemented across the 
nation by the government of India. Aadhaar (meaning support in Hindi) 
is a 12- digit unique identification number (UID) issued to all residents in 
India on a voluntary basis by the Unique Identification Authority of India. 
The agency was established by the government of India in 2009, and be-
gan assigning UID numbers in September 2010. The Aadhaar numbers are 
stored in a centralized database and linked to demographic and biometric 
information such as photographs, ten fingerprints, and iris scans of every 
individual with a UID number.28
IndiaStack adds new layers onto Aadhaar, and uses the UID as the back-
bone for managing and integrating next generation of application process-
ing interfaces, which can be programmed by various third- party providers. 
In 2011, an Aadhaar “payments bridge” service was introduced to enable 
government agencies to make electronic financial transfers to beneficiaries 
of government programs who had been assigned UID numbers. In 2012, a 
paperless e- KYC (Know Your Customer) service was launched that would 
enable a bank or telecommunication company to authenticate a consumer’s 
identity using Aadhaar. In 2016, Aadhaar reached a major milestone when 
the number of Indians enrolled in the program crossed the one billion 
mark. In that year, three new services were introduced into the Aadhaar- 
based system: the first was an online electronic signature service called 
e- sign that allowed an Aadhaar cardholder to digitally sign a document 
by utilizing the Aadhaar biometrics for verification. The second was a di-
gilocker service that was made available to Aadhaar cardholders to store, 
access, and share their documents online. The third service introduced in 
2016 was the Unified Payment Interface (UPI) that enables an Aadhaar 
cardholder to send and receive money from and to a virtual address using 
a two- factor authentication process based on Aadhaar biometrics on any 
networked device like a smartphone.29
The UPI services are also being integrated with the “Know Your Cus-
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tomer” (KYC) system currently being used by banks and other financial 
institutions to digitally distribute services and collect payments from con-
sumers. The resulting e- KYC system is used in conjunction with Aadhaar 
to individually identify each customer and verify his or her identity by us-
ing uniquely identifiable data such as a photograph, residential address, 
marital status, and so on. Introduced in 2002 by the Reserve Bank of India, 
the KYC system is now used by all banks to ensure that they are fully 
compliant with the government of India’s regulations aimed at preventing 
money laundering, terrorism financing, and identity theft schemes.30
More recently, under IndiaStack, e- KYC has also been expanded to 
incorporate electronic payment services to individual consumers with 
Aadhaar cards. One of the main goals of harmonizing e- KYC and Aad-
haar through IndiaStack is to move the entire country toward a “cashless” 
economy. When Prime Minister Modi suddenly announced on Novem-
ber 8, 2017 that the 500- rupee and 1,000- rupee currency notes would no 
longer be accepted after midnight on November 8, 2017, political pundits 
attributed several noble intentions and ignoble motives to the decision. 
While some hailed the government’s move as a step toward the eradication 
of black money, others attributed political motives of corruption for the 
abrupt and precipitous decision.31 While the political implications and the 
economic consequences of the demonetization policy are still being de-
bated and felt around the nation, it is undeniable that the various layers of 
IndiaStack— such as the Aadhaar- KYC- UPI interfaces— have quickly be-
come the bedrock of the emerging financial- technological infrastructure 
(fintech) of Digital India.32
Nandan Nilekani, one of the key architects of both Aadhaar and the 
IndiaStack, firmly believes that the emerging fintech infrastructure of In-
diaStack has the potential to transform the nation into world’s first data 
democracy. At the heart of Nilekani’s dream of data democracy is the pro-
cess of what he calls data inversion. For Nilekani inverting the data means 
giving users ownership of their data and empowering them to decide how 
much of their personal data will be shared with whom, when, and where. 
Nilekani argues that after the nationwide implementation of the various 
layers of IndiaStack such as digisign and digilocker, the country will be 
uniquely positioned to implement data inversion. With his trademark flair 
for digital utopianism, Nilekani writes, “We have a billion users on the JAM 
[Jan Dhan, Aadhaar, Mobile] trinity for individuals and strong national- 
level platforms GSTN [Goods and Services Tax Network], BBPS [Bharat 
Bill Payment System] and UPI [Unified Payment Interface] for businesses. 
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We are doing close to 40 million Aadhaar Authentications every day. The 
government has also developed the India Stack, a set of Open APIs that 
enable paperless, presenceless and cashless transactions dramatically driv-
ing down the cost of transactions. System designers can mix and match 
between OTP, Aadhaar Authentication and UPI PIN to create robust and 
secure authentication.”33
Jan Dhan Yojana— which Nilekani glowingly refers to in the above- 
mentioned quote— has been billed by the government of India as the larg-
est financial inclusion program in history. The program seeks to provide 
every Indian household digital access to banking services by giving them 
zero balance accounts in all commercial banks in the country. To celebrate 
the third anniversary of Jan Dhan Yojana, Prime Minister Modi tweeted on 
August 27, 2017 that the program had provided near universal access with 
a 99.99 percent success rate. Critics of the program peg the success rate to 
lower numbers ranging from 70 to 90 percent, and claim that the govern-
ment’s inflated numbers include many Indians who already have bank ac-
counts. But advocates of JAM claim that the nationwide implementation of 
these programs can provide the necessary fintech infrastructure for every 
Indian to participate in the cashless economy of Digital India.34
According to R. S. Sharma, the chairman of the Telecom Regulatory 
Authority of India, a cashless economy can be achieved by gradually mak-
ing all payment systems in Digital India compatible with the Aadhaar card. 
For example, in the television industry, the new digital addressable system 
is being promoted as a mechanism to uniquely identify each subscriber in 
coordination with the Aadhaar and KYC systems. According to a study 
released by the Unique Identification Authority of India in April 2012, 
telecommunications companies were projected to save over Rs. 1,000 
crore35 every year if they used Aadhaar to verify the identity and address of 
new subscribers. The report claims that the telecom industry can save this 
money by going paperless and cashless in backend processes, and by avoid-
ing the fines that the Telecom Enforcement Resource and Monitoring cell 
imposes on companies for failing to verify subscriber identity in a proper 
and timely manner.36
Dish TV— one of the leading providers of DTH services in India— was 
among the first in the television industry to embrace the Aadhaar system 
for uniquely identifying its customers with minimal delays and confusion, 
and for rapidly expanding its subscriber base across the country. “Dish TV 
is proud to align with UIDAI to recognise and support the country’s largest 
movement to provide unique ID numbers to its residents. Aadhaar will also 
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serve an additional payment option as the UID has a direct connect to the 
banks and financial institutions,” said Dish TV chief operating officer Salil 
Kapoor in statement released to announce the implementation of the new 
policy in February 2011.37
But the poster child for the successful integration of the cashless, paper-
less interface of IndiaStack into media business practices is, without any 
doubt, the Reliance Jio mobile phone. In September 2016, Reliance Indus-
tries launched its mobile phone services called Reliance Jio in an already 
crowded market dominated by corporate giants like Bharti Airtel, Voda-
fone India, Idea Cellular and the state- run Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited. 
Describing how Reliance capitalized on the IndiaStack infrastructure to 
propel its mobile phone business to the top of a crowded and competitive 
industry, Arvind Gupta and Philip Auerswald write that Jio “succeeded in 
using the India Stack to enroll 108 million consumers in 170 days with 
a totally paperless, mobile- centric manner— in the process achieving cus-
tomer acquisition costs of less than $1 (USD) per customer, compared with 
the prior industry standard of $25.” Gupta— a founding member of iSpirt, 
who currently heads the Digital India Foundation and also leads the ruling 
Bharatiya Janata Party’s IT team— and Auerswald— a self- proclaimed ad-
vocate for digital disruption— believe that the use of IndiaStack by media 
and technology companies like Reliance Industries to launch an ecosystem 
of Aadhaar- compliant devices with built- in biometric authentication will 
soon transform India into a digital- first economy.38
While the current interactions and intersections between IndiaStack 
and Aadhaar- enabled devices in the broadcasting, cable, satellite television, 
and mobile industries are currently limited to issues such as billing, pay-
ments through UPI, and subscriber identification using e- KYC systems, 
the future potential is immense. At the same time, critics of Aadhaar and 
IndiaStack point to the equally immense concerns in the areas of privacy 
and surveillance due to the encroachment of digital technologies into every 
aspect of life in India. The issues of privacy and digital surveillance took 
center stage on February 3, 2017 when IndiaStack’s Twitter account posted 
an image of a group of people on a crowded street but individually iden-
tified with their Aadhaar ID numbers. IndiaStack had posted the image 
from the website of OnGrid as a way to welcome the background verifica-
tion company into the community of developers that had adopted its APIs 
to advance their business practices. However, the tweet engendered a big 
debate on and off Twitter and was soon taken down; IndiaStack issued a 
detailed clarification on its Twitter account about how sandbox develop-
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ers like OnGrid can use the biometric data from Aadhaar only with users’ 
consent.39 But the episode served as a cautionary reminder to the critics 
of Digital India about how Aadhaar and IndiaStack could very easily and 
very quickly turn India into an Orwellian Big Brother nation.40 At the same 
time, the systemic inefficiencies and corruption in the Aadhaar ID system 
have made many people skeptical of the government’s ability to safely and 
ethically monitor and control the massive amounts of personal data that 
are constantly being generated and transacted on a daily basis by more than 
a billion Indians. For example, there are many stories in newspapers about 
how dogs, cats, and cows or even Hindu deities like Hanuman have man-
aged to get their own Aadhaar cards.41
Leading critics of Aadhaar, like the Member of Parliament Rajeev 
Chandrasekhar and privacy advocate Usha Ramanathan, have for years 
cautioned that consolidation of all biometric data such as iris scans and 
fingerprints into a single government- sponsored hybrid public- private sys-
tem like IndiaStack could be easily manipulated by corporate interests for 
commercial gain, or potentially be hacked by third parties and thus com-
promise the privacy and security of individual users.42 Moreover, biometric 
data such as fingerprints and iris scans may not always be completely reli-
able indicators of one’s gender, sexuality, class, caste, or religious identity, 
particularly when such identities are culturally fluid in a country like India 
where the interoperability of digital technologies has not been— and may 
never be— fully completed. In such a scenario, consumers and citizens in 
culturally marginalized and digitally underserved areas could potentially 
be denied vital services. Or worse, in the event of a major catastrophe, crit-
ics fear that Digital India may come to a grinding halt as millions will be 
unable to conduct basic transactions of everyday life in the presence- less, 
paperless, and cashless society being promoted through programs like Aad-
haar and IndiaStack.43
Conclusion
The growth of digital addressable systems in television and allied indus-
tries provides illuminating insights into the emerging consensus about how 
the benefits of digitization can be reaped through the harmonization of 
telecommunications policies at supranational organizations like ITU and 
among its member states like India. I posit harmonization as a new mode 
of digital interoperability that cannot be reduced to earlier debates about 
standardization versus diversification, or homogenization versus hetero-
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genization, or globalization and localization in global media studies. In-
stead, I argue that the development of new digital technologies through 
nationally and internationally harmonized systems such as DAS, Aadhaar, 
and IndiaStack in Digital India requires a new understanding of the emerg-
ing modes of digital address in our world today. The debate over digital 
addressable systems cannot be simply reduced to the positive versus nega-
tive effects of new technologies like digital television at home or more 
generally in media culture and industries. Media consumers are increas-
ingly ambivalent about the potential threats of digitization to their privacy 
and growing more aware of the possibilities of greater surveillance by the 
media industries in the digital world. But, at the same time, consumers 
recognize that many everyday conveniences of better programming ser-
vices, efficiency of delivery mechanisms, and greater security and mobility 
both inside and outside the home depend greatly on the harmonization of 
their digital addressable systems like television, mobile phones, comput-
ers, and other personal devices. As is evident from the recent attempts of 
major players in the media industry like Dish TV and Reliance Industries 
to integrate the DAS platform with the IndiaStack and Aadhaar systems, 
the rise of digital addressable systems and their ability to uniquely address 
viewers as consumers and citizens raises new questions about the chang-
ing relationships between public and private spaces, privacy and surveil-
lance, and the state and its subjects. These are questions that Indian media 
scholars need to address by extending our critiques of television industries 
and cultures to a more sustained analysis of the growing harmonization of 
digital infrastructures like DAS, BharatNet, and Aadhaar with a range of 
open application processing interfaces being generated through programs 
like IndiaStack in Digital India.
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The Popular, the Infrastructural, and the National
Rahul Mukherjee
In August 1995, Jyoti Basu, then chief minister of West Bengal, called 
Union Telecom Minister Sukhram on a Nokia mobile phone, “ringing in” 
the cell phone revolution in India. From that one cell phone subscriber 
to 1,035.12 million subscribers at the end of September 2016, the Indian 
mobile phone market is the second largest in the world, surpassed only by 
China.1 With this exponential growth of mobile phones, the cellular infra-
structure to support them (particularly cell towers) has had to also grow at 
breakneck pace. As of June 30, 2017, Indus Towers, the biggest tower com-
pany operating in 15 circles in India, manages 122,920 towers with 297,867 
tenancies.2 Drawing a fascinating infrastructural analogy, Robin Jeffrey 
and Assa Doron note that towers are to cell phones what gas stations are 
to automobiles.3 The work of scholars such as Nimmi Rangaswamy sug-
gests that growth of cyber cafés has shown mixed results in different parts 
of India.4 However, mobile phones, being relatively more accessible, af-
fordable, and easy to use than computers, promise the possibility of clos-
ing the digital divide through consumerist bottom- up interventions, even 
as questions regarding restricted computability remain.5 New additions to 
mobile media assemblages in the form of microSD cards and WhatsApp 
applications afford new possibilities for listening, watching, sharing, and 
communicating, but they are also disruptive, rerouting erstwhile circula-
tions of CDs and DVDs.
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Communication studies scholars Anandam Kavoori and Kalyani Chad-
dha emphasize the need to study the cell phone as a cultural technology, 
exemplifying through their analysis of cell phone advertisements how a 
technology attains particular meanings within a cultural milieu.6 In this 
chapter, I take the cultural- ness of mobile phone technology seriously 
through analysis of ads, Bollywood films, and anthropological vignettes 
and interviews (with mobile media dealers, mobile phone repair workers, 
and mobile phone users). The cultural meanings of mobile technology are 
crucial to study. Anthropologist William Mazzarella has carried out such 
an exercise through an ethnography of Indian advertising workplaces.7 
Nimmi Rangaswamy and Kabita Chakraborty have undertaken innovative 
fieldwork to examine local mobile phone cultures in urban slums in Hyder-
abad and Kolkata, respectively.8 While working through Indian cell phone 
cultures in this chapter, in addition to my own fieldwork in cities and small 
towns of India, I espouse a multiscalar and multimethod approach so as 
to connect interviews, texts, and practices to meanings, experiences, and 
imaginations.
It is important to understand how cellular infrastructures are very much 
a part of the everyday life of people, and hence a part of their culture. 
Culture, as defined by Raymond Williams (and Stuart Hall, among many 
other scholars of the Birmingham school), retains a sense of the everyday 
and ordinary: as Williams explains, “culture is ordinary” and is manifested 
in the values and meanings people give to objects and ways of living in 
their everyday life.9 A lot of Indian citizens’ everyday practices— whether 
it is booking a cinema hall (or airline) ticket through apps/platforms or re-
maining connected with friends and relatives (through calls or WhatsApp 
messages)— happens through (and is shaped by) the mobile phone. As I 
will discuss, there are people who cannot stream music and hence develop 
a workaround by downloading songs on memory cards, and then inserting 
those cards into mobile phone slots so that they can access them. There 
is an entanglement, in each of the above- mentioned examples, of social 
practices and media practices, and cellular infrastructures are constitutive 
of these practices. The mobile phone is itself a technology/infrastructure 
that supports— that is, provides a foundation (operating system) for— 
applications like Skype and Uber to run, and slots for memory cards to 
function. The mobile phone exchanges signals (radio waves) with cell an-
tennas (and cell towers) that form the extended cellular infrastructure. The 
strength of these signals determines whether cell phone calls will be com-
pleted or whether the amount of bandwidth required to stream a YouTube 
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video on the phone will be available. If the cell antenna signal strength 
becomes too high, it could (potentially) cause cancer. Hence, whether it is 
about fulfilling a desire for the seamless streaming of YouTube videos (or 
an uninterrupted video chat) or concerns about the environmental/health 
impact of cell antenna signals, we can see that cell phone infrastructures be-
come objects of cultural concern. Such cellular technologies become part 
of people’s everyday lives. Indeed, infrastructures in this chapter, as Brian 
Larkin would say, should not be understood as exclusively conceptual (soft) 
or exclusively hard material/technical objects10; rather, infrastructures, as 
Abdoumaliq Simone has argued, can emerge in the “complex combina-
tions” and conjunctions of “objects, spaces, persons and practices.”11
Imagining cellular India is incomplete without an infrastructural imag-
ination since imagining infrastructures is connected with imagining na-
tions: the values of growth and development aspired by a nation’s citizens 
seem emblematized in particular infrastructures. If in the newly postcolo-
nial India of Jawaharlal Nehru, dams and nuclear reactors stood as mod-
ern temples of India, then today cell towers epitomize the new “pillars” 
of India’s development. Cell towers embody the promises made in Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi’s “Digital India” campaign, which aims to equip 
1.2 billion citizens of India with a smartphone. The recent, much touted 
entry of Reliance Jio in India’s telecom market wants to achieve precisely 
that target with its 4G LTE (fourth generation long- term evolution) cel-
lular technology.
With an aggregation of applications and facilities (camera, audio player, 
credit card, notebook, design pad) available on the smartphone, “talk” is 
not the only thing people do with their mobile phones. The mobile phone 
is connected to various information platforms and infrastructural assem-
blages, and thus human bodies using such phones are conditioned by a 
range of human and nonhuman forces including algorithms, electromag-
netic signals, and networked friendships. Therefore, it is important to ex-
plore, as Amit Rai has influentially argued, the phenomenological encoun-
ters of humans with mobile phone assemblages: “how mobile phones affect 
micro- transformations in perceptual capacities and self- expression.”12 We 
need to see developments in mobile phone technologies alongside devel-
opments in other media forms like television and radio. In the new net-
worked/convergence media model, active audiences, as part of “mobile 
publics,”13 react to live television chat shows and reality shows by tweeting 
comments in real- time or voting in/out participants.
The aim of this chapter is not to suggest that Indians have an absolutely 
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unique way of engaging with mobile technologies. A hotel receptionist and 
a cab driver I conversed with in Tulum, Mexico were avid WhatsApp users, 
explaining to me that they prefer WhatsApp to phone texting because they 
have a lot to communicate, often all the time, and WhatsApp was a good 
over- the- top service since it did not consume a lot of Internet data. The 
reasons for favoring WhatsApp mentioned here are the same ones I heard 
from my interview participants in Delhi. The popularity of WhatsApp can-
not be explained away by technological determinism or economic deter-
minism. The “pointless chit- chat” and the trading of gossip that What-
sApp has unleashed has much to do with emerging socialities in India and 
Mexico, and that makes WhatsApp a potent application used by politicians 
to reach out to their publics. WhatsApp’s affordances have made it central 
to India’s fake news cycle and viral spreading of rumors that have even 
instigated communal riots.14
I begin with how mobile phone advertisements and Bollywood cinema 
have engaged with the cell phone. Both Bollywood films and cell phone ads, 
while often spectacular, are also critical sites to witness the ordinary lives of 
Indian citizens where the cell phone is a constant companion. Tracking the 
reconfigurations of cell phone advertisements and the use of cell phones in 
Bollywood films through the last 20 years is a way of understanding how 
cell phone use has changed, in what ways public perception about mobile 
phones has shifted, and how cellular network companies, ad copywriters, 
film directors, and screenwriters imagine their consumers and audiences 
as cell phone users. I argue that such an analysis offers a way to gauge the 
national- popular cellular imagination. Following this section, I examine 
the informal ways and workaround cultures (Jugaad) of using cell phones 
practiced by socially and economically disadvantaged communities. These 
subaltern- popular practices help us understand how various communities 
with differential digital access find ways to express themselves and their 
aspirations through mobile phones. Finally, in the penultimate section on 
infrastructures, I reflect on recent controversies related to cell tower radia-
tion and net neutrality in India.
Mobile Phones and a New National- Popular
The mobile phone’s inclusion in Bollywood scripts has altered cinematic 
notions of space and time, and has particularly amplified representations of 
people’s intimate encounters with terror and love in recent films. In Aamir 
(Raj Kumar 2008) and A Wednesday (Neeraj Pandey 2008), cell phone calls 
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become a way not only for protagonists and antagonists to stay in touch, 
but also to surveill and manipulate each other. While in Aamir the protago-
nist feels dragged more and more into the terror network with each new 
call from the kidnapper, in A Wednesday it is the common man who uses the 
cell phone to make the purportedly inefficient state/police fight against ter-
rorists.15 Shaunak Sen analyzes the film Good Night, Good Morning (Sudhish 
Kamath 2012), where two strangers connect with each other via mobile 
phone while traveling in separate spaces, forming an intimate bond.16 Inti-
macy on the phone involves probing questions, lingering pauses, sweating 
and stammering, and, by extension, these momentary hesitations, anxieties, 
and pleasures are also part of today’s WhatsApp conversations.
Sometimes, the cell phone might seek to reassign particular spaces to 
specific genders. Airtel’s ad (released in 2015) featuring a youthful couple 
became controversial, stirring quite a buzz on television and social media 
for its portrayal of gendered subjectivities. The ad opens with two working 
professionals in a meeting at a swanky office. The female boss assigns work 
to her male colleague, and is shown to be sympathetic but firm in stating 
that the assignment needs to be completed.17 Soon after, we see the boss 
cooking in her home, and then video calling her male colleague, who we 
now know is her husband. Using Airtel’s smartphone network, the boss- 
now- wife sends her husband videos of the food she has prepared and on a 
video- chat asks him to come home (see figure 3.1), saying “Boss ko bolo 
wife bula rahi hain”/“Tell the boss your wife is calling.” The ad was alleged 
to have been progressive and regressive at the same time. On the one hand, 
it was breaking stereotypes by having a wife as her husband’s boss and, on 
the other hand, reaffirming the stereotype of a wife cooking for her hus-
band in the domestic space.
The Airtel ad also showcases new affordances of video calls available 
through upgrades to Airtel 3G and Airtel 2G. The mobile phone screen’s 
ability to vividly capture the sumptuous meal being cooked is shown in con-
junction with the Airtel 3G label, which is conspicuously prominent (see 
figure 3.1). Mobile phone companies and ad agencies claim that each new 
service offered or each new application supported by the mobile phone or 
the network provider is an “enhancement,” or, still better, an “enrichment” 
to the lives of their consumers, and hence requires a new advertisement. 
For instance, if Idea Cellular offers 3G services or Airtel supports Face-
book for the first time, this enrichment needs a new ad. In 2010 and 2011, 
when these ads first appeared, the ad world was trying to crack the code for 
how to showcase mobile phones that had “data” and not just “voice.”
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Gendered subjectivities and values assigned to particular practices are 
not only a field of contention in urban environments but are also key in 
small towns and rural areas. The use of cell phones by women in low- 
income households in small towns was considered transgressive, a chal-
lenge to traditional gender norms. While mobile phone ads celebrated 
the new liberated mobile wali (a woman in possession of a mobile phone), 
this mobile- fueled empowerment of women was also met with anxiety by 
the prevalent patriarchal system. Manoj Tiwari’s “Mobile Wali” song (ren-
dered in Bhojpuri with innuendos and suggestive lyrics) satirized the con-
dition of men and women coping with the new norms of social relations 
brought on by the introduction of mobile phones.18 By 2010, the mobile 
phone had become an object of desire and dismay, and its entanglement 
with discourses of sexuality seemed inevitable. The Lava brand of mobile 
phones marketed its Lava 10 mobile handset with an ad campaign having 
the following tagline— “The Lava 10 with the gun metal finish and mas-
culine edges separates the men from the boys.”19 The ad features a female 
supermarket cashier who, instead of offering teabags as a form of change 
(due to a shortage of coins), ends up offering condoms to a male customer 
who has just bought a new Lava 10 phone.
More broadly, advertising and marketing industry lore about Indians 
Figure 3.1. Boss (wife at home) calling husband at work. (Snapshot from Airtel 
Boss ad, 2015.)
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being known for their garrulity, argumentativeness, and make- do culture 
remains powerful. Not surprisingly, cell phone ads exploit these tenden-
cies when they suggest a “chota recharge” (small recharge). In a Vodafone/
Hutch ad, Bollywood actor Irfan Khan posits a situation where all the talk- 
time has been exhausted by the 20th day of the month, and the monthly 
salary has also been expended by then. In such circumstances, he suggests it 
is best to go for a “chota recharge” of only 50 rupees.20 In another ad Khan 
conjures a scenario where it is imminent that a lover needs to patch things 
up with his girlfriend on the phone, but has no talk- time left. Hoping that 
a simple “I love you” will suffice he can opt for a 10 rupee “chota recharge.” 
Mobile phone conversations involve intimacies and expressions, but these 
intimacies and expressions have to be budgeted, rationed, and calculated. 
Capitalism modulates affections.21 Here, it needs to be noted that what 
Khan/Vodafone are prescribing in terms of budgeting time or what Lava 
phone (in the earlier example) is suggesting as connoting masculinity may 
not necessarily be the way Indians use and perceive their mobile phones. 
That said, in the ad’s prescription/suggestion, there begins a process of at-
taching meanings and values on particular practices and perceptions.
The above- mentioned Vodafone ads emphasized economizing talk 
times and budgeting streaming videos, but this discourse was completely 
transformed by the arrival of Reliance Jio in December 2015. Jio promised 
free talk time and boundless data connectivity at affordable prices, thus 
unburdening its customers from worrying about talking or streaming too 
much. Jio’s icon had many balloons and its ads depicted Jio customers fly-
ing in the air supported by colorful balloons while chatting or surfing the 
Net on smartphones and devices connoting the unburdened freedom they 
felt.22 Jio customers simply did not have to count how many times they 
were downloading or streaming a video, something that legendary Bol-
lywood actor Amitabh Bachchan conveys in his inimitable baritone voice- 
over for a Jio ad: “Cricket, movies, downloads— bhala yeh bhi koi ginta 
hain?” (“Cricket, movies, downloads— does anybody count these things?”). 
The ad ends by showing a woman with outstretched hands in a lush field 
with the sun’s radiant light on her as Bachchan’s voice offers the coda: “Ab 
Ginh ke nahi, khul ke jio” (“Now, do not count and live, just live openly”).23
India’s conjugated narrative with the cell phone needs to be told keep-
ing in mind the nation’s cultural specificities, and yet it might be too much 
to say that such a narrative is “unique” to the nation. India’s regional dis-
parities, caste asymmetries, political carnivals, and gendered subjectivities 
provide opportunities to see varied perceptions, imaginations, and uses 
of cell phones. At times, mobile phones act as great equalizers, removing 
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some of the above- mentioned disparities, but during other times they cre-
ate new inequalities. Disparities within the population mean different audi-
ence segments have to be targeted. An Airtel executive once told me that 
when Airtel makes ads for rural consumers, they are more functional in 
nature, focusing on how the cell phone can help the villager’s livelihood. In 
contrast, when Airtel targets its urban users, the ads are thematic. The Air-
tel “Tarraki” ads featuring Rajpal Yadav and Shreyas Talpade set in rural or 
suburban India indeed follow the trajectory of how their lives have changed 
after acquiring a cell phone: through the use of cell phones, these villagers, 
who make their living playing instruments at weddings, start contacting 
their clients directly (and thus cut their earlier reliance on middlemen), 
thereby taking control of their own business.24 Airtel’s ads for urban youth, 
such as the very popular “Har Ek Dost Zaroori Hota Hain,” take place in a 
college classroom and concern themselves with cell phones being used for 
building and maintaining expanded socialities.25 Along similar lines, the ad 
for Samsung’s Guru brand of low- end mobile phones features Aamir Khan 
as a village youth who moves to the city, but is nonetheless able to main-
tain his village friendships through the Samsung phone. It is quite semioti-
cally telling that Khan is shown getting down from an Uttar Pradesh State 
Transport bus, a key identification object for a lot of youths traveling from 
small towns to big cities in search of work.26 Samsung Omnia has the same 
Aamir Khan as the brand ambassador, but this time Khan plays somebody 
who glides through the endless apps and services that Omnia, a higher end 
mobile handset, provides.27
That livelihood is the chief reason for people in rural India to buy 
phones might be somewhat untenable. In 2011, I was discussing with an In-
dian Institute of Technology Bombay computer science professor about an 
agriculture- informatics application he had installed in the mobile phones 
of several farmers in several villages of Maharashtra. This app was sup-
posed to help the farmers share seed and crop price updates. The professor 
clarified that farmers in rural Maharashtra do not spend their time on such 
apps, but use their phones mostly to listen to the weekly top 15 Bollywood 
songs. Thus, the cell phone is not merely a functional tool for rural Indians, 
but is an object associated with pleasure and entertainment.
Mobile phones and the Subaltern- Popular
The nation could be a hegemonic construct (and hermeneutic) if seen as 
a reconciliation of heterogeneities. Thus, alongside the national- popular, 
I am interested in briefly sketching the ways mobile media assemblages 
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operate in informal and piratical markets, and enable consumption and 
circulation of locally produced music videos (Bhojpuri, Mewati) and films 
in India’s hinterlands.
In Mewat (“land of Meos”), a region southwest of Delhi, Maulavis (re-
ligious preachers) strictly object to the consumption of visual images, and 
yet supposedly notorious “Mewati Videos” with “lurid” lyrics are popular 
there. Such music videos circulate amid the community’s tight censorship 
regime because producers deploy innovative publicity strategies. Mobile 
phone shop owners are key “mediators” in the music sharing network; 
the most prevalent way of circulating these videos within the villages is 
through microSD (micro Secure Digital memory) cards that are procured 
from phone vendors, which then make the videos compatible to be watched 
on mobile phones by performing the necessary format changes. The small 
and inconspicuous size of mobile phone screens and microSD cards (often 
carried in polythene covers kept in shirt pockets) ensure portability and aid 
youth in privately consuming (and circulating) such videos, thereby side-
stepping the risks of getting caught by village elders and religious men.28 
There is an entire informal economy of music video circulation that is 
enabled by microSD cards, Bluetooth, and mobile phones.
The memory card or the microSD card is a key flash memory technol-
ogy that supports download cultures in India, particularly in places where 
the bandwidth required for Internet streaming is unavailable. Music en-
thusiasts go to download vendors who put songs and music videos onto 
these memory cards, which are then plugged into mobile phones or $3 iPod 
knock- offs or audio players. These audio platforms themselves also generate 
affective associations with other popular consumer products: new Chinese- 
manufactured audio players (speakers) being sold in rural Gaya (in India 
where Bhojpuri music is popular) are made out of Gillette shaving cream 
or Coke bottle casings equipped to play music through USB and microSD 
cards (but not CDs or cassettes) (see figure 3.2). Some of these plastic cans 
also have images of Bollywood actors from a scene of their last films.
Operating between the stable and the ephemeral, between the cele-
brated and the censored, this subaltern- popular usage of mobile phones, 
which fashions vernacular lifeworlds in informal economies, remains un-
derstudied because of the selective conceptual frameworks of contempo-
rary scholarship. Such mobile media practices then remain “infra” in the 
sense of infrastructures, that is, invisible and illegible. Digitization has led 
to the micromaterialization of music: the mp3 phenomena plays out in differ-
ent ways in different parts of the world. While mapping digital music in the 
Figure 3.2. Memory card being put inside an Axe audio player in Gaya mobile 
phone shop
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United States makes us think of platforms like Tidal and Spotify (and then 
by extension cloud computing and server farms), the narrative of microSD 
cards in the rural hinterlands of India points toward a different trajectory 
of informal circulation.29 From 2010 to 2015 (before WhatsApp and then 
Jio connections) became popular, memory cards were being used exten-
sively by migrant workers in informal settlements (slums) in urban and 
peri- urban areas. Mobile recharge shops for cheap feature phones were 
a place where these memory cards were sold and loaded with music, and 
Swati Janu has noted how such recharge shops (along with cyber cafés and 
underground gaming parlors) have acted as an “informal digital substruc-
ture” for settlement dwellers in cities like Delhi and Mumbai.30
Alongside memory cards, Bluetooth technology is an integral part of 
the Indian cellular imagination. Bluetooth is a key technology of audio and 
video transfer among villagers in rural India. The mobile phone not only 
enables conversations but also allows for listening to music, thus function-
ing as a radio. The process of sharing music across phones through Blue-
tooth is termed “Bultoo” by particular tribal communities.31 The number 
of radio programs in tribal languages is very limited. Many indigenous 
tribes living in dense forests in India have used the potential of Bluetooth 
to get their voices heard on radio programs made in their own languages 
of Kurukh (Oraon tribe) and Mundari (Munda tribe) among others. They 
record the music and news from their locality and transfer them through 
Bluetooth. This content then moves across several villages to finally reach 
a panchayat town where it can be uploaded to the Internet portal CG-
Net Swara for wider dissemination. Radio programs featuring music and 
news can be heard over mobile phones through Bluetooth sharing, a phe-
nomenon labeled “bultoo radio.” Mobile phone technologies have brought 
about an oral and vernacular resurgence in India, and in doing so have 
redefined media citizenship.
In a recent article, Jackie O’Neill and others argue that while, in 2009, 
microSD cards and Bluetooth were key file sharing technologies, by 2015, 
with the easy availability of low- cost smartphones, WhatsApp has become 
the primary sharing app among even lower middle- class population groups 
in Indian urban centers such as Bangalore.32 Much of my study on memory 
cards in Mewat was done in 2013 and things are changing there as well, 
with many of my interview participants chatting with me on WhatsApp 
nowadays. That said, during my January 2016 fieldwork in the peri- urban 
regions of Gaya, I still observed wide use of memory cards on feature 
phones for music sharing/listening among working- class populations. The 
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entry of Jio has more recently further led to decreased use of memory cards 
because streaming has become both more available and more affordable.
Cellular and mobile infrastructures
Cell phones require two key infrastructures to operate: the wireless spec-
trum and cell towers. The scarcity of spectrum as a resource has often led to 
desperate battles between competing cellular operators, sometimes expos-
ing the connivance of governmental officials who are supposed to be acting 
as regulators (of the telecom sector) but have thoroughly compromised 
their positions by favoring one telecom service provider over another. In 
2008, the former telecom minister A. Raja was found to be involved in 
illegally undercharging cellular companies during the distribution of spec-
trum licenses. This became the infamous 2G scandal, which led to a severe 
loss of credibility for Raja’s party (DMK, or the Dravida Munnetra Kazha-
gam) and the Congress- led United Progressive Alliance government.33 On 
December 22, 2017, a special court judge acquitted A. Raja who, along with 
the Congress Party, then said that they were clean all along and that the 2G 
scandal was all about perception of corruption and not actual corruption.34 
The public interest in the 2G spectrum allocation scandal was not only 
because of the huge sums of money involved but also because corruption 
in the rapidly growing telecom sector is viewed as a retrenchment of the 
government’s commitment to technological development.
More recently, with the entry of Reliance Jio, the spectrum wars 
are heating up again. In 2016, Jio acquired spectrum in the 800MHz, 
1800MHz, and 2300MHz bands. This led Jio’s competitor and India’s larg-
est telecom provider, Bharti Airtel, to acquire the Norwegian telecom firm 
Telenor’s India operations so as to use the company’s 43.4 MHz spectrum 
in the 1800 MHz band. Such spectrum consolidation is crucial for Airtel 
to expand its customer base and match Jio’s network capacity in delivering 
4G data services. In order to withstand competition from Jio and Airtel, 
two other cellular operators, Idea and Vodafone, also decided to merge to 
increase their net spectrum footprint.35 Thus, spectrum as a key resource 
and infrastructure is very much a part of the Indian cellular imagination.
Cell towers are ubiquitous in the Indian skyscape but they were also 
inconspicuous for a long time until their disruptive effects came to the 
forefront. Cell towers acquired visibility in 2010 when the signals emitted 
by them were considered potentially carcinogenic. This, however, is only 
one kind of image/imagination of cell towers. After dams and nuclear reac-
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tors, cellular infrastructures, which enable omniscience and connectivity, 
are touted as the new temples (and cathedrals) of (modern) India.
Since 2010, there was growing uncertainty within the expert commu-
nity including radio- frequency scientists and oncologists about how to 
measure radiation from cell antennas, how to affix threshold levels, and 
how to ascertain their effects on different human bodies, including those 
of women, children, the young, and the elderly.36 Regulations set by the In-
dian Department of Telecommunication and municipal corporations were 
openly being flouted by tower companies and commercial establishments 
that offered their rooftops to cellular operators to set up towers. Gaurav 
Bhatia lives in Clover Apartments in Cuffe Parade area in Mumbai. He 
fears for the health of his preteen boy and girl because of 29 cell anten-
nas that are located on the rooftop of the Hotel Supreme, a commercial 
lodge next to his residential apartment. This particular picture (see figure 
3.3) taken from Bhatia’s balcony of the Hotel Supreme terrace should give 
some sense of just how blatantly laws regarding cell antenna siting have 
been flouted.
During the cell tower radiation controversy, people felt helpless and 
frustrated because they were unable to evict proximate towers. After a 
while, cancer was not the only potential problem from cell antenna signals. 
Urban residents living close to towers complained of severe headaches, 
hair loss, nausea, and sleeplessness, thereby demonstrating a heightened 
sensitivity to electromagnetic fields, often referred to as “electrosensitiv-
ity.” Beyond the embodied experiences of using mobile phones, we also 
need to understand the affective encounters between human bodies and 
infrastructures (which support mobile phones) that arise because of inter-
actions and interferences between antenna signals (electromagnetic fields) 
and neural impulses in the body.37
Bollywood celebrities like Juhi Chawla and Farhan Akhtar supported 
concerned citizens (who often were elite urban middle- class people) in cam-
paigning for stricter regulation of cell antennas. This campaign reached its 
peak in August 2012. Cellular operators complained that the cell tower ra-
diation scare had impeded the growth of cell towers. While mobile towers 
may not be environmentally sustainable, they help to sustain calls. Begin-
ning in 2015, mobile phone users who subscribed to a number of different 
telecom companies had to face incomplete conversations. Other problems 
related to connectivity, weak mobile signal, patchy mobile Internet data ser-
vices, and busy networks were also reported.38 When asked for an explana-
tion, cellular companies pointed to insufficient spectrum and mobile towers 
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as the causes. Both these causes are infrastructural and are very much a part 
of the cellular imagination. Should we still imagine cell towers to be the new 
temples of neoliberal 21st century India or should we consider them poten-
tial radiation machines? Are we fine with tolerating cell towers just because 
they help us to have smooth mobile phone connectivity?
The same argument about (enhancement of) infrastructures is given 
by telecom companies when they argue against net neutrality. Suggesting 
that the Internet cannot be a public commons, when multiple infrastruc-
tures, whether they be spectrum or cables or cell towers, are dependent on 
private investment, the telecom companies (telcos) in India have wanted 
to create high- bandwidth (hi- speed) lanes for services and sites that pay 
them more. Advocates of net neutrality have argued that this would lead to 
prioritizing the already powerful companies and their services, thus com-
promising the fundamental democratic nature of Internet communication.
In developing nations like India (and countries such as Indonesia, Phil-
ippines, Zambia), the net neutrality debate takes another turn. Specific 
telecom providers (like Airtel) can work with particular companies (such as 
Flipkart) to provide their (Flipkart’s) services a zero- rating (for a fees that 
Flipkart has paid to Airtel) so that a user of that particular telecom provid-
Figure 3.3. Cell antenna cluster atop Hotel Supreme (Cuffe Parade, Mumbai)
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er’s (Airtel’s) connection will not have to buy an additional consumer data 
pack for that service. For many other services, the consumer of Airtel’s con-
nection will have to buy extra data packs.39 This is something that the comic 
collective All India Bakchod (AIB) mentioned in their popular video while 
campaigning for protecting net neutrality in India. They name- dropped 
Flipkart in their video and also gestured toward the famous Airtel ad “Har 
Ek Dost Zaroori Hota Hain/Every Friend Is Necessary,” even implying at 
one point that not all friends are really necessary, and that our telecom op-
erator might not be our friend after all.40 AIB often makes irreverent satire 
on the political culture of India. That AIB decided to make a video uphold-
ing net neutrality suggests that telecom policies are culturally resonant, for 
such policies in the process of being enacted might have ramifications for 
prevalent values and practices. AIB, which depends on social media for the 
promotion and circulation of its videos, suggested that telcos might decide 
to slow down the loading of AIB videos if net neutrality were eschewed. In 
urban India, where the start- up culture is gaining momentum, attacks on 
net neutrality by telecom operators were seen as a threat to newly starting 
small businesses that could not afford to pay fees to telcos that Facebook 
and WhatsApp can in exchange for preferential treatment.
Conclusion
A chapter that explores the Indian cellular imagination must acknowledge 
the limits of any mapping exercise given the sheer scale, linguistic and re-
gional diversity, and so on. I have flitted from one ad to another event, one 
app to still another practice in order to understand the dynamism of the 
Indian mobile media ecology, which has been shaped by historical forces, 
market competition, technological developments, and cultural messiness. 
My goal here has been to show how mobile mediation envelops the deeply 
divided social fabric of India. Mobile mediation has an infrastructural as-
pect that cannot be ignored as posh residents of Carmichael Road in Mum-
bai, for instance, discovered when cases of cancer in their neighborhood 
were attributed to proximate cell towers. Cell towers were viewed as en-
croachments and yet could not be done away with because people were so 
used to the convenience of using the always- connected cell phone.
The Indian cellular imagination is partly created by Bollywood and ad-
vertisements as they package and market affective desires, intimacies, and 
vulnerabilities about the mobile phone. However, the national- popular di-
mensions of Bollywood can be hegemonic and commercial advertisement 
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might be presenting controlled contingencies (and not situated precarities), 
and therefore one has to understand the subaltern practices (workaround 
cultures) of working with cell phones under limited electricity, bandwidth, 
talk- time, and so on. Imaginations are after all enacted in lived practices.
Modi’s vision of “Digital India” is predicated on a series of apps/plat-
forms such as PayGov and BHIM (Bharat Interface for Money) that ensure 
demonetization, e- government, online delivery of banking documents, and 
net banking. Various e- government initiatives that once started with com-
puter kiosks have now become Web 2.0 apps/e- portals like BHIM. With a 
majority of Indian citizens accessing Internet (only) through their mobile 
phones, the smartphone is a crucial device to make it possible for ordinary 
citizens to utilize these services. In such a governmental vision of India, 
the mobile phone, simply put, is the most crucial tool of governmentality.
Beyond governmentality, “Digital India” is also about the politics of 
aspiration, and the mobile phone has furthered this production of aspira-
tion, bringing rural Indians in virtual (yet intimate) contact with urban 
middle- class lifestyles. Due to the mobile media devices they own and op-
erate, even people within low- income groups now are aware of the large 
variety of consumer choices available if only one had money. Whether it 
is a network service like Jio or an application like WhatsApp, the addi-
tions to mobile media are continuing to breach limits of streaming and 
communication, and perhaps even more significantly, the capacity to aspire 
and desire. In contributing to the narrative of aspirational India, mobile 
media are not just helping Indians imagine an optimistic future, but also 
furthering anxieties about new vulnerabilities such as hate- filled rumors 
about (vulnerable) minority communities smuggling cattle or kidnapping 
children. Even Jio streaming services sometimes do not work due to ab-
sence of proximate cell towers and spectrum distribution issues. Further-
more, WhatsApp is unable to find ways of regulating circulation of rumors 
through its own platform. Infrastructural limits thus have a way of punc-
turing myths of freedom and aspirational mobilities. In this unpredictable 
India of aspirational mobilities, young Indians spend their entire day on 
smartphones, partly because they do not have a stable job, and perhaps also 
because their temporary job entails forwarding thousands of WhatsApp 
messages to hundreds of WhatsApp groups for political mobilization.
While conceptualizing the mobile phone (or still better, mobile me-
dia) as part of, and embedded in, Indian cultures, this chapter has demon-
strated how lived experiences of social space and time have changed with 
mobile technologies. These shifting considerations of social space- times 
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have a bearing on concerns of privacy, decency, gender- religion- and- caste 
dynamics, public- private boundaries, and perhaps most importantly, on the 
social fabric of the country.
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Bridging the Deepest Digital Divides
A History and Survey of Digital Media in Myanmar
Daniel Arnaudo
The digital divide between those inside this online world and those outside 
is deep and profound. Entering and mastering this space is a steep climb. 
One of the deepest divides, followed by one of the most rapid ascents, 
can be found in Myanmar. This is true principally because the country is 
undergoing a political transition that is just as sudden. After decades form-
ing part of the British Empire, an authoritarian regime led by the mili-
tary controlled the state in various forms from the 1960s until 2010, when 
the government initiated reforms and allowed more free elections. These 
reforms included opening up the Internet, removing censorship controls, 
restricting surveillance, allowing the sale of computers, modems, and cell 
phones, and granting citizens access to the global network.
An examination of the history of the country, formerly known as Burma, 
shows how media has played a key role in defining its political system. This 
began with a colonial press when Burma was part of the British Empire 
and India, continued with a briefly democratic media after independence, 
followed by increasing consolidation and government control under the 
military dictatorship. At the same time, an international network of exiles 
shaped global opinion about the country and linked it to the newly com-
mercialized Internet. This network played a role in encouraging demo-
cratic reforms, starting with changes in policies by the dictatorship in 2010, 
followed by local elections, the freeing of political prisoners, and culmi-
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nating in the election of the opposition National League for Democracy 
(NLD) party to a large majority in parliament in 2015 and control of the 
presidency and legislature in 2016.
In the past five years, the Internet has become available to anyone in 
Myanmar with a cell phone. As late as 2011 less than 1 percent of the popu-
lation had used the Internet, making it one of the least virtually accessible 
points on earth, after North Korea, East Timor, and Eritrea.1 Simultane-
ously, a media system that had been completely controlled by the military 
became relatively independent. This combination of factors has created a 
relatively unique situation of a country moving from a completely closed 
authoritarian system to an open, democratic one while adopting a modern, 
largely mobile Internet.
The development of the Internet in Myanmar, with its rapidly transi-
tioning democratic political system, has created a networked public sphere2 
that has been shaped by the dictatorship but is no longer completely be-
holden to it. Foreign companies have been invited to invest in the country, 
and the nature of a borderless network has given multinationals an entry 
into a newly digitized population without any invitation by a state that 
once sought omnipotence and omnipresence. This chapter will examine 
this media history intertwined with the development of Myanmar’s Inter-
net, the transition toward democracy, and how the country’s digital media 
has come to reflect the fractured, recovering polity and rapidly developing 
society that Myanmar has become.
Burma’s Painful Birth and Unresolved Ethnic Conflicts
Myanmar is undergoing a revolution in media across platforms with a pop-
ulation that has very little experience with any form of a free press, either 
print or digital. However, the country is also in the midst of an ongoing 
transition to democracy as this media landscape shifts rapidly. Since World 
War II and independence, what was then Burma struggled with the forma-
tion of a national identity. Burmese are the dominant ethnic group, making 
up roughly 68 percent of the population, but a number of other groups 
including Shan, Kachin, and Chin make up a significant proportions of 
the national census,3 and declared war after their claims to power were 
ignored. The Pangalong Agreement signed in 1947 formed the Union of 
Burma in 1948 through independence from Great Britain, and guaran-
teed various rights to autonomy for other ethnic peoples, particularly the 
Chin, Kachin, and Shan, who were signatories.4 However, negotiations to 
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construct the shape of the Union collapsed after the assassination of Aung 
San, the principal leader of Burma’s independence and the nascent govern-
ment’s signatory of the Agreement. The lack of any accord to formally or-
ganize the country in a federal political system respecting ethnic autonomy 
over local affairs crippled the Union of Burma and led to growing insur-
gencies. With the fall of the Union to a group of senior military officers 
led by Army Chief of Staff General Ne Win, these conflicts deepened as 
the new leadership eliminated opposition and promoted a “Burmese path 
to socialism.” Following years of varying forms of dictatorship from 1961 
until 2010, these conflicts continued and created independent zones where 
rebel groups controlled territory, sometimes with the support of China, 
with which Myanmar shares a border, along with Thailand, Laos, Bangla-
desh, and India.
These conflicts remain a central issue for the new democratically 
elected government of Aung Sung Su Kyi (daughter of Aung San) and her 
National League for Democracy party, which continues to primarily repre-
sent Burmese. Ethnic groups outside of the central, developed areas and on 
the fringes of political movements continue to struggle for access to power 
and economic resources in this context.
Burmese Media under the Dictatorship
By the time the Internet became commercialized and entered into common 
global usage in the 1990s, Myanmar’s media and information landscape 
had been locked tight8 in an authoritarian political system for decades. 
After a brief flowering in the interwar years under the British, independent 
Burmese media had diminished by the Second World War and the growing 
conflicts throughout the country in the turbulent period that created the 
independent Union of Burma.5 The same gunmen who assassinated Aung 
San and ended hopes for a federal state also killed many in his govern-
ment simultaneously, including the first minister of information and the 
publisher of the influential journal Deedok, Ba Cho. Others were targeted 
in the aftermath including U Saw, the editor and founder of the influential 
Thuriya newspaper, who was arrested for his role in the murder of U Saw 
and hung by the British in 1948.6 By the time an independent Burmese 
state formed, the press had been sufficiently cowed by threats of assassina-
tion, exile, or economic hardship to self- censor or go out of business.
The military dictatorship tightened its grip on power from the forma-
tion of a Union Revolutionary Council in 1962 until it banned all politi-
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cal parties other than the military’s Burmese Socialist Programme Party 
in 1964. Afterwards, the government increasingly consolidated the media 
and instituted new laws restricting the remaining independent press. Par-
ticularly through the Law for the Registration of Printers and Publishers 
of 1962, the government moved to tighten dissent within the media and 
opposition parties. This included restrictions on what the press could say, 
political objectives and party platforms, and a requirement that censors 
vet all publications before approval.7 This law would be cited repeatedly 
by successive military governments in justifying crackdowns on dissidents, 
media, and nascent opposition parties. A Press Scrutiny Board censored 
content and kept track of all that was written or broadcast.
The regime slowly nationalized or closed the remaining independent 
newspapers, and by the end of the 1960s only six government- run publica-
tions remained. The import of foreign papers were also heavily restricted, 
and local bureaus of international organizations such as Reuters were 
forced to use correspondents that had been approved by the government, 
creating unique hybrid bureaus controlled by foreign groups but reporting 
the dictatorship’s perspective.8 Myanmar’s radio became completely gov-
ernment operated in this period, television did not come to the country 
until very late, June 3, 1980, and only in Rangoon until a few years later.9 
In 1985, the Ministry of Communications, Posts, and Telegraphs enacted a 
special Television and Video Law, later updated in 1996. The law required 
a government license for anyone to acquire television or video equipment 
such as a satellite dish or broadcasting equipment, effectively placing any 
video technology under government control, and limiting the means of 
citizens for receiving foreign broadcasts.10
Myanmar’s people could receive foreign radio broadcasts such as the 
BBC and Voice of America, or the Democratic Voice of Burma, operating 
a long- range signal out of Norway.11 The BBC’s Burmese service in par-
ticular became one of the most popular regional languages, but the gov-
ernment also became very effective at jamming these foreign signals. In 
general, the media environment had entered completely under the control 
of the military.
Local radio systems operated sporadically in rebel areas, in particular 
the People’s Voice of Burma, controlled by the Chinese- sponsored Com-
munist Party of Burma, which operated from the late ‘60s in China and 
in the Wa hills in the northeastern part of the country. Local peoples did 
operate independent samizdat operations within these ethnic areas, par-
ticularly the “Karens, Shans, Kachins, Palaungs, Pa- Os, Karennis and 
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Rohingya Muslims from Arakan State” but these did not circulate widely 
because of the heavy government control and the limited reach of these 
groups.12
In this heavily restricted and almost completely closed environment, 
cracks began to appear in the late 1980s, as the economy entered into cri-
sis and people pressed for a change in government. Stressed by growing 
changes, the government moved to stop the riots and protests, particularly 
those organized around universities, which came to a head in the “8888 
Revolution” starting around the August 8, 1988. The government repressed 
the protests by declaring martial law and firing into crowds, murdering and 
imprisoning thousands in the process.13
After suspending the constitution, they instituted the State Law and 
Order Restoration Council (SLORC), headed by the military chief, Saw 
Maung. SLORC said it had been called to maintain law and order, improve 
transportation as well as the humanitarian situation, and hold elections.14 
In 1989, SLORC renamed the country Myanmar, partly to recognize the 
different ethnic groups in the country apart from the ethnic Burmans and 
to undo the colonial legacy, among other factors.15
In the aftermath of this uprising, various members of the opposition 
formed a new party, the National League for Democracy, to contest na-
tional elections in 1990, which SLORC declared would be open and fair. 
Suu Kyi took on the leadership of the party. After winning 392 seats in the 
National Assembly and nearly 59 percent of the popular vote, it appeared 
the NLD would take power, but the SLORC annulled the results, refused 
to allow the legislature to convene, and cracked down on opposition anew. 
It placed Suu Kyi under a house arrest that would continue off and on for 
the next two decades.16
The Burmese Internet Forms in Exile
However, in this period a key factor changed the political equilibrium: 
the global adoption of the commercial Internet, including by Myanmar’s 
people. As early as 1988, exiles from groups such as the Committee for the 
Restoration of Democracy in Burma and the All Burma Students Demo-
cratic Front were operating Usenet groups to spread information about 
the country and organize.17 In 1994, the Open Society Institute funded the 
creation of BurmaNet, an e- mail listserv that morphed into a website later 
in the 1990s. Universities in the developed world particularly connected to 
the web and served as organizing centers for Burmese exiles such as Muang 
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Zarni at the University of Wisconsin, who organized the Free Burma Co-
alition in 1995. This online coalition grew to connect “[r]oughly 150 col-
leges and universities, thirty high schools, over one hundred community- 
based Burma support groups, and individual supporters in twenty- eight 
countries scattered in Asia, Australia, North America, and Europe.” This 
had the goal of ending investment by multinationals in Burma and building 
an “international Free Burma movement in support of Burma’s freedom 
struggle.”18
Conversely, the government established several international websites 
to promote its image abroad, including registering Myanmar.com, the In-
ternational Telecommunications Union’s (ITU) Myanmar website, and 
the Myanmar Information Committee.19 These generally promoted the 
regime’s views to the international community and were not for domestic 
consumption. Written in English, they distributed government- controlled 
news sources such as the New Light of Myanmar, or offered propaganda 
on ethnic conflicts, drug trafficking, the regime’s position on political is-
sues, and tourism information.
Domestically, the country’s nascent networks remained under the con-
trol of the military, which restricted online technology in much the same 
way they had controlled video technology under the 1985 Television and 
Video Law, which they updated in 1996. They bolstered it with a new 
Computer Science and Development Law mandating similar controls on 
ICTs such as modems, fax machines, computers, and software.20 Posses-
sion of almost any ICTs without a permit would result in imprisonment. 
Internet access itself required approval of the government, which operated 
the domestic networks and kept them heavily monitored. For example, cy-
ber cafes were required to record user browsing every five minutes.21 The 
Ministry of Defense controlled the country’s only Internet server, and any 
e- mail correspondence was monitored and redacted.22
Simultaneously, its surveillance infrastructure grew to manage the new 
threat, particularly with a new electronic center in Rangoon23 and various 
listening posts in place throughout the country to monitor activity in the 
new virtual space.24 As a result of these laws, a strong censorship system 
became largely self- policing through fear of an omnipresent surveillance 
infrastructure, and a severely restricted media and political system. A so-
ciety had formed by the beginning of the twenty- first century with few 
links to the outside world, no independent media, and a complete lack of 
experience with ICTs.
However, information persisted on entering this closed world, partly 
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through the growing online networks created in the 1990s. Early Usenet 
groups and e- mail listservs transformed into websites such as BurmaNet, 
Radio Free Burma, the Free Burma Project, and others, which began to 
publish and share longer articles.25 The NLD continued to organize and 
advocate for free and fair elections despite the fact that its leadership had 
been imprisoned, killed, or forced into exile, and its leader Suu Kyi was in 
a near continual state of house arrest.26 In 1999, the country connected to 
the SEA- WE- ME 3 cable, the first truly transoceanic, higher bandwidth 
Internet connection for a country that previously had had to use satellite 
or dial- up connections to get online.27 New stronger means of access de-
veloped as national and global events altered people’s perceptions of the 
regime, and the creation of a Burmese language Internet helped accelerate 
these transformations, improving organization for opposition groups and 
providing a means for Myanmar’s people to connect online and confront 
the regime.
The Struggle to Code the Burmese Language
One of the key tools to develop a national cyberspace is a font for native 
language encoding, certified as Unicode by the World Wide Web Con-
sortium. As the regime had no interest in developing this standard and no 
real expertise at the time, a group of Burmese expatriates designed their 
own system known as Zawgyi so that they could communicate in their own 
language and allow for the propagation of Burmese media online. Unfor-
tunately, this standard did not hew to the Unicode system rules, and was 
rather hard coded in such a way that it is difficult to translate the characters 
into other systems.28
The Burmese language is much different from Latin languages. The 
writing process comprises a base character modified by selected compo-
nents to create different meanings. Before new intelligent rendering sys-
tems came into common usage, typing any Myanmar language on a com-
puter was difficult. Early operating systems and particularly Windows up 
to XP Service Pack 2 did not support systems that could render Myanmar 
text properly. The solution was to hard code variations of the same char-
acter, rather than changing elements within the character.29 The Myazedi 
character set, first released out of beta in 2003, represented one of the first 
versions of this.30 However, it was expensive to use, costing $100 for a user 
and $1,000 for a developer.31
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In 2006, a group of developers based in Mandalay released a similar 
font named Zawgyi that contained many elements of Myazedi and could be 
used for free. Much of the code base appears to have been copied and then 
modified from Myazedi, but because it did not cost anything to use, early 
Internet citizens rapidly adopted it. The Zawgyi script maintained the hard 
coded nature of Myazedi, and as a result a single word could be written 
in various ways, and it did not conform to Unicode standards that ensure 
compliance with rendering across languages and countries.
By the early 2000s, the Internet had entered pockets of the country, 
principally Yangon and Mandalay, and the government instituted new web 
regulations, in addition to existing censorship laws such as the 1962 Print-
ers and Publishers Act and restrictions on owning ICTs. These decreed:
• Any writings detrimental to the interests of the Union of Myanmar 
[Burma] are not to be posted.
• Any writings directly or indirectly detrimental to the current poli-
cies and secret security affairs of the government of the Union of 
Myanmar are not to be posted.
• Writings related to politics are not to be posted.
• Internet users are to inform MPT [Ministry of Communications, 
Post and Telegraph] of any threat on the Internet.
• Internet users are to obtain prior permission from the organization 
designated by the state to create Web pages.32
The government also approved the Electronic Transactions Act, which 
criminalized electronic transactions “detrimental to the security of the 
state or prevalence of law and order or community peace and tranquility or 
national solidarity, or national culture.”33 These laws, along with the ICT 
ownership restrictions in the Computer Science and Development Law of 
1996, prior censorship laws, and pervasive security and surveillance contin-
ued to severely restrict domestic users’ online access.
However, despite these challenges, Myanmar’s blogosphere exploded 
with the help of new language encoding that allowed Burmese and other 
ethnic speakers to begin to converse in their own words. Disruptive events 
such as the Saffron Revolution in 2007, a political protest sparked by monks 
denouncing rising fuel prices,34 and Cyclone Nargis, disrupted traditional 
communications across the country and led to calls for better emergency 
response, coordination, and information resources for ordinary citizens.35 
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The revolts during the Saffron Revolution caused the government to shut 
down the national Internet by disconnecting its international connections, 
blocking websites, and prohibiting foreign press access.36 The blockages 
didn’t stop the spread of information and the network effects from those 
with connections to the Internet. In 2005 there were less than 10 blogs 
dedicated to Myanmar’s news and politics, while by August 2009 there 
were over 140.37
While the Internet remained out of the reach of most of Myanmar’s 
people due to the dictatorship’s continued control of ICTs and a lack of 
development, communities outside Myanmar and the small domestic user 
base allowed to use computers began to create content and propagate it 
primary in the free Zawgyi script. As in all countries around the world, this 
increasingly came in the form of cell phones and other mobile ICTs such as 
tablets. In 2005, a Unicode compliant script known as Myanmar1 created 
an alternative that rendered the Burmese language properly, but continued 
to struggle because of the difficulties involved in configuring it to work 
with Windows. Zawgyi also gained popularity among Burmese bloggers 
and particularly through the popular planet.com.mm website.38
Partly because many users began their experience using ICTs with Za-
wgyi and also because it is designed to be built into software such as Micro-
soft Word or Explorer without an easy uninstall option, migration became 
a challenge. Minority ethnic groups remained severely underrepresented 
in terms of online media, as they had in other forms, partly because of 
the rigid nature of the coding schema, focused on Burmese. As with many 
unique languages, including Burmese itself, the languages of Myanmar’s 
diverse ethnic groups require a unique coding and an online community, 
which was often weak or nonexistent, to support it. The struggles to en-
code and standardize the Burmese language online represent a major leg-
acy of the dictatorship in a unique way that hinders translation, adoption 
by major online media or Internet companies, search, and a host of other 
online functions.
The use of the Zawgyi font has created a cascade of issues, present 
and future. Search, filtering, or indeed any type of activity that requires a 
machine to recognize the script becomes problematic. As more applica-
tions use modern programming techniques, machine learning, and voice 
recognition, these problems stemming from Zawgyi’s hard coded nature 
will become more apparent. It also leaves little room for expansion and use 
by other ethnic languages, which are continually underrepresented in the 
online space.39
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Transitions in Democratic and Virtual Space
Now the country had its language and nascent connections to a growing 
international activist network, but an entrenched regime that refused to 
move forward. This changed drastically in 2010, when the military ceded 
power to a nominally civilian government. The NLD did not participate in 
the election,40 calling the system unfair and the results fraudulent.41 None-
theless, the new, nominally civilian administration still controlled by the 
military began allowing serious reforms.
The military released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, allowed 
her to travel the country, released political prisoners, and allowed them to 
contest future elections that they said would be free and fair. The regime 
also promised to open up the economy, legalized unions, and guaranteed 
freedom of information.42 In an interview published in 2012, the minis-
ter of information described three stages the government would follow to 
achieve media independence:
“We have been relaxing restrictions on the press phase by phase. In 
this [first] step, we are paving the way for domestic periodicals to 
practice press freedom with responsibility and accountability . . . a 
learning period in order to work in harmony with the future print 
media law . . . Because of these reforms today, 173 journals and 124 
magazines can now publish without prior approval from the Press 
Scrutiny and Registration Department  .  .  . In the second step, we 
are dealing with a new print media law that ensures press freedom 
in accord with the Constitution and replacing the existing Regis-
tration of Printers and Publishers Law (1962). In this process, the 
Myanmar government has been cooperating with regional media 
organizations since 2008. We are currently in the process of drafting 
the new media law, and [will] include the outcome from this confer-
ence in the second draft.” In the third stage, he said, the Ministry of 
Information will support the private media sector “for [the] harmo-
nious exercise [of] freedom and accountability under the new print 
media law.”43
This process quickly accelerated, as domestic press outlets proliferated 
rapidly. On March 4, 2014, the government passed a new Media Law, al-
lowing for newspapers and television and radio stations to report the news 
more independently. The law superseded the censorious 1962 Printing and 
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Publishers Registration Act to allow publications about politics and indeed 
any subject with far fewer controls, but others laws still remain to threaten 
imprisonment, encouraging self- censorship.44 In August 2015, the parlia-
ment approved a law to allow private control of television stations.45 For-
eign broadcasts of both television and radio channels are allowed through 
satellite connections, which have proliferated rapidly, especially in urban 
areas such as Yangon.46 Restrictions on the import and use of ICT and 
audio- video technologies such as the 1985 Television and Video or the 
Computer Science and Development laws have been superseded or sus-
pended but not repealed since the return of partial democracy.47
In addition to completely new mass media, Myanmar faced a challenge 
in that cell phones quickly became ubiquitous, but hardly anyone has expe-
rience with computers or other ICTs, nor understanding of informational 
concepts such as searching, sharing, or verifying. Myanmar’s cellular sys-
tem started under the control of the dictator in control of the country in 
the 1990s, Ne Win, which the government later transferred to the control 
of the Ministry of Communications, Post and Telegraph (MPT) after his 
arrest during an alleged coup attempt in 2002. Under Ne Win’s control in 
the late ‘90s, SIM cards were a restricted ICT and required a military con-
nection or approval to purchase for as much as $3,300.48 These remained 
highly priced at around $500 and thoroughly restricted until 2012, when 
the government cut the price in half and then to less than $2,49 allowed 
the public to purchase them without approval, and began the process of 
allowing competition to enter the market. In 2014, MPT granted two for-
eign telecoms, the United Arab Emirates’ Ooredoo and Norway’s Telenor, 
15- year licenses to build out networks covering around 90 percent of the 
country within two to three years, starting in the major cities.50
The Internet is conceptualized much differently in the mobile context, 
especially in developing countries with fewer resources, low broadband 
penetration, and a weak educational system.51 These competencies are 
poorly understood by the vast majority of the population. While literacy 
is high at roughly 93 percent,52 there is a low level of development, and a 
weak educational system with universities and schools plagued by years of 
shutdowns, underfunding, authoritarian administrative control, and cen-
sorship. Simultaneously, few users have prior experience with independent 
media, the Internet, or ICTs outside of members of academia, the govern-
ment, and the military.
With no restrictions in place and cheaper technology available, Myan-
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mar’s people rapidly adopted cell phones and other ICTs. However, while 
they are able to communicate using the new devices, they are often spread-
ing information without understanding the underlying context. While lit-
eracy is high, media and information literacy is lower, as people have little 
experience with either the new devices, the Internet, or independent me-
dia. According to the International Telecommunications Union, there were 
fewer than 600,000 mobile phones in 2010, but by 2015 reported over 40 
million subscriptions.53 However, rapid adoption of cell phone technology 
came alongside a low adoption of traditional computing and broadband 
technology— a situation common across the developing world. The ITU 
measured Myanmar’s broadband penetration rate at less than 2 percent in 
2014,54 while the cost of access remains high, at least $17 a month for basic 
broadband, and anywhere from $200 to $1,000 for a fiber- optic high- speed 
connection.55 All of these costs remain exceedingly high for individuals in a 
country with GDP of just over $980 per capita in 2014. Broadband access 
outside of the major metropolitan areas is negligible to nonexistent.56 In 
2014, Myanmar’s neighbor, Thailand, had a similarly low level of Internet 
penetration at around 8 percent, but still a much higher level of cell phone 
adoption, with 144 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants.57
New international connections are coming, both overland to Thailand 
and China, as well as over the sea, particularly the new SEA ME WE 5 
cable that will connect Myanmar to an international consortium of coun-
tries from Singapore to Marseille, France. The 20,000 kilometer cable sys-
tem launched in 2016 has a 23Tb/s capacity,58 a major upgrade from the 
existing SEA ME WE 3’s 4.6 Tb/s capacity, which will also provide greater 
redundancy in international links than has been the case in the past.59 The 
Myanmar link, projected to be completed by the end of 2018, and further 
international and regional connections are coming through the overland 
Myanmar- Malaysia- Thailand Interconnect (MYTHIC) and transoceanic 
Asia Africa Europe- 1 (AAE- 1) cables.60 As discussed, access remains rela-
tively slow and expensive for the population, and will remain so at least 
until these initiatives are completed.
Domestically, in January 2017 the government granted a fourth license 
to the Vietnamese owned Viettel and a consortium of Myanmar companies 
(Myanmar Economic Corporation or MECTel) controlled by the military. 
The group will operate under the name MyTel and use existing infrastruc-
ture controlled by the local MECTel group with a focus on bringing low 
cost 2G and 3G services, particularly to rural areas.61
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Modern Myanmar’s Online Ecosystem
Major cell phone and device manufacturers such as Huawei and Samsung 
preload Zawgyi in Android operating systems so that new users continue 
to come online using the flawed font. Facebook, the network they are most 
likely to begin using first, supports the Unicode and Zawgyi standards, but 
because so much content is in the latter, and new adopters gain experience 
with it first, it continues to be the default.62
Companies besides Facebook have been slow or unwilling to adopt the 
Zawgyi standard. Microsoft has not developed Myanmar language software 
or documentation for most of its applications, and Internet companies such 
as Google have been slow to adopt a consistent framework for its products 
entering Myanmar. As the first mover and an ecosystem that allows Zawgyi 
without conflict, Facebook has become the dominant platform. A survey 
in 2014 by the Sri Lankan NGO LIRNEasia found that many people, not 
only in Myanmar but across Asia, were not even aware that they were using 
the Internet. One out of 100 Myanmar people responded that they used 
the Internet, but four out of 100 said they used Facebook in 2014.63
This domination of the market has been bolstered by zero rating pro-
grams such as Facebook Zero, offered by Telenor starting in 2014, which 
allows individuals to use Facebook without using their data, which is “rated 
zero.” Another Facebook- funded initiative known as Free Basics entered 
the market through MPT in 2016.64 Free Basics offers similar zero rated 
access to an array of apps including the social network, and has become a 
point of contention in countries such as India, which barred it from the 
country in 2015, arguing that besides funneling users into closed corporate 
ecosystems, the program abrogated network neutrality laws.65
Other popular apps include Viber, WeChat, WhatsApp, and Skype, 
used for calling and messaging. Locals have developed a limited amount 
of applications; interesting examples such as Yik Yak66 and Hush67 provide 
anonymized instant messaging systems. Piracy is rampant and margins are 
low, so it is challenging to find a money- making business model for both 
local and multinational businesses.68 For years, the Google Play store didn’t 
include Myanmar- specific apps, and did not offer support for Burmese, so 
users came up with alternatives through circulating USB sticks or privately 
posted applications.69
Gmail has also become incredibly popular, especially after Google in-
troduced Burmese language support for both the Zawgyi and Unicode 
standard keyboards in February 2015, as well as Google Search in 201370 
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and Google Translate in 2014, which takes text in both forms, but only out-
puts unicode.71 Android remains far and away the most popular operating 
system, with over 90 percent of the market captured.72
As mentioned, new users in developing countries that lack a strong 
educational system, low ICT use, and an authoritarian history often have 
no knowledge of the risks involved online and how to protect their se-
curity. There are no precise words in Burmese for privacy, in addition to 
anglicized ones for things such as computer, website, and other technical 
terms.73 A history of royalism, colonialism, and military authoritarianism 
may have precluded privacy concepts linguistically, and created serious 
barriers to developing a culture that values it, either in government regula-
tions, within the private sector, or for ordinary citizens.74 This predilection 
to ignore the value of privacy is itself very valuable to Internet multina-
tionals such as Google, Facebook, Apple, and others that profit from user 
data at the center of their business models. The country’s population lacks 
digital literacy after years offline. When they do connect, it is primarily 
through mobiles, using Android and Facebook, and they often do not know 
about alternative apps or why they would want to use them.
The government has encouraged this movement by posting almost all 
press releases and other official information on Facebook. The Minister 
of Information from 2010 until 2015 was known as the “Minister of Face-
book” and became known for his interactions on the social network.75 The 
result of all these factors is that Facebook reportedly had over nine million 
monthly active users in Myanmar in 2016,76 and through code, government 
help, and exponential proliferation, the social network has become the key 
method of digital access for businesses, the public sector, and ordinary 
citizens. The primary mode of advertising, community organizing, search, 
communication, news, and a host of other functions is now delegated to a 
single social network, more so than almost any country on earth. This de-
velopment has shaded every aspect of Myanmar’s digital media landscape 
in its transition to democracy.
Conclusion: Future Challenges on Democratic  
and Digital Frontiers
Suu Kyi’s NLD party fulfilled the promise of the annulled 1990 parliamen-
tary election in December 2015 when it clinched more than two- thirds of 
the seats in Myanmar’s legislature.77 A year later, in 2016, Suu Kyi clinched 
the presidency. While Suu Kyi had been unable to run because the consti-
110 • global digital cultures
Revised Pages
tution bars citizens who have foreign spouses from holding political office 
(she had a British husband, now deceased), she effectively retains control 
of the government as the leader of the party and the democracy move-
ment. Indeed, as state counsellor, Suu Kyi is officially in control of the gov-
ernment.78 Additionally, the military retains control of key aspects of the 
government including key ministries (defense, home, and border affairs), 
25 percent of the parliament, leadership in key states, and much of the 
economy.79 This arrangement has created a hybrid system and an effective 
veto for any changes to the constitution, which has contributed to the per-
sistence of dictatorship era regulations such as the Computer Science and 
Development or the Electronic Transactions laws. Just before the change-
over, in 2013, the government instituted a new Telecommunications Law, 
which allowed for outside investment but has also provided the means for 
the government to sue users for posting “defamatory” information about 
officials online. Civil society groups have argued that this has been used 
to shape public opinion and muzzle opposition.80 The fact that these laws 
remain in place has created the potential for continued censorship in vari-
ous forms.
Another central historical political issue that has transitioned to the on-
line landscape is the problem of ethnic representation, particularly of mi-
nority communities that have been persecuted for their opposition to the 
dictatorship, their religion, or other differences. Ethnic conflicts that have 
raged since independence remain unresolved, still technically in a state of 
war and unconnected to the central government. This has resulted in large 
parts of the country remaining underserved by telecom services and often 
unable to access the Internet. Many of the smaller parties, often made up 
of ethnic groups, are not represented online. For example, only one- third 
of the 91 registered parties in 2015 had an active Facebook presence.81 The 
continuing plight of the Rohingya illustrate another kind of conflict.
In 2013, Anonymous publicized the plight of the Rohingya people, a 
persecuted ethnic group residing mostly in western Myanmar near the 
border with Bangladesh. As Muslims, they are a minority in a Buddhist 
society and have been subject to attacks, often organized online through 
social networks, particularly Facebook. Flashmobs in this context can be 
a very dangerous thing, and groups have organized riots, murders, and 
even massacres of Rohingya people based on faulty online information. 
For instance, on June 3, 2012, rioters killed 11 people traveling to Yangon 
in the western Arkan state that borders Bangladesh, mistaking them for 
Rohingya.82
Revised Pages
Bridging the Deepest Digital Divides •  111
Seeking to draw attention to these attacks, members of Anonymous 
began attacking government websites and called on their membership 
to tweet the hashtag #rohingyaNOW or #OpRohingya, resulting in over 
24,000 tweets an hour at 5 p.m. on March 24, 2014.83 Twitter is not used 
very much in the country in comparison to Facebook, but it is an im-
portant tool for international users to spread online political awareness 
campaigns.84 Online attacks have continued and spread in different forms. 
In 2015, reports indicated that the Blink Hacker Group had targeted the 
Democratic Voice of Burma for its coverage of attacks on Rohingya.85
Beginning in August 2017, the Rohingya crisis deepened, as riots 
sparked by videos circulating on Facebook of alleged crimes by Muslims 
helped inflame populations living near their communities to attacks on 
them, driving them to serious protests, to attack villages, burn houses, rape 
women, and push hundreds of thousands to flee, mostly into exile in Ban-
gladesh. Principally in the Rakhine state, these actions were often driven 
by religious leaders pushing propaganda against Rohingya and calling for 
their expulsion from the country, often with the support of the military and 
local police, citing disinformation or misinformation about these groups.86
These actions, which the UN Human Rights Commission assessed 
as credible allegations of human rights violations, with the lead author of 
the report noting that “[r]egarding the Myanmar military, we are receiv-
ing credible reports of indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, extra-
judicial killings, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances, 
destruction of property and pillage, torture and inhuman treatment, rape 
and other forms of sexual violence, forced labour, and the recruitment of 
children into armed forces,” and highlighted the catastrophe occurring, 
with over 671,000 people fleeing into exile.87 The challenges of creating a 
democratic, pluralistic state are being increasingly threatened, particularly 
as the Suu Kyi government tries to thread the needle and continue mak-
ing progress toward democracy while satisfying the Burman majority, now 
interconnected and often inflamed by social media. A new coalition of civil 
society groups has formed under the name “Dear Mark” after they penned 
a letter to Mark Zuckerberg asking him to respond to issues in Facebook’s 
content moderation and other policies.88 Facebook has struggled to re-
spond to threats, hate speech, misinformation, and disinformation online, 
and now it is facing a mounting debate over its role in Myanmar’s society.
The press has also come under attack, as two Reuters journalists in-
vestigating the attacks have been imprisoned, and continue to be confined 
throughout their trial, as Reuters has published their articles and pressed 
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for their release, but they are being threatened with being charged under 
the Official Secrets Act.89 These threats demonstrate how these communi-
ties, technical and media, are connected. There are new delivery mecha-
nisms that the regime will have to contend with in the form of the Web 
and social networks, while traditional media is now increasingly interna-
tional and interconnected.90 Both groups play a symbiotic, critical role in 
the function of civil society.
The gender divide remains wide in what is still a very paternalistic so-
ciety. According to research by LIRNEasia, women were 28 percent less 
likely to own a phone than men, with 72% of men saying they owned a 
phone to 52 percent of women, up from 43 percent and 26 percent, respec-
tively, in 2015.91 Unlike in many other Asian countries, women do hold a 
significant amount of power as the head of the household, for instance over 
purchasing decisions such as a phone. However, as they traditionally stay 
at home while the men of the family go out to work, they have often del-
egated the phone to them, and this has encouraged the disparity. However, 
as more families are able to afford multiple devices, the disparity is likely 
to shrinkfurther.92
Censorship and surveillance are making a return in 2017, as the mili-
tary continues to control a significant portion of the government ad-
ministration and holds veto powers over proposed legislation or repeal. 
Freedom House declared the country’s Internet and media “Not Free” in 
2016, citing attacks on the press by the government, self- censorship, pos-
sible government- sponsored hacking campaigns, and the preservation of 
dictatorship- era legislation.93 Users have been jailed for posting offensive 
material against both members of the military94 and against Suu Kyi95 un-
der the 2013 Telecommunications Law.
Continued progress toward a strong, independent media system will 
depend not only on new infrastructure, but also a deep commitment to the 
democratic process, which is being tested, particularly with the ongoing 
crisis in the west of the country in Rohingya areas near Bangladesh, but 
also in the other areas that continue under rebel control and with continu-
ing clashes between the military and local groups. Citizens, businesses, and 
government officials lack these skills, and will need continued training to 
reach higher levels of information literacy. This includes both ICT skills 
and conceptual knowledge to work in the online environment and imple-
ment large- scale informational goals, from the national census, election 
monitoring, local language applications, and a host of other projects, but 
also the understanding of how to assess content as true or false, and to 
avoid being provoked by fake but emotionally compelling narratives.
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The government led by Suu Kyi’s NLD walks a fine line, grappling 
with this new digital world, pondering how to fight online hate speech 
against Muslims without antagonizing the Buddhist majority, organize 
electronic services, and police the cyberspace democratically. In this new, 
more open era for Myanmar, regression is just as possible as progress while 
old laws remain and the military retains significant control of the legisla-
ture, the executive, and key economic sectors. With the new digital media 
deeply embedded in Myanmar’s culture and society, there will never be 
a way to completely return to an older system, but media suppression in 
various forms remains deeply entrenched after a history of censorship, sur-
veillance, and suspicion. Progress on these fronts will take longer, but will 
undoubtedly depend on the Internet, strong independent media, and an 
interconnected, educated online society to truly move beyond this authori-
tarian historical legacy.
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Dating Applications, Intimacy, and 
Cosmopolitan Desire in India
Vishnupriya Das
On October 8, 2015, TrulyMadly Matchmakers Private Ltd. cemented its 
presence as a key player in India’s mobile- phone- based dating app mar-
ket by releasing a digital advertisement that went viral. The video, titled 
“Creep Qawwali”, opened with two troupes of female qawwali1 singers sit-
ting on the floor, facing each other, in an ornate room replete with chan-
deliers, candelabras, fairy lights, and flower arrangements. The title briefly 
superimposed on this scene included cartoon hearts, a tabla,2 and a bearded 
caricature of what I was told was a “stereotypically creepy” man with wide 
leering eyes and a curly beard.3 In the advertisement, the female singers 
were locked in a tongue- in- cheek lyrical battle in Hindi (with a smattering 
of English words) debating which one of them suffered the “creepier” man 
hitting on them. To prove their points, each expound on their trysts with 
such men in physical and digital spaces:
Woman 1: My creep has sent me his picture via WhatsApp
Woman 2: My creep has sent me his dick picture via WhatsApp
Woman 1: He has distributed our wedding cards already
Woman 2: He has already named my baby.4
After four minutes and 56 seconds of back and forth, the video ended 
with the two women realizing that the same man had been creeping on 
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them all along. Their relief at this discovery was marked by laughter, an on-
screen embrace, and the tagline— “Don’t let boy browsing turn into creep 
browsing. Date wisely. Verified profiles only on TrulyMadly.”5
The year the advertisement released, there were over 35 mobile- 
phone- based dating applications accessible through iOS and Android op-
erating systems in India, all claiming to provide services that would allow 
their users the possibility of romantic connection without marriage as 
an explicitly articulated end.6 Unlike international companies targeting a 
“global” audience, TrulyMadly was a “local” heterosexual dating applica-
tion produced and developed in India targeting users within the country. 
In 2015, having just landed 5.7 million dollars from angel investors in 
its first round of funding (the largest amount of Series A by any Indian 
dating app company), TrulyMadly was considered a “leader” among lo-
cal dating apps.7 During an interview with popular technology magazine 
TechCrunch, Sachin Bhatia, one of the cofounders of the app, remarked on 
their unique position within the country’s dating app ecosystem, saying 
“Facebook is India’s Facebook and Twitter is India’s Twitter, but Tinder 
won’t be India’s Tinder.”8
Analyzing the ways in which dating is framed by a key player in an 
evolving digital industrial ecosystem provides an avenue to explore broader 
questions regarding the place of female sexuality in emerging technology 
companies, which, going by historical precedent, have a significant influ-
ence on national imaginaries of desire and modernity. In this chapter I 
trace how historical tensions between piety and promiscuity in the fig-
ure of the Indian young, middle- class woman are played out in today’s 
information- rich digital age. I begin by examining the specific affordances 
of smartphone technologies that these platforms depend on. Then, I exam-
ine academic discussion surrounding (nondigital) new media technologies 
and the erotic in India, drawing links between these historical antecedents 
and questions surrounding the current digital dating app ecosystem in the 
country. Finally, focusing on TrulyMadly, I delve into the production strat-
egies through which a local Indian dating app company constructs what 
“appropriate” male and female behavior should look like on their platform. 
Exploring how companies like TrulyMadly are grappling with how to best 
depict the possibilities of Internet- enabled intimacy and “Indianness” in 
mobile dating platforms, I argue that understanding the intersections of 
Internet- enabled mobile media technologies and sexuality in India today 
mandates a deeper examination of how “dating” is imagined by digital in-
dustries claiming the term.
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Dating Apps: A Brief History
The origins of mobile- phone- based dating can be traced to the launch of 
Grindr, a gay male geo- social app in March 2009. The defining feature of 
Grindr’s design was its ability to match users based on their geographic 
proximity to each other.9 By 2011 Grindr’s user base had expanded to India 
where it faced competition from Scruff (another international gay male 
geo- social dating app) and Planet Romeo (a web- based gay men’s dating 
website popular since the early 2000s that had just launched its mobile ava-
tar).10 As of 2016 in India only international corporations marketed them-
selves as dating apps for the queer community. On the other hand, as noted 
earlier, there were multiple heterosexual dating apps marketing themselves 
as catering to uniquely “Indian” erotic desires during the same period. This 
difference in the concentration of international versus national companies 
explicitly catering to gay male users is striking, though not entirely surpris-
ing considering the illegality of homosexuality in the country.
It should also be noted that in the years preceding Grindr’s launch, 
between 2005 and 2010 the web- based heterosexual dating market was 
exploding across the Western world.11 However, in India, dating websites 
had little presence. Instead, it was chatrooms (Yahoo, MSN) and messag-
ing services on social networking platforms (Orkut, Hi5, Facebook) that 
were the places where intimate connections (not explicitly aimed at mar-
riage) were being imagined and forged. Writing about these digital spaces 
Kabita Chakraborty observes that “through theme- based rooms, like love 
and friendship rooms, chat services participants interested in developing 
romantic and other relationships could meet, communicate and share vari-
ous multimedia information, including photos and videos of themselves.”12
Tinder, a primarily heterosexual dating app, launched in 2012 (five 
years after Grindr was founded). Tinder adopted an interface similar to 
Grindr (matches based on geographic proximity, touch screen based swipe 
features) and like Grindr its user base quickly spread across the globe. In 
2014, the Indian edition of the Wall Street Journal published a commen-
tary section observing how Indians were “ditching” their blackberries to 
get on iPhones that supported the app.13 At the same period as Tinder’s 
global expansion (2013 to 2014) numerous India- focused dating apps— 
TrulyMadly, DesiCrush, Woo, icrushiflush— were launched by nonresi-
dent Indian entrepreneurs targeting the Indian market, each claiming that 
they held the key to answer the question of what Indians were looking for 
in non- marriage- based intimacy.
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By 2016, there were a slew of both global heterosexual dating app com-
panies extending their reach into the Indian market and local companies 
aimed specifically at users located in India. Smartphone technologies al-
lowed for features such as swiping (right or left) through profiles and set-
ting radii to find new matches.14 While feature phones still make up the 
majority of the Indian handheld market, smartphone penetration estimates 
in India for 2016 were 28.3 percent (as a percentage of all handset users), 
nearly double the 14.8 percent penetration estimates in 2013.15 The word 
“dating” was used by PR managers, user interface designers, journalists, 
and company founders of both types of organizations as a catch- all to de-
scribe everything from no- strings- attached casual sex to platonic friend-
ship to matrimony. Interestingly, most dating applications (even those that 
had website avatars) were accessed through smartphones, allowing users 
to simultaneously move across geographic locations and multiple digital 
platforms when searching for and communicating with matches. Adrianna 
de Souza de Silva and Jordan Frith describe this sense of being in perpetual 
motion using location- aware apps to constantly coordinate and communi-
cate one’s spatial orientation as a new form of spatiality— “hybrid space.”16 
While theorizations of hybrid space are not unique to India, it is nonethe-
less worth noting, as the corporate imaginary of mobile- phone- based dat-
ing becomes inextricably intertwined with industry attempts to capitalize 
on experiences of digital hybridity.
One way to study dating apps in India without treating technologies 
that govern them as all powerful or merely instrumental in structuring 
imaginaries of intimacy17 is to situate these applications within a longer 
history of media and communication technologies associated with the 
erotic.18 In an edited collection on Media Erotics and Transnational Asia 
Purnima Mankekar and Louisa Schein write about the difficulties of study-
ing “the erotic” as a conceptual category because of its fuzzy boundaries 
and tendency to be framed in terms of oppositional logics of similarity 
or difference.19 In an effort to engage with these concerns, I focus on in-
stitutional developments that provide the infrastructure required for the 
proliferation of dating apps and go on to map the particular assemblage of 
global flows of information, labor, and ideas that shape the potentials and 
pitfalls of dating apps that target Indian consumers.
The institutional, physical, and financial infrastructure required to 
sustain wireless phone growth in India can be traced back to policy de-
cisions made during the late 1990s and early 2000s. During this period, 
the Department of Telecommunication Services (soon to become Bharat 
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Sanchar Nigam Limited) began to put into action a series of policies aimed 
at ensuring the success of India’s nascent cellphone industry.20 Assa Doron 
and Robin Jefferies trace these changes, noting that in October 1999 a 
New Telecom Policy (NTP- 99) was formed under a coalition government. 
NTP- 99 put forth longer mobile license periods, expanded the scope of 
services private telecom companies could provide, and reformed the struc-
ture of the country’s regulatory authority (TRAI) to allow it have the final 
say in mobile phone charges. As a result of these changes the number of 
cellphone users in the country grew fourfold between 1999 and 2005, with 
the majority of users becoming subscribers of private company networks.21 
While these regulatory changes are not directly linked to the rise of dating 
app use in the country, they provide a foundation to begin examining the 
link between digital platforms (such as dating apps) and medium specific 
technologies they are intertwined with (here, mobile phones).
Along with the proliferation of cellphones were a series of moral pan-
ics about the disintegration of Indian cultural values as a result of mobile 
phone use.22 In 2004 a video clip of two underage students engaging in 
sexual activity was recorded over a cellphone and passed as a MMS (mul-
timedia messaging service) clip from one mobile phone user to another. In 
the aftermath of this event, several educational institutions banned the use 
of mobile phones within the premises of their buildings.23 The 2004 “DPS 
MMS Scandal,” as it came to be colloquially known, marked the begin-
ning of a series of well- publicized news stories where mobile phones were 
placed at the center of national debates regarding issues of female sexuality 
and individual privacy.24 A big part of the moral uproar surrounding the 
clip was that the two individuals involved were underage and came from 
“well- educated upper- middle class” backgrounds. Through the 2000s as 
debates raged over national media regarding the potential consequences 
of mobile phones on Indian female sexuality and family life, young tech-
nology entrepreneurs began appearing in cities like Bangalore, Hyderabad, 
and Delhi trying to wrangle their claim on the country’s expanding market 
for Internet- enabled applications.25 Anna Lee Saxenian examines the rise 
of these cross- regional flows between Silicon Valley and Indian technology 
capitals, noting how the globalization of entrepreneur networks in these 
regions was emblematic of broader labor market changes that blurred the 
distinction between center and periphery in digital technology produc-
tion.26 Among the growing legion of nonresident entrepreneurs that began 
to arrive in India during the late 2000s were the founders of Shaadi.com and 
Bharat Matrimony, two start- ups that transformed the Indian paper matri-
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monial column into a searchable interactive online database using Western 
websites such as ‘Match.com’ as templates to design their interfaces.27
The aesthetics of and advertisements for Indian matrimonial websites 
prominently displayed the figure of a New Indian Woman who Shoma 
Munshi describes as a person who embodies a global lifestyle but sticks to 
Indian values. Nearly two decades before Shaadi.com and Bharat Matri-
mony launched, Munshi traced how burgeoning Indian makeup and fitness 
industries deployed the figure of this New Indian Woman through images 
of femininity that were simultaneously shaped by global media flows and 
laced with local ideals of femininity.28 Tracing this figure in the television 
industry of the ’80s and ’90s, Purnima Mankekar argues that popular tele-
vision melodramas such as Udaan and Rajani sustained the imaginary of 
this suitably modern female figure by featuring “secular, modern middle 
class consumers.”29 Theoretically, conceptualizing advertising as a practice 
of commodity production that builds public culture, William Mazzarella, in 
examining a range of Indian advertising campaigns between the 1980s and 
1990s, argues that “Indianness” becomes a commodity in the contemporary 
advertising industry that is increasingly commercially viable in a globaliz-
ing market.30 Similarly, observing the first time that the Miss World pag-
eant was held in Bangalore, India in 1996, Radhika Parameswaran writes 
about how perceptions regarding the benefits of being associated with the 
event for producers of the local culture industry were tied to categories of 
gender and nation.31
As with many of the consumerist activities surrounding the lifestyle of 
India’s new middle class, socially approved behaviors for women intertwine 
with broader political and cultural debates regarding acceptable versions 
of modernity. Here, it is worth remembering that while this chapter is fo-
cused on India, this figure of a ‘new woman’ is associated with a wide va-
riety of non- Western spaces in South and Southeast Asia where gendered 
ideals of modernity became tied to the feminine figure over the first half of 
the twenty- first century.
Underlying all these narratives is the centrality of appropriate displays 
of femininity in the national imagination of modernity.32 Because of these 
reasons, I am in interested in how ideals of both masculinity and femininity 
negotiated by industry actors within the present moment of erotic prolif-
eration have helped the rise of mobile- phone- based dating in India. Ex-
amining these technology cultures involves tracing how ideas surrounding 
“dating” are used by dating app companies in their production decisions.33 
In what follows, I examine how ideas about “dating” are imagined and mo-
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bilized by TrulyMadly, one of the leading Indian dating app companies. To 
be sure, observations about TrulyMadly are not reflective of production and 
design cultures across dating app companies. But it does provide a rich site 
to examine how historical tensions between piety and promiscuity in the 
figure of the Indian young, middle- class woman get worked out in an effort 
to make “Indianness” commercially viable in mobile mediated dating.
TrulyMadly: Safely Sexual
On a hot June afternoon, I made my way to TrulyMadly’s corporate head-
quarters to try and understand how its executives mobilized and deployed 
the term “dating” in their production and design practices. The layout of 
the south Delhi office exuded a modern minimalist aesthetic. Walking into 
the ground floor foyer from a dusty street in an up- and- coming neigh-
borhood (filled with small independent art galleries), I was greeted by an 
all- white décor and an open floor plan. The style of the space was particu-
larly notable considering that all three founders of the app were in their 
late 30s/early 40s and entering the realm of mobile dating from traditional 
corporate careers in travel and banking.34 Shuffling my feet into what ap-
peared to be a waiting area, I perched myself on the edge of an ottoman 
(again, all white) underneath a neon sign made up entirely of lightbulbs 
spelling the word “CHAI” in capital letters. I had managed to get one of 
the cofounders’ contact details the evening before. Tracking down busy 
professionals working in dating app companies operating in India was an 
exercise in tenacity and persistence that involved gaining access to large 
“entrepreneur WhatsApp” groups. In these groups emotional support, fi-
nancial advice, and network contacts were crowd- sourced 24/7 by mem-
bers of India’s start- up software and business development community.
Fifteen minutes after arriving at TrulyMadly’s office I found myself 
inside a meeting room with two glass walls listening to one of the app’s 
founders give me his take on a question that had been on my mind for a 
while: What did TrulyMadly believe Indians were looking for on the app? 
The answer according to him was simple: the app allowed people to safely 
explore their sexual desires. As the interview went on he described how 
he was initially surprised by survey responses conducted by the company 
where users repeatedly indicated that one of their favorite parts of the app 
was “dirty talking” with people they had never met. Asking him why he had 
found this surprising, I was told, “Well, you don’t expect this from Indian 
girls, do you?” This response captures much of the essence of public dis-
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course regarding behavioral norms for women— namely the idealization of 
“good” women as innately passive in sexual scenarios. For example, schol-
ars have noted that media representation of female sexuality in Bollywood 
tends to characterize female leads as stoic bearers of the amorous desires 
of male heroes, rarely if ever being driven by sexual desire themselves.35 
Instead, the burden of the erotic is borne by the figure of the vamp who 
makes a temporary appearance often through a song or dance routine (col-
loquially known as an item number) and then disappears back into the pe-
riphery of the storyline.36 What becomes expected from women, or at least 
from those portrayed as “good,” is romantic desire devoid of sexual drive.
What is interesting to note in the case of TrulyMadly is not so much 
their apparent surprise at sexual activity initiated by females over their 
platform or attempts to capitalize on it, but rather their efforts to bound 
possibilities of this erotic desire through discourses of safety both in the 
digital and physical domains. The spatial and temporal mobility that these 
apps bring by virtue of their constant connectivity provides an additional 
layer of complexity to the idea of digitally mediated desire in a country 
where concerns surrounding women’s safety and sexuality found their way 
into the spotlight of public discourse since the Delhi Gang Rape of 2012.37
This centrality of “safety” is reflected in TrulyMadly’s app design, 
marketing material and public statements. For example, in their brief 
company description on the Google App Store and CrunchBase (an open 
market company database) TrulyMadly use the analogy of friends setting 
up other friends on a date, except here the “friend” doing the setting up 
is their digital platform: “Safe and Discreet— They’re like those friends 
who know how to keep all information you share, private. Your profile 
can only be viewed by the ones they sort out for you. And you can only 
be messaged by those you have liked. No casual surfing, no spamming, no 
peeping tom business.”
The term “They” in the excerpt above refers to the app itself (Tru-
lyMadly). The platform is presented as a friend who knows what is best 
for you. A key concern for the app is keeping romantic and intimate con-
nections over the app both “safe and discreet.” What is not permitted in 
this vision of appropriate intimacy over the platform is “casual surfing,” 
“spamming,” and “peeping tom business.” The use of the phrase “peeping 
tom” is particularly interesting not just because of its colloquial, informal 
tone but also because it brings in dynamics of who should or should not 
be looking. As highlighted in the discussion on TrulyMadly’s “Creep Qaw-
wali” advertisement, the figure of the male creep is the most likely candi-
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date to be the “peeping tom” that women need protection from. Thus, the 
female users “dirty talking” with strangers on the platform in many ways 
directly opposes the intended/desired definition of “dating” the platform 
seeks to facilitate. If the logics of intimacy, as Lauren Berlant and Lisa 
Lowe suggest, can be conceived of as more than closeness between indi-
viduals (romantic or sexual) but rather a bio- politics through which insti-
tutional forces administer power, then what versions of modernity does 
TrulyMadly’s engagement with the term dating provide? In an effort to an-
swer this question I delve into the specific practices through which Truly-
Madly operationalizes “appropriate dating” through its design, marketing, 
and financial structure. In particular I explore the ways in which gendered 
sexuality intersects with what appropriate mobile dating is imagined by the 
producers and designers of the platform.
Since I was interested in the specific processes through which “secu-
rity” was guaranteed by “local” dating applications, I asked TrulyMadly’s 
cofounder to elaborate on how they guaranteed safety in their app: “Truly-
Madly’s most obvious difference is that it uses trust- based scores to verify,” 
he said. “The process, of course, also provides women with greater peace- 
of- mind about their potential matches.”38 As part of this process of verifica-
tion, TrulyMadly users were asked to sign in through Facebook and were 
given the option to provide their voter card information in return for ac-
cess to more matches and better matching features on the platform. Using 
this information TrulyMadly manually compared demographic data pro-
vided on the card with criminal databases and Facebook accounts. For ex-
ample, if a man had a criminal record or his Facebook account did not have 
a profile photo with a face on it they were automatically removed from 
the app. Reviewing a combination of national identification documents 
and online behavior is not an uncommon practice; social media platforms, 
online marketplaces, and matrimonial columns have long used incentives 
(such as greater searchability) to encourage users to provide identifying 
documents (from passports to mobile numbers).
While these efforts are not unique, here are at least two things that 
are interesting about verification efforts by TrulyMadly.39 The first is 
that “safety” was largely a manually mediated process. This is notable in 
a digital sphere increasingly dominated by narratives of the centrality of 
algorithmic cultures and suggests a need for closer scrutiny of common 
presumptions regarding the digital architecture of Internet- enabled mo-
bile applications (more specifically, dating apps). The second was that the 
burden of having to prove one’s identity was placed almost exclusively on 
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older men - specifically men above the age of 27: “For men above 27 we 
always access their Facebook accounts. So we have one girl whose job is 
just to access Facebook accounts. This audit we do for men over 27 who 
are married.”
The monitoring of age on dating applications can occur through ex-
plicit methods such as minimum and maximum age restrictions as well as 
deterrents such as age warnings on Google and Apple Play. Taking the case 
of Tinder, Stephanie Duguay observes that the app allows individuals be-
tween the ages of 13 to 17 to be matched only with other users within the 
same age bracket.40 In addition, she notes that the maximum possible age 
setting over the app is 55, suggesting a strong focus on a younger demo-
graphic. Similar structural features to target younger audiences yet deter 
“children” from dating platforms can be seen on the popular dating appli-
cations, including TrulyMadly. What I was particularly curious about in the 
case of TrulyMadly was why the age 27 was chosen as the age after which 
men received additional scrutiny. The reasons I was given were vague but 
appeared to be partly arbitrary and partly based on the fact that 27 was 
just above the average age of marriage in the country and the organization 
wanted to prevent married men from joining it. It is also worth noting 
that as of 2017, age 27 generationally splits the Indian population roughly 
between those born before or after economic liberalization in the 1990s.41 
The centrality of the institution of marriage in determining appropriate 
relationships as well as who might be possible threats for these relation-
ships alludes to a fuzzy definition of safety as both a protection from every-
day acts of physical/emotional violence as well as protection from a range 
of forces that threaten not the individual, but social institutions.
The processes to ensure safety by TrulyMadly allude to two types of 
“danger’ that the company believed Indian women needed protection 
from. The first was the danger of unwanted male attention as humorously 
advertised in its viral video “Creep Qawwali” (described at the beginning 
of this chapter). The second was the danger of the breakdown of the in-
stitution of “marriage,” which is deemed by TrulyMadly to be particularly 
vulnerable. This is not to say that TrulyMadly explicitly structured its app 
around protecting the institution of marriage, but rather the figure of the 
“creep” that women on the app needed protection from was feared to be a 
man who transgressed the bounds of marriage. In this way, sexual liberation 
becomes premised on “protection and safety” where what is considered as 
safe is mobilized through corporate decisions that attempt to structure user 
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interactions on the app.42 Thus, even as the expansion of the possibilities 
for females to express and explore their desires becomes a central part of 
the structure of the app and its advertising, the core of this expansion re-
mains dependent on the guarantee of safety for women.
Desire 101
Between 2015 and 2016, apart from “Creep Qawwali,” TrulyMadly put 
forward two more ad campaigns. The first, #boybrowsing, centered around 
girls checking out and flirting with young attractive men in real life and 
then browsing through profiles over the app. The second, called Watchboyz, 
featured a music video with the catchy chorus “If you want, then call a guy 
over to your house. . . . If you want, then sit on the verandah and smoke a 
‘doobie.’” In both videos “dating” through the app was framed as an em-
bracing of a modern cosmopolitan lifestyle and of sexual discovery for In-
dian women who might choose to use the app. As I show below, the right 
way of “doing dating” is simultaneously structured by local understanding 
of international ideals of desire and sexuality.
One of TrulyMadly’s aims as a dating app company was to educate In-
dian men on appropriate ways to “date” through its platform. When I went 
to speak to them in 2016 they were experimenting with plans to have a 
premium service where a woman would chat in real time with men and give 
them tips on how to become more successful in their digital interactions 
with women.
Describing the need for the service, a cofounder of the platform com-
mented:
We [men] don’t grow up with skills like to talk. Our purpose now 
is to teach them how to chat . . . so now two weeks back we got this 
psychology major. She is just sitting and chatting with guys, telling 
them how to chat up, just chatting with guys telling them how to 
make a conversation. So if it is useful today, then, we can scale it up 
tomorrow and maybe even charge for it [as a premium service] the 
day after.43
Dating is presented as the discovery of new ways to express intimacy, 
but one that needs to be taught (and one that can be commoditized in the 
process). Masculinity becomes tied to performances of male behavior that 
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fit within stringent cosmopolitan stereotypes of male- female interactions, 
where cosmopolitanism operates as a sociocultural condition that enables 
the imaginary of a global- local hybrid that is simultaneously celebrated 
for its cultural creativity and feared for its perceived threat to local and 
national identities.44
Apart from its advertising strategies, TrulyMadly’s move away from its 
genesis as a matrimony- oriented matchmaking services, a vestige of which 
remains in its official registration as TrulyMadly Matchmakers Pvt. Ltd., 
and its pivot toward a more cosmopolitan aesthetic have focused on con-
structing a user interface and corporate space incorporating a “light global 
millennial design.”45 When developing the initial version of the application 
in 2013 TrulyMadly hired a UX (user experience) design firm to conduct 
a workshop with the key stakeholders behind TrulyMadly to help them 
articulate the key characteristics they hoped their platform would have.46 
Keywords for the desired look/feel/structure of the platform by the organi-
zation heads were “Cool, Edgy, New Age, Clean, Visual, Intuitive, Engag-
ing, Directional,” and the characteristics of users according to corporate 
stakeholders were “independent, evolved, outgoing, liberal, urban, semiur-
ban, progressive, anxious, aspirational, opinionated, influenced.”
In 2017, in downloading the 11.04 MBs that comprise the digital data 
of the completed app, one is treated to a series of images of the interface 
and then asked to sign in via Facebook. Registering without Facebook ap-
pears to be impossible. After a Facebook login, a person is led to a primar-
ily white screen and asked to enter a series of demographic information 
(e.g., height, city of residence, occupation). Following this, a prompt— 
“describe yourself in at least 3 words”— pops up. These descriptions are to 
be presented through a series of hashtags, automatic suggestions include 
“#FriendChat #CoolDude #LiveandLetLive.” A variety of incentives to 
increase one’s trust score is suggested— among them are the options of 
providing one’s LinkedIn Profile, mobile number, or options direct refer-
ences. The combination of carefully phrased hashtags and repeated nudges 
to verify both one’s identity and one’s intentions suggests the push and 
pull between ideas of liberation and protection that underlie experiences 
of online dating in India. In the case of TrulyMadly we see a local company 
aiming to tap into the allure of sexual liberation as a characteristic of cos-
mopolitan culture. However, in framing security (as essential to the Indian 
female experience) and a pedagogy of proper etiquette (as symptomatic of 
the Indian male condition) it suggests the contradictory imaginations of 
what social structures “dating” fits within the national context.
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Conclusion
Following a long lineage of examining the media and technologies’ en-
gagement with the erotic, I make a couple of different observations. First, 
I note how concerns surrounding the influence of new media flows repeat-
edly get framed in terms of gendered relationships with technologies. Yet 
there remain features associated with contemporary dating applications 
(such as geo- location and continued connective mobility) that suggest the 
potential uniqueness of mobile- phone- based dating platforms (compared 
to their web- based avatars). While this might seem an obvious point, it 
is worth reiterating since examination of emerging technology platforms 
often gets framed as either uniquely revolutionary or simply a repetition of 
histories, when in fact they are more often than not a combination of the 
two. Taking a closer look at a specific case reveals how industry lore about 
dating— specifically, as an expansion of sexual possibilities— comes to de-
fine both media representations and design features. Yet even as dating is 
constructed as a way to explore, discover, and express one’s sexual desires, 
it remains deeply gendered and worked out within a particular app as pro-
tecting women’s “safety.”
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Anomalously Digital in South Asia
A Peri- Technological Project for Deaf Youth 
in Mumbai
Shruti Vaidya and Kentaro Toyama
The proliferation of South Asian digital media, particlarly its unique forms 
of consumption and production, offers much to be celebrated: from aspi-
rational romantic gestures on Facebook (Arora and Rangaswamy 2015) to 
grand edicts for more accessible government (Bhargava 2015), from clas-
sified ads via mobile text- messaging (Zainudeen, Samarajiva, and Sivapra-
gasam 2011) to martyred sex symbols on social media (Mohsin 2016).
Into this mix, we throw in an oddball project: one in which the typical 
narratives of technology as savior or oppressed minority as vulnerable ben-
eficiary are upended, all while engaging in a quasi- action- research meth-
odology whose intervention is not gadget- focused but peri- technological. 
Our post hoc aim is to further stretch the already impossibly broad span 
of South Asian digital phenomena to its breaking point, and to ask: Does 
it even make sense to speak of a digital South Asia? Is there anything that 
coheres in the vast expanse of the subcontinent’s myriad engagements with 
the digital?
In our study, we consider digital hearing aids for deaf young adults in 
Mumbai. Like deaf people all around the globe, deaf young adults in In-
dia must negotiate institutions and spaces constructed by a predominantly 
hearing world. Digital hearing aids may offer deaf people with moderate 
to severe hearing loss a chance to gain some degree of hearing ability, yet 
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the use of hearing aids is a fraught issue among the deaf community, many 
of whom question the pressure for the deaf individuals to adapt to hearing 
society (Guillemin, Gillam, and Brookes 2005).
Indeed, though hearing people consider deafness to be a disability, this 
assumption has been frequently questioned (Padden and Humphries 1990). 
Many deaf people do not consider themselves to have hearing loss as much 
as deaf gain (Bauman and Murray 2014). Deafness may confer individuals 
with visual acuities that hearing people may lack, and we as a global society 
are surely made richer by the existence of sign languages, as much as we are 
with spoken languages. Such gains from deafness, both as individual trait 
and broader cultural phenomenon, raise an analogy regarding the use of 
hearing aids: Could the use of hearing aids be akin to the assimilation of 
smaller cultural groups into majority cultures, leading to the demise of a 
unique language and culture?
Meanwhile, there is little doubt that the ability to hear can have ad-
vantages in a world of sound. Even deaf people— as we heard from our 
participants— do not deny the potential value of, for example, being able to 
hear an approaching vehicle, or of interpersonal communication without 
line of sight.
In our project, we worked with the students of a nonprofit academy in 
Mumbai whose mission was the education of deaf teens and young adults, 
and provided 14 of them with hearing aids. Our objective was both to un-
derstand how the students perceived the hearing aids (before and after re-
ceiving them), as well as to see whether there might be a way to transform 
the perception of the devices in both the hearing and deaf worlds. In par-
ticular, we asked half of the participants to decorate their hearing aids in a 
personalized way that would cause them to stand out more than the devices 
otherwise did. We wondered whether by having wearers own a symbol of 
potential stigma, it could change other people’s perception of the deaf indi-
vidual, as well as affect how the participants felt about their devices.
India presents an intriguing backdrop for this work for several reasons. 
For one, the country has an exceedingly complex relationship with what 
are often considered disabilities. Observers note, for example, that disabili-
ties are commonly seen to be the fruit of karma, and therefore the result 
of negative actions in a previous life (Lang 2001). The disabled person is 
thought to deserve their inconvenience, and this shadow falls not only on 
the individual with the disability but also on their family who must con-
tend with the supposed burden. Meanwhile, some communities celebrate 
disabled individuals as possessing special powers, often based on a religious 
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interpretation (Lang 2001). The social realities of disabled people are fur-
ther dependent on geography, religion, caste, and socioeconomic status. 
For example, families in urban areas are more likely to view disability in 
terms of its medical explanations, likely because of greater exposure to for-
mal education and modern science.
Upon this complex and heterogeneous ground, the 1990s witnessed the 
emergence of a disability rights movement (Mehrotra 2011). This move-
ment was intricately tied to the Indian state’s engagement with disability. 
Historically, the Indian state has viewed disabled people through the lens of 
pity, rehabilitation, and charity. But the 1980s saw the Indian state make a 
shift from a medical model to the development model, with disabled people 
becoming participants, not just recipients of state policy. The Persons with 
Disabilities Law (1995) has served as a strategic tool for disability activists 
to further their agenda. Nilika Mehrotra argues that unlike the women’s 
movement, which had to stage protests in order to get laws drafted, the dis-
ability movement was mobilized around disability- related laws. At present, 
diverse advocacy groups, NGOs, and academics engage with disability and 
disabled people from the perspective of rights and services.
All of this, of course, is additionally complicated by the fact that deaf-
ness, if it is a disability at all, is not necessarily disempowering. Deaf people 
can and do lead independent lives without requiring routine assistance.
Another reason for India’s uniqueness as a site for this study is its repu-
tation as a digital technology superpower. India is among the leading sites 
for projects in “information and communication technologies for develop-
ment,” often abbreviated ICT4D and usually implying digital technologies 
(Kano and Toyama 2016). The work described in this chapter can be un-
derstood in relation to that field. ICT4D projects seek to apply novel digi-
tal technologies to support socioeconomic development, and many are run 
by computer scientists and engineers, eager to use their technical skills to 
address social challenges in domains such as agriculture, education, gover-
nance, and healthcare (Unwin 2009). India’s prominence as a host to these 
projects is likely due to a combination of its information technology (IT) 
prowess, its high rate of poverty, and a strong tradition of grassroots activ-
ism and charitable work. The Indian government has been a strong spon-
sor of such projects, hoping to spread the success of its IT sector to rural 
development, with large projects ranging from a universal ID card (Sathe 
2011), to rural broadband telecenters (Prasad and Ray 2012), to more re-
cent efforts to computerize government services toward a “Digital India” 
(Bhargava 2015). Usually, such projects highlight novel technology, but in 
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the study reported here, we consider a low- tech decoration that affects how 
an existing digital technology is received. In a context where many deaf 
people have been forced to wear hearing aids in school as a child (Friedner 
2015), how would a design intervention that collaboratively involves proj-
ect participants affect their relationship with a digital aid?
This chapter discusses the core of our research study and concludes 
with a discussion of the technicolor digital kaleidoscope that is South Asia.
An Aside on Terminology
As with other researchers who have worked with the deaf community, we 
wrestled with terminology. Some scholars use Deaf with a capital “D” to 
indicate the deaf community, in recognition of its linguistic and cultural 
distinctness (Woodward 1972; Padden and Humphries 1990). These au-
thors often reserve lower- case “deaf” to mean the fact of being unable to 
hear. We have, however, opted to keep “deaf” and its derivatives lower case, 
following both Friedner (2015) as well as our deaf participants, who did 
not adhere to the language of capital- D deaf or the idea of being a cultural- 
linguistic minority.
Meanwhile, the word we use for hearing people is either “hearing” or 
“normal.” Initially, and also as noted by Friedner (2015), we were taken 
aback by the use of the latter word by the deaf community in Mumbai, 
no doubt because we projected onto it an interpretation that not to be 
normal is to be abnormal or deviant. But, as we have come to understand 
through our participants, “normal” in this context implies no judgment 
about their or others’ social rank. It indicates simply a matter of fact that 
hearing people outnumber deaf people, and therefore define a merely sta-
tistical majority.
A Deaf Community in Mumbai
Our research was conducted in Mumbai, India, with deaf young adults who 
strongly identified as deaf. We initially approached audiology clinics to see 
whether any would be open to a project involving their patients, but most 
audiologists seemed skeptical. It was explained to us that usually, much 
younger children came in for hearing aid fittings, while young adults who 
had not used hearing aids already would refuse to use them. The clinics 
directed us to visit deaf schools, as that was where we were most likely to 
meet deaf young adults.
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Soon after, we established a collaboration with a school located in a 
Mumbai suburb. It is a privately funded academy that was founded in the 
1990s and which has operated largely through the efforts of its principal, 
a normal woman. Today it is a high- functioning, elite, nonprofit organiza-
tion housed in a multistoried building. As described on its official website, 
the school is for students with hearing impairments, multiple disabilities, 
and other special needs, but most of its student body is composed of deaf 
students. The principal of the school hoped to leave her students with an 
education that allowed them to lead independent, productive lives in a 
hearing society. She wanted more of her students to use hearing aids.
The school is managed almost exclusively by normal teachers and staff. 
A majority of the teachers, excluding one deaf teacher who is an alumnus 
of the school, impart their lessons orally along with some rudimentary sign 
language. The school also has one interpreter, but she must flit from one 
class to another and cannot accommodate all the needs of all the classes in 
her schedule. The participants were all students of this academy, and were 
composed of deaf teens and young adults.
Methodology
Our study spanned the ten- month period from November 2015 through 
August 2016, with much of the first several months seeking out a group of 
participants interested in our project and establishing relationships with 
relevant stakeholders. Our overall approach was ethnographic, involving 
a combination of formal and informal interviews, participant observation, 
and simply accompanying participants as they went about their daily lives. 
Whenever possible, one of us (Vaidya) spent significant time at the acad-
emy, with the principal, and with the student participants, often involving 
eight or more hours of engagement per day straddling the school day and 
after- school hours. Vaidya had little prior experience with sign language 
at the beginning of the study, but learned it to some degree of fluency 
by the end of the study. She communicated with deaf participants using 
a combination of signing and, when necessary, interpretation via some of 
the school staff. The students use what could be considered a variant of 
Indian Sign Language that is common in Mumbai. (The quotations by par-
ticipants provided here have been translated from Indian Sign Language 
to written English. The process of translation has involved reworking the 
syntax and sentence structures of ISL into English.)
We discussed our ideal set of participants with the principal. We were 
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seeking an even mix of women and men who were interested in trying 
hearing aids but unable to afford them. The school principal then drew 
up a list of students who formed a larger pool from which we selected our 
research participants. In the end, all of our 14 participants were young 
adults— seven women, seven men— from 18 to 26 years of age, each of 
whom opted to accept a hearing aid, and who were examined by a local au-
diology clinic for their suitability for a hearing aid. (Many deaf people have 
what is medically considered “moderate to severe hearing loss”— a loss in 
hearing of 40– 80 decibels— and some can hear sounds with a well- tuned 
hearing aid.)
The study was roughly divided into three phases. The first phase in-
volved spending an extensive period of time at the school as well as other 
spaces the participants inhabited familiarizing ourselves with the context of 
their lives to the greatest extent possible. This phase also involved conver-
sations with the participants through semistructured interviews about their 
general life experiences with various spaces and institutions as well as spe-
cific experiences regarding past hearing aids. In the second phase, we pro-
vided the participants off- the- shelf, behind- the- ear hearing aids along with 
professional fittings and return visits with a professional audiologist at no 
cost to them. We also interacted with them about the experiences of engag-
ing with the new hearing aids. In the final stage, a randomly selected half of 
the respondents collaborated with an artist to codesign the decoration for 
their own hearing aid, while the other respondents continued using their 
regular hearing aids. The intention behind this comparative design was 
to explore if there were differences in the experiences of the personalized 
hearing aid versus the nonmodified hearing aid. This approach might be 
considered a kind of action research (Greenwood and Levin 1998), but we 
are hesitant to use the term, as we had no longer- term goals beyond an un-
derstanding of how our specific “intervention” might change perceptions 
and behavior surrounding the hearing aids.
On the Difference between Deaf and Normal
Our initial conversations with the participants allowed us to gain a broad 
view of the context, histories, and affiliations of our participants. We also 
learned about their past experiences with hearing aids and their desires 
for a new one. The conversations, through semistructured interviews and 
over hours of participant observation at school, homes, and the sometimes 
meandering commute in between, were a way for us to engage with their 
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opinions about deaf and normal people, families, friends, life partners, and 
aspirations. Below we highlight a small fraction of what emerged from 
these interactions, focusing primarily on what is pertinent for participant 
reactions to the hearing aids.
The baseline sentiment, heard over and over in our interactions, is 
that deaf and normal people are distinct from one another, primarily due 
to barriers of language. As captured concisely by Rohit (all names have 
been changed to preserve the confidentiality of the participants), “When 
normals talk, they speak. I don’t understand it. When deafs sign, normal 
don’t understand.” This experience came out in stark relief when partici-
pants spoke of their schoolmates in comparison to their families. Most of 
the participants came from hearing families, and the dominant sentiment 
expressed about their families was one of alienation. In contrast, there 
was friendship, sharing, and collectivity experienced at school with fellow 
deaf students.
The communication gap was seen to have practical consequences, as 
well, particularly as a source of inequality between deaf and normal peo-
ple. Education, especially with respect to English, was seen as being much 
easier for normals, which resulted in them performing better otherwise 
at school and in the larger Indian society. Varun, expressed this matter- 
of- factly: “Normals can go to shop and ask for something and buy it. . . . 
Deafs have to write it down and show it to the shopkeeper. . . . Normals 
learn faster in school.”
At the same time, there was no articulation of wanting to become normal. 
It was not seen as a desirable state. Many respondents talked about how 
boring it was to interact with hearing people because they would have to 
sign slowly.
Family and School
As above, familial spaces emerged as the consistent site of regular interac-
tions with normal people. Yet this interaction only seemed to reaffirm their 
sense of alienation within the household. Most participants emphasized 
that home was a space of boredom and a desert of communication. Hrithik, 
describing his life at home, says, “I’ve tried teaching sign language at home, 
but they are too busy. So I just go home and sleep.” Sunita, who immi-
grated from Nepal as a young child and lives with her hearing uncle and his 
family, says, “I ask my brothers ‘What’s happening on TV?’ but they don’t 
tell me because they can’t sign.”
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These vignettes highlight what deaf people perceive as the lack of ef-
fort on behalf of hearing people to learn their language, even when it is 
the language of a family member. Friedner (2015), who observed a similar 
dynamic in Bangalore, suggests that deaf young adults feel a disconnect 
with families, with conversation being limited to those required to satisfy 
physiological needs such as eating, drinking, and sleeping.
A small minority of participants had family members who could sign, 
and how they talk about these family members is revealing. The feeling is 
less gratitude and more that an expectation has been met. Something that 
should be happening more often has finally happened. Manisha, expressing 
her fondness for her brother says,
My brother signs very well. . . . I taught him and he is very good. 
When he was young, he would try to call me and I wouldn’t be able 
to hear . . . he used to get angry and wanted to hit me. Then Mom 
explained to him that I could not hear and asked him not to hit me 
and go tap me on the back if he wanted to talk. . . . I love my brother. 
No one else signs.
But, except for a few such supportive family members who made the effort 
to learn sign language, families were experienced as isolating.
The school community was seen as very different from the family, but 
still with considerable complexity. The school we worked with represented 
a space to co- constitute life experiences with deaf friends, but also a site 
where authority still vests in hearing people.
Many painted deaf school as a site of engagement with other deaf people, 
contrasting it against the dull gray of their previous schools, which were for 
the most part taught in local (spoken) languages with teachers who did not 
sign at all. Rohit, recounting his experiences at previous school, said, “[My 
experience at the previous school was] not so good. They would speak and 
I wouldn’t understand. I didn’t understand the words. That school was in 
Marathi. This school is better. I am better at English and the teachers both 
sign and speak.” Others expressed similar feelings.
But most importantly, deaf school was significant because it provided 
space for deaf people to meet each other, reconfirming observations by 
Friedner (2015). In fact, despite the assimilationist intentions of the acad-
emy’s leadership, the students found it a conducive site for learning sign 
language and interacting with deaf peers. During our observations, we 
found that students were in no hurry to return home at the end of a day of 
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classes, in contrast with normal students at most schools. In one case, for 
example, we saw young adults in the 12th grade staying back, ostensibly to 
finish an environmental science project together. Yet even as the principal 
was present, helping them by hand- holding them through the material, the 
students engaged in signed side conversations whose content was largely 
nonacademic.
The close friendship among deaf students was specifically noted to be 
based on a common language. Friendship was not seen to be restricted to 
deaf people only, but our participants noticed a pattern that, as they grew 
older, friendship was increasingly constrained by the mutual knowledge of 
sign language. While some participants said they had no normal friends, 
others suggested that they used to have normal friends, who were now “too 
busy.” As childhood friendships, based perhaps on physical activity, ma-
tured into an adult companionship based on communication, the distance 
was increasingly felt. Normal people were seen to assimilate comparatively 
easily into life after school into colleges and workspaces, resulting in their 
new found “busyness.”
The occasional exceptions confirm the bond of sign language. Poorni-
ma’s best friend from her neighborhood is normal. We observed that their 
interactions on a walk home from the train station occurred in sign lan-
guage. Later, Poornima noted that they had been friends since they were 
children, and she taught her friend how to sign while growing up. Simi-
larly, Rahul, a student in the 11th grade, mentioned a normal friend who 
lives near his house, to whom he taught sign language.
Initial Perceptions of Hearing Aids
Most of our participants had previous experiences with multiple hearing 
aids, and much of our interaction focused on them. They were familiar 
with two types of models: pocket models that require headphones and 
behind- the- ear (BTE) models that curl behind the ear lobe.
These conversations were dominated by problems that they had with 
the hearing aids: how they went bad, were lost, or were too noisy. Poorn-
ima said, “I had a pocket machine when I was young, but it became kharaab 
[went bad, mouthed in Marathi]. Then I got a BTE machine, but the 
mold used to hurt me, and that too became kharaab.” It was not easy to tell 
whether the fact of the mold hurting her was the reason that she perceived 
it as going bad, or whether the two were distinct, unrelated events. In either 
case, though, there was no mention of a period of delight when the hearing 
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aids worked. Rohit shared his experiences about the body hearing aid he 
used to have: “I could only hear noise with my previous pocket- machine. If 
there were cars or traffic on roads, I could hear it. But I never understood 
what the teacher was saying. I couldn’t understand words or sentences.” 
Similar stories were relayed by almost all of the other participants.
Given these negative experiences, it was not evident to us at first why 
our participants opted for new hearing aids in our study. The reasons var-
ied. Poornima said, “I like riding scooters . . . but without [the hearing] ma-
chine, I will not get a license.” Tilakram, who is more conversant in spoken 
Hindi than most of the participants, said, “I want the machine to be able to 
hear close conversations.” Based on their past experience, the participants 
were aware of the limitations of hearing aids as a technology, especially as 
determined by aid quality, which itself was determined by financial con-
straints. But even when those financial constraints vanish (as they did for 
them in our project), the participants can be seen to choose with strategic 
and pragmatic reasons in mind.
Hearing Aids: Pragmatic and Aesthetic
After being fitted with new hearing aids, however, reasons for use of the 
hearing aids sometimes changed.
For two months after the participants were fitted with hearing aids, but 
prior to their personalized decoration, we spent a substantial amount of 
time with the participants discussing their experiences with their new de-
vices. The conversations focused on how they felt wearing the hearing aids 
in various spaces and others’ reception. What did they think other people 
thought of their hearing aid? Did the perception of others affect their own 
perception of their appearance? Did using the hearing aid at all change the 
participant’s perception of their own appearance? And, finally, did the de-
sign component change the experience of engaging with the hearing aid?
The reports were heterogeneous, though participants across the board 
cited both usefulness and problems. The usefulness was experienced on 
several pragmatic levels: to hear objects falling, doorbells ringing, horns 
blaring in traffic. Some of the participants said that the machine helped 
them with lipreading, listening to conversations close by, watching televi-
sion, and hearing others calling out their name.
Despite these desirable outcomes, many of the participants expressed 
dissatisfactions, as well. A general theme that emerged along these lines 
was that the awaaz (sound or voice) was not clear. This caused obstacles in 
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understanding full sentences, confusions between traffic sounds and other 
sounds, and even the direction of sound sources. Another complaint was 
that the mold of the hearing aid was too tight and caused physical pain 
(despite being offered the option to have the auditory clinic refit them at 
no cost). Sunita, talking about her problems with the machine, said,
It used to hurt a lot. I put some Vaseline [on] before using it. I talked 
to my grandmother about the machine. She tried talking to me with 
her mouth covered. I couldn’t hear anything. I can’t hear what the 
teacher is saying perfectly. I don’t understand where the sound in 
traffic is coming from, or if a plane goes by.
On the whole, the participants alternated between use and nonuse, depend-
ing on the context, much as people with far- sighted vision put on glasses 
only to read. This differs from the medically anticipated use of hearing 
aids, which are designed for all- day use by manufacturers. For instance, 
Rohit told us that he uses the hearing aid in the school and while traveling 
from the station to school. He said he never uses it on the train, because 
the background noise becomes too loud. He also did not use it in his neigh-
borhood, because normal people there ask him what it is and try to wear 
it. Over time, Rohit’s engagement with the hearing aid diminished. While 
discussing his patterns of hearing aid usage a few months later, he said, 
he uses them only when there is urgency. For example, “When there is a 
program at school and I don’t wear it, the principal scolds me. If there are 
guests coming to school . . . I bring the machine to school and forget it in 
the bag until the principal scolds me.” (Consistent with her desire for the 
students to assimilate, the principal apparently insisted to participants that 
they use the devices whenever possible.) Rohit’s narrative illustrates how 
the reasons for using hearing aids can be strategic and change over time. It 
also shows how selective usage of the hearing aid determines who engages 
with the technology, in what manner, and whose reactions are finally re-
ceived and interpreted by the participants.
After having provided the hearing aids, what was noticed was that the 
participants did not use or wear their machines all the time. In fact, they 
did not use the machines for the majority of the time that we were with 
them during school hours. At the same time, certain contexts did make the 
participants wear the hearing aid: in the principal’s presence, in class being 
taught by a hearing teacher, for interviews for this study. But most often, 
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when deaf young adults were interacting with each other, the devices were 
not used.
While discussing what wearing the hearing aids feels like, especially in 
terms of how it makes people feel about their appearance, the responses 
ranged from indifference to feeling good about it. In some cases, the hear-
ing aid made their deafness visible, sometimes with humorous results. 
Sunita recalled, “Some people asked me about the machine when I went 
to buy milk. I had to explain to them that I cannot hear properly. Some 
women on the station saw me wearing the hearing aid and offered me a 
seat on the bench  .  .  . they offer me the seat even when I am signing.” 
Apparently, the person felt that deaf people required non- hearing- related 
physical accommodations!
At other times, these moments of recognition came with an ensuing 
retreat from interaction that disappointed our participants: “People some-
times come to ask things on the train. On one side I look normal. On the 
other side when I show the hearing aid, they understand I am deaf and say, 
‘Sorry.’”
Yet others noted that the visibility of their deafness warded hearing 
people off entirely: “People on the road see the machine and they know. . . . 
When I didn’t wear a machine, they would come and start talking to me. 
I would say I am deaf, they would say sorry and leave. When I wear the 
machine, people know [and don’t approach].”
And still others felt comfortable with these phenomena, one way or an-
other: “With the hearing aid, people know I am deaf. I am okay with that.”
Deaf young adults conclude very quickly that the hearing world makes 
meaning of their deafness via the hearing aid as marker. Normal people are 
seen as reacting either with an acknowledgment of the deafness or guilt for 
not having acknowledged it in time.
Unexpectedly for us, but consonant with our other findings, none of the 
participants felt the least bit of shame about using hearing aids. Though 
there were different degrees of comfort and preference with respect to 
hearing aids themselves, there was no expressed complaint about the stigma 
of the technology. The closest thing that any of our participants said along 
these lines was the following by Narendra: “Before the design, people used 
to look at the machine and know that I am deaf. Now they look at the color. 
I feel nice.” That is to say, he appeared to feel no stigma about the device 
or his deafness, but he did appreciate the shift in attention. As researchers, 
we had to reevaluate our starting assumption. While the participants had a 
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complex relationship with the hearing aids, the technology was not experi-
enced as a locus of stigma.
Personalized Decoration
Seven of the participants (exactly half) participated in an interactive work-
shop hosted by the researchers and an artist based in Mumbai. The partici-
pants were asked to draw a series of paintings about things that had mean-
ing for them. The artist then took these portions of the paintings, digitized 
them, resized them, and printed them on stickers that could be applied to 
the hearing aid. One such design is shown in figure 6.1.
Did using these personalized designs change the experience of engag-
ing with the hearing aids? Did it instill a sense of pride in being users of 
this technology? Did it have any larger impact on their self- identity as deaf 
young adults?
Varun was one of the people most enthusiastic about his design: “The 
children in the school loved it. They asked me, Who gave this to you? We 
want it too! My classmates also asked me where I got it. This is a really 
good idea!” Aishwariya had positive reactions to the design as well, say-
ing, “All the kids asked me where I got it and they wanted it too! People at 
home asked me about it too. I told everyone that I made it and then your 
friend changed it to this size. All hearing aids look the same; this looks 
different. I like it.” The appeal the design has to children raises a ques-
tion about its appeal to young adults. The argument that the design distin-
guishes the hearing aid from other mass- produced hearing aids and hence 
is a pleasurable experience to wear illustrates how designs are intended to 
stand out, especially in relation to technologies that have been convention-
ally designed with the intention of discretion (Pullin 2009).
Yet the experience was not equally received by all participants. Virat, a 
college student, tried to negotiate with us from the beginning after being 
assigned the design group. When we met him a few weeks after he received 
the design, he told us that he took it off: “It made me feel like a baby! I feel 
that people look at me and laugh because I look like a baby. Though it is 
bright now, I used to like it when it was simple.” Virat’s comment suggests 
it is not a dismissal of the design’s visibility as much as the playful nature 
of his design, which could be construed as being too childish for his tastes 
as a young man.
Finally, Narendra, one of the few who remarked specifically about what 
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he thought others were thinking, said, “More people look now, but I don’t 
know what they are thinking. Nobody comes to talk to me. I would have 
liked the whole machine to be covered with a design. The whole machine, 
even the back, should have been covered with a plastic design.” This, too, 
suggests not an outright rejection of the design, as much as a desire to im-
prove it, possibly to extend the idea further than we allowed.
Figure 6.1. A participant wearing the hearing aid with personalized decoration, in 
this case of a camera.
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The Indian Context
One finding that was surprising to us is the degree to which deaf youth 
in India have a strong identity from which they draw personal and collec-
tive strength. Among disability scholars and within the deaf community 
itself, it is widely accepted that there is a “Deaf culture,” a dynamic set of 
norms and traditions that is unique to deaf people, and one which deaf 
people themselves readily adopt (Padden and Humphries 1990; Padden 
and Humphries 2009).
But what is striking about the deaf community we interacted with— a 
community connected at least as much with deaf activists in the greater 
Mumbai area, as much as with their school— is how strong and proud an 
identity it provides for its members, especially in a larger sociocultural 
context in which family forces can be intense and marginalized com-
munities tend to accept and even internalize ostracism. A long- standing 
debate, for example, asks why caste remains a potent force in modern 
India (Mahalingam 2003). Louis Dumont in his classic study of Indian 
caste describes the hegemony of upper- caste values, with one effect be-
ing lower- caste group’s internalization of caste hierarchies in a kind of 
Marxist false consciousness (Dumont 1970). Others, however, retort with 
alternate interpretations that involve less internalization and more as-
similation and strategy for mobility (Appadurai 1986). Still others argue 
vehemently against anything other than pride in one’s own caste or for a 
dismantling of the caste hierarchy altogether (Ilaiah 1989). But whatever 
the case, what is largely not in contention is a phenomenon that Indian 
sociologist M. N. Srinivas (1962) calls “Sanskritization”— the tendency 
for lower- caste people to take on the customs of the upper castes, espe-
cially as they gain socioeconomic status. That is to say, with caste, those 
considered lower on the hierarchy appear to feel pressures to adopt the 
outward appearance of those on the supposed upper rungs.
We saw no evidence of an analogous phenomenon among the deaf 
community in India. If anything, there is hostility toward the adoption 
of normal customs. At every turn, our deaf participants questioned why 
they should be the ones to adapt to hearing society, and not the other way 
around. Why shouldn’t their families learn sign language? Why should they 
learn to read lips? Why isn’t television routinely accompanied by signing?
What additionally brings this into stark relief is a casual awareness 
among deaf young adults that their normal peers tend to outperform them 
in a variety of ways. One participant, Hrithik, summed this up neatly: “Nor-
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mals do better at everything— cricket, swimming, getting jobs,” presum-
ably because of the differential opportunities to learn and hone such skills. 
Yet, despite acknowledging that normals have more opportunities for edu-
cational and vocational success, our deaf participants expressed no regret 
about being deaf. As above, all participants questioned the need to adapt to 
normal society. All were happiest among deaf friends. Almost all wanted to 
marry someone who was also deaf (with the one exception citing the practi-
cal value of having a spouse who could converse with hearing people).
This pride and confidence in spite of disadvantages is inspiring and ar-
guably rare in India and South Asia generally among marginalized groups. 
Even among disabled groups, and despite activists who work toward dis-
ability pride, many nevertheless experience their situation as one of “social 
suffering” (Meekosha 2011). Some see in digital technologies the potential 
to gain more independence, respect, and social status (Pal and Lakshmanan 
2014)— implying that those things were not theirs to begin with. Our deaf 
participants did not appear to feel this lack— as they might themselves ex-
plain, theirs is not necessarily a disability.
As Peri- Technological Intervention
As technology- for- development projects have proliferated since the mid- 
1990s, they have faced a range of criticism. Some of the problems cited 
include that projects are not appropriate for the context (Donaldson 
2009); violate sociocultural norms (Hosman and Fife 2008); neglect poor 
infrastructure (Surana et al. 2008); ignore the local community (Swindell 
2006); misunderstand user needs (Kuriyan, Ray, and Toyama 2008), and 
on and on. Among the reams of criticism is one that focuses on the overly 
technology- centric nature of the interventions (Toyama 2015). As the say-
ing goes, “When you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail,” and so, 
too, with technology proponents: when you have a powerful digital tool, 
everything looks like a problem that can be solved by it.
Our project’s goal was not to add to the mounting criticism of ICT4D, 
as much as to open the door to an entirely different class of project that 
we think of as peri- technological— related to or close to technology, but not 
strictly of it. As observers have remarked and statistics show, digital tech-
nology is pervading the world, regardless of ICT4D projects and their 
supporters. Today, the world has more mobile phone accounts than it has 
people on the planet (World Bank n.d.). India alone has over 1.1 billion 
accounts, a number equivalent to over 90 percent of the total population. 
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As gadgets have gone mainstream, researchers have discovered a range of 
peri- technological activity that is either enabled by or intended to enhance 
digital technology’s features, but which is not itself digital in nature. For 
example, mobile devices are widely personalized through protective cov-
ers and key- ring- like accessories; such ornamentation is a form of self- 
expression and identity reinforcement (Katz and Sugiyama 2005; Zoetewey 
2010). Usage patterns vary widely, with many households sharing devices 
that in other countries are considered personal and private (Sambasivan et 
al. 2010).
What is rarer— and possibly heretofore unseen— are intentional efforts 
to use peri- technological interventions to cause positive social outcomes. 
Several projects have developed peripheral devices to smartphones, for ex-
ample, to create microscopes (Breslauer et al. 2009) or portable ultrasound 
devices (Mertz 2012), but these are further digital extensions; technology 
is still core to the activity.
Our work provides a novel example where a nontechnological interven-
tion was intended to make a technology more palatable, in a context where 
the technology might have been helpful. Indian deaf youth are somewhat 
isolated due to their difference; meanwhile, the deaf community can be 
hostile to suggestions that they should adapt to a world of normals. As a re-
sult, deaf youth might avoid hearing aids both for highlighting their deaf-
ness and for creating distance from their own community. Both of these 
issues, we imagined, could be mitigated by a peri- technological adaptation 
that draws attention to the device itself. Paradoxically, by embracing the 
artifact, by augmenting its visibility, by turning it into an object of self- 
expression, some of the adverse social pressure could have been deflated. A 
peri- technological intervention could enable one to benefit from techno-
logical features without taking on the negative social impact that specific 
technologies might signify.
Indeed, there are other contexts in which minority communities ap-
propriate symbols of stigma or discrimination as a way to gain control over 
public perception and narrative. Among the most well- known examples is 
the pink triangle used by the international gay community (Jensen 2002). 
The pink triangle was originally a badge used in Nazi concentration camps 
to identify homosexual inmates, but sometime in the early 1970s the sym-
bol began to be used by gay rights activists in the United States and even-
tually in other parts of the world. (The exact origin of its current usage is 
unknown [Jensen 2002].) Often juxtaposed with the equation, “silence = 
death,” the mark has become a powerful symbol of identity and a potent 
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emblem around which the gay community and its supporters rally. A re-
lated example that is more recent but lesser- known is a campaign called 
“It Was Never a Dress,” in which a software company, Axosoft, released a 
reinterpreted image of the common symbol for women’s bathrooms (#It-
WasNeverADress n.d.). Instead of a dress, the graphic reimagined the tri-
angular shape as a cape on a woman wearing pants, hoping to “shift the 
perceptions and assumptions about women.”
Yet, contrary to our expectations, our peri- technological intervention 
had mixed results, which, though they leaned positively, were not without 
detractors. In fact, we saw no sign that our participants felt any stigma at-
tached to their hearing aids to begin with, and postdecoration there seemed 
to be no qualitative shift either in how they were perceived or how they re-
sponded to hearing people. If anything, the decoration merely accentuated 
the status quo for our deaf participants. In short, there was little expecta-
tion that the digital technology would impart an advantage, and certainly 
no sense that it would “repair” a problem. The result once the devices were 
worn was also mixed, with most responses acknowledging benefits but in a 
rather muted way. Our deaf participants were level- headed going into the 
project, and level- headed coming out. None of the typical exuberance ac-
companying digital technology, either as technology proponents hoping to 
fix an ailing society, or as anthropological observers finding a novel adapta-
tion by “the locals,” was present.
Conclusion
Our exploration of a personalized decoration intended to make hearing 
aids less objectionable to deaf Mumbai youth led to what were for us many 
unexpected findings. We found a community that had a robust sense of 
confidence and identity, even as they felt marginalized by the larger society 
and isolated from their own families. We were surprised by a tepid reaction 
to hearing aids— technology that normal people imagine as enabling for 
those with hearing loss. We saw mixed results with our peri- technological 
intervention that further confound narratives of tech- enabled social im-
pact. And, all this in contradistinction to the larger geo- cultural context of 
South Asia where social disparities can be oppressive and where technology 
is frequently exalted.
For many researchers, it is the richness of digital phenomena and the 
cultural variety of South Asia that make them attractive as foci of schol-
arship. Few generalizations can be made, and seeming contradictions are 
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everywhere. If so, what at first seems an outlier project might in fact be 
adding a new hue to a colorful spectrum, further celebrating what is the 
essential core of the digital in South Asia: its prodigious diversity.
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The Making of a Technocrat
Social Media and Narendra Modi
Joyojeet Pal
In the last two decades, much work has considered ways in which digital 
technologies such as mobile or computing devices, sensing devices, and 
the communications that are enabled by them— such as social media— 
intersect with a range of development issues in the Global South. Although 
many such technologies have been designed explicitly for use in low- and 
middle- income settings, others intended for other purposes have impacted 
human development issues because of the changing nature of technology- 
driven interactions that permeate society.
Social media offer one such space of inquiry whereby the sheer scope 
of adoption and use throughout the world have transformed interpersonal 
communications and power relations and agency between citizens and the 
polity (Bryer and Zavattaro 2011; Loader and Mercea 2011). Social media 
such as Facebook and Twitter have created a “digitally enhanced public 
sphere” that has become a space for political actors and citizens to exercise 
agency and outreach (Dutton 2009). Elections in most major democracies 
increasingly feature social media campaigns of key candidates in what has 
come to be a new normal for parts of the Global South (Lufkens 2016). 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who with more than 24 million 
followers on Twitter and 37 million “likes” on Facebook, is second only to 
Barack Obama among elected officials worldwide with social media fol-
lowers. The overwhelming majority of Modi’s messages on Facebook are 
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“liked” more than 50,000 times apiece, and the median number of retweets 
of his Twitter messages is more than 2,000. As of November 2016, Modi 
had more than twice the number of followers on either Twitter or Face-
book as any mainstream news media channel or journalist in India.
Social media are not the first or even only case of Modi using tech-
nology in some form of self- branding. Modi hired a global public rela-
tions agency that specialized in political leaders, which started a campaign 
of rebranding the leader as a growth- focused politician, building a Vikas 
Purush, literally meaning “Development Man” (Kanungo and Farooqui 
2008). Through much of his campaigning in Gujarat, Modi has used tech-
nology to recraft himself as a man who appeals beyond his Hindutva roots 
to a leader who represents the needs of a “neo- middle class,” using a range 
of media including a initiating a television channel called “NaMo,” mobile- 
based outreach, an Internet campaign, and a number of public appearances 
through holographic shows during elections (Jaffrelot 2015).
The choice of social media is, in and of itself, not surprising. Unlike 
earlier means of technology- enabled outreach such as a website with 
downloadable wallpapers, or opt- in subscriptions for SMS messages, so-
cial media allow an unobtrusive way of connecting with the electorate and 
building a community (Kapoor and Dwivedi 2015). The nature of social 
media, in its perception as a technology of young people, came to the fore-
front significantly after Barack Obama’s successful online campaign for his 
2008 election. Modi’s investment in social media is necessarily more than 
just the value of head count outreach to voting citizens. The symbolic value 
of social media emerges on two fronts— being active on social media itself 
suggests an embracing of modernity, but second, the tone and content of 
the messages on social media are also representational objects used to re-
mind listeners of the leader’s political message.
The construction of social media as a means of political outreach that 
spoke out against entrenched political institutions gained purchase in the 
aftermath of the Iranian elections of 2008 and the Egyptian prodemoc-
racy movement (Sabadello 2011). The popular press, in particular, played 
an important role in promoting the politicized social media participant as 
representing youthful revolution and a voice of change and decentralized 
empowerment (Grossman 2009). The use of short- form social media mes-
saging was individualized yet informal, and distinct from the traditional ba-
nality of political polemic, and consequently seen as attractive to a younger 
tech- savvy ethic (Lenhart et al. 2010; Sago 2010). The election of a “giant- 
killer” Barack Obama, who defeated establishment candidates within his 
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party to emerge on a platform of change, helped further the idea not just of 
a different kind of modern political leader but also of a campaign strategy 
that could canvas a young and idealistic population into political action. 
Several studies showed that politicians on social media were either younger 
themselves (Larsson and Kalsnes 2014), trying to reach the young (Leng 
2012), or looking awkward trying to act young (Baxter and Marcella 2012).
The flag- waving for social media as an emancipatory technology af-
ter the Arab Spring also waned as many scholars noted their potential for 
capture by entrenched institutions and powers (Burns and Eltham 2009; 
Morozov 2009; Mungiu- Pippidi and Munteanu 2009). The notion of the 
active social media politician as representing an alternative voice against 
the establishment declined with the gradual institutionalizing of social 
media; being active on Facebook or Twitter grew to be a given for major 
politicians for their campaigns as well as for citizen outreach (Hong and 
Nadler 2011). Most recently, with the U.S. 2016 election, the social media 
political space was touted by eventual winner Donald Trump as a space 
offering an alternative to a mainstream media discourse, and the candidate 
frequently used and referred to social media as his primary means of reach-
ing the electorate, often piggybacking on the virality of social media mes-
saging as a means to attract mainstream media attention. More important, 
the postelection analysis focused on the potential for dubious social media 
messages to go viral.
It is also clear that participation on social media may not be dependent 
on the actual size of the active voting citizenry active on social media. Stud-
ies show that politicians even in the World Bank’s list of poorest nations, 
including a vast majority of heads of government in the Global South, are 
directly engaging with social media (Lufkens 2016), irrespective of scant 
evidence of any influence of social media on election outcomes, with even 
some evidence to the contrary (Leng 2012). Indeed, a number of major 
political figures or heads of government from the Global South engaged 
in social media are neither popularly elected nor have any immediate need 
for support from a voting electorate to stay in power, but rather use social 
media as a means of signaling affiliation with national or diasporic elites 
or presenting palatable images of themselves to the outside world (Pal and 
Gonawela 2016).
Political social media offer a new element in the evolution of mediatiza-
tion, which refers to the mainstream media being an interlocutor between 
the politician and the citizen. The relationship between a politician and 
the mainstream media can be guided on one end by political logics, where 
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a politician controls media reporting about himself or herself, or by media 
logics, where that politician’s public actions may be driven by what a main-
stream media deems newsworthy (Vergeer, Hermans, and Sams 2013). The 
emerging perspective on social media engagement is that of an alternative 
and often concurrent channel for political branding (Nilsson and Carlsson 
2014), which offers a soapbox through which to potentially control and 
channel a precise message that can reach those who choose to use it, but 
hopefully to a larger listening mainstream media as well (Fuchs 2013). This 
has been an important strategy, which has arguably had the desired second- 
order impacts— research has shown that despite not directly addressing 
professional journalists, Modi was able to have the mainstream print me-
dia cover his social media feed extensively (Chakraborty et al. 2018). The 
resulting social media stream allows for a flow of unmediated outreach, 
which has been found to focus inordinately on positive, feel- good stories, 
ignoring tricky or controversial issues of national concern (Haq 2016; 
Kohli 2018).
The Social Media “Technocrat”
Modi’s growing public image as a technocrat is not just one of folklore. Un-
like the traditional definition of a technocrat who rules on the basis of their 
own scientific expertise, Modi’s technocracy has come to be defined in not 
only his repeated public espousal of technology but, equally importantly, 
in his very public consumption of the latest technology. Narendra Modi 
was a relatively early starter with an interactive online presence. He had 
a regularly maintained website— narendramodi.in since 2007— on which 
citizens could message him, set up appointments, and view a full archive of 
his speeches. Since 2009, he has had accounts on both Facebook and Twit-
ter. By the eve of the 2014 general election, he had active accounts with 
sizable following on Google+, Instagram, Tumblr, Pinterest, and LinkedIn, 
and an active multimedia channel on YouTube. By 2014 Modi had reached 
“influencer” status on LinkedIn, an invitation program for public figures 
who post what are seen as influential messages on professional issues.
Modi’s presence on social media must be framed within the history of 
his political genesis from a grassroots proselytizer and organizer for the 
right- wing Hindu social organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 
to a leading member of its political wing, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 
and eventually to chief minister for the western Indian state of Gujarat in 
2001. Modi led the BJP to three election wins in Gujarat and became the 
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longest- serving chief minister in the state’s history. The early years of his 
Gujarat tenure were marred by the 2002 riots, which some news media 
alleged were a pogrom against Muslims. Modi was acquitted of charges, 
though some of his key aides were convicted and jailed for their involve-
ment. This led to Modi’s marginalization in the international community: 
the United States banned Modi from entry and the European Union de-
nied him diplomatic access for several years. Modi’s association with the 
RSS also put him at odds with the relatively liberal English- language me-
dia in India, a channel to both Indian elites and nonresident expatriates. In 
the years following the riots, Modi’s negative coverage persisted, including 
interviews with antagonistic television commentators.
Although even before 2002 Modi had been known to talk about or be 
seen using a computer in media interviews (Shukla 2000), his investment 
in an aggressive public relations effort to build an image as a development 
icon expanded significantly after the riots (Kaur 2015; Price 2015). The 
“Vikas Purush” campaign featured a series of photos of him in sylvan set-
tings, in thoughtful poses, surrounded by artifacts like an Obama biogra-
phy, a financial newspaper, using technological devices like an Apple lap-
top and an SLR camera— proposing an image of a thoughtful, well- read, 
technology- embracing leader (Pal 2017). The regime highlighted indus-
trial growth and the investment climate, avoiding mention of the riots in 
public fora. Modi’s positive- tone messaging on Twitter that we see later has 
roots in the espousal of the terms asmita (common pride) as a central part 
of his speeches while he was chief minister, suggesting that people invest in 
pratiksha (aspiration) rather than ninda (condemnation) (Suhrud 2012). The 
use of asmita presented a turn- the- other- cheek style of forward- looking 
leadership that by encouraging its own movement to disavow ninda under-
cut the political opposition’s attempts to bring up the riots.
Modi’s use of APCO for public relations was controversial because of 
the firm’s past campaigns with military dictators (Ahmed 2012). On pa-
per, though, the firm was hired by an international group of funders called 
“Friends of Gujarat” (Jaffrelot 2015). In the run- up to the 2014 general 
election several other agencies were more closely involved in the brand 
campaign, including Citizens for Accountable Governance and NitiCen-
tral, with various aspects of the outreach process (Kapoor and Dwivedi 
2015; Torri 2015).1 Specifically, the 2014 election campaign had carefully 
managed use of technology, what British politician and head of UK– India 
Business Council Patricia Hewitt referred to as “having the best bits of 
Blair, Clinton, and Obama, but with even more modern techniques that 
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even they hadn’t dreamed of,” including an encore of his 3- D hologram 
campaign (Price 2015). While Modi campaigned aggressively through 
public speeches throughout the country for the general election, he had 
very few unplanned events such as television interviews leading up to the 
2014 election. Whether in person or digitally, his output was crafted— 
allowing him to select what issues he would address, dictate the timing of 
such output, and precisely frame the tenor of the message, unlike the risky 
improvisation of a live traditional media interaction.
The social media affordances of having followers who engage with one’s 
content offers the semblance of interactive direct communication— in Mo-
di’s case, his voice on social media is not just his flow of direct content, but 
also the resonance of his image and message through retweets, likes, and 
forwards through an active population of Indian social media users. This 
population is largely an aspirational and tech- savvy middle and upper class, 
an educated and often successful professional class whose support matters 
by virtue of its publicness, particularly because of its apparent distinction 
from his traditional base of social conservative voters. Here, communicat-
ing through Facebook or Twitter provides instrumental benefits, but doing 
so simultaneously dovetails a larger discourse of aspiration at a particular 
moment in India’s history, where the political actor’s embrace of the social 
media artifact in and of itself represents a normative positioning.
This positioning can be framed through the reframing of the middle- 
class voter since the 2000s. Leela Fernandes (2009) identified two dis-
courses of development in this period: the first was marked by discussions 
of sustainable development and growth in policy initiatives and the second 
by a celebratory language of middle- class consumption as a sign of the suc-
cess of these policies. This language was integral to the neoliberal move-
ment and is referred by sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant 
(2001) as the “NewLiberalSpeak.” It features a plethora of buzzwords 
such as “globalization,” “governance,” and “employability”— all terms 
used to discuss issues of development in the mainstream to replace the 
erstwhile negative terminology that included “exploitation,” “class,” and 
“dominance.” As we see in this research, Modi has made such language— 
alongside catchphrases such as “digital dividends” and “next gen”— central 
to his social media messaging since 2009.
Digital technology in various human and material symbolic avatars— 
the swank buildings in software special economic zones, globe- trotting 
IT professionals, a slew of India’s cheapest computer projects, farmers 
checking crop prices on the Internet, or the Indian software product— 
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all emerged in this period as sources of collective largesse and as objects 
of individual desire amid a discourse of national leapfrogging to catch up 
with the West (Pal 2010). A vision of credentialed modernity was touted 
as replacing a corrupt system plagued by nepotism, reservations, and a 
broken educational system out of which emerged an aspirational endgame 
of working with technology in one of the major metros or even abroad 
(Radhakrishnan 2009). The heroes of this vision are the young who work 
with digital technology and, more important, those who allow them to get 
ahead— where the notion of egalitarianism rests not on leveling the num-
ber of opportunities but rather in removing the barriers to middle- class 
aspirants who present the possibilities of a resurgent India.
Modi is not the first major politician to highlight digital technology as 
central to his political branding. Since the mid- 1990s, several politicians 
have crafted political images as tech- savvy leaders. Key among them was 
Andhra Pradesh’s chief minister N. Chandrababu Naidu, who claimed the 
moniker of Cyber- Naidu, signaling his vision for a tech industry- inspired 
polity by referring to himself as the state’s CEO (Rudolph and Rudolph 
2001). In subsequent years, several politicians came to embrace both a 
macro- vision of technology- enabled industrial growth by explicitly pro-
moting the tech sector or special economic zones as part of their political 
platforms (Banerjee- Guha 2008; Kamat 2011), or through a visible interac-
tion with digital artifacts such as posing with computers for the media or 
incorporating technology into their public programs such as laptop give-
aways around election times (Mudliar and Pal 2015). This political invest-
ment in the symbolic value of technology occurred alongside the broader 
expansion of the discourse of ICT4D (information and communications 
technology for development), which saw a role for digital technology and 
the tech industry in a symbiotic relationship with the idea of global devel-
opment (Kleine and Unwin 2009), often drawing on the work of manage-
ment theories premised on a value that “Bottom of the Pyramid” markets 
offered growth possibilities to corporations and vice versa (Schwittay 2009). 
Building on Arjun Appadurai’s work on the “capacity to aspire” (Appadurai 
2004), several works looked at the projection or enactment of aspiration as 
an interim indicator of development (Ray and Kuriyan 2010; Rangaswamy 
and Cutrell 2012; Ray and Kuriyan 2010).
The rise of ICT4D in India after the 1990s saw an expanding affirma-
tive discourse of technology, with images lionizing technology figures and 
the industry as representing “a new India.” Mainstream media highlighted 
stories of hope from Potemkin villages where farmers used computers to 
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estimate their farm inputs, or gendered bodies of low- income, low- caste 
women using cellphones, or a range of devices juxtaposed against users 
whose very presence alongside these was meant to signal the inclusive po-
tential of digital technologies (Keniston 2003; Mazzarella 2010).
William Mazzarella, critiquing the technofetishism of the ICT4D wave, 
noted that the problem of the social acceptance of a technocratic imagi-
nary is further complicated because the “media that constitute the infor-
mation network [are made] so organic that they become indistinguishable 
from the social relations they mediate” (Mazzarella 2010). Consequently, 
the mainstream media’s role in presenting technology as the vanguard of 
an alternative future for India has been profoundly political (Mazzarella 
2010). By the 2000s, even mainstream cinema saw the rise of software engi-
neers as lead male and female characters (Pal 2010). Politicians essentially 
hopped onto an aspirational language of communication that was already 
eminently obvious in the popular discourse.
Technocracy as Political Cachet
A large body of literature exists on the politics of technocracy in the man-
agement of complex political systems and rational planning (Banfield 1959; 
Fischer 1990). Yet ideas around the presentation of a technical/rational 
vision for governance, the very basis of a technocracy, have been deeply 
contested, with few agreements on what a technocracy is or how it exists 
as a system (Laird 1990; Winner 1977). Much of the work on technoc-
racy has focused on the complexities of scientific management and the role 
of expertise- driven direction of modern states (Silva 2009); the attention 
to specific personal brand management of political actors as technocrats 
is relatively recent (Lewandowski 2013). Modi’s self- representation as a 
technocrat at once uses the discourse of technology in communicated out-
put (such as talk of the technology industry and e- governance) and the 
integration of technological artifacts into his persona (such as posing with 
computers and mobiles, appearing in 3- D holograms, or regularly posting 
to social media in a first- person voice). In this, Modi goes beyond Jawaha-
rlal Nehru or Rajiv Gandhi, in whose national political visions technology 
played a significant part. Modi’s brand cachet as a modern, technologically 
oriented political actor was even greater than that of his immediate pre-
decessor, Manmohan Singh, who was arguably the Indian political estab-
lishment’s most accomplished technocrat— a widely published economics 
professor and former governor of the Reserve Bank of India. Modi’s use of 
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technology in his political branding raises the importance of the embod-
ied technological actor in electoral politics, a subject that has largely been 
missing (Subramanian 2006), particularly given the long- standing percep-
tion that technocracy and populist politics have traditionally been at odds 
with each other (Howse 2002).
Social Media in Political Branding
The work on social media and electoral politics has been dominated by re-
search on the Obama campaigns and its impact on campaign outreach and 
political communication (Hendricks and Denton 2010). In part because of 
his appeal among a younger, liberal electorate who are also relatively well 
represented on social media, Obama quickly grew in appeal as a tech- savvy 
“communicator- in- chief” (Miller 2013). This association of social media 
success with a youthful brand image held sway through many campaigns 
worldwide up to the 2012 U.S. election, by which point older citizens had 
become a significant constituency on social media (Conway, Kenski, and 
Wang 2013). While Obama has served as an important example for sev-
eral political leaders using social media, many of Obama team’s specific 
social media campaign strategies, including the creation of a centralized 
discourse, the use of followbacks, and positive- themed messaging, were 
hallmarks of the Modi campaign (Pal, Chandra, and Vydiswaran 2016).2
A Brief Overview of Methods
This is a mixed- methods study of Narendra Modi’s Twitter campaign from 
2009 through 2015. Twitter was selected because of a comprehensive ef-
fort on our end to record activity through periodic downloads of Modi’s 
tweets and the activity surrounding them. Our database consists of 9,368 
tweets by Narendra Modi between February 2, 2009, and October 2, 2015. 
Five researchers qualitatively coded a subset of 2,960 of these tweets in six 
phases (table 7.1).
We assigned each of the 2,960 tweets to one of nine categories such as 
Updates, Generic, Regards, and Confrontations; we do not discuss these 
here because our focus is on themes. The themes are separate from catego-
ries in that one tweet can have multiple themes, based on the subject mat-
ter. We assigned each tweet up to three thematic codes out of 160 themes, 
and a regional code, if relevant.
The following example helps illustrate the coding:
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Example 1: Date: 05/04/2009, Phase 1
Tweet text: In Pakistan, the Taliban is inflicting its tyranny and in 
Pakistan, Sikhs are being persecuted, Sardars are being perse-
cuted.
Category: Generic
Themes: International, Violence, Sikhism
Region: Pakistan
Example 2: Date: 12/11/2012, Phase 2
Tweet text: Congress neither has people nor issues in this election! 
Addressed 3 public meetings in Ahmedabad
Category: Confrontation
Themes: Congress, Criticism, Election Campaigning
Region: Ahmedabad
We used three rounds of iteration to arrive at the 160 themes, but as 
the research continued we added new themes if necessary. For this paper 
we specifically examined the subset of themes directly related to informa-
tion and communications technologies (ICTs) to analyze how often Modi 
talked about technology and the ways in which he did this. We created 
“ICTs” as a composite variable, the definition of which is as follows, from 
our theme legend:
Table 7.1. Tweets dated by the sampled phases (n = 2,960)
Phase Tweet time period Time period significance No. of tweets
1 Feb. 1, 2009– Jan. 21, 2012 Early tweets 625
2 Aug. 3, 2012– Jan. 30, 2013 Tweets leading into 2012  
Gujarat elections
500
3 Jan. 30, 2013– May 27, 2013 Tweets following election as 
chief minister
352
4 Apr. 13, 2014– May 17, 2014 Tweets leading into 2014  
general elections
501
5 Dec. 15, 2014– Feb. 18, 2015 Six months after election as 
prime minister
486
6 Aug. 14, 2015– Oct. 2, 2015 Six months after phase 5 496
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Mentions of science and technology, particularly digital technology. 
This includes scientific innovations, computers, mobile devices, and 
science programs (e.g., ISRO [Indian Space Research Organisa-
tion]). The theme also includes mentions of people primarily as-
sociated with technology such as scientists or industrialists (e.g., Bill 
Gates).
Example tweets include:
• “From making electronic goods that are globally competitive to en-
hancing cyber security, India must show the way.” (July 1, 2015)
• “Tomorrow I’ll address public meetings in 4 cities simultaneously 
through 3D Projection Technology. Sharing details  .  .  . nm4.in” 
(November 16, 2012)
ICTs composed 9.6 percent of the total number of tweets through the 
entire sample of tweets analyzed. We used two forms of analyses on these 
tweets. First, we examined the frequency of the ICT themes through the 
six phases, and the reach of these tweets in terms of retweeting and favorit-
ing. Second, we contextually analyzed the language and framing of selected 
tweets that characterize Modi’s discourse on technology.
Results
Table 7.2 compares the thematic areas of ICTs with those of development, 
youth, and initiatives. Briefly, the development theme includes all tweets 
about economic development, the youth theme includes all specific refer-
ences to young Indians or the notion of youth, and the initiatives theme 
includes all tweets about an initiative of the Modi government (tweets un-
til May 2014 included Gujarat state initiatives, thereafter national initia-
tives). These four themes are among the most frequent themes in the en-
tire sample of tweets. ICTs appeared consistently throughout all six phases 
studied, suggesting they have been part of the outreach message since the 
start of Modi’s social media campaign. The references to youth are also an 
important part of the political branding, and these are tied to ICTs and de-
velopment because they nudge at the aspirational discourse of the younger 
generations. We also found that ICTs were a major part of the discourse in 
the lead- up to the general election, as the single most frequent theme in 
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tweets, as opposed to development, which was by far the most frequently 
tweeted theme by Modi while he was chief minister of Gujarat. Initiatives, 
which were not spoken about much in the run- up to the 2014 elections, 
form the single largest theme of discussion right after the 2014 election, 
at which point Modi started discussing a range of programs he planned to 
pursue as head of the government.
While development is a consistent theme, its frame changes over time. 
A qualitative analysis of the tweets shows that Modi’s messaging uses what 
Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001) call “NewLiberalSpeak.” We created a sep-
arate theme for “wordsmithing,” which includes tweets using clever turns 
of phrase of business buzzwords. We found that these composed 2.0 per-
cent of the 2,960 tweets, and were frequently applied to technology- related 
tweets, including the following:
• IT (Indian Talent) + IT (Information Technology) = IT (India To-
morrow)! Sharing video of my speech at #BigTentIndia (March 21, 
2013; Phase 3)
Tweets related to e- governance, including the following:
• While Government is about FILE, Governance is about LIFE. If 
we can infuse LIFE in FILE, we will experience Governance! (April 
8, 2013; Phase 3)
Several development- themed tweets also referred to the influential expa-
triate Indian population in wealthy foreign nations, whose success is often 










Early tweets 8.5 14.9 5.6 15.0
Tweets leading into 2012 Gujarat 
elections
7.0 11.4 8.8 6.6
Tweets following election as chief 
minister
8.3 17.7 4.3 8.3
Tweets leading into 2014 general 
election
14.2 14.0 4.0 0.6
Six months after election as prime 
minister
13.6 16.3 9.5 18.1
Six months after phase 5 11.7 11.1 3.4 7.3
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discussed in the public sphere as exemplifying the potential technology 
offers assiduous Indians:
• A new India should focus on 3 pillars of Scale, Speed & Skill. Shar-
ing video of my speech at Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (January 9, 2012; 
Phase 1)
The call out to the wealthy, aspirational nonresident Indian population 
was crafted in alliteration to signify a command over this kind of language. 
We find it significant that development was a frequently co- occurring 
theme— 19.6 percent of ICT- themed tweets were also about development. 
However, ICT- themed tweets were almost always phrased in positive lan-
guage, unlike development- themed conversations, which at various points 
were also confrontational. Another aspect to the ICT- themed tweets was 
their high correlation to international- themed tweets. These include tweets 
about Silicon Valley, meetings with global tech leaders, as well as what has 
come to be known as “selfie diplomacy” of Modi posing on selfies with 
world leaders. We also found that tweets themed around ICTs tended to 
have more individual persons mentioned in them; in four of the phases— 1, 
2, 4, and 6— there was a significant relationship between ICTs and callouts, 
such that if a tweet was ICT- themed, there was a higher chance than in the 
rest of the sample that another individual was called out in the tweet.
An example of Modi’s strategic tweeting with personalities in tech came 
in 2011, when he tweeted about meeting Infosys CEO N. R. Narayana 
Murthy. The message came at an important time— the widely respected 
Murthy was one of the best known names in Indian tech, a middle- class 
engineer turned software billionaire, and Modi had not made his national 
ambitions clear yet. Modi was still dogged by a generally negative media 
portrayal, and was once a pariah even among some sections of the industry, 
with the lingering memory of his criticism by leading industrialists regard-
ing the “sense of insecurity” in the state after the 2002 riots (Jose 2012). 
Few major public figures had endorsed Modi at this point, so the tweet had 
signaling value.
WoW! What a nice light- hearted chat with Narayan Murthyji on 
diverse issues, so delighting (July 19, 2011; Phase 1)
This tweet uses a respectful “ji” suffix and suggests mutual respect in 
their informal chat. The signaling value is also inherent in Murthy be-
ing from the tech sector, synonymous with a new tech economy built on 
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talent and not nepotism, unlike other industrialists known to be close to 
Modi because of their Gujarat connections. Modi’s style of informal tweet-
ing using equivalence with another individual was used consistently in his 
tweets about several leading tech figures, even after his ascendance to the 
prime ministership. Over time Modi has tweeted about meetings with Dick 
Costolo (Twitter), Sundar Pichai (Google), Salman Khan (Khan Academy), 
John Chambers (Cisco), and Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook), among others. 
The continued style of casual association signals to his followers regarding 
those who have his ears, as seen in the following casual tweet to Bill Gates, 
in which he appears to remind the industrialist that they spoke during a 
meeting with the French president.
Was great meeting you @BillGates. Got to spend some time talking 
to you during the meeting with President @fhollande (September 
28, 2015; Phase 6)
Modi used selfies very effectively in associative references. His ap-
propriation of the selfie, typically seen as a technology for the young, in 
the political sphere came to further his reputation as a “Selfie Diplomat.” 
At several points after becoming prime minister, Modi took images with 
world leaders, film stars, or casual citizens and tweeted them, and on a 
few occasions was able to create viral hashtags on selfies, including #Self-
ieWithModi, an online campaign to post a selfie saying one had voted. 
The campaign not only highlighted the leader’s apparent comfort with a 
contemporary means of self- expression, but it also incorporated a clever 
brand exercise— these tweets were typically widely retweeted because they 
allowed people to share a tag with their leader, creating the sense of inter-
acting with the leader.
Never imagined such a remarkable response to #SelfieWithModi. 
A big thanks. Here are some Tweets shared by friends http://t.co 
(April 30, 2014; Phase 4)
The SelfieWithModi hashtag is a good example of how the notion of 
technology reaches more broadly outside the text of the messages them-
selves. Modi’s ubiquity on social media includes Tumblr, Instagram, Linke-
dIn, Pinterest, and even a curriculum vitae on LinkedIn, a shout- out to the 
millions of young Indians who use it for job searching. Modi was among 
the first politicians to use Google Hangouts and Twitter Videos, and has 
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since the mid- 2000s kept evolving his social media strategy alongside what 
was the dominant technology. His early messaging, for instance, was man-
aged through an easy- loading website.
A Call to the Nation!Listen Narendra Modi on your mobile, config-
ure podcast to http://narendramodi.in, For help call to 9974309240 
(March 31, 2009; Phase 1)
# Your beloved leader Narendra Modi could be just around you!! 
Catch him up on google maps at http://narendramodi.in (April 1, 
2009; Phase 1)
These two tweets from 2009 signal the leader’s presence across some of 
the newest media. We see in these tweets that he offers a range of ways to 
interact. We also see a strategic use of (at the time) the latest technology, 
Google Maps, which even early adopters had not started using widely, il-
lustrating the leader’s claim to a certain modernity.3
Discussion
In his much- cited speech at the United Kingdom parliament on November 
11, 2015, Modi noted that his “India resides in people like Imran Khan,” re-
ferring to a young man in Rajasthan who built a mobile app and donated it 
to his fellow citizens. The tweet created a brief tech- enabled celebrity who 
would trend on Twitter that same evening. The message had two implied 
intents— first, a Muslim man was chosen to allude to the politician’s secular 
vision; second, the do- good technological maker in Imran signposted the 
prime minister’s long- standing stated vision of a social order that stands on 
technology and the benevolence of the entrepreneurial spirit. Just as Modi 
rewards entrepreneurship, he condemns inefficiency.
The themes of efficiency, entrepreneurship, business- friendliness, 
and consciousness of the needs of the youth all repeat themselves. Their 
importance is in the fact that their frequent appearance sets the tone for 
technocratic rationality as a governing principle. The breadth of the social 
media campaign promotes the idea of a broadly subscribed social discourse 
of Modi’s positions. The affordances of social technology reinforce this 
ubiquity. Messages across various social media channels are coordinated— 
Facebook statuses are coordinated with tweets, a YouTube channel features 
both the prime minister’s radio addresses and his speeches, which in turn are 
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tweeted about. To go beyond polemics and provide a guide to well- being, 
Modi’s YouTube channel also touts speeches on yoga. Three- dimensional 
meetings project life- size holograms of Modi in public meetings when he 
is not available to speak in person. Thus, the discourse of technology and 
development does not stop at talk; it actively parades as action.
What we found in the consistent invocation of technology and develop-
ment in Modi’s social media message is that the inherent signaling crafts 
these as a means to remake his complicated past. Here, Modi’s use of Twit-
ter needs to be looked at not just as a case of political brand management, 
but as an artifact of a moment in history where technology- driven no-
tions of development present an aspirational frame that has purchase in 
the media and in a broad- based middle class. Calling out to technology, 
rather than being elitist and misguided in a nation of great inequalities, 
presents a vision of patriotic optimism. Modi’s self- affiliation with tech-
nocracy through this light is as much about him rebranding politically as 
it is about a middle- class support base seeking a secular justification for 
supporting him.
Conclusion
Who does a technology- centric vision of development most appeal to, and 
who by extension may be excluded from this vision? That Modi has suc-
cessfully reframed the popular discourse surrounding him is neither new 
nor surprising (Colvin and Bhattacharjya 2013). What is worth examining 
is the appeal of this message at this historical juncture. On September 28, 
2015, a Facebook post about Modi’s interaction with Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg was “liked” by more than 1.7 million users within hours. The 
same day Zuckerberg changed his profile picture to a tricolor tint, prompt-
ing hundreds of thousands of Facebook users to follow. Social media were 
abuzz with the hashtag #ModiInUSA, which featured meetings of the 
prime minister with the CEOs of Google, Microsoft, Cisco, Qualcomm, 
Adobe, Tesla, and Apple.
Within a month of these massively retweeted events, the Modi- led BJP 
lost an important election in the poor and largely rural Indian state of 
Bihar, despite hectic campaigning. For many who watched the surge of 
enthusiastic commentary about Modi on social media, the news came as a 
shock. Indeed, the story of Narendra Modi’s social media campaign tells us 
little about the leader’s standing in popular elections. What the story does 
emphasize is the ways in which the association of technology with develop-
Revised Pages
The Making of a Technocrat •  179
ment as doxa is driven home by the language and themes employed by the 
prime minister and by their affirmation through his followers’ retweets and 
favoriting. The power of Modi’s message is in the juxtaposition of his past 
as a train station tea seller with his present as a selfie- clicking leader of a 
strong aspirational state. The real treason on social media, it would appear, 
is for anyone calling herself Indian to reject that possibility.
Notes
 1. Modi’s own tweets have been reported as posted by staffers http://www.dna-
india.com
 2. There are a number of other interesting examples of social media use in 
elections. For instance, in Scandinavia during nonelection cycles has shown an as-
sociation between political social media communication and younger, opposition, 
and relatively more maverick political actors (Larsson and Kalsnes 2014). Other 
work on European electoral social media has also shown distinctions in the nature 
and tenor of messaging based on the political culture of nation- states. Finally, social 
media accounts are associated with individuals; consequently, they highlight a per-
sonal style in reaching out to an electorate directly (Medina and Muñoz 2014). This 
helps the branding exercise move away from the political party toward a greater 
focus on the individual political actor (Enli and Skogerbø 2013). There is, however, 
little work on media and political signaling in the Global South, and most such 
work revolves around the traditional image management of former (or current) 
strongmen through signaling neoliberal reforms, where the rebranding is often 
overtly tainted and separated from ostensible citizen support (Cabezas 2014; Fisher 
2015).
 3. The same tweet does, however, have a less impressive use of a hashtag.
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#ShamedInSydney and the Paradox  
of Participatory Live Television
Sangeet Kumar
The ways in which the rise of digital culture is changing older media forms 
(print, television, and radio) is a subject of wide scholarship (Jenkins 2008; 
Chadwick 2017). In the case of television, digitization across media tech-
nologies has reshaped every dimension of the medium including its con-
tent, format, temporal structure, and audience interactivity. This chapter 
interrogates the ongoing ways in which live television appropriates and 
continues to be transformed by the growth of digital media by closely ana-
lyzing a case study about an Indian television network’s attempt to garner 
audience interactivity through the web platform of Twitter. This incident 
from March 2015 is one wherein the audience for the talk show The New-
shour (telecast on the news network Times Now) upended attempts by the 
show’s anchor Arnab Goswami to peddle a critical narrative about India’s 
defeat in the Cricket World Cup of 2015 using Twitter. They did so by 
creating a counter narrative by using a competing Twitter hashtag, thus 
intervening in the debate even as the live broadcast of the show unfolded. 
Through interrogating the now famous debacle, this chapter invites us to 
reconsider how the very nature of liveness is being transformed because 
of the rise of a public networked through proliferating digital devices and 
social networking site (SNS) platforms such as Twitter. While a networked 
public has allowed live television shows to appropriate and foster interac-
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tivity in unprecedented ways, thus altering the very definition of liveness 
and expanding the category of the audience, the precarity of liveness also 
risks pitfalls such as a public backlash and rebuke in real time, thus leading 
to an embarrassing unraveling of the very goals of interactivity.
The scramble for interactivity that this chapter analyzes can be better 
understood when situated within the dual context of intense competition 
among the Indian news networks to carve out viewership and advertising 
revenue as well as the widespread proliferation of networked devices and 
platforms in India. The deluge of news broadcast networks in the dominant 
languages as well as the regional ones has resulted in the contradictory ef-
fects of a culture of debate and deliberation but also a strong tendency 
toward sensationalism and dramatization of news events to cut through the 
clutter of competition. Hence, two obverse sides of the same phenomenon, 
media oversight over politics and authority figures in public life due to 
proliferation of news and opinion shows, have also raised the decibel levels 
of the discourse as networks bid to outcompete others with jingoism and 
uber- nationalism. Notably, both these aspects of being a public watchdog, 
on the one hand, and seeking to stand out from the clutter, on the other, 
rely on the use of new media platforms to foster interaction and involve-
ment through means such as citizen journalism and live audience feedback 
through social media.
News television has sought to leverage this networked culture resulting 
from the widespread use of mobile phones and social networking sites in 
India to create the artifice of participatory news production with a goal to-
ward expanding viewership and increased ratings. This phenomenon is the 
latest in a process of the gradual appropriation of the public by television in 
India through social media devices as has been evident in the invitations to 
call, text, or upload user videos in a wide range of shows over the past de-
cade or so. The rise and growth of reality television (Punathambekar 2010), 
from Kaun Banega Crorepati to shows such as Big Brother, MTV Roadies, 
Indian Idol, and others that stage competition in areas ranging from quiz-
zing to cooking, singing to dance cannot be divorced from the simultane-
ous growth in new media technologies that helped expand the audience 
of television beyond the urban metropolitan cities to include small towns 
and rural India. The technological changes have allowed networks to ap-
propriate viewer input to shape the trajectory of the show by having live 
interactions with contestants, voting them out or giving general feedback.
Participatory interaction resulting from competition among news net-
works and growth of networked devices can therefore be seen as a democra-
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tizing moment within the historically contentious tussle between the hege-
monic forces of mass media technologies on the one hand and the impulses 
of democracy, free speech, and a plural public sphere on the other. The 
inclusion of voiceless audiences, within the shows and programs of domi-
nant media networks from which they have long been excluded, symbolizes 
the fruition of a long- held utopian dream of media critics (McChesney 
2015; Bagdikian 2004). On the other hand, this drive can also be seen as a 
ruse to appropriate the democratic impulse and foster interactivity within a 
commodified format that uses the resulting audience engagement for com-
mercial gains. This critical perspective argues that fostered interactivity, far 
from being some from the ground up organic expression of the demos, is 
invariably channeled and controlled to serve particular goals such as tar-
get ratings points (TRP) and advertising revenue. Drives to appropriate 
the participatory culture are visible across news shows in their invitations 
for viewer comments, as well as in encouraging citizens to report on lo-
cal issues and conduct sting operations on corrupt officials, thus making 
each viewer in the audience a veritable extension of the newsroom. These 
changes are also an outcome of an increasingly activist role played by me-
dia institutions as they channel the anger and frustration of citizens seeking 
quick recourse and justice (Roy 2016; Cody 2015). Times Now’s prime-
time show Newshour, whose previous anchor Arnab Goswami (addressed 
as ‘Arnab’ on the show) led the show to high TRP ratings through a mix 
of jingoism and high decibel levels masked as the artifice of speaking truth 
to power, epitomized this impulse to commodify interactivity as Goswami 
sought to use the platform of Twitter by inviting its viewers to interact with 
the show by trending a chosen hashtag each evening.
Situated within these opposing motivations and consequences of in-
teractivity, networked new media technologies have both shaped and been 
shaped by this attempt to appropriate the “public” within television shows. 
In navigating these positions, this chapter focuses on how the combined 
affordances of live television and new media platforms such as Twitter are 
leveraged to serve the goals of media institutions. Given their relationship 
to liveness, these media technologies can function together akin to a hybrid 
media apparatus (Chadwick 2017) whose combined affordances intensify 
immediacy, simultaneity, and reciprocity, thus amplifying the constructed-
ness of live television (Marriott 2007; Scannell 2014). New media plat-
forms such as Twitter allow live broadcast networks to include the flow of 
comments within their broadcast in real time; by urging viewers to tweet 
and running the tweet count on screen, the show enters into a symbiotic 
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relationship akin to a feedback loop with the audience, thus amplifying and 
shaping the staged liveness. In analyzing how the affordances of Twitter 
make it particularly amenable to be appropriated by live television, this 
chapter focuses on the role of hashtags by news networks as a unifying 
tool (Rambukkana 2015), to generate and appropriate conversation about 
specific topics of focus each day. By creating a hashtag that encapsulates the 
main news event of the day and asking viewers to tweet using it as the show 
unfolds, shows such as Newshour try to create a feedback loop between the 
news studio and the ongoing conversations outside the network’s studio. As 
they display running Twitter counts and flash chosen tweets on the screen, 
even reading some of them to provide the semblance of interactivity and 
inclusion, these news shows betray the intense pressure to create the per-
ception of an organic involved and participatory audience.
Twitter, Television, Liveness
The case study of #ShamedInSydney allows us to explore the connection 
between two distinct media technologies— Twitter and live television— 
that are tied together through their common relationship with the notion 
of time. The varying affordances of media technologies shape user experi-
ence differently and often evolve in ways that “developers, manufacturers 
and managers of particular technological forms, in other words, cannot 
altogether prescribe” (Marriott 2007, 13). The initial days of adoption of a 
media technology are often too early to predict the particular aspect that 
will gain traction. The unexpected growth of text messaging through a 
device designed primarily for voice calls (the mobile phone) is a classic in-
stance of this phenomenon. Given this, one can argue that both television 
and Twitter have emerged as media technologies par excellence for captur-
ing and enhancing the experience of liveness. Liveness is central to the 
phenomenon of television broadcasting and scholars have argued that the 
“management of liveness” is the “most fundamental task” of broadcasting 
(Scannell 2007, 194) and have claimed that “television is the ‘live medium’ 
par excellence” (Hammelburg 2015). In the case of Twitter, responding to 
speculation about the ongoing changes to the platform, its cofounder Jack 
Dorsey has famously tweeted, “Twitter is live. Twitter is real- time” (@Jack, 
February 2, 2016). The affordance of 140 characters, the publicness of the 
medium (the conversation is not restricted to a closed group unless one 
chooses to do so), and the ability to connect tweets across time and space 
through hashtags has allowed the platform to emerge as the go- to site for 
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news updates and for participating in global conversations about issues and 
breaking news events unfolding in real time.
The case study analyzed here draws attention to the affordances of 
Twitter that enable it to emerge as an apt medium to capture the live 
unfolding of an event. While other SNS platforms, such as Facebook or 
Wikipedia, are better suited for in- depth discussions of preexisting issues 
that have evolved and matured, the technical and cultural architecture of 
Twitter, which emphasizes brevity, makes it apt for interactions that re-
quire immediacy, simultaneity, and speed. This is by no means to argue that 
older simmering topics of contention are not actively debated on Twitter, 
but that platforms other than Twitter (e.g., Facebook, which does not have 
limits of space) are just as appropriate, if not more, for those discussions. In 
fact, Twitter’s own guidelines for determining trending topics underscore 
the value that recency has for its algorithms. In describing the criteria that 
its algorithms use to determine a trending hashtag, Twitter states, “This 
algorithm identifies topics that are popular now, rather than topics that 
have been popular for a while or on a daily basis, to help you discover the 
hottest emerging topics of discussion on Twitter.”1 The criteria goes on to 
add that while the number of tweets on a topic is important, they are not 
the only factor that determines trends. The emphasis on the freshness of 
a topic rather than on a purely numerical count emphasizes the medium’s 
affinity with liveness and explains why it remains the go- to place for facts 
and updates about a breaking news event.
Twitter’s affinity with immediacy is shared by live television’s ability to 
simulate the sensory experience of sharing the time and place during the 
unfolding of an event, which was a marked improvement (that yet remains 
unrivaled) over prior media technologies that preceded it. In his analysis of 
liveness, Paddy Scannell argues that the “management of liveness” (Scan-
nell 2014, 154) takes precedence over the actual experience of it. In other 
words, it is more important to convey to audiences that a particular broad-
cast is live and emphasize it through words, gestures, and other semiotics of 
liveness than the transmission of images and sounds in immediate real time 
without delay. While a slight delay (deliberate or technological) may not be 
immediately perceived by viewers, the absence of other markers of liveness 
can make the claim of a live broadcast seem suspect. The distinctness of the 
semiotics of liveness can be better understood by comparing footage from 
a surveillance (closed- circuit television) camera with the live television 
broadcast of an event, claims Scannell. While the former captures “sound-
less visual immediacy” (Scannell 2014, 99), live television provides continu-
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ous reminders that the event being witnessed is unfolding “right now” in 
the “here” of the correspondent reporting on the event. Marriott (2007) 
agrees with Scannell (2007, 2014) to claim that television needs to do work 
“to steer viewers towards the conclusion that what they were watching was 
live” (Marriott 2007, 21). Liveness therefore is not some naturally appar-
ent phenomenon but is the “worked at, achieved and accomplished effect” 
(Scannell 2014, 99) that must be staged and constructed with the right in-
dices that audiences have learned to associate with live broadcast. Scholars 
have identified these indices variously as direct address to the camera and 
remoteness (Marriott 2007, citing Vianello 1985) or immediacy and affin-
ity (Hammelburg 2015) but always requiring preplanning and rehearsal 
(Scannell 2014) given that live broadcast is “intrinsically risky” (Scannell 
2014, 168). The specifics vary according to the nature of the particular 
event being broadcast live, but the fact that there are formatted routines of 
liveness on television show its constructed and managed nature.
As they come together to simulate liveness, these media technologies 
also remind us of the quandary of mediation that is fated to limit one’s ac-
cess to the totality of the real event. The affordances of each medium limit 
and shape our access to it, and the immediate experience of sound and 
image that live television provides us is nevertheless only a representation 
at a distance of the actual events. It follows therefore that “no mediated 
encounter is going to be able to deliver anything other than a relatively 
thin engagement with the world” (Marriott 2007, 15). The insurmount-
able hurdle of space and materiality ensure that sensory experiences such 
as taste, touch, and smell cannot be represented live at a distance. Hence, 
the deployment of digital or networked media technologies along with 
broadcast television is often intended to complement and enhance the lat-
ter’s abilities of reaction, feedback, or reciprocity. The increasing use of 
networked technologies (e.g., Twitter) by live broadcast shows, as in the 
case of Newshour’s appropriation of Twitter, therefore seeks to enhance the 
experience of liveness for the audiences by supplementing television’s limi-
tations as primarily a one- way medium. Viewers are implored to enter into 
a conversation using a particular hashtag, thus allowing live shows such as 
Newshour to generate real- time engagement and response to compensate 
for the limitations of television.
This process of bringing the audience into the show through the prom-
ise of interactivity (Andrejevic 2004) that leverages the ubiquitous net-
worked devices and SNS platforms have allowed for a new kind of inten-
sity in creating feedback loops of participation in an ongoing conversation 
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about an event. The ways in which such feedback loops can influence the 
coverage but also change the very nature of the event was most apparent in 
the live coverage of the Mumbai attacks. As trapped hostages with mobile 
phones revealed their locations on live telecasts, attackers and their han-
dlers watching the same broadcast went to those locations to prey on them 
(Kumar 2012). Incidents such as the coverage of the Mumbai attacks and 
#ShamedInSydney share the common element of audiences cocreating the 
event even as it unfolds. As the particular episode of the Newshour being 
discussed unfolded, the mismatch between the show’s narrative and the 
mood of the nation outside the news studio became increasingly apparent. 
The abysmal tweet count affected the anchor’s demeanor and the show’s 
content including the comments by the guests on the show. Through their 
reactions on Twitter, audiences outside the studio therefore shaped the un-
folding of a live event, as I show below.
The #ShamedInSydney Debacle
Times Now’s coverage of India’s defeat in the semifinal of the Cricket 
World Cup on March 26, 2015 was similar in its format to the coverage 
of any other big news event. As is a usual practice among news networks 
in India, Times Now too attempts to trend a hashtag each evening that 
seeks to both predict and capture the unfolding daily zeitgeist among the 
Indian audience as expressed on social media. Its chosen hashtag for the 
said day was #ShamedInSydney and was meant to encapsulate the public 
rage at India’s defeat by Australia, tapping into which would have been 
a ratings gold for its primetime talk show, the Newshour. This is a daily 
routine on the show where recent hashtags such as #TirangaTussle, #Tri-
pleTalaqEnds, #OneIndiaOneLaw, and #UPTrainTragedy have sought to 
coalesce conversations on the topic chosen for discussion on the show. The 
running tweet count using the particular hashtag on the top right corner 
of the screen is a marker of audience engagement that seemingly realizes 
the dream of a truly participatory news organization that critics of mo-
nopolistic, top- down media structures have long yearned for. A trending 
hashtag means that it has gained traction and crossed a certain threshold of 
tweets, thus marking a temporal convergence of the increasing intensity on 
the talk show and an equally rising number of tweets using the particular 
hashtag.
On a typical Newshour anchored by Goswami, as the show unfolded to-
ward a climactic peak and the guests became increasingly inaudible (given 
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the format of instigating them to speak at and over each other), the rapidly 
running counter of the number of tweets with the chosen hashtag signi-
fied the level of audience engagement to the guests and the audience. A 
high tweet count would mean that the Times Now team made the right 
call about the mood of the nation on a controversy or event. The choice 
of a hashtag therefore is a calculated gamble, and calling the bet accurately 
lends credence to the network’s claim about being attuned to the national 
mood. The uncertainty about how involved the audience will be on a par-
ticular evening provides excitement but also introduces an element of risk 
to live broadcast. As Peters (2001) has argued, this uncertainty of liveness is 
akin to a gamble and fraught with danger. What will unfold in the next mo-
ment in time is unknown and while one can make educated guesses about 
it, watching it unfold second by second provides the thrill that makes “live” 
among the most used buzzwords in broadcast television (Peters 2001). In 
the case of the Newshour the show’s anchor (Goswami) had not just sought 
to predict the mood of the viewers but to shape it through his tone, for-
mat, and style. As the show progressed, the decibel levels rose, with one 
half of the panel (that can include up to 10 people) screaming at the other 
half. The rising passions in the studio were meant to synchronize with the 
rage outside, thus resulting in more tweets and a rapidly trending hashtag. 
The conflation of intensity in the studio with the tweet count is the digital 
equivalent of a passionate embrace between two competing temporalities, 
each egging the other on as fast moving fingers on keypads match the deci-
bel levels on the Newshour. The ability to ratchet up the affective tempera-
ture in the Twitterverse by guessing and predicting the appropriate hashtag 
therefore becomes a marker of the program’s success. By the standards of 
this successful formula repeated each night, March 26, 2015 was a day of 
infamy in the annals of the Newshour’s success story.
As Goswami started the Newshour with the usual prologue before guests 
are introduced, the chosen villain for the night was the Indian cricket team. 
His certainty that he had, as always, accurately captured the national mood 
was based on a past where India’s exit from any global cricket competition 
has been met by acrimonious attacks on the cricket team that have gone 
beyond protests and angry words to physical attacks including stone pelt-
ing on cricketers’ homes. By betting on cricket, the holy grail of jingoistic 
Indian nationalism, and attacking the cricket team on a day of India’s exit 
from the World Cup, Arnab’s was a safe wager for any late night talk show 
host seeking to seize the affective fulcrum of its audience. Goswami started 
the show by proclaiming that “the results are a disaster in Sydney,” adding, 
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“a star- studded Indian team has collapsed like a pack of cards,” “India has 
surrendered in the semi- final without a fight,” and that was “humiliating.” 
As he expressed his rage the hashtag #ShamedInSydney appeared on the 
top- right corner of the screen with the words “India thrashed and sent 
packing.” A few minutes into the debate Goswami was as usual, shouting 
down every panelist who dared to suggest that the honor was in having 
played a good game. However, something atypical and unpredictable was 
happening in the Twitterverse throughout the evening. Barring a couple of 
initial tweets that agreed that the Indian team had been #ShamedInSydney, 
the general sentiment on Twitter seemed to be that of support and appre-
ciation for the team, acknowledging that they had reached the semifinal 
without having lost a single game. Those expressing this opposing senti-
ment soon began using the competing hashtag of #ShameOnTimesNow to 
oppose the channel’s position.
Gradually, even the ambivalent emotions reflected in some of the 
tweets, which sought to reconcile appreciation for the team with the dis-
appointment of the loss, soon gave way to a strong tone of appreciation 
and respect for the team. Critics, writing about this moment later, would 
mark this as a turning point in the history of India’s cricket fandom— a 
sign of maturing spectators with realistic expectations. Sandipan Sharma 
(2015), in an essay titled “India May Have Lost but Our Fans Have Finally 
Grown Up,” presented a contrast from the past when “[b]ooing the team, 
pelting stones, setting stands on fire . . . ridiculing and humiliating players 
and their families” had “been typical Indian reactions to a loss.” In ask-
ing the question about the maturing Indian fan, Sharma presented several 
reasons including the string of recent cricket victories by India that had 
ensured India entering the tournament as defending champions. As the 
show began, one of the panelists, Atul Wassan a former cricketer, reflected 
the popular sentiment by strongly objecting to the word “shamed” in the 
chosen hashtag. He claimed that the team fought hard and hence “defeated 
in Sydney” or “walloped in Sydney” was more accurate. “No sportsperson 
can be humiliated” he emphasized to Arnab, who responded in his typical 
combative tone with “[w]hat are you getting so touchy about?” It was soon 
clear that just like the audience outside, a majority of the seven- member 
panel (excluding the anchor) were in disagreement with the anchor’s nar-
rative that evening.
Instead of targeting the cricket team, as Arnab had hoped, the out-
rage on Twitter increasingly began to be directed toward Times Now 
and Arnab Goswami himself. Users blasted the low standards of televi-
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sion news in India by negatively comparing it to the press’s role during 
the freedom struggle. Appreciation for the team and its captain contrasted 
with the calling out of Times Now’s expedient use of the defeat to ratchet 
up viewer emotions. Many angry tweeters used the opportunity to deride 
the sensationalist nature of Indian television news specifically lambasting 
their desire for TRPs. In addition to tweeting with the competing hashtag 
#ShameOnTimesNow many began to unfollow or block the Times Now 
handle on Twitter and uploaded screenshots of the blocking. One user, M 
J Imran, shared that he had specifically searched for Times Now, followed, 
and then blocked their account, claiming that it “Feels good now!” Others 
argued that the response against Times Now was long in coming and the 
#ShamedInSydney debacle represented a culmination of pent- up viewer 
angst against the network and its host that had just boiled over. A notable 
aspect of the critique was the acknowledgment of the power of social media 
in talking back to the dominant media institutions. One user, @nandan_jk, 
for instance, congratulated other users for trending the #ShamedInSydney 
hashtag by proclaiming “@nandan_jk Mar 26 I’m so proud of my country-
men. . . . Taught the useless media a good lesson!”
The anger also took the form of requests for an apology, for instance 
in this tweet by the user @raw_rak, “We need an apology on behalf of our 
brave team #ShameOnTimesNow.” While the majority of tweets were tex-
tual, as is often the case with a trending hashtag, other creative skills were 
also in full display in the form of photoshopped images and memes using 
the rival hashtag. There were suggestions for creating memes that were 
promptly taken up and published, thus pointing to the sense of momentary 
solidarity with distant strangers across space that a platform such as Twit-
ter can enable. An instance of such a request from the user @Joseph_AJohn 
asked, “Can somebody make an animation of @msdhoni slapping @Times-
Now Arnabgoswami??? #ShameOnTimesNow.” Many tweets, often from 
loyal acolytes of the show’s anchor, reflected shock and disbelief at how 
horribly wrong the show’s position had been. In underscoring the relation-
ship between liveness and gambling made earlier in the chapter, one user 
(@halfacomic) wondered if “they flip a coin to choose the side of debate 
#ShameOnTimesNow.” Each of these sample tweets reflected a gross mis-
judgment of the nation’s mood by the network. As the rival hashtag caught 
on, congratulatory messages began to mention the number of tweets using 
the hashtag #ShameOnTimesNow, thus providing a running commentary 
on how Twitter users were gradually turning the tables on Times Now. 
One user, Swapnil Ajgaonkar (@swapnils2011), for instance, mentioned 
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the number of times the hashtag had been tweeted by saying, “157 K an-
gry tweets and still counting.” Very soon, instead of the hashtag #Shame-
dInSydney it was the hashtag #ShameOnTimesNow that was trending on 
Twitter and several users emphasized this in order to embolden other like- 
minded tweeters.
An estimate of how erroneous the Newshour’s position on India’s defeat 
had been can be gauged from the data on trending hashtags for the day of 
March 25, 2015, when the episode of the Newshour being discussed aired. 
While their chosen hashtag of #ShamedInSydney was nowhere in con-
tention, the rival hashtag #ShameOnTimesNow had risen to number 17 
among the trending hashtags in India and number five worldwide. While 
this ranking is remarkable, given that the Newshour airs late in the night 
(9 p.m.), leaving only a few hours before the end of the calendar date for 
it to count as a trend for that day, the real effect of the debacle can be 
sensed by the top trending hashtags for the day after the debate. Times 
Now’s telecast had so mobilized the Twiterati that #ShameOnTimesNow 
was the topmost trending hashtag in India for March 27, 20152 while it was 
at number eight globally among the top trending hashtags. These rankings 
indicate that not only had the Newshour and its anchor Arnab Goswami 
misjudged the mood of the country but also that his position against the 
Indian team had functioned to further galvanize support, appreciation, and 
respect for the team. The show’s positionality as reflected in the hashtag 
functioned dialectically to entrench and embolden the opposing emotion 
that found expression in the rival hashtag. The fact that the show’s strong 
position was about the sport of cricket that, along with Bollywood and 
politics, remains among the most emotive topics within the Indian public 
sphere played no small a part in drawing the battle lines.
Specifics details during the telecast of the hour- long show reflected that 
the Newshour team, including the anchor Arnab Goswami, was gradually 
becoming aware of this debacle and making course corrections. With the 
team realizing that the tweet count for their chosen hashtag was not rising, 
and that too on an issue as resonant with the Indian audience as cricket, the 
mention of the live tweet count was conspicuous by its absence from the 
television screen during the show. The hashtag that appears frequently on 
the screen for any typical Newshour telecast only appeared once (at 21:43 
minutes) during this particular telecast. In its place was a generic invitation 
to “Tweet Live Join the Debate” that kept flashing on the screen through-
out the show without any particular hashtag. The anchor, Arnab, who re-
peatedly invokes his audience to tweet using the hashtag did so only once 
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at the start of the show when the ensuing chain of events was yet to unfold. 
It was clear that the response from the audience had conveyed the intended 
message. The broadcast tried to save face (by not showing the tweet count, 
for example) while not doing an entire turnaround, which would have been 
deeply humiliating.
Hashtag Wars and Networks of Simultaneity
The #ShamedInSydney debacle allows us to analyze the phenomenon of 
hashtag wars whose particular instantiation we see in this case study but 
which is a much wider occurrence across the global Twitter sphere. These 
so- called wars, which use rival hashtags to propel competing, often oppos-
ing narratives about an issue or event, epitomize what critics have called out 
as the divisive polarizing dimension of Twitter (Maney 2017). These wars 
are especially intense on political topics around elections (as was the case 
with the 2016 US elections) but hardly limited to them. The choice of a 
hashtag by Indian news networks each evening is strategic because it allows 
them to generate and then stake a claim on conversations about specific 
news events or issues that may otherwise have been diffused in the virtual 
realm. In enabling this yoking together of disconnected and dispersed con-
versations, Twitter hashtags function akin to a symbolic baton being passed 
around in a conversational relay, allowing each member to join an ongoing 
stream of conversation. As the hashtags are hyperlinked, clicking on any 
one of them streams all tweets on the screen in a continuous flow while 
the “live” button (now changed to “latest”) rolls the most recent tweets 
from top to bottom. Twitter’s ability to enable these discursive chains that 
cut across space and time is an affordance unique to the platform and has 
enabled a global alliance of users where the hashtag ties together conversa-
tions around events or ideas in real time. In the case of India, just as glob-
ally, they have also helped create alliances among reactionary and jingoistic 
discourses that may have been on the social fringes but now are embold-
ened due to Twitter’s ability to erase the barriers of space and time to en-
able a global conversation. These emboldened reactionary discourses are 
most visible within India’s Twitterscape, which routinely witnesses hashtag 
wars over competing narratives in the public sphere.
The polarizing and vitriolic nature of the Indian Twitterverse (Udupa 
2017) is unique even by the global standards of the discourse on Twitter, 
which invariably rewards and privileges extreme positions over moderate 
ones. This partisanship must be contextualized against the number of Twit-
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ter users in India, which at the time the episode being analyzed aired was 
about 22 million, or only about 9 percent of the Internet users in India and 
less than 2 percent of India’s total population (Hindu, January 28, 2015). 
This number of Twitter users (since risen to 41 million in May 2016),3 
while a tiny fraction of India’s overall population, nevertheless makes In-
dia’s Twitter population the second largest in the world after the United 
States. With less than half its population online (34 percent in May 2016), 
India already has more Internet users (462 million)4 than any other coun-
try except China; given Twitter’s popularity in India, it is only a matter of 
time before India’s Twitter population becomes the largest in the world. 
These rising numbers of Internet and Twitter usage provide a large base 
for the growth of a participatory culture in India even though Twitter us-
ers are not necessarily representative of the plurality and diversity within 
India’s population. In fact, the relative niche and elite user base of Twitter 
in India mirrors global trends since the microblogging site attracts those 
users likely to already be invested in and more engaged with daily events 
and controversies than the average Internet user. This background perhaps 
explains the vitriolic nature of its discourse and the sobriquet of “keyboard 
warriors” that captures images of people with desk jobs, Internet access, 
and spare time to spend their entire day tweeting and sparring over issues. 
News networks’ attempts to trend hashtags and appropriate this participa-
tory culture must be understood against this relatively narrow base of SNS 
platforms in India that gives online interactivity more symbolic value than 
real one.
While the partisanship across political and ideological lines on Twitter 
has widely been acknowledged, what made the episode of #ShamedInSyd-
ney different from the typical partisan hashtag war was also the fact that, as 
opposed to the typical right vs. left divide on most issues in the Indian pub-
lic sphere, the #ShameOnTimesNow hashtag galvanized support across 
the political spectrum. This solidarity, cutting across political ideologies, 
can be understood through the unifying fandom that cricket commands 
in India. Moreover, the fact that the target of this solidarity was the show 
Newshour and its anchor Arnab Goswami, who remains a polarizing figure 
with doting loyal viewers as well as raging critics, further underscores how 
Twitter’s emphasis on immediacy, simultaneity, and recency can enable new 
alliances between hitherto opposed sections of users. As opposed to preex-
isting issues and controversies where positions are already well entrenched 
along ideological divides, breaking news events evolve rapidly, often de-
manding an immediate response. While the old divides are still likely to 
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shape opinions initially, the case of #ShamedInSydney shows that the rapid 
spiral of tweeting and response allows its own communities of conversation 
to emerge, communities that are tied together in the temporal “now.” The 
nonexistent support for Times Now’s hashtag and the near unanimity in 
the debate on Twitter showed a clear breaking of ranks by Goswami’s loyal 
supporters. This emphasized how the platform’s affinity with the temporal 
now could enable a discursive momentum that weakens prior ideologi-
cal loyalties in favor of the immediate emerging directional flow, which 
was against the channel’s position. However, this emerging critical position 
was also informed by the prior history of anger against the channel, which 
unleashed itself in this particular episode. In allowing these distant users, 
who are strangers to each other, to be tied together in the moment, either 
through disagreement or alliance, Twitter enables what can be called are 
networks of simultaneity.
These networks of simultaneity are glued together by a spontaneous 
affective intensity as they are reacting viscerally to an immediate event in-
stead of deliberating on issues over long periods. The relationship between 
affective intensity and the viral spread of ideas in the digital world has 
been studied recently (Papacharissi 2015), and the current scholarship on 
viral culture, for instance, emphasizes the role played by affective “arousal 
hierarchy” (Guadagno et al. 2013) in determining the resonance of ideas 
or events online. Situating this diverse range of affective responses, such as 
anger, curiosity/anxiety, humor, or other positive affects (Shifman 2012), 
alongside conversations about the role of affect in democratic deliberations 
(Cody 2015) and media activism (Roy 2016) can explain why certain ideas 
and not others gain traction within digital cultures. The #ShamedInSyd-
ney episode illustrates the formation of these networks of simultaneity that 
cut across political ideologies and were connected by an affective intensity 
being experienced in the moment. The fact that the hashtag continued to 
trend for a few days after the airing of the said episode reflects the magni-
tude of the network’s miscalculation.
Conclusion
The case study analyzed here presents us with a snapshot of the conver-
gence between live broadcast television and the digital platform of Twitter. 
It shows us the ways in which the growing interdependence between new 
and preexisting media technologies creates hybrid media spaces (Chadwick 
2017) where the differing affordances of each technology complement each 
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other to transform the experience of mediation across space and time. The 
particular case of #ShamedInSydney shows us how appropriating Twitter 
allows news networks to claim enhanced and interactive experiences of liv-
eness and immediacy. It also points to the unpredictability and risks associ-
ated with a live broadcast. As Times Now’s failed gamble aptly illustrates, 
the more enmeshed live audiences become within a live broadcast the more 
likely they are to begin to shape its unfolding. The resonance that liveness 
has with audiences (Peters 2001; Scannell 2014) reflects an inherent long-
ing to traverse time and space and share in the unfolding of history. By tap-
ping into that longing and advertising their success in their ability to do so, 
news networks seek to exploit that longing to cut through the competition. 
While Times Now has been one of the leaders in this attempt, it is not the 
only network that seeks to do so.
While the drive to attract audiences is as old as privatized corporate 
media, the continuing fragmentation of audiences because of a multiplicity 
of media outlets has made the necessity urgent. The imperative to engage 
a broad range of social media outlets beyond television is a commercial 
compulsion as networks vie for the limited advertising revenue that is also 
gradually moving to the web. What the analysis above shows us is how this 
embrace of emerging platforms transforms the nature of news content by 
infusing a new temporal structure within it. While broadcast television has 
its own rhythms and patterns, its convergence with the “always on” social 
media platforms creates an entirely new dynamic that requires far speedier 
response time and immediate course corrections. No doubt live television 
has gained from this ability to tap into networks of users and audiences for 
crucial details about breaking news events, thus enhancing its own cov-
erage of events and reportage. As the case study above shows, however, 
this reliance has also meant that it cedes control in crucial areas, such as 
editorial positions on issues and the direction of the narrative within news 
and talk shows. The ways in which networks strike the balance between in-
corporating live audiences into their shows while still maintaining control 
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The Remediation of Nationalism
Viscerality, Virality, and Digital Affect
Purnima Mankekar and Hannah Carlan
In February 2016, Kanhaiya Kumar, a PhD student at Jawaharlal Nehru 
University in New Delhi (JNU hereafter), was arrested on charges of se-
dition and criminal conspiracy. Kumar was the president of the Univer-
sity Students’ Union and had delivered a speech on campus criticizing the 
2013 execution of Mohammed Afzal Guru, who had been convicted for 
his alleged involvement in the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament 
in 2001. Kumar’s arrest and subsequent release on bail created a firestorm 
of debates surrounding the meanings of nationalism in postcolonial India. 
At the center of this firestorm were digital media or, more specifically, the 
convergence of digital media like Twitter and video- sharing platforms like 
YouTube with mass media like television and print (Jenkins 2006; on the 
convergence of television and digital media in India, see Shanti Kumar 
2010, 2014; Sangeet Kumar 2015; Punathambekar 2011; and Roy 2014).
Focusing on the proliferation of affectively charged discourses sur-
rounding Kanhaiya Kumar, we examine how digital media, in conjunction 
with television, participated in the ongoing remediation of nationalism as 
visceral and viral. By foregrounding the generation and circulation of af-
fect by and across media, our analysis complicates assumptions about the 
role of digital media in producing new means of political participation and 
agency on the part of nonelite actors (cf. Kumar 2014; Punathambekar 
2011, 2015; and Udupa 2017).1 We seek to make the following theoreti-
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cal interventions. One, by focusing on the mediatized debates surrounding 
Kumar, we seek to foreground the centrality of affects rather than “ratio-
nal communication” in the generation of political discourse.2 Second, we 
argue that the convergence of mass media and digital media generate and 
circulate affects that proliferate with such speed and intensity as to be-
come simultaneously viral and visceral. Third, as the affects that congealed 
around the figure of Kumar demonstrate, the remediation of nationalism is 
deeply refracted by gender and sexuality, thus underscoring the importance 
of feminist social critique.
What does it mean to make the apparently contradictory assertion 
about nationalism as simultaneously visceral and viral? The dictionary 
definition of visceral makes reference to that which is felt deep in the body 
(as if in its internal organs), instinctive rather than rational, and stems from 
“elemental emotions”3 (Merriam- Webster Dictionary 2018). In postulating 
nationalism as affect, however, we assert that the visceral, in this case, is 
also socially mediated; indeed, as Mankekar has insisted elsewhere, it is 
imperative that we think of nationalist affect as part of affective regimes in-
timately imbricated with the workings of the state, media, and other socio-
political institutions (Mankekar 2015). As we will elaborate below, affects 
are not equivalent to emotions but, instead, operate on a separate register 
(on the “autonomy” of affect, see Massumi 2002). Our analysis of the af-
fective regimes that relayed between media representations of Kumar and 
online responses to these representations draws on the premise that, unlike 
emotions, which are deemed to be located “within” subjects or are expres-
sive of subjectivity, affect does not reside in the individual “psyche.” Rather 
affects generate subjectivity. Hence, our focus on affect sidesteps binaristic 
assumptions of superficial utterances or performances (performances that 
we could take at “face value”) versus inner truths.4 Theorists of indexi-
cality have long insisted on the need to expand our analyses of language 
beyond a focus on mere referential content, and its purported truth value 
(Silverstein 1979), to the semiotic processes through which certain ways 
of speaking become tied to ideological structures, identities, and forms of 
difference.5 We add here the importance of attending to the production of 
affects, which are themselves continual processes of becoming; they per-
tain to agential capacities that are irreducible to binaries of resistance and 
compliance: affects reside in contingency and potentiality.
As we will argue in this paper, nationalism is neither solely imagina-
tive (Anderson 1991) nor only discursive (Chatterjee 1986; Bhabha 2013 
[1990]), but is profoundly affective. It is deeply felt, as if in the very viscera 
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of our bodies. It is corporeal; it is embodied. While discourses of national-
ism might cohere around specific icons and symbols (such as the national 
flag, the tomb of the Unknown Soldier, or, in the case of India, the figure 
of Bharat Mata), these figures become potent when they acquire affective 
freight, which is to say, when they become generative of action and agency.
Nationalism, as Anderson suggested, is fundamentally translocal and 
transnational, and media have played a critical role in its production and 
circulation (1991; see also Abu- Lughod 2005, Mankekar 1999, 2015; Ra-
jagopal 2001 for the role of television in the reconstitution of nationalism 
in postcolonial contexts). It is also essential to remember that affects are 
not located in any one site or sign: affects are intransitive in that they ac-
quire potency through their circulation and concatenation (Ahmed 2015; 
Mankekar and Schein 2013; Mankekar 2015). We argue that digital me-
dia, whether through social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook or 
content- sharing platforms like YouTube, have played a crucial role in the 
creation and promulgation of nationalist affects.
We draw upon a long and rich tradition of feminist critiques of na-
tionalism in South Asia (including, among many others, the work of Uma 
Chakravarti 1989, 2014; Veena Das 2007; Malathi de Alwis 2002; Purnima 
Mankekar 1999, 2015; Nivedita Menon 1998, 2012; Nayanika Mookherjee 
2015; Mrinalini Sinha 2000; Tejaswini Niranjana 1994, 1999; Srirupa Roy 
2007; Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid 1989; Rajeshwari Sundar Rajan 
2003; and Susie Tharu 1996) that have variously examined how nation- 
and state- making projects are fundamentally gendered. These processes 
are manifest in the nature of YouTube comments responding to Kanhaiya 
Kumar and JNU student protests, which combine accusations of antin-
ationalism with violent, misogynist, and homophobic rhetoric.
Recent scholarship on digital media has interrogated the capacity of 
online spaces to engender a “participatory culture” (Burgess and Green 
2009) where previously marginalized voices are potentially able to con-
struct social and political counterpublics (Bonilla and Rosa 2015; Losh 
2014; Subramanian 2015). Facebook, in particular, has been identified for 
its role in recent political movements, facilitating new “netizens” to par-
ticipate increasingly in democratic politics (Hauben and Hauben 1997). 
Several scholars have argued that people become “empowered through the 
Internet and use it to solve sociopolitical problems and to explore ways 
of improving the world” (Fedorak 2012, 120). Just as the antiglobaliza-
tion protests in Seattle in 1999 were organized online, grassroots social 
movements like the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, 
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and recent protests against the Trump administration have emerged largely 
through Facebook and Twitter, allowing people to access news and orga-
nize direct action at increasing speeds and on unprecedented scales (Pen-
ney and Dadas 2014; Juris 2012; Tufekci and Wilson 2012). We note that 
analyses that have emphasized the democratization of online spaces have 
elided the fact that digital publics are not devoid of structures of power and 
inequality, as both mass and social media are often sites for the reinforce-
ment of racism, sexism, xenophobia, and, in our case, a particular form of 
fundamentalist Hindu nationalism that is intimately linked to gender and 
violence (Phillips 2016; Lal 1999). Print and televised media in particu-
lar have been analyzed for how they operate by de- and recontextualizing 
sensationalist tropes that contribute to moral panics and reinforce racist 
and orientalist discourses (O’Hara 2012; Briggs and Mantini- Briggs 2003; 
Puar and Rai 2002; Narayan 1997). This was especially true in the after-
math of the mediatization of the 2012 Delhi gang rape, which exceeded the 
specificity of the crime as it spurred protests and activism within India for 
criminal justice reform and became a spectacle in the international media 
of India’s purportedly uniquely “rape culture” (Amrute 2015; Roychowd-
hury 2013; Carlan 2014). Yet it was precisely on digital media platforms 
like YouTube that some Indian youth were able to critique the normaliza-
tion of violence against Indian women through satirical and carnivalesque 
videos and imagery that mocked victim- blaming narratives (Carlan 2015).
In attempting to understand how a particular kind of affective national-
ism was remediated by online responses to student protests at JNU, it is 
necessary to go beyond the content- production side of media analysis to 
investigate the crucial role of user reception and (re)interpretation as a 
central aspect of political participation (Carlan 2014). Thus, we must at-
tend carefully not only to content produced by actors in mediated publics, 
but also the “uptake formulations” (Agha 2011) that proliferate in the form 
of online comments. We thus attend to different nodes in the circulation 
of videos portraying Kumar and other JNU students as “antinational” 
in order to understand how these videos produced heightened affective 
responses that articulated with violent and nonviolent forms of political 
agency (Couldry 2006; Burgess and Green 2009).
The mediatization of the JNU student protests as “antinational” is part 
of a long- standing historical phenomenon of “technocultural Hindu na-
tionalism” (Chopra 2008), with technology and nationalism having con-
verged beginning in the colonial period and being transformed with the 
rise of globalization and the consolidation of militant right- wing Hindu 
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politics, or “Hindutva,” since the 1980s. This brand of militant digital na-
tionalism has been particularly salient in the context of the North Amer-
ican diaspora, where the Internet has been used to mobilize supporters 
through the reinterpretation of Indian history as one of a unified Hindu 
nation (Lal 1999, 2003, 2014). So- called Internet Hinduism (Udupa 2014) 
has often relied on abusive language online that is never mere insult but, 
instead, has the potential to incite offline violence (Udupa 2017). Indeed, 
the register of abuse that has become characteristic of online Hindu na-
tionalism is necessarily gendered, as it relies on and reproduces a historical 
formation of Indian womanhood propagated by an upper- caste male elite 
during the anticolonial nationalist movement. Much of the research on 
digital Hindu nationalism has demonstrated the strategies whereby groups 
collectively construct a historical narrative of Hindu unity in India, which 
Udupa (2014) has described as “archiving”: an epistemological battle to 
establish truth. We focus on a form of digital nationalism that emerged in 
response to mediatized events like those surrounding Kanhaiya Kumar in 
order to underscore a particular type of affective nationalism that is under-
girded by violent misogyny and homophobia.
A Space for Violence
Analyzing how the convergence of digital and mass media enables the re-
mediation of nationalism necessitates that we move beyond behaviorist ex-
planations of “what happened” or draw a positivist connection between the 
videos, the commentary, and the violence that followed. Rather we wish 
to theorize the coimplication of the events surrounding Kanhaiya Kumar’s 
arrest, the dissemination of videos that purported to provide evidence 
of his alleged sedition, comments posted on YouTube, and the violence 
threatened and enacted against him. We posit that media (digital and mass) 
created feedback loops of affective regimes that produce what, in another 
context, Pradeep Jeganathan (2001) has called a space for violence.
Jeganathan locates the space for violence as a habitus that can be learned 
or performed and as a culturally constituted phenomena (2001, 39, 41) 
rather than (simply) as fury, eruptive acts, or “unthinking explosions” that 
are opposed to moments of peace or restraint or ordinariness (42). Draw-
ing on these insights, we conceptualize the space for violence around Ku-
mar in terms of its affective constitution, which is to say as generative inten-
sities that refract community and identity on an ongoing basis. This space 
for violence was deeply affective precisely because it was transformative: it 
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rendered violence perpetrated in the name of the nation legitimate, if not 
necessary. Furthermore, occurring as they did at a historical moment when 
the line between Hindu nationalism and Indian nationalism is increasingly 
fraught, the communal tone of the comments posted on YouTube should 
not surprise us. Nowhere was this slippage clearer than in the centrality 
of discourses of gender and sexuality. As we will thematize below, calls for 
violence against Kumar were frequently articulated in terms of gendered 
and sexual violence.
How was this space for violence produced and how did it articulate 
with the ongoing reconstitution of nationalism as an affective regime? On 
February 9, 2013, Mohammed Afzal Guru and Maqbool Butt were hanged 
after being convicted for the attack on the Parliament of India in 2001. 
The execution occurred in secret under the code name Operation Three 
Star, with the families notified days after the execution and the burial of 
the bodies. Controversy followed surrounding the fairness of the trial and 
allegations of human rights violations by the Delhi police of torture and 
a secretive hanging. John Hutnyk has argued that there was an upsurge in 
nationalist affects that arose through the convergence of different media 
relating to Guru’s trial. The trial was aired on Indian television channels 
soliciting participation from viewers via SMS that, in turn, led to increased 
calls for Guru’s death. This happened despite the fact that there was no 
reliable evidence of Guru’s involvement in the attack and that the Supreme 
Court had dismissed his confession video as manufactured (Hutnyk 2014). 
Guru’s execution spurred protests at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi, and vio-
lent clashes with police followed. Three years later, the Democratic Stu-
dents Union, a student organization at JNU, planned to commemorate 
his execution with a cultural program to protest what they termed as his 
“judicial killing.” The event, titled “A Country without a Post Office,”6was 
supposed to include protest through poetry, art, and music, and was sched-
uled to occur at the Sabarmati Dhaba on the JNU campus. In response 
to protests by the Akhil Bhartiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP, the student 
wing of the Bharitya Janata Party, currently in power in India), the JNU 
administration withdrew permission for the event. Nevertheless, the event 
proceeded as scheduled, and clashes ensued between the Democratic Stu-
dents Union and ABVP during which it was alleged that outsiders to the 
university shouted anti- India slogans (Zee Media Bureau 2016).
The following day, Zee News, a Hindi- language news channel, telecast 
a video of the previous night’s demonstration that was edited to include a 
caption suggesting that the students were shouting “Pakistan Zindabad” 
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(Long Live Pakistan). Shortly thereafter, Delhi police filed a First In-
formation Report (FIR) on the basis of this video and charged Kanhaiya 
Kumar and fellow students Umar Khalid, Anirban Bhattacharya, Rama 
Naga, Anant Prakash Narayan, and Ashutosh Kumar with sedition under 
Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code.7 The video was later revealed to 
have been doctored by producers at the show; scrambled audio from an-
other group of protesters shouting “Bhartiya Court Zindabad” (Long Live 
the Indian Court) was dubbed onto the original video, and the “Pakistan 
Zindabad” caption was imposed in order to suggest that this is was what 
students were shouting.
Processes of recontextualization added affective potency to these alle-
gations. During the frenzy surrounding the alleged “anti- national” slogan-
eering by JNU students, Zee News uploaded the same footage to YouTube. 
This video became subject to considerable remediation through social me-
dia posts and comments.8 The uploading of the clip onto YouTube rein-
forced the narrative that producers at Zee News had knowingly fabricated 
alleging that Kumar and his colleagues had engaged in antinational acts. 
In the 10 days following the February 9 event at JNU, Zee News uploaded 
dozens of videos onto YouTube that explicitly described JNU students as 
“anti- nationals,” “criminals,” “traitors,” “renegades,” and terrorist “sympa-
thizers.” Such accusations had both an illocutionary force and perlocution-
ary effects, in the Austinian sense (Austin 1962), in that the students were 
not merely accused of seditious, and therefore illegal, behavior, but the act 
of invoking such language emboldened police, other protestors, and, later, 
lawyers outside Delhi’s Patiala House Courts Complex to violently attack 
Kumar. The narrative of the “antinational” students of JNU consolidated 
through the mediatization of doctored videos that were both circulated 
and commodified by Zee News (Agha 2011) thus articulated (in both senses) 
a visceral and viral affect with state- sponsored violence.
One of the earliest videos Zee News uploaded was entitled “JNU Shouts 
Anti- nationalist Slogans; Nation Questions Intent,” and the 87 online 
comments that followed highlight how passions had been ignited on all 
sides. Commenter Kulsum Fatima suggested that those who shouted anti- 
India slogans at the cultural program on February 9 may have been ABVP 
activists “masquerading as others.” But the majority of the posts called for 
the violent punishment of Kumar, often offering to mete out the punish-
ments themselves. For instance, one poster responded: “However many 
Afzals emerge from home, we will hound each one of their homes and kill 
them. Jai Hind” (“Jitne bhi Afzal ghar ghar se niklenge, hum utne Afzal 
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ghar ghar me ghus kar marenge Jai Hind”). This poster claimed to intend 
to personally pursue Afzal Guru, who had been hanged a year ago, but was 
essentially articulating an exhortation against all individuals engaging in 
antinational activities. Thus, without naming Kumar and his colleagues, 
the poster was calling for their death. This post ended with the slogan, “Jai 
Hind (“Victory to India),” thus remediating a frequently used nationalist 
salutation with an exhortation to violently pursue, hound, and kill traitors.
Gender, Sexuality, and Nationalist Affect
Theorizing the affective potency of these exhortations necessitates that we 
underscore the primacy of gendered and sexualized violence in the forma-
tion of hypernationalist affect. These virulent responses to Kumar and his 
colleagues did not stop with the exhortation to kill them. They slid into 
violent gender- based abuse as suggested, for instance, in the response from 
commenter Azad King, who wrote: “Hang Umer and Kanhaiya for sup-
porting those motherfucking terrorists” (“Ye madarchdo terrorist ko support 
karne wale umar or kanhiya ko bh fadi [sic] de do”). This post was followed by 
another that highlighted the centrality of sexual violence to Hindu nation-
alism: “What is new about this? Most people are antinational (deshdrohi). 
But it is we Hindus who are cunts (chutiye) because we don’t unite the way 
they do . . . arise, friends . . . Jai Hind.” Azad King was drawing on a strategy 
typically deployed by RSS activists to reprimand Hindus for not uniting 
against a common enemy (Muslims). Other posters agreed, arguing that 
“we” Hindus are not united, with one poster going further: “If one we will 
unite we can f**k them [sic].”
Gendered and sexualized violence were the primary modalities for the 
articulation of the threats to Kanhaiya Kumar and his colleagues (cf. Udupa 
2017). For instance, when commenter Shwetank Seth pleaded (in vain) for 
reason, arguing that these students were not antinational and that it was 
important to get “complete information,” commenter Prasanna Chitnis 
would have none of it, and responded that they were indeed antinational; 
after all, they were not shouting Bharat Mata ki Jai (“Victory to Mother 
India”). At this point, commenter Bharadwaja Bidadi responded, “What is 
it that these sister- fuckers want freedom from?” and proceeded to abuse a 
woman in the video portrayed shouting these alleged slogans: “Who is the 
bitch shouting over vocal cord [sic]?”
The creation of a space for violence against Kanhaiya and other “trai-
tors” recalls a moment in the United States when, after the events that we 
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have now memorialized as “September 11, 2001,” similar exhortations to 
violence were made against terrorists and those who allegedly “looked like” 
terrorists, in particular, men from the Middle East and South Asia. While 
this is not the place to parse out the differences between those calls to vio-
lence and the ones that appeared in the posts against Kumar on YouTube, 
certain discursive continuities are striking. Muneer Ahmad has pointed out 
that, in the United States after September 11th, hate crimes were often 
framed as crimes of passion. He argues: “The passion in question here is 
love of nation, the crimes a visceral reaction born out of patriotic fervor” 
(2002, 9, emphasis added). Likewise, the exhortations to violence against 
Kumar and other students were also articulated in terms of passion and, 
since the object of passion was the nation, this violence was rendered legiti-
mate rather than morally reprehensible. Drawing on a deeper genealogy of 
tropes of the feminized Hindu- Indian nation who must be protected from 
sexual violation, the exhortation to violence may be interpreted as calls for 
honor killings on behalf of the betrayed/violated nation against Kumar 
and his colleagues who, by protesting the circumstances surrounding the 
conviction and killing of Afzal Guru, were represented as terrorist sympa-
thizers or terrorists themselves (cf. Ahmad 2002).
Muneer Ahmad draws our attention to flyers that circulated in New 
York after the destruction of the World Trade Center depicting Osama Bin 
Laden being sodomized by the World Trade Center with the caption, “You 
like sky scrapers, bitch?” (Ahmad 2002, 10). In addition, the Associated 
Press distributed a picture of a bomb intended for Afghanistan on which 
an American sailor had written, “Hijack this, faggots!” (Ahmad 2002, 10). 
As we have noted above, the calls for sodomistic rape as punishment for 
Kanhaiya Kumar and his colleagues were also saturated with misogyny and 
homophobia. For instance, N. Jain wrote, “Put a stick up the arses of the 
motherfuckers at JNU and make them parade naked .  .  . those bastards” 
(“jnu ki madarchodo ki gand mai danda dalke nanga ghumne chahiye .  .  . ha-
ramkoro ko”), while another poster exhorted: “Put a stick up their arses and 
shoot them and give them freedom” (“inki gand mai goli mar ke do azadi”).
As calls for violence became ubiquitous in response to the ongoing 
recirculation of the doctored video first published by Zee News, public 
discourse surrounding Kumar became increasingly polarized. Debates 
on television channels like Times Now devolved into shouting matches 
between guest speakers who charged Kanhaiya Kumar and his colleagues 
with antinational activities. In a series of feedback loops, the affects gen-
erated by these television programs converged with those generated by 
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several digital platforms, including YouTube. When, on February 12, 2016, 
another video was uploaded alleging that the previous one portraying JNU 
students (including Kumar and Umer Khalid) shouting “antinational” slo-
gans was false and doctored, 784 commenters responded. Many of these 
comments consisted of affectively charged responses that were equally ex-
hortative in their calls for violent punishment to “anti- national traitors.” 
Again, almost all of them called for gendered and sexual violence against 
Kumar and his colleagues. One poster, Pratik Tulsyan, exclaimed: “Kill 
evry [sic] student who loved Pakistan, let’s make a bomb and kill all these 
motherfuckers.” Another commenter, Manish Agarwal, responded that the 
person who uploaded this video was a “chutiya” (cunt) and “jihadi.” This 
sexually violent language was reiterated in several posts that followed, such 
as “Internet jihadi . . . Madarchod [motherfucker].” These posts were coun-
tered by j. blin who wrote: “Kill all motherfucking ABVP supporters (ma-
darchod bhakts). Time for a revolution to kill cunt (chutiya) fascists in India.” 
However, a majority of the posts were against those who allegedly shouted 
anti- India slogans and used similarly violent language (for instance, “Fuck 
him in the pulic [sic] with Bitch donkeys Dick. Wtf” posted by Aswartha 
Ashu, and “Shame on u jnu students . . . u live in this country . . . india feeds 
u and today u r thinking about destroy it . . . if u want to go to pakistan 
u can go . . . u deserve to lick pakistani asses u mother fucker Afzal guru’s 
asses” by Lucky Indian. The Thinker added, “Shame on you anti- national 
horse shit go fuck yourself.” Exhortations to sexual violence thus remedi-
ated older Hindu nationalist demands that Muslims and others deemed to 
be traitors be “sent back” to Pakistan. Furthermore, in one fell swoop, all 
JNU students were castigated as traitors irrespective of their political lean-
ings: they were told that they deserved to “lick Pakistani asses.”
Following his arrest, Kanhaiya Kumar was placed in judicial custody 
for three days while the other five students went underground. Thousands 
of students, faculty, and staff at JNU protested the arrest and stopped 
classes at the university for several days. Tensions mounted further, when, 
on February 14, 2016, Zee News republicized the same doctored video 
that purported to depict students shouting “Bharat ki barbadi” and “Paki-
stan zindabaad” (“Destruction to India” and “Long Live Pakistan”).9 This 
video became viral as it was quickly relayed across various digital media 
platforms. Its virality was also manifest in how it rapidly and repeatedly 
sparked calls for violence against Kumar and his colleagues. For instance, 
one poster commented on YouTube, “Anti national deserve on bullet in 
their forehead [sic].” This was followed by a post by Arrow Straight who, 
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reverting to exhortations to sodomistic rape by previous posters, went one 
better with “Put a bullet in their butt and make them suffer!”
Contagious Affects
These calls to violence spread like a contagion. Vishwanath Hindustan 
posted, “If got gun I will kill him,” and John Cena Wwe, “Hang them to 
death.” Vivek K let loose a spate of sexually violent abuses on Kanhaiya 
Kumar: “maakichut, madarchod, madarchod,” (all synonyms for mother-
fucker) and “bhenchod” (sisterfucker), with 48darklord suggesting, “All 
these guys need to be rounded up and beaten wih [sic] sticks in between 
their legs” This theme of sodomistic rape continued unabated with Di 
John exhorting: “All those motherfuckers who participated in the JNU 
cultural event should have a hot rod shoved into their arses . . . son of a 
prostitute do you think we the public are cunts?” (“Randi ke aulad chutiya 
samajhte hai public ko?”).
On February 15, when Kanhaiya Kumar appeared for his hearing at 
the Patiala House Courts Complex, several lawyers physically attacked 
him and the journalists who were present, as the police stood by passively. 
The Delhi court extended Kumar’s judicial custody by two days and re-
scheduled the hearing for February 17. That day, Kumar was attacked 
a second time by bystanders. Journalists inside the courtroom captured 
footage of the attack. This footage became viral on different digital me-
dia platforms, including YouTube. The district court further postponed 
Kumar’s hearing until March 2, and he was taken to Tihar Jail. Kumar 
filed a petition to the Supreme Court for bail the following day, and an 
investigative report was submitted to the Supreme Court showing that 
the district court had allowed the judicial protection order to be violated 
when Kumar was assaulted.
On February 22, Vishwa Deepak, one of the producers of Zee News, 
released a statement admitting, “Our biases made us hear Bhartiya Court 
Zindabad as Pakistan Zindabad” (“Long live Indian courts” as “Long live 
Pakistan”). Deepak resigned from the channel after expressing reserva-
tions over its “biased coverage.” He stated that the network had a bias in 
favor of Narendra Modi, and that it had “abetted a riot- like situation.” An 
investigation was ordered by the government of India, and the forensic 
company Truth Labs found that two out of seven different videos shot 
at JNU on February 9 and 11 had been altered and, in particular, that 
the audio containing “Pakistan Zindabad” was inserted.10 On February 
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23, Umar Khalid and Anirban Bhattacharya surrendered to police and 
were held at Tihar Jail; they were subsequently granted bail on March 
17, 2016. On March 2, Kanhaiya Kumar was granted a six- month in-
terim bail by the Delhi High court and, immediately after his release on 
March 3, gave an impassioned speech on the need for justice and, attack-
ing Prime Minister Modi and the BJP government, appealed for freedom 
within India rather than from India.
Angry responses against Kumar again went viral on digital media. 
For instance, 6,981 comments were posted on YouTube, most of which 
reiterated previous exhortations to violence with ever- increasing fervor. 
As before, these calls to violence were rendered legitimate because they 
purported to be on behalf of the nation: therein lay their affective charge. 
For instance, on March 3, one poster wrote, “I’m gonna kill this bastard 
the moment I see him,” to which Arshdeep Singh responded: “What an 
idiot [!] I am ready to go to jail after killing him!” Significantly, some 
posters also heaped gender- based abuse on Barkha Dutt, the celebrity 
NDTV journalist who interviewed Kumar after his release, calling her a 
prostitute (“Randi barkha”).
On March 10, Kanhaiya Kumar was physically assaulted by one Vi-
kas Chaudhary who claimed that he was a traitor who had to be taught 
a lesson. Kumar responded to the threats against his life thus: “You can 
kill me, you can silence me but you cannot scare me. But before you kill 
me, think about Rohith Vemula. When you killed one Rohith, several 
Rohiths came forward. If you kill someone else now, many others will 
stand up.”11 In the days that followed there were four attacks on Kumar. 
On March 28, Uttar Pradesh Navnirman Sena’s national president, Amit 
Jani, posted a threat on Facebook that his organization would storm the 
JNU campus and gun down Kumar and Umar Khalid unless the two left 
Delhi by the end of the day.
The usage of particular hashtags online has been tied to the formation 
of new subjectivities, and can become what Sanjay Sharma has called “af-
fective contagions” (2013, 61). As the YouTube clip purporting to show 
students shouting slogans praising Pakistan and calling for the destruction 
of India circulated, it was continuously subject to an iterative and cita-
tional process that shifted and transformed its meaning. The production 
of the original video from the cultural program, with doctored audio, and 
a written caption that read “Pakistan Zindabaad” meant that this video was 
already a complex, intertextual product that then became subject to further 
reinterpretation. Intertextuality and citationality are foundational features 
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of human communicative practice, and are similarly integral to the de-
contextualization and recontextualization of videos online that make them 
mutable and continuously reinterpretable (Rymes 2012; Agha 2011).
We wish to reiterate the cautionary note with which we introduced 
our analysis of the inseparability of “events” from online comments posted 
about Kanhaiya: far from attributing positivist causality to these comments, 
we underscore instead their affective freight. Affect, as Spinoza (1985) re-
minds us, is about the generative capacity for action. Blurring the bound-
aries between emotion, cognition, and corporeality, at once ambient and 
viscerally felt, and spanning the private and the public, affect is the name 
we give to that intensity that enables us to navigate the world: it is that 
which enables us to affect others and to be affected by them. As we have 
noted above, affects do not reside in individuals; nor are individuals the 
loci for affects. Instead, affects leave their traces on and generate subjectiv-
ity. We have pointed to the virality of nationalist affects as they spiraled 
out from the relay between mass and digital media. The February 9, 2016 
public memorial to Afzal Guru and Maqbool Butt, the protests and coun-
terprotests surrounding it, Zee TV’s coverage of this event, its subsequent 
release of footage that purported to portray the seditious acts of Kanhaiya 
and his colleagues, the constant relay of this footage across mass and digital 
media, the posting of comments that ricocheted across multiple platforms 
including YouTube and, last but not least, the confusion surrounding the 
veracity of this footage and, indeed, about what had “really” occurred— all 
converged with and amplified each other to produce nationalist affects that 
were familiar in their reliance on gender- based and sexual violence, but 
also unfamiliar because of the speed with which they fed each other and 
spread though the body politic like a contagion. This was a remediated 
nationalism that was, at once, old and new.
The Remediation of Nationalism
On February 19, the day after Kanhaiya Kumar was taken to Tihar Jail, 
classes were canceled at JNU as a solidarity movement broke out across the 
city with thousands of people marching in the streets in his support. JNU 
faculty launched a series of public lectures on nationalism that were cov-
ered by television news and uploaded onto YouTube. These public lectures 
were remarkably effective in generating critiques of different connotations 
of patriotism and nationalism, the relationship between the state and civil 
society, the role of dissent in Indian democracy, and the implications of the 
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increasing privatization of higher education in India for academic freedom. 
These debates were also uploaded on YouTube and generated passionate 
commentary. In most comments, these faculty members were condemned 
as “anti- national.” While we do not have the space to engage either the cru-
cial and powerful acts of resistance by JNU faculty, journalists, and other 
public intellectuals or the responses to them, it is important that we remind 
ourselves of the political and discursive significance of their interventions.
In scholarship on digital media, remediation has come to refer to in-
tertextual relationships between different media and to processes by which 
digital technologies articulate to reconfigure and refashion mediation (for 
instance, Bolter and Grusin 2000). Remediation, therefore, refers not to 
ruptures or radically new forms of mediation but, instead, to the remixing 
of “new” and “old” media. Certainly, as we learned through our analysis of 
the feedback loops spanning Zee News, the videos uploaded on YouTube, 
and the online commentary, digital media relied on “older” media like tele-
vision even as it produced new forms of identification and, most pertinent 
to our argument, affective regimes surrounding Hindu- Indian nationalism.
Indeed, we extend the concept of remediation not simply to emergent 
articulations between “old” and “new” media but to how Hindu- Indian 
nationalism was itself reconfigured through the generation and circulation 
of affective regimes surrounding Kanhaiya Kumar and his colleagues. We 
have suggested above that these affective regimes drew upon older forms 
of Hindu nationalism (as in the ways in which they deployed misogyny 
and homophobia to call for the protection of a feminized nation [Bharat 
Mata] or the calls to “send back” Muslims to Pakistan) and, at the same 
time, produced a belligerent nationalism that was at once old and new. As 
these remediated forms of nationalism became viral through their relay 
across different media platforms, the contagious nature of these affects, 
their intertextuality and citationality, and their centrality to the produc-
tion of a space for violence were precisely what rendered them visceral. 
Put simply, as in the case of the remediation of media, the form of these 
nationalist affects (quite literally, their mediation) refracted their content: 
it was their virality, their simultaneous immediacy and expansiveness that 
rendered them both familiar and unfamiliar.
In closing, we return, once again, to the importance of feminist social 
critique for understanding the work of digital media in South Asia, particu-
larly with regard to their role in the production of public spheres, emergent 
forms of political participation, and the remediation of nationalism. Femi-
nist critique is never simply about sexual difference but insists that gender 
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is itself constituted— often violently— by other axes of inequality, including 
caste, class, religious difference, and discourses of sexuality. We wish to 
recall the discursive and ideological contexts in which digital media have 
proliferated in India by pausing to reflect on the very term “Digital India” 
and the political uses to which it has been harnessed: Digital India has been 
assumed to be indexical of Emergent India. All the more reason, we insist, 
that we need to foreground the role of digital media in the production of a 
space for gendered and sexual violence in the name of the nation.
Notes
 1. It is important that we note that the viscerality and virality of nationalism 
remediated by digital media has extended beyond South Asia to many other parts 
of the world from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States to Turkey 
and Egypt.
 2. There is, by now, a voluminous body of scholarship critiquing Jürgen Haber-
mas’s original theorization of the public sphere in terms of rational communication, 
most notably the pathbreaking work of Nancy Fraser (1990) and Michael Warner 
(2005) These conceptions of the public sphere have been vigorously interrogated 
in the South Asian/Indian context; see, for example, Appadurai (1996), Appadurai 
and Breckenridge (1988), Breckenridge and Van der Veer (1993), Cody (2011), and 
Rajagopal (2009). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to debate the viability of 
prevalent conceptions of the public sphere in contemporary India.
 3. Merriam- Webster Dictionary. “Visceral.” Accessed May 21, 2018. https://
www.merriam-webster.com
 4. We hence align our conceptions of performance and performativity with 
poststructuralist theories of subject formation, for example, Judith Butler 2006, 
2011.
 5. When analyzing digital speech in particular it is imperative to reject the 
ideological assumption that online speech is fundamentally different from offline 
speech and, in particular, that the anonymous nature of online discourse thus re-
quires skepticism when analyzing its contents. Rather than belabor questions of 
commenters’ “true” identities or feelings (which could be raised in the context of 
face- to- face interaction as well), we focus on the semiotic processes through which 
certain discourses surrounding “anti- nationalism” became mediatized and ampli-
fied alongside particularly violent, gendered affects. For more on the methodologi-
cal questions and ideologies surrounding mediated language, see Gershon 2010.
 6. The event, originally conceived as a poetry reading session, shares its title 
with a poem written by Agha Shahid Ali about Kashmiri rebellion against Indian 
rule.
 7. This law, first implemented by the British colonial government, makes any 
“attempts to bring into hatred or contempt . . . towards the Government” punish-
able with life imprisonment.
 8. Zee News. February 10, 2016. “JNU Shouts Anti- nationalist Slogans; Nation 
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Questions Intent,” YouTube video. Accessed May 21, 2018. https://www.youtube.
com
 9. Prashant V. Singh, “From ‘Pakistan Zindabad’ to ‘Bharat ki barbaadi’— 
Slogans that were raised by ‘anti- nationals’ in JNU,” Zee News, February 14, 2016. 
Accessed May 21, 2018. http://zeenews.india.com
 10. India Today “India Today Impact: Tests Confirm 2 out of 7 Kanhaiya Sedi-
tion Videos Doctored,” March 1, 2016. Accessed May 21, 2018. http://indiatoday.
intoday.in/story/india-today-impact-tests-confirm-2-out-of-7-kanhaiya-sedition-
videos-fake/1/609162.html
 11. In 2015, the Hyderabad University administration decided to withhold the 
scholarship funds of Rohith Vemula, a Dalit PhD student, due to his involvement 
in the Ambedkar Students’ Association, a Dalit rights student organization that was 
branded “anti- national” by the ABVP. The ABVP used the fact that Vemula had 
participated in a demonstration against the death penalty for a convicted terrorist, 
Yakub Menon, as evidence of his antinational activities. Vemula was also physically 
assaulted by ABVP students in his hostel. Subsequently, Vemula and four other 
students were suspended from the university for participating in allegedly “antin-
ational” activities, and after his suspension was confirmed in January 2016, Vemula 
committed suicide. Vemula’s death sparked massive student demonstrations across 
the country condemning discrimination against Dalit students and the stifling of 
free speech, which became another rallying point in the JNU student movement 
against the criminalization of Kanhaiya Kumar and other student activists.
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Nation- Talk and Middle Class Politics  
on Online Media
Sahana Udupa
The resurgence of nationalism as a popular sentiment on online media in 
the last decade has sparked a wide discussion of digital media’s centrality 
to exclusionary populism. Right- wing populism has been on the rise af-
ter formal politics in liberal democracies started moving toward a stifling 
“consensus at the center” (Mouffe 2005, 66), but the debate intensified in 
Europe, North America, and Australia under global conditions of migra-
tion. In the wake of arrivals of refugees escaping war and poverty, longer 
patterns of immigration are also radically reframed to portray them as in-
imical to the national interest. The paradoxical rise of nationalism in the 
age of global connections confirms the fears expressed by globalization 
scholars as early as in the 1990s, and their prescient caution that global 
mobilities may lead to an “even deeper trough of defensive exclusivism” 
(Hall 1997, 25).
That online media have emerged as the staging ground for national-
ist sentiments is evident in the recent surge of vituperative speech aimed 
against migrants on social media. Studies of nationalism in Europe, for 
instance, have drawn attention to the “neo- nationalist rhetoric” expanding 
on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter (Fuchs 2016). The 
demands to seal the national boundaries have combined assertions of “cul-
tural fundamentalism” with “biological racism,” causing concern about the 
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spread of xenophobic “hate speech” on online media (Gingrich and Banks 
2006; European Commission 2016).
If neonationalism has emerged as an isolationist response to global and 
regional migration in the Global North, digital media in India reveal a 
complex landscape of warring narratives and divergent claims, which has 
fueled, with all its contradictions, a rambunctious discourse around nation 
and national belonging. Neither reducible to exclusivist populism nor to 
“benign” patriotism, digitally mediated national imaginaries reveal a zone 
of confrontation among the middle classes in urban India. Based on ongo-
ing ethnographic fieldwork among online users in Mumbai, Bangalore, and 
Delhi, and a close reading of tweets around the hashtag “ModiInsultsIndia” 
on the microblogging platform Twitter, I delineate this zone of confronta-
tion with two interlinked observations.
First, the acrimonious debates on nation and national belonging are 
shaped by a disjunctive discursive field of two prominent groups active on 
political social media in urban India— those who fashion a post- Nehruvian 
model of liberalism and those who declare allegiance to Hindu national-
ism. Although the two groups spar over a variety of issues, a common trope 
of anticorruption and notions of technological modernity run between the 
subfields, both fueled by overlapping sets of online users using similar in-
formational tactics, and both feeding the aspiration of “New India.”
Second, the peer- to- peer network architecture of social media is sig-
nificant in shaping renewed ideas about nationhood among young online 
users in urban India. It has set in motion a culture of verbal confrontations 
fanning hypervocality to debates on national belonging. The proliferation 
of social media discourse on national belonging through confrontational 
verbal cultures of self- confessed “liberals” and “Hindu nationalists” could 
be best captured as “online nation- talk.” By terming it as “nation- talk,” I 
signal the fleeting and blurring sentiments that ride on online speech acts 
(including visual material). Online nation- talk provides the conditions for 
nationalism to develop as a hard- boiled exclusivist ideology, as the squab-
bling publics together compose the quotidian infrastructure to (re)produce 
nation as a legitimate frame of belonging. This is especially significant 
for the resurgence of Hindu nationalism and its particular formation of 
“enterprise Hindutva” in digital India (Udupa, forthcoming). As Victoria 
Bernal (2015, 4) suggests, “Websites [and online media more broadly] are 
sites of conflict that make dominant nationalist discourses and alternative 
perspectives visible and legible as ordinary people articulate to each other 
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what things mean to them in their own words and collectively construct 
accounts and analysis of the nation.”
Social media nation- talk in India is important for many reasons, not 
least that the number of online users in India, at 350 million, is next only 
to China and the United States. India’s Internet users are expanding as a 
consumer market for the private sector and also as a constituency to be 
captured and appeased for political gains and ideological production for 
political parties. The efforts of the market and political interest groups 
to establish online allegiance continue apace, even as online users engage 
in practices that exceed both market calculations and political strategies. 
The irreducible diversity of cultural contexts that shape middle class online 
users and their divergent approach to political participation defy an easy 
summary. However, amid all the cultural and linguistic diversity, I suggest, 
the disjunctive discursive field of “liberals” and “religious nationalists” has 
given rise to a vibrant form of online nation- talk.
Social media nation- talk runs counter to a significant body of litera-
ture that has argued that the transnational technologies of Internet media 
and its peer driven content cultures enable global civic consciousness and 
global civil society (Dahlgren 2015). Even the sobering narratives that cri-
tique digital enlightenment have emphasized that the market and techno-
logical features of digital media undermine national territorial boundaries 
and nation- states as political- juridical entities. Aneesh (2006) has coined 
the term “algocracy” to define the rule of algorithms that upsets the na-
tional boundaries and the very paradigm of territorial governance through 
the logics of computer code universalism and programmability. Although 
the potential to transcend national boundaries is without doubt a key fea-
ture of the Internet- enabled media, the unfolding social and political cul-
tures of new media reveal that the postnational postulation is challenged 
once again in the digital age.
In her critique of the postnational thesis of globalization theorists, 
Leela Fernandes (2000, 612) reveals that India’s economic reforms of the 
1990s saw the emergence of the “discourse of globality” that was “invented 
through the deployment of nationalist narratives.” I have argued elsewhere 
that the local- global dialectic in the media fields of postreforms India yoked 
together the seemingly unrelated discourses of commodity consumption, 
civic activism, cultural ascent, and social mobility as a legitimate aspira-
tion of “New India” epitomized by globalizing cities such as Bangalore 
(2015, 17– 18). Key here is the aspirational construct of the nation in direct 
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relation to media modernity and emerging forms of globality. Equally im-
portant in this mediated discourse of “desire- as- aspiration” is the critical 
role of the urban middle classes imagined as the key actors of aspirational 
new India (17). The aspirational construct of New India resulted in part 
from commercial media’s efforts to expand audience markets in the lib-
eralizing economy, but the hegemonic sensibility of India as an emerging 
global power increasingly enlisted middle class audiences in ways that they 
could actively participate in the aspirational discourse. I suggest that it is 
in this context of mediated national imagination of postreforms India and 
the historical formations of religious nationalism (van der Veer 1994) that 
online nation- talk could be more fully delineated. Far from being passive 
recipients of national imagination— which was not the case even with the 
presumably monological print media1— middle class media users started to 
make direct claims on what the nation should mean and to whom through 
a growing number of web- based media. The vast expansion of mobile In-
ternet after 2010 broadened the class base of online usage (Doron and 
Jeffrey 2013; Tenhunen 2018), taking its political formations (including 
nation- talk) beyond the middle class. The vibrant landscape of Internet 
memes in India testifies to this expansion. However, the protoagentic privi-
lege of middle class users and the representation of their voices on main-
stream media as public opinion continued to magnify the symbolic salience 
of this online user group. The microblogging site Twitter represents an 
important site to understand the dynamic of new media technologies in-
tersecting with the nationalist imagination of the middle class. In the rest 
of the chapter, I will focus on this platform and home in on the hashtag 
ModiInsultsIndia, to examine the clash between self- fashioned liberals and 
Hindu nationalist sympathizers as a cantankerous form of new media fed 
nation- talk.
Twitter Is for “Serious People”
Compared to the vast reach of the social networking site Facebook and 
mobile media messenger service Whatsapp, the user volume for Twitter in 
India is not very large. The social networking site had a share of only 17 
percent of social media users in India and 8 per cent of all Internet users 
in 2015.2 Twitter’s 22 million users comprise just 1.8 per cent of the Indian 
population.3 In 2017, India became the fastest growing market for Twitter 
in terms of the number of active online users.4 However, Twitter’s influence 
stems partly from mainstream commercial media’s privileging of Twitter 
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debates as a lively channel for citizens voice. This practice is especially 
prominent among television news channels because of the interrelated 
agendas of interactive news making and market driven models of monetiz-
ing audiences. Twitter debates thus resonate beyond their limited reach, 
as commercial television news and print media present Twitter updates as 
direct news feed from common citizens and political elites.
Twitter entered major cities in India at a time when online users had 
grown familiar with and quite “addicted” to Facebook and LinkedIn 
where they could reactivate, maintain, and expand their personal friend-
ship groups, familial ties, or professional networks, and also satisfy, in some 
measure, their “insatiable nosiness about what other people are doing” 
(Miller 2011, 101). It was not surprising then that Twitter, despite its em-
phasis on short messages sans images and an imposed restriction of 140 
characters, was initially used as an extension of personal networks, and yet 
another online gateway for “real- world” socializing and snooping. Typi-
cally, people on Twitter would update on what they ate, which film they 
watched, or where they went shopping. In just a year from Twitter’s foray 
into the Indian market, tweeters grew enough in number to encourage 
some enterprising tweeters to take the next step and invite these tweet-
ers for “offline” gatherings. In cities like Mumbai, tweeters assembled for 
offline tweet meets, calling them “coffee tweet up” and “dinner tweet up” 
for socializing or discussing common business interests. By 2010, Twit-
ter experienced a transition. Although routine updates and the impulse to 
organize tweeters for social cause or business interests did not disappear, 
Twitter came to be perceived more as a platform to share information, 
opinionate, and remain up- to- date on “hard” news. This transition coin-
cided with Twitter’s official branding in later years of its inception as a “real 
time information network” where one can “have access to the voices and 
information surrounding all that interests her/him.” The rapidly changing 
new media landscape and new smartphone applications in the market were 
crucial for this branding since Twitter had to distinguish itself from more 
fun- driven new media services. Soon, Twitter users commenting on politics 
and news events or tagging stories on “current affairs” were more com-
mon. Twitter became a high ground for opinion exchange, as opposed to 
what many users described as “frivolous” Facebook— a result of assigning 
“political moralities” to different media technologies (Miller 2011). Many 
online users I met in Mumbai had little doubt when they said, “Facebook is 
time pass. Twitter is for serious people.”5 Although the list of Twitter users 
with the largest following continued to be dominated by cinema actors and 
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sports celebrities, active profiles of political elites on Twitter, and expand-
ing volumes of political debates testified to Twitter’s reception as a forum 
for public debate on publicly relevant matters. It was indeed the supposed 
public character of Twitter with its potential to open up channels of anony-
mous connections through hidden or open handles that confirmed its sta-
tus as a “serious forum for serious people.”
In practice and in corporate branding, Twitter mimicked the repertoire 
of news and its claims to public opinion shaping, wrapped as such in the 
tiny packets of 140 characters. This perception continued in India, even 
as the U.S.- based company struggled to retain its global user base and in-
creasingly turned to “emerging markets” such as India and the Philippines 
for future growth through advertisement- led revenue strategies (Rajan 
2016).
The perception of Twitter as a public medium for serious debates is at 
once generative and reflective of the vibrant online discussions on the In-
dian nation and what it means to belong to the nation. Tweets around the 
hashtag ModiInsultsIndia are one among the several instances of online 
nation- talk, illustrating the distinct features of new media and aspects of 
online work among warring factions that together provide the conditions 
for nation- talk to flourish. While no hashtag is representative of the en-
tire gamut of discussions on social media, influential hashtags that stirred 
media events (Couldry 2002) provide a window to the broader cultures of 
online discourse by illustrating the content and tenor of debates set in a 
milieu explored through ethnographic methods.
Clash of Actors
The hashtag ModiInsultsIndia appeared on Twitter in 2015 to express an-
ger at what a section of online users saw as an insult to India’s pride when 
the Indian prime minister made a statement during a foreign visit that 
Indians abroad need no longer feel ashamed about being born in India. 
More than 80,000 tweets surfaced on Twitter within just two days, criticiz-
ing the “insensitive” remarks of the nation’s highest executive. The hashtag 
top trended nationally and also globally for a brief period in May 2015. 
The sudden invention of the hashtag and the spurt of tweets condemning 
the prime minister’s statement was ironic. The hashtag that spiked on the 
national and global Twitter charts was an unexpected affront to a leader 
who had cultivated a strong Twitter following precisely with the dream 
of a corruption- free India and the pride of Hindu India as a global power. 
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Modi had filled the need for a strong leadership figure— a need that had 
stemmed from a host of factors, including the perceived weak leadership of 
the incumbent government and an ambient mediated culture to legitimate 
“celebrity icons” to take charge of new India.6 Tech- savviness was one of 
the key elements of the cultivated public image of Modi, as he actively 
participated in the microblogging platform of Twitter to amass a large fol-
lowing (at 42 million followers in May 2018). The adulation for the leader 
on Twitter invoked the sobriquet of “bhakt” community online, who would, 
as a devout to the deity, hold the leader in awe and unremitting reverence. 
The hashtag ModiInsultsIndia thus came as a surprise. The messiah of net- 
savvy young India surging ahead to free the country from old world politics 
had to confront a tide of critical tweets, all the more caustic because of the 
hashtag that implicated him in a no- holds- barred style typical of Twitter 
clashes. “The dam broke this morning,” announced the English language 
news daily the Telegraph, “digital fire and brimstone fell mercilessly upon 
the unchallenged poster- boy politician of the Twitter age.”7
The hashtag embodied the claim that a serving prime minister should 
not disrespect the country and its people with a casual and critical portrayal 
of the nation, especially during foreign visits. With punching irony, the 
hashtag signaled the intriguing sway of online nation- talk for which even 
Modi was an insufficient icon. Hence, contrary to the interpretation that 
the hashtag brought to light a contested cyberspace that came out in un-
equivocal terms for the first time to challenge a hegemonic figure, I intend 
to show that the hashtag signaled online nation- talk as a highly charged 
emotional discourse that, with all contradictions, seeks to normalize na-
tional pride as an ethical attribute of a proper citizen in the digital age.
In the days between May 19 and June 4, 2015, a total of 84,762 tweets 
attached to the hashtag ModiInsultsIndia were collected using the Twitter 
Archiving Google Sheet (TAGS) Hawksey tool.8 The application revealed 
a Twitter rate of 10.6 tweets per minute for the hashtag during this pe-
riod. The tweet pool was later analyzed for the highest retweeted tweets, 
prominent themes, links embedded in the tweets, and other hashtags cited 
in the hashtag pool. A close reading of the impassioned tweets filled with 
humor, anger, and satire, alongside plain mimesis and retweets, revealed a 
vibrant and acrimonious discourse of national pride. Of the total sampled 
items, posts that were retweeted more than 20 times were chosen for a 
close reading.
Before a detailed analysis of the tweets, a few meta- analytical points are 
in order. Similar to other Twitter clashes in the Indian public domain in re-
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cent times, the tweet pool around #ModiInsultsIndia illustrated the highly 
intertextual nature of online debates. Online sites or printed stories of 
commercial news media were frequently cited in the tweets to authenticate 
or debunk propositions. News companies for their part made the trending 
hashtag— proxy for “popular voice”— a regularly updated news story. The 
influence of news organizations was evident not only in a direct sense of 
posting the themes for discussion but also in a more complicated manner 
of injecting circularity into the discourse. On the list of top 10 tweets in 
the sample was a post by @BBCtrending that announced that over 80,000 
tweets had used #ModiInsultsIndia to react to the prime minister’s com-
ments. This post was retweeted 426 times. Another highly retweeted post 
came from Huffington Post India: “RT @HuffPostIndia: #ModiInsultsIn-
dia Trends worldwide as furious Indians slam PM’s overseas remarks.” The 
evidentiary effects of social media trending and the staging of trending 
as news by organized media influenced tweeters’ participation. Tweeters 
enthusiastically shared the trendometer readings and confirmed to them-
selves and others that the trending hashtag stood for something significant 
and authentic. A tweeter exclaimed, “Oi teri! 68000 Aaj Sanghi aatmahatya 
karenge bhai” [oh its 68000! Sanghis will commit suicide today bro].9 An-
other updated: “#ModiInsultsIndia has just crossed 100 K tweets. The 
massive shame this c*% has brought to his own party.”10
Politicians drew upon both the sources— “popular tweets” and news 
entities— to advance their claims. It was hard to distinguish where the “un-
mediated popular voice” ended and commercial media messaging began, 
or where the top- down political propaganda converged with the seeming 
spontaneity of nation- talk. Moreover, as tweeters absorbed the messages 
coming from various quarters, they discussed the possibility of manipu-
lation of hashtags by political forces. The shades of suspicion and criti-
cal awareness added yet another layer of mediation to an already charged 
intertextual field. The tweets in the sample revealed the practice of mu-
tual references for authenticating or discrediting argumentative positions, 
and the undercurrent of suspicion that all these might be orchestrated by 
the political parties after all. A post retweeted 365 times wondered: “How 
much money BJP paid to @TwitterIndia to remove #ModiInsultsIndia 
from Trends List and replace it [with] another.”11 This suspicion gathered 
steam when a new hashtag “ModiIndiasPride” surfaced on the Twitter 
trending charts just when #ModiInsultsIndia had started to trend globally 
and nationally.12 The flattering and congratulatory hashtag was construed 
as an engineered tweet coming out of the party’s social media campaign 
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managers. The post: “#ModiInsultsIndia propaganda exposed by @X #Mo-
diIndiasPride,” which was retweeted 1,027 times in the sample, was at the 
center of this discussion. The post showed the images of newspaper reports 
of Modi’s speech, arguing that the original message was misrepresented 
and that it was yet another instance of false media propaganda. It became 
the second most retweeted post in the hashtag pool, inching closer to the 
first position after some hours of undisputed trending of #ModiInsultsIn-
dia. Many tweeters joined the simmering sentiment of suspicion, while 
others alleged this was without doubt a case of buying out Twitter’s silence:
Is it true??? @twitter has removed #ModiInsultsIndia?? (101 counts)
The suspicion prompted a tweeter to give a heroic call against TwitterIndia 
succumbing to political pressure:
RT @nesoron: I say guys, beat @twitterIndia. And how. RT #Mo-
diInsultsIndia a million times. C’mon. Let’s beat ‘em. Please do. (97 
counts)
Amid the suspicion that such tweets were coming out of the propaganda 
machinery, challenges to the PM’s statement in the Twitter debate were 
advanced by prominent spokespersons of the Indian National Congress 
Party. Two of the top 10 tweeters in the sample, for instance, were official 
spokespersons of the Congress Party. Presenting Twitterati as a bold group 
of conscientious citizens, one of the spokespersons hailed their valor:
Glad that twitterati hs given a fitting reply to prime minister. Enough 
of tolerating his barbs at the country&countrymen. (288 counts)
Spokespersons of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) were also active, 
albeit further below the list of top retweets. Tweets by official spokesper-
sons of political parties as well as suspected dummies represented attempts 
to assuage or malign online stardom for overt political gains by major po-
litical parties such as the Indian National Congress and the BJP. Mindful of 
the political wrangling that had entrenched the hashtag, tweeters conjec-
tured in a variety of ways, and one of the top 10 tweets surmised:
BJP has good opportunity to take revenge for #ModiInsultsIndia by 
claiming #RahulInsultsHinduism. (347 counts)
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In the later tweets #ModiInsultsIndia started to appear with other unre-
lated hashtags such as #PrayforPhillipines, inducing clutter into the de-
bate. A Twitter handle (now defunct) stood out in the pool for its repetitive 
attacks on the prime minister’s statement, inserting harsh metaphors at 
regular intervals throughout the trending period.
Intertextuality, remediation, and political propaganda qualify claims of 
unmediated popular voice bursting out on social networking sites, and on-
line nation- talk is no exception. However, the sheer volume of tweets and 
the number of unique Twitter handles in #ModiInsultsIndia indicate that 
the tweets cannot be reduced to a discourse that was fully engineered top 
down. It is precisely in the remediated intertextual field, including conjec-
tures about manipulation, that online actors emerge and collide, thereby 
experiencing new forms of political expression and new ways of laying 
claims to public discourse. That nation- talk remained on the top of such 
claims was evident in the various themes marshalled around the hashtag 
ModiInsultsIndia. These could be analyzed as “discursive themes,” which 
refer to strategies and content of texts “as instantiations of discourse” 
(Barthes 1972).
In the sample, the highest retweeted posts made a direct reference to 
“nation,” with allegations of disgrace and dishonor to the country, and as-
sertions of national pride. These tweets/retweets constituted 54 percent of 
the total sample (table 10.1). Others (9 percent) staged a direct confron-
tation between major political parties and still others (9 percent) simply 
relayed information from organized media networks.
Category 1: Critical of the prime minister’s speech with direct or 
implicit reference to “nation” and “national pride”
Table 10.1. Thematic categories of #ModiInsultsIndia 
tweets May– June 2015
Category
No. of unique 
tweets* Tweet count %
1 311 20,149 54
2 187 10,278 28
3 41 3,292 9
4 26 3,035 8
5 16 540 1
*Each unique tweet is repeated at least 20 times. Tweet count includes retweets.
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Category 2: Critical tweets with distinct themes but with no direct 
or implicit reference to “nation”
Category 3: Tweets that shared information from news sources
Category 4: Tweets defending the prime minister’s statement and 
challenging opposition parties
Category 5: Tweets critical of the speech with references to the op-
position party in positive terms
How was the idea of “nation” invoked, asserted, and expressed in the 
hashtag pool? What were the elements of the national imaginary and how 
did the themes cluster around #ModiInsultsIndia?
Theme 1: Failed Symbol of National Pride
“Speak for yourself Sir. Strictly Yourself,” a tweeter posted insistently, and 
others joined the debate, declaring that they were “not ashamed” of being 
born in India. Some tweeters capitalized the phrase to announce their in-
domitable stance and others resorted to retweeting as many posts as they 
could. Still others found satire and cynicism to be effective:
Congratulations India on having a Prime Minister who was ashamed 
of his origin till we made him the Prime Minister. (with slight varia-
tions, 78 counts)
Stirred up by the maelstrom, thousands of tweeters joined to condemn 
the PM’s statements as “disgraceful” and “distasteful” that to them in-
sulted, offended, or embarrassed the people of India. “Most controversial 
part of Modi’s speech was ‘People were born in India due to sins of past 
life,’” complained a tweeter, and another added in jest that his frequent 
foreign trips could be because he felt ashamed of being born in India. Ad 
hominin attacks on Modi in the hashtag pool expressed tweeters’ anguish 
at the faltered symbol of national pride, resulting in all manner of name 
calling— liar, illiterate, uneducated, selfie- driven, self- obsessed— and de-
riding hashtags such as GappuInIndia and Feku (liar). Some expressed dis-
appointment that the PM didn’t know the “basics of public speak[ing]” and 
more important, he was not “nationalist” and “patriotic” enough. His “poor 
knowledge” was to be questioned, since he had a tendency to get “carried 
away by his own rhetoric.” Fueled also by political mudslinging, the tweets 
derided his failure to embody the national spirit and properly represent its 
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strengths and achievements. A tweet by a political party spokesperson say-
ing that the PM’s statement had “offended the sensibilities of every Indian” 
was retweeted more than 350 times. A sense of betrayal underwrote a large 
number of tweets, and the promise before the election of a proud national-
ist dissipating after gaining power:
Before Election: Proud chaiwala [tea vendor], Proud Hindu, Proud 
Nationalist. After Election: Ashamed to be born in India. (169 
counts, with some variation was retweeted again 79 times)
[T]his was when I felt ashamed . . . ashamed of your fake national-
ism! (153 counts)
Theme 2: Taxpayers Money
For many tweeters, “nationalism” and the failure to embody it meant defi-
nite material consequences. One of the key complaints in the hashtag was 
that the prime minister was wasting taxpayers’ money on foreign trips and 
the deriding comments just added to the wound.
We elected a PM who travels the world at our expense just to tell the 
world how ashamed we are to born in India. Pathetic . . . (83 counts; 
with slight variations, 102 counts)
Foreign visits and residence by ordinary citizens, on the other hand, were 
for actual life opportunities— studies, jobs, and suchlike. Going abroad 
would no way mean they were any less nationalist:
Ppl may dislike many things happening in India. Go abroad for bet-
ter opportunities. But they’re NOT ashamed of being Indian.  .  .  . 
(150 counts)
People may go abroad for further studies or jobs, but no sir, they 
aren’t ashamed of being an Indian. (44 counts)
Theme 3: Glory and Sacrifice
The materiality of taxpayers’ money merged with the symbolic resonance 
of the nation as a space of belonging. Claiming that “no individual is big-
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ger than the motherland,” tweeters emphasized that India’s unbroken and 
glorious tradition went well beyond the short- term regimes of political 
leaders. Even those that came to the defense of Modi reiterated that the na-
tion was indeed not insulted and the prime minister’s statement had been 
twisted by “media propaganda.” India as Bharat was timeless, abundant, 
and magnificent, and no mortal leader measures up to its glory— no prime 
minister now or before:
PM’s may come and go— but our proud and illustrious National 
Identity as Indians will endure for time immemorial. Jai Hind! (110 
counts)
Dear PM, India is not getting importance abroad bcoz of you, infact 
u r getting importance abroad bcoz of India only. (retweeted with 
slight variations over 70 times)
Our proud and pride about India is nothing to do with someone 
becoming PM of India. (66 counts)
Mujhe Bharatiy hone par tab bhi garv tha jab aap pradhaan mantra nahi 
the aur tab bhi hoga jab aap pradhaan mantra nahin honge (I was proud 
of being an Indian even before you became the Prime Minsiter [sic]. 
I will be proud even after you are no longer the Prime Minister) (49 
counts)
India made you PM. . . . You haven’t made India. Just a reminder you 
are the 15th PM of this great country. (39 counts)
The default idioms to assert India’s excellence centered on the symbolic 
and mythological repertoire of Hinduism. The top tweet in the entire 
hashtag pool invoked Brahma, the creator of the world in Hindu mythol-
ogy, as the ultimate arbiter to settle the matter. In a half- jesting tone, it 
declared:
RT @TheTweetOfGod: Just talked to Brahma. He’s not ashamed to 
have been born Indian either. (1,182 counts)
Together with Brahma, a large number of historical figures were parleyed 
to assert India’s glorious past. Most of them were heroic warriors during 
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India’s liberation struggle and none of them— asserted the tweeters with a 
tinge of sarcasm— were ashamed of being an Indian. A tweeter stated sar-
castically: “Maharana Pratap was ashamed being an Indian until Modi be-
came PM!” On the publicly shared profile page, this tweeter called himself 
“Biologically, Emotionally, Financially, intellectually . . . Indian.” A slew of 
tweets illustrated that there were indeed many such “multifaceted” patriots 
active in the hashtag pool:
Samrat Ashok felt ashamed to be born in India. He died in shameful 
state as Modiji declined to take birth then. (166 counts)
Tab to Bhagwan Ram ko bhi badhi sharm aayi hogi Ayodhya mein paida 
hone mein (By that token God Ram might also have felt ashamed to 
be born in Ayodhya)
so swami vivekananda was ashamed of being called Indian before 
modiji became PM. (34 counts)
Are you ashamed of Gandhi, Nehru, Sardar Patel, Vivekananda? (32 
counts)
My apologies to Bhagat Singh, Rajguru, Sahdev and numerous 
young men who sacrificed lives so tht 1 day a PM can shame them. 
(26 counts)
The valor and sacrifice of these heroes illustrated, according to a tweeter, 
that “India is more, much more than you can ever understand.”
Together with historical figures came the image of Indian soldiers 
fighting battles on the borders. Soldiers were cited repeatedly to signify 
the gravity of national belonging:
If “Indians were ashamed of being Indians” why did soldiers sacrifice 
their lives at the border? (with variations, 34 counts)
Those who laid down their life for BJP’s failure in Kargil, Acc to 
Modi they were ashamed of India. (101 retweets)
I was ashamed wen China had d audacity to show wrong map of 
India during @narendramodi’s visit! (26 counts)
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Following these tweets, an image of the prime minister not applauding 
when a martyr’s wife received a salutation from the president at a public 
event circulated swiftly, with one tweeter complaining that the minister 
didn’t show “a single percent respect for a martyr’s wife.” The territorial 
and militarized narrative of the nation melded with “sacrificial citizenship” 
in which “citizenship is expressed through sacrificing for the nation” (Ber-
nal 2005, 7). Shaped by a long history of popular representations of sac-
rificial citizens in cinema as well as in state media, social media narratives 
brought the related symbols of territory, soldier, and sacrifice as a coherent 
account of the nation.
The hard side of territorial defense and heroic sacrifice inspired a swell-
ing of emotions. The nation for these tweeters was not a distant, abstract 
concept but a personalized community composed of forefathers, parents, 
and sons yet to be born. The insult, thus, was personal:
A PM while representing the whole country in the foreign soil in-
sults our parents, forefathers. (76 counts)
I am & will always be proud to be Indian because our forefathers 
routed the mighty British empire through non- violence. (27 counts)
Can Anybody Be Ashamed of One’s Own MOTHER? Yes, an emo-
tional . . . (71 counts)
Modi is ashamed of being born to Indian Mother! . . . (with minor 
variations, 21 counts)
After this tweet I feel #ModiInsultsIndia and the Pride of the coun-
try I am born in. This is not Done Mr PM. (50 counts)
Proud of India’s Culture 🎋 Diversity 🎉 Freedom fighters 🙏 Soldiers 👮 
Farmers 👳 Scientists . . . (117 counts, retweeted with slight varia-
tions 57 times)
Yeh hai mera [This is my] Hindustan and we are proud Indians and 
will never feel ashamed to be born here. (43 counts)
The emotional appeal of national pride and belonging was not limited 
to those who were critical of the prime minister’s statement. It was just as 
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striking among tweeters who defended the statement. Some tweets were 
cynical of the Congress Party leader Rahul Gandhi (named as Yuvrraj) and 
accused him of not knowing how to salute the national flag, and other 
tweets dismissed those standing behind the hashtag as pernicious traitors 
feigning national pride.
Yuvrraj does nt know how to salute our national flag; @INCIndia 
says #ModiInsultsIndia. Morons of the highest order.
Shayad yeh iss #ModiInsultsIndia hashtag aur trend ka hi asar hai, ki 
kuch gaddar bhi Bharat mata ki jai bolne lag gaye hey, dikhawe! [Perhaps 
it is the effect of this hashtag that even traitors have started to hail 
Mother Bharat, show- offs!]
Caustic as they were, the tweets squabbled to show who was a better 
nationalist and who was just a fake. Supporters of the ruling party were 
dubbed as “bhakts” (religious devotees) busy in the “bhakt photoshop fac-
tory” and those critical were derided as “AAPtards” (supporters of the Aam 
Aadmi Party— Common Man’s Party), “Congi” (Congress Party support-
ers), and “AdarshLibrals” (ideal liberals in a cynical portrait). Despite their 
wrangling, and indeed through this wrangling, tweeters kept alive online 
nation- talk as a legitimate discourse, with all the terms of the argument 
firmly in place.
Theme 4: Corruption
The blurring of boundaries between the two seemingly oppositional camps 
becomes stark on the issue of corruption. Those who defended the PM’s 
statement asserted that if one should be ashamed of anything, it should be 
“rampant corruption” and the corrupt political class. A tweeter declared, 
“Even thou it cud hav been articulated better, there is NO case for #Modi-
InsultsIndia; We were shamed due to rampant Corruption.” Several anti-
corruption tweets condemned the hashtag:
FACT: Supporters of all corrupt leaders in India are trending #Mo-
diInsultsIndia against @narendramodi’s development. (91 counts)
If Booting out big corruption, Presenting India as a global power, 
Development etc is insult . . . then Yes #ModiInsultsIndia. . . . (212 
counts)
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Tweeters who supported the hashtag and condemned the PM’s statement 
were equally critical of the political class as “corrupt” and formal politics as 
“dirty.” “We Are Not Ashamed Of Born Indian, But Are Ashamed Of Our 
Politicians!” declared a tweet, and others said:
Prime Minister should maintain the dignity of the post and should 
not try to play dirty politics everywhere. (84 counts)
So even patriotism was a jumla! [jumla is an empty, vapid political 
promise] (55 counts)
The anti- political- class rhetoric in the tweets combined with a sense of 
responsibility and ownership as citizens. This was illustrated in the tweets 
that lectured that no country was perfect, but it should be made perfect 
with hard labor. Others were more direct:
It’s my job as a citizen to keep my country on her toes, but unlike 
#NaMo I’ve never been ashamed of being Indian. . . . (57 counts)
Responsibilized citizenship and anti- political- class sentiment constituted a 
new middle class sensibility in postreforms India that was reflected as well 
as fed by mass media organizations (Udupa 2015). Insult and pride were 
thus inseparable from the emerging sense of responsibilized and angry 
citizens eager to experience and assert India as a global power. It was not 
surprising that a large number of tweets expressed discontent not so much 
about the content of the speech as the fact that it was delivered “on foreign 
soil.” It was unpardonable, according to these tweeters, that “Indians were 
insulted abroad.” PM made “a joke out of India abroad,” decried a tweeter 
in Hindi [Bharat ka duniya mein Mazak], while others urged:
Modi should immediately cancel all future foreign tours. He is do-
ing nothing but insulting our country on foreign soil. (41 counts).
Respected PM, when you are on a foreign tour, do remember that 
you are representing a nation, not your political party. (238 counts, 
retweeted with slight variations 40 counts)
No world leader goes abroad to trash talk his own country. (34 
counts)
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Vidheshi bhoomi par desh ko badnam karne vale Modiji pahle Pradhan 
mantri bane [Modiji became the first prime minister to defame a 
country on foreign land]. (124 counts)
Going on foreign tours and insulting his own country. . . . has any 
PM in history does this before? (29 counts)
Mr. Modi . . . Ur remark has let Indians down on foreign land, nd it’s 
a national disgrace. We r proud Indians. (27 counts)
Can u ever imagine, Cameron/Obama, etc go abroad & say ‘We/
Our citizens r ashamed of being born British/American, etc’!?
Next time when Modi speaks abroad, this disclaimer may be shown. 
“All my views are personal and not of my employer, India.” . . . (160 
counts)
These tweets illustrate that aspirational restlessness in a globalizing milieu 
is an important element of online nation- talk. Other themes in the hashtag 
pool included historical references to Nazi Germany as well as the con-
troversies around the role of the Rashtreeya Swayam Sevak Sangha in the 
Indian national struggle.
The variety of themes marshalled in the name of “nation” through 
rhetorical confrontation, joking, cynicism, and evidencing do not reveal a 
clearly formulated friend/enemy schema or a sharp “us/them” distinction 
identified by many scholars as the key discursive tool for online national-
ism (Fuchs 2016). While the framing of religious minorities as “the other” 
is a common occurrence in online debate cultures in urban India, what 
this hashtag reveals is the process “emotionalization” of nation- talk (Fuchs 
2016, 181) even as these emotions were subjected to strategic use by major 
political parties. The case of #ModiInsultsIndia illustrates that the emo-
tional confrontation between “liberals” and “Hindu nationalists” on online 
media is generative of a revived and vibrant form of online nation- talk. 
Although the divide between the self- proclaimed liberal tech- moderns and 
Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) volunteers appear irreconcilable, the com-
mon discourse of national pride that runs between them reveals the blurred 
boundaries of ideology that constitute middle class politics of online delib-
eration in urban India.
How do we understand the mediatic elements of social media shap-
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ing this nation- talk? I conclude with a provisional argument to address 
this question, adding that social media’s mediations can be separated only 
analytically while in practice a host of factors go into making online na-
tion talk.
Social Media Nationalism
In his well- known thesis on imagined communities, Benedict Anderson 
(1991) posits a distinct sociality emerging from the mass ceremony of 
reading newspapers. There are several well- accepted critiques of Ander-
son’s Euro- centric assumptions of linguistic standardization, homogenous 
empty time, and the “unbound seriality” of the nationalist imagination ide-
alized as the ethical universal. But what is significant, at least in the limited 
sense of the technological mediation of print, is the idea of simultaneity 
and a cognitive capacity to imagine others even though physically distant, 
through the ritual of reading that unfolds in “silent privacy” or “the lair of 
skull,” as Anderson describes it (35). How does this compare with social 
media, after we accept, contra Anderson and following Partha Chatterjee 
(1999) that the nation as a conflictual political community moves in het-
erogeneous time- space?
Gerald Kane and colleagues (2014) describe four constitutive features 
of the users of social media: (1) users have a unique user profile that is con-
structed by the user, by members of their network, and by the platform; 
(2) access digital content through, and protect it from, various search mecha-
nisms provided by the platform; (3) can articulate a list of other users with 
whom they share a relational connection; and (4) view and traverse their 
connections and those made by others on the platforms. Manuel Castells 
(2009) and Christian Fuchs (2016) emphasize “permanent input and activ-
ity” as the specific features of web 2.0 shaped by the market imperatives of 
data analytics. The “upload of user- generated content and permanent com-
municative flows” (Fuchs 2016, 138– 39) underlie “self- work” in the mass 
self- communication models of social media. I suggest that these features of 
traversing and articulating a list of concrete users— even when they have 
pseudonyms— as well as the market inflected generation of continuous user 
data in terse prose cocreate peer- to- peer verbal confrontations as a consti-
tutive aspect of online nation- talk. In the hashtag pool, tweets illustrate 
the cultures of word play, irreverence, satire, and verbal clashes among us-
ers. And, therefore, distinct from the cognitive and temporal mediation 
of print, social media shape the conditions for the utopia of nationalism 
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through discursive, seemingly voluntary, continuous, confrontational, and 
peer- to- peer networks in quasi- public forms. I have argued elsewhere that 
this should be analyzed in terms of “fun as a meta practice” (Udupa, “Na-
tionalism,” forthcoming) that brings “hot nationalism”— “a psychology 
of extraordinary emotions” (Mihelj 2011) and the banality of repetition, 
habit, staging, and signaling (Billig 1995) into a co- constitutive relation 
on digital media. Online nation- talk composes the daily materialities of 
nationalism (Postill 2006) beyond the state apparatus and political craft, yet 
it is encouraged and solicited by these structures in a market- augmented 
culture of “self- work” in new media.
If technological mediation calibrates group power via communities of 
practice, the growing acrimonious debates between “liberals” and “Hindu 
nationalists” point to the layered nature of online political media in India, 
signaling that the “high political debates” concerning nation and national-
ism are increasingly negotiated by the online work of middle class sector 
with access to social media. Online political media revives and reproduces 
the historical legacy of the middle class as the nationalist vanguard (Fer-
nandes 2000), aligning the debates along the fragile divide between liberals 
and religious nationalists who together advance a rambunctious discourse 
of hypernationalism. Contradictory and contentious as it may be, online 
nation- talk provides an important condition for exclusivist nationalism to 
coagulate around it.
Notes
 1. An extended argument on the production of interactivity in print news me-
dia in post reforms India is available in Udupa 2015.
 2. http://www.huffingtonpost.in, accessed November 21, 2016.
 3. http://www.huffingtonpost.in, accessed November 21, 2016.
 4. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/interviews/india-became-
our-number-one-market-in-daily-users-twitters-new-india-director-taranjeet-
singh/articleshow/58601906.cms, accessed May 1, 2018,
 5. The perception, however, changed in other cities like Bangalore where 
Facebook’s more regional language friendly usage worked well for regional com-
mentaries on politics.
 6. The link between celebrity saviors of New India and personalization of news 
in the media industry is significant in creating the ambient culture of celebrity sav-
iors of New India (Udupa 2015).
 7. http://www.telegraphindia.com, accessed May 20, 2015.
 8. https://tags.hawksey.info. Tweets that were posted prior to the data collec-
tion period are out of this sample. All the Twitter handles are removed to protect 
anonymity, except the handles of mainstream media.
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 9. “Sanghis” refer to the volunteers of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the fore-
most right- wing Hindu nationalist organization in India.
 10. Tweets are retained in their original style and grammar to stay close to the 
colloquial argumentative styles and casual disregard for grammatical rules in online 
debates.
 11. Tweets are retained in their original style and grammar to stay close to the 
colloquial argumentative styles and casual disregard for grammatical rules in online 
debates.
 12. http://zeenews.india.com, accessed May 27, 2015.
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New Media and Performances of Pakistani Identity 
from Party Videos to Cable News
Mobina Hashmi
Two stories from Pakistan dominated my Twitter feed in early 2017. Sev-
eral prominent bloggers and activists from Islamabad and Lahore went 
missing, presumably abducted.1 The uncertainty around their absence 
created an opportunity for another iteration of critique of the Pakistani 
political and military classes’ ongoing intimidation of journalists and ac-
tivists and debate over the possibility of an independent public sphere.2 
The other story was that of Tayyaba, a 10- year- old girl who was repeatedly 
severely physically abused by her middle- class professional “employers.”3 
This story developed on social media when pictures of the child’s badly 
bruised face circulated along with the fact that her employer was actually a 
district judge. As interest built, the police were forced to investigate, and a 
case was opened against her abusers.
These two stories together illustrate parallel concerns about the nature 
and scope of media publics in Pakistan today. The story of the abducted 
bloggers was inserted into public discourse as the latest skirmish in the 
struggle to establish independent institutions that can hold the state ac-
countable for its actions. Tayyaba’s story, on the other hand, feeds an ap-
petite for scandal, but it also shows how the boundary between domestic 
private spaces and media publics is porous in a way that historically has 
not been the case. Domestic workers from rural or poor urban families are 
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intimate witnesses to the private lives of urban middle- class and elite fami-
lies. These private lives had been protected by class privilege from public 
scrutiny, but the growth of new media publics— on news and talk channels 
as well as on digital media— have created spaces where aspects of these 
private lives are made selectively available for broader audiences. That is, 
the domestic private is quite literally made public, made visible, and thus 
available for scrutiny.
The emergence of these new publics brings with it new norms for pub-
lic performances of Pakistani identity, norms that combine elements of pri-
vate conversation and interaction with already established rules for public 
behavior. Unlike the state- centric productions of Pakistani identity that 
dominated electronic media for almost the first 50 years of the nation’s 
existence, the last 10 to 15 years have seen the emergence of the varied and 
conflicted media publics that we see today in dozens of television channels, 
radio stations, and of course, digital media. These media publics express a 
range of interests, logics, and practices such as journalistic identities, social 
codes of interactions, visual codes for set design and live coverage, and 
developmental discourses.
In this chapter, I focus on social codes of interaction to trace how pri-
vate conversational norms are remediated in a range of media publics on 
YouTube, ranging from news outlets to informal and amateur videos of 
weddings, dance parties, and encounters with sex workers. These online 
spaces publicize more informal and intimate spaces of conversation, con-
testation, opinion, and socializing, and are a fascinating space of perfor-
mance of Pakistani identity. The desires, anxieties and frustrations, and hu-
mor on display here give us a window into a Pakistan that is, I would argue, 
closer to the one that many of us live than the one we see performed and 
produced on more official channels.
I call these spaces the “private publics” of digital life in Pakistan in 
order to bring out the texture of online interactions that easily slide 
from sociability to hostility and back again. In contrast with the at-
tempts to impose order, security, and civility in official media publics, 
these overlooked private publics reveal the untidy experiences of na-
tional attachment. Recent scholarship on media publics departs from 
the Habermasian investment in rational civic discourse and instead ex-
plores the practices, affects, and attachments at play in digital publics. I 
build on this scholarship to suggest that Pakistani identity is one of sev-
eral rhetorical devices used in “acts of citizenship” rather than a steady 
attachment.4
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Official Digital Publics: State and Activist Calls  
for Censorship and Regulation
Pakistan’s digital cultures register on the international news radar largely 
in relation to censorship. For example, the government’s 2012 ban on You-
Tube following the distribution of the film Innocence of the Muslims (2012) 
on that platform was widely reported.5 Pakistan Electronic Media Regu-
latory Authority, the main regulatory body for television, and the Paki-
stan Telecommunication Authority, which regulates the Internet, are both 
charged with censoring content in the name of national security and pro-
tecting Islamic values.6 A number of activist groups challenge this frame 
for regulation of digital spaces. Bytes For All, which advocates for trans-
parency, freedom of expression, and action against cyber harassment and 
bullying, was one of the main groups that objected to the Prevention of 
Electronic Crimes Ordinance, enacted in August 2016. The ordinance was 
supposed to deter hate speech and harassment, but contained sweeping 
language that could be used to suppress critique as well.7 The tension be-
tween media activist groups and the state over the line between protec-
tion and censorship is evident in the small, but growing, research corpus 
on hate speech, harassment, and censorship that is gradually taking shape. 
Largely consisting of reports from domestic and foreign NGOs, this body 
of research focuses on the online harassment of women as well as on in-
stances of physical violence against women in retaliation for their use of 
digital media.8
Much of the discourse on public/private distinctions centers on the 
movement of women across boundaries that are themselves mobile and 
mediated by class, region, and religiosity.9 Thus, it is no surprise that some 
of the most visible contestations over older and newer conceptions of mo-
dernity take place in relation to women’s bodies and public appearance. For 
example, Girls at Dhabas, which started around 2015, is a movement of 
mostly elite women who unapologetically enter traditionally male spaces 
such as dhabas (roadside teashops) and public parks or organize group bike 
rides on public roads as a way of protesting the harassment of women.10 
While Girls at Dhabas has received extensive news coverage in the Eng-
lish press, rural and working- class urban women who navigate male public 
spaces on a daily basis remain deeply vulnerable. They make the news only 
in the context of violence, as in the case of Tayyaba or that of four women 
killed in a village in northern Pakistan because a video of them enjoying 
themselves at a wedding was circulated on social media.11
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In contrast to the official discourse on modesty, surveillance, and pri-
vacy, Pakistani YouTube videos reveal a messier reality. For example, a 
poor- quality undercover style video of a roadside pickup spot for sex work-
ers in Karachi had almost 220,000 views as of mid- 2018.12 All we see is 
the occasional conversation between burqa- clad women and the driver of 
a car, motorbike, or rickshaw that ends when one of the women walks off 
the screen. The comments are almost all in Urdu in either naksh script or 
transliterated into Latin script, and are light- hearted in tone. One person 
wrote, “Yar me yahan ata hun to mujhy to milti he nahi hai han 1 mili the par wo 
bekar the. Usny kaha. K baki achi achi gai v hai. Biking par.” (Man, I never find 
any when I come here. I did find one a week ago but she was useless. She 
said all the good ones have gone biking.) Another offered the tip, “Tariq 
road ka mqrkit mein achi wali hain.” (Tariq Road market has the better ones.) 
The joking, informal tone of these comments is typical of the mode of talk 
in the thousands of comments on other similar YouTube videos. Such talk 
is expressive of modes of public life in Pakistan that display little concern 
for religious morality, social welfare, or any of the other concerns we see in 
state or NGO discourses on the Internet.
Theorizing Pakistani Digital Media Publics
By now, scholarship on digital publics has moved well beyond the ana-
lytic constraints of public sphere theory developed for a different medium 
and context to research the nature of conversation and interaction in these 
digital publics; the dynamics of their formation and persistence; and, the 
potential of these spaces to nurture, direct, intensify, or practice political 
affinities, affects, and actions. For example, Mimi Sheller and John Urry’s 
call for a “sociology of mobilities” that asks us to recognize “relationships 
that involve the complex and fluid hybridizing of public- and- private life” 
is much better for understanding Pakistani identity than any attempt to 
neatly contain politics and dynamics of citizenship within distinct “public” 
and “private” spheres of action and thought— even if only as analytic con-
structs.13 Not only has the state variously been in the hands of the military, 
the industrial elite, and the landowning elite, these sectors are often united 
by kinship and business ties. The interlocking military- feudal- industrial- 
bureaucratic alliances in Pakistan are crafted, cemented, and negotiated 
in ways that cut across governmental, public, private business, and familial 
interests. The state, civil society, and the media, in their institutions and 
practices, are best understood as the sedimentation of these relationships.14 
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Thus, only an understanding of the social that recognizes mobility and flu-
idity can accommodate publics constituted by the crisscrossing movement 
of media, bodies, actions, and affects evident in either the case of the young 
women who were killed because a video of them at a wedding was leaked, 
or in the mediated construction of Girls at Dhabas as the feminist face of 
Pakistan. These multilayered entanglements also shape the formal struc-
tures of media publics in Pakistan. The performance of Pakistani identity 
we see in talk shows, television dramas, news programs, and so forth is 
also, I argue, shaped by the remediation of private norms of gendered and 
classed behavior.
In addition to challenging the spatial segregation of public and private, 
digital media publics also require a reconsideration of the modes and norms 
of reasoned public conversation. Instead of assuming rational debate as the 
only legitimate form of public talk, it is necessary to recognize the different 
modes of conversation, interaction, and, simply, presence in digital publics 
such as those of YouTube. As Zizi Papacharissi notes in her work on af-
fective publics, democratic participation needs to be civil, but need not be 
polite: “The distinction drawn defines politeness as etiquette- related, and 
civility as respect for the collective traditions of democracy.”15 While this 
does open up room for taking trolling and other forms of online vitriol as 
part of political speech rather than disruptive noise, Papacharissi remains 
interested in assessing these spaces for their political potential.16 Liesbet 
Van Zoonen, Farida Vis, and Sabina Mihelj offer a useful corrective to this 
approach in their analysis of responses to an anti- Islam video. Focusing on 
the multiplication of viewpoints in relation to the video’s original provoca-
tion rather than on dialogue and close networks of interaction, they argue 
for YouTube as a digital public in which new “acts and practices of (un-
located) citizenship” emerge.17 These scholars open up room to consider 
sentiments such as anger, provocation, satire, or amusement as legitimate 
political affects. They show how the political dimension of digital publics 
can include discrete performances or acts of citizenship rather than the 
expressions of citizen selves. Finally, I draw on Aswin Punathambekar who 
brings out the temporal dimension of media publics when he asks:
Instead of arguing endlessly about whether popular culture can 
serve as a staging ground or a terrain for learning and practicing 
skills that can then, in some stagist fashion, be applied in the realm 
of formal politics, another way to think about “entertaining politics” 
is to ask, “How do people entertain political matters?” To pose the 
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question this way is to wonder how talk about political matters gets 
woven into the rhythms of everyday mediatized lives.18
Tehzeeb, Ikhlaaq, and Takalluf: Norms of Civility  
on Pakistani Television
News and public affairs programming as well as television drama are, 
I argue, structured by shared understanding of the etiquette of public 
conversation. In this section, I outline the two discourses on the norms 
of public conversation that have shaped Pakistani television. The first 
is Ganga- Jamani tehzeeb (north Indian, Muslim, Urdu- speaking elite 
culture) with its elaborate norms of takalluf (deference, politeness) and 
ikhlaq (manners, morals), and the second is that of the journalistic con-
ventions of the 24- hour news channel that have supplanted these norms 
in the multichannel era.
The hegemony of elite north Indian Urdu culture had always been 
challenged in Pakistan by regional cultures, notably by a very popular vi-
sion of rural Punjabi culture articulated in a series of films in the late 1970s 
and 1980s. These films featured the character Maula Jatt who “marked 
the emergence of a new type of a hero, one who was rural, loud, hyper- 
masculine, unabashedly violent, fluent in colloquial Punjabi, and had very 
little to do with the nation or state.”19 Further, this character marked the 
popularity of new filmic conventions that, instead of prioritizing socially 
conscious stories, celebrated “vulgar comedy, ‘dirty’ dancing and charis-
matic Punjabi villainy.”20
PTV’s (Pakistan Television) hour- long Urdu dramas, drawing on a tra-
dition of zannana literature and often written by leading Urdu playwrights, 
continued to use the Urdu- speaking elites’ norms of tehzeeb (culture) to 
frame their depictions of domestic spaces and lives and their intersections 
with public life well into the 1990s.21 Eventually, intrusions from outside 
the hegemonic national space forced a change. Satellite television and vid-
eocassette tapes introduced Pakistanis to foreign media in the 1980s, and 
the penetration of these media accelerated in the 1990s.
Some of the old norms persisted in the news publics crafted by privately 
owned channels like Geo News and Aaj TV in the early 2000s in the use 
of what I call “uncle talk.” This masculine version of women’s talk relies on 
the comfort of familiar norms and spaces. In particular, it reproduces the 
conversational norms of elite drawing rooms and semiprivate spaces where 
men who hold positions of public importance meet in private (social or 
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familial) contexts and hold forth on issues of public import. It is marked by 
elaborate codes of politeness and verbal markers of deference to those of 
higher status. Despite the growth of regional language channels, increased 
class diversity in on- air reporters and on talk shows, and freedom from 
direct state supervision, these new publics still largely reproduce the con-
versational norms of elite Urdu- speaking culture, especially in the use of 
linguistic markers of respect for status.22
However, public figures and politicians have developed a greater reper-
toire of performance styles that blend private conversational modes, uncle 
talk, and formal address and allow a more confrontational attitude. For 
example, in 2016, during a session of the National Assembly, Khwaja Aziz, 
the defence minister, admonished Shireen Mazari, a leading opposition 
politician, to “make her voice more feminine.” An unidentified govern-
ment backbencher chimed in, saying “Keep quiet, aunty!,” illustrating how 
social norms of politeness and respect are used even as the speaker is tell-
ing Mazari that she belongs in a different— private— space. Mazari’s party’s 
spokesman responded that “Khawaja Asif should be hung upside down for 
his vulgarity and misbehavior, and should be beaten with a shoe 25 times 
in the morning and 25 times in the evening.” Mazari herself also drew on 
familial, even feudal, norms by calling Asif “besharam and behaya” (lacking 
in shame or a sense of propriety) in a tweet.23
A more promising trend for challenging elite hegemony over televi-
sual norms comes from the introduction of elements from the repertoire 
of 24- hour news channels around the world. Live reporting on location, 
person- on- the- street interviews, investigative journalism, and reality pro-
grams introduced a range of voices and locations not seen before on televi-
sion. As television journalists sought to define their professional identities 
in relation to international norms of objectivity and reasoned debate, they 
began to distance themselves from the modes of “uncle talk.” In its place, 
we now see the emergence of a more confrontational style that articulates 
elements of elite Urdu- speaking tehzeeb with vernacular performance styles 
and global norms.
For example, Sar e Aam, a popular weekend television program on ARY 
News, takes a sensationalist approach to investigative reporting. The name 
of the program means “in public” or “something done openly in public.” 
Each episode is structured as an exposé of a social issue or problem that 
has traditionally been kept private and unseen. In an episode from 2017, 
shot entirely on location, the host Iqrar- ul- Hassan invites viewers to ac-
company him into a beauty parlor, a back alley in a poor neighborhood, 
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and a “respectable” private residence to see the realities of prostitution in 
Karachi.24 We hear Hassan negotiate a meeting and rates with the woman 
who runs a sex work business from a beauty parlor. More disturbingly, we 
see the visible and sustained distress of the women when Hassan and his 
camera crew burst into their space. Under loud, dramatic music, we can 
hear women crying as they cower on the floor and even grab Hassan’s feet, 
begging him to stop. One woman implores Hassan to stop, saying that her 
husband will kill her, but he continues to demand the women uncover their 
faces and talk with him. The only concession he makes is to, impatiently, 
assure them that their faces will be blurred on television. However, his con-
frontational manner alters radically when he meets with a sex worker who 
has a more exclusive clientele. This woman, who is presented as young, 
educated, and middle class, is treated with compassion and Hassan’s tone is 
polite and even mildly flirtatious. The episode ends in her bedroom with 
Hassan addressing the viewers asking them to make the changes in social 
norms needed to end this kind of exploitative sex work.
On the show’s YouTube channel, this episode has over 1.5 million views 
and over 1,100 comments as of May 2018. Many of the commenters chide 
Hassan for his rough behavior: “Iqrar Bhai I respect you and ur programe. 
If u can do programe then do on Poverty which is the main root of 80 
% problemes. Why u are teasing these innocent women.” Another person 
asked “why don’t you raid in five star hotels,” and yet another noted “All 
faces are visible enough. Not sure what they are blurring.” Other com-
menters, though, were simply fans: “Bhai iqrar I am big fan of you.  .  .  . 
please I want meet you” and “I just love ur shoe u and ur show amazing, 
fabulous, brilliant, fantastic e.g u have a great sene of humour.” Yet others 
expressed disapproval in religious terms, but the overall tone of the com-
ments was one of distressed compassion: “Think some things are better not 
to be revealed or exposed so he should have just stayed away from exposing 
brothels; no point in making these poor women feel even more embar-
rassed about their lives. . . .”
The negotiations between religious beliefs, gendered ideologies about 
protecting women, class critiques, fandom, and disapproval of the host’s 
techniques showcase the range of ways in which ordinary Pakistanis think 
and talk about uncomfortable issues. There is nothing remarkable about 
these responses except for their utterance in a shared public space. Like 
the talk shows on Geo News, family dramas on PTV, or politicians’ tweet 
wars, Sar e Aam and the comments it elicited on YouTube remediates pri-
vate norms in different ways for different audiences. In the collective, read 
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as acts of citizenship, these comments show a more nuanced version of 
private and public life in Pakistan than that revealed, for example, by the 
government’s attempts to create a sanitized Internet.
Bickering between politicians, long- standing skepticism toward state 
media, and newer disillusionment with the urban and sensationalist bias 
of commercial media has contributed to the growing importance of social 
media such as Twitter and Facebook as important sources of breaking sto-
ries, leaks, comments by politicians, and so forth. For example, the efforts 
undertaken by cricketer- turned- politician Imran Khan, who became Prime 
Minister in 2018, to mobilize public support are reported and debated in 
social media platforms such as Twitter as much as they are in news channels 
or newspapers. The dynamics of the digital publics that take shape around 
formal politics is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is a necessary 
complement to the analysis offered here.
The Private Publics of Digital Pakistan on YouTube
I stumbled upon the vast and varied world of Pakistani party, dance, and 
“sexy” videos while doing research for another project and was imme-
diately fascinated. Following a trail of links, starting with documentary 
videos exploring Pakistan through either the eyes of either a white or 
Pakistani- British traveler, it took only a few clicks to reach a different set 
of “documentary” videos. Unlike diasporic narratives of return and dis-
covery25 that reproduce the aesthetics of documentary video, these party 
and “sexy” videos display all the signifiers of unauthorized, amateur videos 
captured on a camera phone: poor lighting and focus, uneven sound levels, 
jerky camera movements, and hastily composed framing. They are mostly 
uploaded to YouTube by ordinary users, but also by aggregator channels 
that specialize in subgenres such as mujras (erotic dances by women or hi-
jras performed almost exclusively for all- male groups at parties, weddings, 
and so on), party videos, videos of college girls, and so forth. The videos 
that meet the criteria of a “private public” can be grouped into five catego-
ries by subject matter:
• private videos of dance recitals or performances by school or college 
girls that have circulated beyond their intended context;26
• illicit recordings of mujras;
• recordings of video sex chats or sexual encounters that are almost 
certainly circulated without consent;
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• amateur videos of “underground” dance parties in elite homes or 
clubs;
• news or documentary clips that have been recoded for sexual content.
The descriptions for many of these videos explicitly state the desire to 
make private spaces available in public. When directed toward elites— coed 
groups or women— this impulse undermines the privilege that have kept 
elites protected from public scrutiny. In other instances, such as videos of 
private dances for all- male crowds, the videos reinscribe gendered hierar-
chies by inviting a shared voyeurism. The comment spaces are overwhelm-
ingly male— judging by names and the language in the comments that use 
a mixture of everyday Urdu, English, regional languages, and, sometimes, 
Hindi. Urdu comments are sometimes written in naqsh script but are more 
often transliterated in Latin script.
What we see in the unofficial “private publics” of YouTube videos is a 
significantly different vision of Pakistan. The topics are actually quite simi-
lar to those discussed in more official spaces: the use of women’s bodies to 
draw national, ethnic, religious, and class boundaries; the airing of ethnic or 
national rivalries and resentments; debates over women’s rights couched in 
the opposition between Islamic values and Western modernity, and so forth. 
The difference lies in tone and in the presence of two other categories of 
comments: critiques of the aesthetic and technical quality of the video and 
brief, strangely poignant requests for contact with the subjects of the video 
(e.g., simply “plz numbe”). The comments I analyze below were in response 
to three YouTube videos: a private mujra,27 an amateur documentary about 
an underground nightclub in Karachi,28 and a video of a young woman 
practicing a dance in a classroom at the University of Lahore.29
I argue that the version of Pakistan expressed here is characterized by 
fragmented attachments, local desires and concerns, lazy provocation, and 
casual sociability and not the desire for legitimacy, civility, or accountabil-
ity expressed in official discourses— statist or activist. For example, people 
looking for evidence of political activity might find it difficult to know 
what to make of the following exchange on a video of dance practice at the 
University of Lahore:
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These comments are performative acts of citizenship with such diffuse mo-
tivations and ambitions that to look for any kind of indication of potential 
for political affiliation let alone action seems perverse. Nonetheless, I argue 
that the utterances and interactions in these spaces tell us as much about 
what it means to be Pakistani as any official discourse. More so, they help 
us understand the everyday experience of living citizenship as one form of 
attachment among many.
Even though most comments focused on drawing national, ethnic, re-
ligious, and class boundaries, often using the videos either as examples of 
“Western” or Indian contamination of a Muslim society or as illustrations 
of progress toward social tolerance, the tone was rarely serious or coher-
ent. The pair of comments on the nightclub video below are, respectively, 
stream of consciousness and ritual condemnation:
i dont see whats so disgusting about this i think Pakistan should 
tone it down a bit. remove currupt asshole . . . i mean government 
officials. like come on . . . youth culture will always thrive this isnt a 
scandal its a revolution LONG LIVE FREEDOM (qaesar09)
lanat ho kutay ki naslon yahan janay walon par bc apna deen imaan bhool 
kar apnay bappoon ko follow kar rhay ho Doob maro Allah karay ya tm 
logo k liay sharam ki bat honi chyan haram khooron Allah karay asa azaab 
nazill ho jis s tum logon k hosh thikhanay ajain!:@ (“curses on the de-
scendants of dogs who go [to] these clubs because they have forgot-
ten their faith and follow their fathers. You should drown of shame. 
This should be a source of shame for you bastards. May God punish 
you in such a way that it brings you back to your senses!”) (some-
one501)
An equal number of commenters mocked the young people shown in the 
video as “wannabees.” Yet others asked for the location of the club, “any-
one who knows the location of this place should post it immeidiately . . . It 
looks fab for couples . . . I would be a regular goes so anyone who knows 
about the location. . . . Please do post . . . thanks.” Another strand of com-
ments was more reflective, wondering, “[h]aving night clubs is not a big 
deal but the thing is that what we gonna do with our life, imitating west 
by doing all wrong things that never ever being considered good even in 
noble western families.”
While the comments on the nightclub focused on anxieties about au-
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thenticity, the comments on the dance practice at the University of Lahore 
were split between ethnic insults targeting Punjabis (Lahore is the largest 
city in Punjab) and contesting the location of the performance by decod-
ing the accents and the furniture in the room. One person declared, “its 
fake video. I am study in university of Lahore and we not have that kind of 
class. . . .” Several others claimed the young women could not be Pakistani 
because of their accents:
@tamsadeas this is either in america or britain, listen to their accent 
at the start you idiot.
WTF. . . . do u really think this fuckin accent can be from any pub-
jabi girl. . . . fuck u uploader!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
A small group of people voiced the same concerns about violating the 
young women’s privacy as did commenters on the Sar e Aami episode. For 
example, one person both countered criticism from others and critiqued 
the uploader: “man come on ease up its just a dance for fun and sum stupid 
fck uploaded it. dont get angry pakistani brothers girls these days r chan-
gin.” Some of the angriest and most violent comments were on the video of 
the mujra. For example, one person left two comments: “Punjabi girls are 
all cheaters. Never marry them” and “these bitches are on the increase . . . 
FUCK YOU BITCHES!” On the other side of the affective and politi-
cal spectrum was this dispassionate observation on an older version of the 
nightclub video, “Bad upload. No sound after about 3 minutes.”
In lieu of a conclusion, I’ll end with a sequence of comments on the 
University of Lahore video that illustrates the range of emotions, opinions, 
desires, and provocations that are, I argue, typical of the comments on this 
genre of video:
punjabi Randi. . . . (gulfam khan)
Once in Pakistani universities and other educationak institutes stu-
dents were practicing for educational debates and other develop-
mental activities. . . . May ALLAH protects us (Syed Akhtar)
clumsy steps (Abhi Jeet)
She can come over to India and have a peaceful life away from Tali-
bans. (LoveALL)
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She needs more practice. (slickr48)
i want to marry that girl so i get her to dance for me every night for 
free lol (Sajid Ali)
What should we make of lazy insult, despair over decline, deliberate nee-
dling, aesthetic critique, and (ironic?) patriarchal humor in close textual 
(but not necessarily spatial or temporal) proximity? Artists, social com-
mentators, and scholars have long lamented the underimagined nature of 
Pakistan. Filmmaker Sabiha Sumar says in relation to a lack of a “tradition 
of filmmaking” in Pakistan that it cannot develop “unless we can ask, what 
is Pakistan about, what is our vision, what is our self- image; unless Pakistan 
can define its dreams; unless Pakistan can define this very clearly and bring 
on board the majority of this country to agree to that vision— that dream, 
that self- image— we cannot create anything successfully. We do not have a 
nation.”30 In the face of such longing for identity, it is tempting to resolve 
the messiness of these digital private publics into neat social and political 
positions. But it might be more productive to instead spend some time in 
these spaces and, as Aswin Punathambekar suggests, entertain the politi-
cal, “to give attention to, carefully consider, contemplate, think about, give 
thought to, support, and at times, tolerate an idea, a suggestion, and, of 
course, feelings (the affective dimensions of the political).”31 In the process, 
we might discover a way of being that comes closer to the experiences of 
citizenship, belonging, and disaffection in Pakistani digital publics.
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The Man on the Moon
A Semiotic Analysis of Scopic Regimes in Bangladesh
Muhammad Nabil Zuberi
On March 3, 2013, a large number of people in Bangladesh claimed to 
see the face of Allama Delwar Hossain Sayeedi on the moon.1 Sayeedi, a 
popular and charismatic Islamic orator and vice- president of the largest 
Islamic political party in Bangladesh, Jamaat- e- Islami, was sentenced to 
death by the government on February 28, 2013 for war crimes commit-
ted during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. As the sun went down 
the next day, an image of Sayeedi’s face on the moon began to circulate 
on Facebook with a caption claiming it as divine proof of his innocence. 
While the majority of the urban educated population was busy mocking 
the “absurdity” of the image, it continued to be shared through texting to 
those without Internet access, and through loudspeakers in mosques and 
word of mouth to those without a cell phone. Finally, that “manipulated” 
image became “real” when, after the Morning Prayer on March 3, scores 
of people throughout the country managed to see Sayeedi on the moon 
with their naked eyes. Apparently assuming it was a Karāmāh2 or an omen 
indexing his innocence, they took to the streets protesting the verdict. By 
the end of the day, 67 people were dead, making it “the worst day of politi-
cal violence in Bangladesh in decades” (Ethirajan 2013).
Nothing could have prepared the sector of the urban middle class for 
the shock they received from the unexpected and inexplicable rage and 
violence that the images and the sighting generated. The same was true for 
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people who believed in the images and the sighting, as they were equally 
appalled by suggestions that all these divine signs were part of an elaborate 
Jamaat- e- Islami scheme to deceive them. The image, therefore, squarely 
divided the public into two groups: some could not comprehend how such a 
charade cannot but be retorted to with sarcasm and contempt, while others 
could not fathom how such divine signs can be responded to with anything 
other than devotion. The actual sighting of Sayeedi on the moon further 
removed these “realities” from each other. For people on one extreme, the 
entire atmosphere in which the sighting occurred was imbued with signs of 
divine intervention. For people at the other end, nothing could have been 
more bizarre, more antithetical to their sense of reality. All they saw in the 
entire ploy— accomplished through this- worldly acts of manipulation of 
images and rumors— was treachery and deviousness of mortals.
How did a population with a common language, history, and religion 
manage to see and experience such contrasting phenomena? What made 
the “manipulation” behind the image visible to some, and Sayeedi’s face 
on the moon visible to others? How did these different appearances come 
about and acquire such contrasting meanings and political weight that an 
absurd matter to some became so significant to others that they were pre-
pared to sacrifice their lives? In this chapter, I argue that these distinct 
visual experiences expose the contested nature of a seemingly homogenous 
“Bangladeshi” ocular culture, making it possible to discern the presence 
of two conflicting yet intimately related scopic regimes: a disembodied, 
positivist regime versus an embodied, deictic mode of vision (Jay 1999, 3). 
Here, instead of reducing the visual either to the effects of an universal, 
innate faculty or to manifestations of fixed, isolated, homogenous cultures, 
I locate its political significance in the interlocked histories of technologies 
and ideologies that constantly destabilize the boundaries of what can be 
shown and seen, opening them up for manipulation (Jay 2002, 275; Pin-
ney 2004, 8). In other words, I argue that the power to define visual and 
political possibilities operates not just through these preexisting scopic 
regimes, but through the workings of distinct semiotic ideologies on con-
stantly mutating technologies of vision that reshape those regimes (Keane 
2003, 419). This chapter, therefore, along with developing a critique of the 
positivist model of visuality dominant in Bangladesh, attempts to chart the 
ways distinct semiotic ideologies of efficacy and indexicality opened up the 
“manipulated” images and sightings of Sayeedi to different interpretations 
and political actions.
Moreover, I also argue that while these scopic regimes played a signifi-
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cant role in creating these distinct visual experiences, in the South Asian 
context these regimes do not constitute “incommensurable” or “unbridge-
able” ocular fields (Jay 2002, 268). In other words, at least in this post-
colonial setting, neither of these regimes completely rejects or replaces 
the other. Rather, their relationship is marked by a complex coexistence 
where they simultaneously resist and reproduce each other. In this chapter, 
I therefore illustrate how in staying true to the “polyscopic” and “interocu-
lar” nature of South Asian visuality, these ways of seeing not just coexisted, 
but merged with each other in producing different readings of Sayeedi’s 
images and sightings.
Seeing with/out the Body: Syncretism  
in South Asian Visualities
A productive ground to start this inquiry comes from a range of interdis-
ciplinary works that examine diverging modalities of vision in the South 
Asian postcolonial context and their relation to Western modernity (Da-
vis 1999; Freitag 2007; Jain 2007; Pinney 2004). While being cautious in 
not reifying South Asian visualities, these studies elucidate the presence of 
two different scopic regimes: a decarnalized, disengaged mode associated 
with the Cartesian tradition and inculcated mostly during colonial periods, 
against an embodied, deictic mode of vision, with a deeper history dating 
back at least to precolonial times (Jay 1999, 3; Nandy 1995, 21; Pinney 
2002, 356). Corresponding to Norman Bryson’s distinction between gaze 
and glance,3 the crucial difference between these two is that the former 
reduces vision to a static point, fetishizing the image through conflating it 
with objective reality, whereas the latter requires a carnal body, conscious 
of the viewing process and the representational status of the image being 
viewed (Bal 1991, 142; Bryson 1986, 95; Jay 1999, 7).
In the South Asian context, two key examples of such an embodied 
mode of viewing are darshan (Eck 1998) and nazar (Bhatti 2012), where 
the viewing process is conscious and corporeal, not needing the viewer to 
privilege vision over other senses, or to assume the existence of the viewed 
object independent from the viewing process. In darshan, the key is the 
intersubjective relation between the subject of the image and the viewer, 
which gets established through the reciprocation of gaze (Gell 1998, 117). 
Similarly, nazar denotes the potency of a fixated, penetrating gaze that 
mixed with the affective force of love or envy can affect the object or the 
person viewed, either through transference of bad luck or through signi-
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fying intimate physical interaction (Bhatti and Pinney 2011, 228; Taylor 
2002, 297). Both darshan and nazar therefore require the active and em-
bodied engagement of the viewer through the habituated use of senses, 
emotions, and imagination.
A corollary to understanding South Asian visualities as embodied is that 
instead of aesthetic and semiotic aspects of images or how they “look,” 
their efficacy or what they “do” for their viewers becomes important (Pin-
ney 2004, 8). Critiquing Kantian approaches to aesthetics that depend on 
objective evaluation of the image by separating it from the viewer, Pinney 
proposes the concept of “corpothetics” to understand the corporeal aes-
thetics that unites the image and the viewer through mobilizing a certain 
poetics of the body in order to make the images efficacious, that is, to ac-
cess their power to intervene in this- worldly affairs (Pinney 2004, 190).4 
Kajri Jain (2007, 12– 13) also critiques the positivist tradition for privileg-
ing the authority of the visual and argues for incorporating the efficacy 
of images in an account. Jain terms this approach to images as forensic- 
juridical, as instead of analyzing images as circulating objects, it primarily 
engages and values the semiotic and ethical status of the images as evidence 
(true/false, real/fake),5 focusing on the representational capacities inherent 
in the images to be understood solely through visual engagement. Jain’s 
work, on the other hand, puts forward other “vernacular” modes of valuing 
and engaging with images that depend on the power of faith and the ability 
of images to be efficacious.
Along with charting the presence of these modes, these studies put for-
ward two characterizations of the complex and intimate ways South Asian 
visualities cohabit in the postcolonial space. First is the polyscopic nature 
of South Asian visual experiences, where instead of the dominance of one 
visual order, multiple visualities operate in eccentric yet complementary 
ways (Jay 1994, 592). The second characteristic of South Asian visualities, 
conceptualized by Appadurai and Breckenridge (1992, 52) as “interocular-
ity,” points to the fluidity of visual fields, where meanings, scripts, and sym-
bols from one visual field cycle ceaselessly into other fields. Thus, while 
darshan has been viewed as an archetypal “Hindu” mode of vision, the idea 
of mutuality of sensual engagements at its heart transcends Hinduism, 
spilling into the everyday practices of visiting holy persons, political fig-
ures, or viewing cinema (Freitag 2007, 307). Similarly, nazar, with its roots 
in the Persianate religiously devotional poetic tradition, has made its way 
into the mundane and profane life, especially in romantic Urdu and Hindi 
literature and commercial films (Taylor 2002, 302).
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In certain ways, Sayeedi’s images and sightings exemplified these char-
acteristics of South Asian visualities. Different interpretations of Sayeedi’s 
images not only showed the complex interaction between an embodied, 
efficacious regime and a disembodied, positivist one, but they also became 
the sites of fusion of ocular experiences and ideologies, making it difficult 
to box them in dichotomous understanding of visualities (corpothetics/
aesthetics, juridical/vernacular) and corresponding binaries like secular/
Islamic, modern/traditional, urban elites/rural mass (Sinha 2007, 193). For 
example, those who refused to believe in Sayeedi’s image did not always do 
so on the basis of secular positivist logic. Conversely, many tried to present 
scientific explanations of how Sayeedi can be seen on the moon. In other 
words, neither the believers nor the skeptics of Sayeedi’s images and sight-
ings were strongly wedded to any one of these scopic regimes. Rather, in 
drawing their conclusions they subscribed to different semiotic ideologies 
embedded in those regimes on what images, sightings, and realities are, 
how to access them, and how they are related. In the next sections, I turn 
to the workings of these semiotic ideologies in different interpretations of 
Sayeedi’s images and sightings, illustrating how, when confronted with the 
technology of manipulation, different ideologies of the efficacy and indexi-
cality of the images ultimately led to these diverse interpretations.
Image as Evidence: Competing Ideologies  
of Efficacy and Indexicality
While the specific source and time of Sayeedi’s image appearing on the 
Internet is debated, everyone agrees that it became viral after being posted 
on the pro– Jamaat- e- Islami Facebook page called Basherkella,6 which had 
over 100,000 followers at that time. The urban educated class started no-
ticing the image on March 2, most of them mocking the idea of Sayeedi 
being seen on the moon. In rejecting the image, the skeptics drew from two 
sources of authority embedded in two different scopic regimes: the secu-
lar argument that deemed the image as “unscientific” and “irrational” was 
entrenched in a disembodied, positivist mode of seeing, while the Islamic 
argument, with its claim that the image should be denounced as a “bid’ah,”7 
had its roots in an embodied mode of vision. However, in spite of their dif-
ferences, these two modes did not cancel each other out; rather, they inten-
sified each other polyscopically in rejecting the viability of Sayeedi’s image.
Catering to this polyscopic nature, most press reports that came out 
next day were composites of these two arguments. The Daily Star, the most 
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circulated English daily newspaper in Bangladesh, reported how the “ab-
surd,” “bizarre and cheap photo manipulation” drew “condemnation from 
Islamic scholars and ridicule from regular Facebook users”:
Several Islami scholars termed the use of this fake picture “a Jamaat- 
Shibir ploy” to cheat ordinary believers and exploited their religious 
sentiments. According to scholars, such an act is a “great sin.” They 
note that such “sighting” of the moon can never happen in the light 
of the Quran and the Hadith. . . . 
The picture also prompted online bloggers and activists to make 
equally absurd jokes using Sayedee’s pictures. In one, for instance, 
Sayedee was shown as one of the three astronomers to have landed 
on the moon in 1969. In this picture, Neil Armstrong’s face has been 
replaced by Sayedee’s face.8
Clearly, while there was little doubt in both Islamic and secular quarters 
about the “inauthenticity” of the image, their grounds of rejecting it were 
quite different. For the Islamic scholars, the main message was a cautionary 
one about what the image can do. From their perspective, the image was 
efficacious in an adverse way, as its potency comes from its ability to do 
harm to believers. The secular skeptics, on the other hand, were fixated on 
the “look” of the image. However, as the report summed up, these modes 
spoke in each other’s support, and many skeptics refused to believe in the 
image for both reasons, illustrating the polyscopic nature of their vision.
Nevertheless, as the secular skeptics of the image flooded the Inter-
net with numerous absurdly manipulated, satirical images of their own, 
the tone of their primary reaction remained sarcastic. While these mock-
ing images functioned as vehicles of moral criticism (Dadlez 2011), one of 
their key purposes was to establish the secular skeptic claim to intellectual 
superiority. This claim stood on the perceived inability of the masses to 
understand the most rudimentary aspect of the image: that it is a “fake,” 
and therefore has no divine power or evidentiary force. These skeptics, 
therefore, were shocked for a second time upon encountering people who, 
despite knowing all the “facts,” wanted to believe in the image. In the com-
ment section of a Prothom Alo9 report, Aminul Islam recounted his experi-
ence of the night before:
A person from my village woke me up calling in the early morning 
to look at the moon to see Sayeedi. Many people in my village have 
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gathered in the field for this reason. I know that the image they are 
seeing is a fake. If I want, I can photoshop his image on a tiger. I 
tried to make him understand that. But someone already managed 
to see Sayeedi on the moon. “Let me see if I can see him also” were 
his last words before hanging up. He was clearly excited!10
While the skeptics at first were surprised by this inability of the believ-
ers to see the “visible,” soon they identified a specific “way of seeing” as the 
problem. In another comment section, Adil Mahmood wrote:
The believers live in a world where Allahu Akbar can be seen on 
the image of a pregnant cow, trees grow in a design to show Allah’s 
name, angels can be seen on kaba in lailatul qadar . . . how can they 
doubt Sayeedi’s sighting on the moon?11
Soon, the key target of the skeptics became this specific kind of “blind-
ness,” which lacks ability to see cheap manipulation, but sees miracles and 
magic instead. With the moral insight that they are the one with the cure, 
the main aim of their flooding the Internet with images mimicking and 
mocking Sayeedi’s image was to treat that blindness by showing that the 
“original” is a “fake.”
In this regard, their approach to the image is similar to Jain’s explication 
of the forensic- juridical approach as it also engages images based primarily 
on their status as “evidence” or their ability to represent the truth or reality. 
As such, the approach located the authority of the images in their represen-
tational capacities, that is, in the meaning of signifiers to be apprehended 
through visual engagement, without properly addressing the “efficacy of 
images as circulating objects or of viewers as embodied beings” (Jain 2007, 
12). Yet, as Aminul’s comment on the Prothom Alo report illustrated, for the 
Figure 12.1. Image 
mocking Sayeedi’s 
sighting on the moon
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believers the key question was not the truth or falsehood of the image, but 
the ability of the image to intervene in this world and the next. Members 
of Jamaat- e- Islami also stressed the potency of the image, as according to 
newspaper reports that came out next day, they circulated the image with 
a warning that those distrusting the image will commit a sin (Gunaah).12 
People therefore kept sharing the image fearing that, otherwise, grave con-
sequences would be waiting for them both in this life and in life after death.
However, while the efficacy of the image became a key determinant in 
its circulation, it did not end the debate on the status of the image as evi-
dence. Rather, for the majority, the question of efficacy became intimately 
tangled with the truth- value of the image. In this regard, while both parties 
subscribed to the notion of the “truth claim” of images in the sense that 
they are representations of the real,13 each came with a very different idea 
of what it means. The secular skeptics rejected Sayeedi’s image based on a 
particular semiotic ideology14 of photographic indexicality that rendered 
some images as “image juste” or just/correct images at the expense of others. 
This indexicality of photographs results from the conviction that as photo-
graphs are physical impressions on the silver emulsion resulting from the 
unmediated reflection of light from the photographed object, they are free 
from human intervention and produce absolute visual accuracy and truth-
fulness. Thus, the quality of indexicality becomes tied to photography’s 
truth claim, making it key in identifying images that are unjust, artificial, 
and misrepresentations of reality. This ideology of indexicality therefore 
not only provided the standard that Sayeedi’s image failed to meet but it 
also laid bare the “blindness” of those who believed in Sayeedi’s image and 
their inability to understand the indexical nature of a photograph.
However, believers in the image made it clear that their belief came not 
just out of the fear of committing sin, but because they consider the image 
to be true, suggesting that they shared a different idea of how the truth 
claims of images work. The difference between these semiotic ideologies 
becomes clear from the fact that in contrast to the skeptics’ idea of indexi-
cality, which demands a fixed, definitive, universally observable connection 
of the image with reality, the believers circulated multiple and radically 
different images as proof of Sayeedi’s sighting on the moon. The most cir-
culated one simply showed a photograph of Sayeedi’s face on a photograph 
of the moon followed by a caption:
From late Friday night to early Saturday, many people were able to 
see Sayeedi’s face on the moon including his prayer cap, glasses, and 
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beard. . . . Throughout history, god has shown his divine power and 
Karāmāh through such phenomena. He has also helped his true fol-
lowers in miraculous ways. May god grant us mercy— Amen.
Absent in this description is any mention of the image or claim that it is an 
actual photograph of the event. The image was more a call to look at the 
moon than a proof of the event, depending rather on the text to testify to 
the trueness of the event through describing the details of the sighting in 
different places.
In contrast, two other less circulated images were presented more ex-
plicitly as evidence of the event. In the second one, two photographs of 
the moon and Sayeedi’s face are shown side by side, with a shape similar to 
Sayeedi’s face sketched on the moon. The caption reads: “I hereby pledge 
in the name of Allah, that I took this image last night, and has not edited 
it, just traced the shape of the blessed face of Allama Sayeedi.” The third 
image was also a composite of two photographs of the moon and Sayeedi’s 
face juxtaposed with each other, with a caption that says “Allama Sayeedi 
can be seen in moon in this shape.” In spite of their differences, in all three 
Figure 12.2. Most 
circulated image of 
Sayeedi
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images a different semiotic ideology of indexicality can be seen working in 
a paradoxical way as they tried to remove ambiguity with a concurrent re-
sistance to semiotic closure. In other words, the use of these images as evi-
dence was impeded by the excess of their “intertwined indexical and iconic 
aspects,” requiring either the assistance of text or specific photographs of 
Sayeedi’s face and outlining to index the resemblance (Gunning 2004, 43). 
Thus, these etchings done by Sayeedi’s supporters illustrates Tom Gun-
ning’s argument that digital manipulation and indexicality do not always 
oppose each other, but that manipulation is required to remove the iconic 
excesses of the image to make indexicality apparent, and to make the im-
ages usable as evidence or proof.
However, contrary to the notion of indexicality active in the skeptics’ 
rationale, this indexicality did not depend on any sort of semiotic closure. 
That is, while all these composite images tried to remove ambiguity by 
making the indexical work, that did not preclude the emergence of other 
meanings and possibilities. Rather, their simultaneous circulation sug-
gested that there was no consensus among the believers on a specific way 
to see Sayeedi on the moon, and any way of seeing Sayeedi on the moon 
is valid. In that sense, like darshan and nazar, neither the image nor the 
object indexed existed outside of the viewing process, but required the ac-
tive engagement of the viewer to materialize. The images here acted in a 
translucent way described in Davis’s (1999, 23) discussion of Indian images 
of god. Davis argued that while images of gods have substantive presence 
in themselves, they allow viewers with a devotional eye to see beyond their 
reality to the transcendent reality of gods. This translucency of Sayeedi’s 
images is also similar to the emptiness or hollowness of deictic indexicality 
described by Charles Sanders Peirce (Doane 2007, 2). While both indexi-
calities are defined by a physical, material connection with the signified, in 
contrast to the photographic indexicality that partakes iconicity because 
of resemblance (footprint, death masks), deictic indexicality partakes the 
symbolic, forcing meaning to be opened to the spatiotemporal instance 
of signification. As Richard Davis illustrates, when translated to the realm 
of the images of gods, this means that each devotional eye may produce a 
different transcendent reality that it sees through the image. Therefore, in 
contrast to the photographic indexicality operative in skeptics’ arguments, 
for the believers, indexicality resisted semiotic closure.
Moreover, as Aminul’s comment on the Prothom Alo report above il-
lustrates, the images did manage to stimulate their duplicates, and people 
in Aminul’s village were able to see Sayeedi on the moon after seeing the 
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image. As such, it violated another cardinal rule of photographic indexical-
ity, which stipulates that the trace and the contact must belong to different 
temporal planes. In other words, the trace must come after, retrospectively 
providing the proof of a contact that does not exist anymore. Therefore, 
once photographs are perceived as mirrors of a different reality, the exis-
tence of that reality cannot be denied. Roland Barthes (2006, 76) points 
to this understanding when he claimed that a photograph mechanically 
reproduces to infinity what can never be reproduced existentially. For 
Barthes, this double constriction or imposition of reality and past, absolute 
and deferred presence, manifestation and separation is the very essence or 
noeme of photography: “the thing that has been.” In a way, Sayeedi’s images 
destabilize this sequential constriction as in many cases people managed 
to see Sayeedi on the moon after seeing the image. In other words, con-
trary to the noeme of photography, the manifestation here occurred without 
separation: the images not only mirrored the past but also mediated future 
actions and, in doing so, asserted the reality of the event.
Therefore, for many believers, the truth claims of the images were not 
located in their photographic indexicality. Rather, their trust in Sayeedi’s 
images illustrate Gunning’s (2004, 42) argument that truth claims are not 
integral to an image, but are rather “a claim made for it.” Gunning sep-
arates truth claims from indexicality, arguing that, in order to speak the 
truth, the photograph must be integrated into a statement and subjected 
to rules of discourse. Following Charles Sanders Peirce, Keane (2003, 419) 
also makes a related point that since icons and indexes in themselves assert 
nothing, their social power depends on semiotic ideologies to make them 
apparent by opening up the material properties of objects like photographs 
to signification. In a similar vein, Strassler’s (2014, 123) concept of auratic 
indexicality elucidates the culturally mediated nature of indexicality in her 
ethnographic study of the images of a spirit queen named Ratu Kidul in 
Indonesia. Strassler illustrates how, on the one hand, indexical claims of 
contact with this unseen queen imbue her paintings with supernatural 
powers, and on the other, due to a culturally mediated semiotic ideology 
of indexicality, these images are conceived not as traces of a “past but now 
absent present,” but as media for “transmitting an ongoing but otherwise invis-
ible presence,” making them potent, efficacious objects.
Similarly, the “reality” effect of Sayeedi’s image differs significantly 
from the idea of truth claims and indexicality that the secular skeptics used 
to criticize the image. Rather, the semiotic ideology of indexicality that 
connected the images physically to the signified worked in a deictic and 
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translucent way, differing in three important ways. First, unlike photo-
graphic indexicality, it did not depend on establishing an objective, uni-
versally observable connection to reality, but kept open the possibility of 
other connections. Second, the believers did not see the images as traces of 
a past event that is absent now, but as mediums of an ongoing event. Lastly, 
in contrast to photographic indexicality, which is contingent on iconicity 
to signify, this deictic indexicality depended on the sketches, text, and col-
lages to allow the believers to actually see Sayeedi on the moon. In other 
words, these tracings and texts embedded in the images support Strassler’s 
argument against Gunning, illustrating that culturally mediated ideologies 
of indexicality can play a presence- conjuring role along with the visual ex-
cesses of iconicity.
Believing the Body: The Semiotic Ideology of Karāmāh
In general, people’s responses to Sayeedi’s images and sightings followed 
similar trajectories. Like the images, people drew from both secular and Is-
lamic worldviews in a polyscopic and interocular way to reject the news of 
Sayeedi’s sighting because it is both “unscientific” and “un- Islamic.” Nev-
ertheless, many rejected the news because it contradicts the sharia, and ar-
gued that the believers are committing bid’ah (innovation) at best and shirk 
(idolatry or polytheism) at worst. As they all believed in the miracles per-
formed by the prophets and described in the Quran, it was not the sighting 
itself that was in question here. Rather, they challenged Sayeedi’s sanctity, 
arguing that no mortal except the prophets is holy enough to be seen on 
the moon.
However, this question of Sayeedi’s sanctity was irrelevant for the secu-
lar skeptics, and they rejected it for completely different reasons: because 
seeing someone on the moon is not objectively observable and scientifi-
cally possible. For example, Dipen Bhattacharya, an astrophysicist, tried to 
fathom the impossibility of the news mathematically:
I was doing a quick back- of- the- envelope calculation for the amount 
of energy to create a visible image on the moon. The numbers are 
astronomical, because to put an image on the moon that would be 
visible from here, you have to match the solar flux at the moon.15
Bhattacharya went on to calculate that it could be done only if someone 
projected a beam using 10,000 terawatts of energy. That is impossible, he 
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explains to the reader, since the total power output of the entire world 
is 2.3 terawatt, and even that is enough to vaporize everything around 
the projector, let alone the 10,000 terawatts needed. He concluded, “but 
when people believe in divine intervention, all these calculations are be-
side the point.”
At the center of skeptics’ arguments like these was the positivist meta-
physical foundation that depended on the existence of two separate but 
interdependent entities: an observable, systematic, external reality and an 
impartial observing subject (Kember 1998, 25). Coupled with the Platonic 
mistrust of mimesis explained by Jain (2007), this ideology makes some 
realities more “just,” true, and believable than others. Here, instead of an 
image, it is the viewer’s mind that becomes the location of mimesis. There-
fore, for skeptics like Bhattacharya, the explanation of why so many people 
were able to see Sayeedi on the moon resorted either to a backward mind- 
set or to mass hallucination. As Jiten Roy commented on Bhattacharya’s 
post:
In my view, the culprit is religion; it’s a faith, which stunted the de-
velopment of normal psyche; probably brain cells as well. Examples 
of such immature psyche among religious people is present every-
where.16
Another blogger, Golam Dostagir, argues that the science behind the un-
conscious mind is key in explaining the sighting:
Human mind has limitless power. It will believe what it wants to 
believe. We already know about mass hysteria in girl’s school.  .  .  . 
if such physical symptoms occur according [to] the suggestions of 
other people, then is it hard to imagine a face on the moon because 
of that? We need to understand it is a mass psychogenic illness.17
Just like the “manipulated” images, the reality here is distorted by this 
pathological collective psyche, which tricks the otherwise “objective” vi-
sion into seeing things that the mind wants to see. As another blogger 
wrote, “You are imagining Sayeedi on the moon with your mind, your eyes 
are just seeing that.”18
However, very different answers to what constitutes reality and how it 
is accessed become apparent in the statements of the people who defended 
Sayeedi’s sighting on the moon. To explain the fact that not everybody who 
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tried to see Sayeedi on the moon was able to see him, they argued that this 
transcendental reality is not accessible to all. The dominant argument was 
that it was mostly pious (dindar), righteous (parhezgar) persons who were 
able to see Sayeedi on the moon. Abu Zaowad, who wrote a booklet on the 
event titled “Karāmāt al- awliyā,” argued:
Following their morning prayer, countless honest (imāndaar) Mus-
lims have seen Sayeedi’s face on the moon when they exited the 
mosque and looked at the sky. People who do not support Jamaat- 
Shibir but are truthful also acknowledged seeing Sayeedi’s face on 
the moon.
Most accounts of Sayeedi’s sighting included testimonies by people who 
reportedly have never lied in their life, and who are believed by everybody 
in the village. The “reality” in these statements was not objective and ac-
cessible to all, but is transcendental), which can only be accessed through 
the vision of a righteous person. A blogger named Usama Yusuf argued: 
“My uncle saw Sayeedi on the moon, and nobody in this area including me 
has the power to doubt what he saw. Just because I have not seen it . . . does 
not mean I have ability to deny his vision.”19
While this embodied intersubjective mode of vision was significant in 
producing the reality effect of Sayeedi’s images and sighting, it was not 
the only one to play a crucial role. Rather what rationalized the entire 
phenomena through opening up the qualities of the moon to such signifi-
cation was the semiotic ideology of Karāmāh, or the belief in the miracles 
performed by Awliya’ Allah (the friends of god), seen as signs of dignity 
bestowed upon them by god (Dabashi 1989). While all Muslims believe in 
Mojaja or miracles performed by the prophets and described in the Quran, 
followers of Sufis strongly believe that the gift has passed down to the Sufi 
saints. As Islam spread into South Asia through Sufi tradition, the Islamic 
worldviews here were molded through these stories of divine intervention. 
Therefore, people here are accustomed to and equipped with semiotic ide-
ologies and forms of embodiment to read and feel the presence of this 
divine order in everyday life.
The significance of the context in which the Karāmāh took place also 
played a role in the reality effect of Sayeedi’s sighting. In most instances, 
it happened after the Morning Prayer in a liminal time known as Subh- 
e- Sadiq, the importance of which was established in the Quran and the 
Hadith numerous times. The selection of the moon as the background 
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of Sayeedi’s apparition was by no means an accident either. The Quran 
has a chapter on the moon, where Allah awarded the miracle of splitting 
the moon to Prophet Mohammad to establish the truthfulness of his mes-
sengerhood to the people of Mecca. Moreover, Iranian and South Asian 
Muslims are not unfamiliar to the idea of seeing Karāmāh on the moon, as 
people like Ayatollah Ruhollah Moosavi Khomeini in Iran and Abul Al’a 
Moududi and Riaz Ahmed Gohar Shahi in Pakistan have claimed divinity 
based on their being sighted on the moon.
In addition, the descriptions of almost involuntary bodily responses of 
people when they saw Sayeedi on the moon provided another important 
cue to the reality of the event as a Karāmāh. For example, in one of the 
interviews of people who saw Sayeedi on the moon done by the writer of 
the booklet, an imam narrated his experience:
I saw the face of Allama Sayeedi floating on the moon with his usual 
prayer cap and glasses. I saw it myself, and the minute I saw it, god’s 
praise spontaneously came out of my mouth. I felt my senses height-
ened and shivers ran through my body.
Such unintentional physical reactions (becoming unconscious, screaming, 
numbness) following the sighting also helped in establishing the reality 
effect of the sighting, since such reactions only come when people face 
something extraordinary, indexing the status of the event as Karāmāh.
Moreover, these somatic experiences were not limited in seeing Sayeedi 
on the moon, but involved feeling changes in the physical world, too, which 
also worked as signs of divine intervention. The imam in the interview 
went on to explain the situation on the day he saw Sayeedi on the moon:
The situation was eerily still  .  .  . to tell you the truth, the day on 
which the verdict was announced . .  . it was uncannily silent . .  . I 
haven’t seen such uneasy silence on earth in my life . . . the entire 
world seemed to be mute from shock . . . the sky and the air seemed 
dazed and shaken up . . . everything everywhere was traumatized.
The most frequent among those changes was the transformation that hap-
pened in the object that was at the center of discussion: the moon. Those 
who saw Sayeedi argued that for the duration the moon was not in the 
normal state that can be seen in ordinary times. In another interview from 
the same series, a madrasah teacher recounted his experience:
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When I looked at the moon, I saw the shape of Allama Sayeedi’s face 
imprinted like negative film. . . . it stayed like that for approximately 
two- three days, but started fading after that. . . . the mark does not 
appear like that anymore, now you can see a map like thing on the 
moon, not that mark.
Another youth from the same series of interviews stated: “I am not sure 
whether it is Sayeedi or not, but I have seen a face on the moon . . . and 
the shape of the moon is different also, it is not the normal moon we see 
every day.”
Therefore, the mode of vision that enabled the believers to see Say-
eedi on the moon was completely different from the one the skeptics were 
equipped with. Instead of the model with an impartial coherent observer 
and a universally accessible objective reality, in this mode of vision the real-
ity is not the same for all; rather, different layers of reality become accessi-
ble and visible to viewers depending on their subjectivity. Moreover, vision 
was not the only way to access that reality; rather, it was open to be inter-
preted through other senses also. It is the semiotic ideology of Karāmāh 
that enabled the believers to read and interpret these signs in the narra-
tives, bodies, context, and physical environment involved in the sighting. In 
other words, the semiotic ideology of Karāmāh did not simply make these 
signs recognizable and interpretable to them, it enabled them to instigate 
certain political responses and actions. The skeptics, without the semiotic 
ideology of Karāmāh, failed to see and understand that call to action.
Conclusion
In analyzing the distinct visual phenomena that the skeptics and the be-
lievers of Sayeedi’s images and sightings experienced, I suggested that two 
scopic regimes underlie these experiences: one based on the idea that real-
ity is objective and external to the viewer and can only be accessed in a dis-
embodied and impartial way though vision, while in the other, reality does 
not exist outside the viewer but becomes accessible through embodied en-
gagement with the subject. However, instead of considering their discrep-
ancies, I here argue that these two modes were applied in a polyscopic and 
interocular way, as the viewers used different semiotic ideologies in believ-
ing or rejecting Sayeedi’s images and sightings. For the skeptics and believ-
ers who subscribed to the ideology of efficacy, the debate was not about the 
visual signifiers in the images or how the images looked, but about their 
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ability to intervene in this world and the next. In terms of the sighting, it 
was not the probability of seeing someone on the moon that was contested. 
Rather, skeptics questioned whether Sayeedi is righteous enough to be seen 
on the moon, while the believers tried to prove his sanctity. On the other 
hand, the secular skeptic argument revolved around the semiotic ideology 
of photographic indexicality, and not only eschewed the efficaciousness of 
the images but also ignored the discursive nature of the truth claim of the 
image and the multiple ways indexicality can be formed. It therefore went 
unnoticed that, for the believers of Sayeedi’s images, the truth claim came 
from a semiotic ideology of indexicality that established the connection of 
the images to the signified in a deictic and translucent way, premised on a 
transcendental reality. Similarly, for the event of Sayeedi’s sighting, the idea 
of an objectively observable reality played a key role in the secular skeptic 
argument, ignoring the semiotic ideology of Karāmāh that the believers 
employed in experiencing and interpreting the sighting of Sayeedi on the 
moon, taking direction for future actions.
Notes
 1. While the phrase “the man on the moon” has been widely used to refer to the 
shape of a human face in the moon familiar to people around the world, it was used 
in the Bangla blogosphere to refer to the event of Sayeedi’s sighting on the moon.
 2. In Islamic theology, Karāmāt al- awliyā refers to the belief that Allah can 
bestow or reveal miracles on behalf of a wālī (a pious person/a friend of Allah) 
(Amanullah 2003).
 3. Bryson argued that Western painting suppresses deictic markers like brush-
strokes, encouraging a disembodied gaze that sees images as objective realities. In 
contrast, Chinese paintings display the strokes through which they materialized, 
requiring the intimate involvement of a carnal body.
 4. Pinney (2004, 18) situates this bodily praxis against the mathematically or-
dered, disinterested aesthetics by invoking the similarity of this dichotomy with 
two others: Susan Buck- Morss’s proposition to apprehend aesthetics as somatic 
experience that can’t be subsumed by the mind and therefore resists “predatory 
reason”; and Jean- François Lyotard’s oppositional understanding of “figure” and 
“discourse,” as contrary to the closure of meaning in discourse, the figural defies 
the demands of meaning through constituting “a space where intensities are felt” 
(Carroll 1987, 30; Kester 1997, 43).
 5. Jain argues that within this ocularcentric formation of knowledge, which 
also draws from Platonic mistrust of the image and the mimesis, the authority of 
the images comes from their adequacy or inadequacy in representing the truth or 
reality
 6. Basherkella (bamboo fort) alludes to the fort built by Titumir, who led a 
peasant uprising against the British colonial authorities in the nineteenth century.
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 7. In Islamic theology, bid’ah refers to matters without precedence and in op-
position to the Quran and Sunnah.
 8. https://archive.is.mtAYT





 13. While the ideology has a complex genealogy, in general, it conceptualizes 
images as tied to “reality” through the natural force of mimesis, and hence closer 
to “reality” than symbols or words, which lack any necessary connection with the 
signified as arbitrary signs (Jay 2002, 269).
 14. Semiotic ideologies are basic assumptions about what signs are and how they 
work, and they scaffold different modes of signification across apparently distinct 
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Media and Imperialism in the Global Village
A Case Study of Four Malalais
Wazhmah Osman
Since the events of 9/11 and the start of the “War on Terror,” debates per-
taining to Muslim women’s rights have been reverberating globally. Par-
ticularly in the West, Muslim women have been put under the popular 
culture spotlight, evident in the proliferation of media such as fiction films, 
television programs, documentaries, books, and news that focus on their 
plight under repressive Islamic regimes. The resultant media attention has 
been critiqued by scholars from a variety of disciplines concerned with the 
overwhelming portrayal of women as victims, without accounting for their 
actual or potential agency, thereby perpetuating stereotypes of women un-
der Islam that have gained new currency since 9/11. Yet while this type 
of media continues to proliferate, little attention has been given to the 
cultural productions that constitute local gender subjectivities and social 
movements. Likewise, little attention has been given to how local activists 
and human rights groups “talk back” to this discourse.
In this chapter, I trace and contextualize the trajectory of iconic figures 
and their role in key contemporary moments of activism and reform in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In particular, I will focus on the four Malalais 
(Malala Yousafzai, Malalai Joya, Malalai Kakar, and Malalai of Maiwand) in 
order to highlight the various ways in which Af- Pak women’s activism gets 
selectively recognized and appropriated by neoimperial agendas. Through 
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tracing how Malala achieved such global stature, I hope to underline the 
ways in which particular aspects of her activism were deemed more legiti-
mate than others in order to justify neoimperial agendas in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. The backlash against Malala in her native Pakistan also reveals 
how the global media and the Western exaltation of her ended up privileg-
ing a particular type of activist that obscured the many other Pakistani and 
Afghan women who had been advocating for political and social change 
for decades before. In doing so, this chapter engages with a broader set of 
questions: Why have some of these local heroines like Yousafzai become 
global phenomena, winning accolades such as the Nobel Peace Prize, while 
others have had a hard time crossing their localized boundaries? What is 
the role of political economy, imperial ideologies, and disparities in media 
infrastructures in their circulation or lack thereof? What does the politics 
of recognition that surrounds them tell us about the ways in which digital 
media are implicated within structures of empire?
In order to begin to answer the aforementioned questions, I interrogate 
the international celebration of Malala Yousafzai and, during select mo-
ments, the celebration of the other Malalais, but also the moments when 
they became persona non grata within media and government discourse. 
The goal is not to question the worthiness of people like Malala’s accom-
plishments, but rather to critique the workings of empire in not generating 
platforms for those equally worthy female activists in the Af- Pak region. I 
am not the first person to draw attention to the incredible global scope of 
Malala Yousafzai’s recognition and critique it as a tool of imperial agendas. 
In fact, Yousafzai herself has reflected on the pull of forces casting her sin-
gularly as just a victim: “In Swat, I studied in the same school for 10 years 
and there I was just considered to be Malala. Here I’m famous, here people 
think of me as the girl who was shot by the Taliban. The real Malala is gone 
somewhere, and I can’t find her.”1 Thus, one of my main goals is to situ-
ate Yousafzai within a broader history of progress, reform, and activism in 
South Asia. This chapter also situates this issue of gender and iconicity in 
relation to a post- 9/11 context marked by new media developments includ-
ing the emergence of dozens of new television and radio stations, hundreds 
of publications, a fledgling movie industry, and an Internet infrastructure 
with funding from foreign and domestic sources.
At a time when numerous other human rights activists from the region 
have also risked their lives to fight local and foreign injustices in ways both 
spectacular and ordinary, it is critical to understand not only what makes 
their efforts less worthy of global recognition but what their contributions 
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are in the first place. I argue that when celebrated women activists, who 
bravely fight for modern signifiers of human rights, equality, and justice, 
also question and challenge U.S. imperialism and hold U.S. foreign policy 
accountable for the rise of extremism in their region, they become dan-
gerous figures. They can no longer be easily subsumed into the simplistic 
narratives of victimhood into which imperial discourses slot them. Their 
circulation must be managed and controlled, and it is here that the role of 
global and digital media acquires significance.
Colonial and Neoimperial Feminism: Giving and Taking Voice
In order to understand why certain instances of resistance to the social 
and political order among women from South Asia and the Middle East 
are celebrated and others are left out of the contemporary record, it is 
important to consider how both colonial administrations and discourses 
view women as a proxy for how effectively a broader political agenda is 
being implemented. This colonial history is by no means a relic of the 
past. The regimes of knowledge production that are endemic to colonial 
forms of power continue today in the guise of neoimperial nation- building 
and development projects and more outward forms of militarization, such 
as the systematic drone attacks that are specific to the U.S.- led War on 
Terror (Khalili 2012; Grewal 2017; Parks and Caplan 2017; Packer and 
Reeves 2017; Tahir 2017), and their place in the genealogy of U.S. warfare. 
The ways in which the media mobilize visual representations cannot be 
detached from war, militarization, and humanitarian and development dis-
course (Chadha and Kavoori 2015; Chrisman 2013; Solomon 2007). When 
grappling with a figure like Yousafzai, it is crucial, then, to keep in mind 
how imperial projects have mobilized gender as a weapon of conquest, 
regime- building, and the governance of colonial subjects.
A key way that imperial powers have used women to further their agen-
das is by creating a narrative in which there is a righteous “us” (read the 
West) and a morally bankrupt “them” (read the “East” or “The Muslim 
World”). In Samuel Huntington’s classic piece “The Clash of Civiliza-
tions,” which has been disgraced in academia but is still alive and well in 
policy circles, sets up false binaries between religiosity and secularism and 
between progress and religious extremism. This modernist rhetoric was 
used to justify Western rule in the name of liberating Muslim, Hindu, or 
Pagan women from their “repressive” societies. As prominent postcolonial 
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scholars have noted, these false binaries obscure the complexities of the 
residues and social configurations of the colonial encounter (Asad 1986, 
2003; Chatterjee 1997; Gole 2006; Mahmood 2005).
Yet in order to maintain the fiction of being bastions of democracy, 
human rights, and freedom for all, the Western ruling elite needs to do 
more than erase their regressive records; they also have to erase the agency 
of progressive reform in South Asia. Anyone who is familiar with Afghan 
history knows that the long struggle for women’s rights (and sexuality) has 
been an ongoing battle between modernist state policies and the more re-
strictive and repressive interpretations of Islamic and tribal laws dictated by 
religio- tribal elders. Put simply, there is a long history of Western colonial 
and more recent neoimperial discourse that deliberately distorts and erases 
histories that do not neatly fit within its narrative and geopolitical agenda. 
Mainstream Western media, including television networks and films, even 
independent ones, tend to perpetuate this dominant ideology.
Therefore, when some people from the Global South and East are 
handpicked for public consumption and celebrated globally, we must be 
suspicious. Upon close analysis of the media coverage of the four Malalais 
as well as other Afghan and Pakistani women who have spoken truth to 
power at home and abroad, it becomes clear that there is a logic to choos-
ing who gets media coverage and who does not. In the digital age, there 
are certainly more spaces for disjuncture from the dominant discourse and 
self- representation. However, as we shall see in the discussion of the four 
Malalais in the next section, ultimately media forms play less of a factor in 
who gets covered than ongoing colonial agendas.
The Four Malalais
The four Malalais I will be presenting are Malala Yousafzai, Malalai Joya, 
Malalai Kakar, and Malalai of Maiwand. First, it is important to note that 
while only one of them, Yousafzai, has achieved an iconic global stature, all 
of them are well- known public figures in the Af- Pak region, and Joya and 
Kakar are figures I know personally through my activist work in the re-
gion. Additionally, it is important to highlight that most of the Afghan and 
Pakistani women’s rights groups and activists I have met and worked with 
actively seek to expand their reach outside of the local and into the global 
public sphere. The fact remains that international attention can bring al-
lies, clout, and funding to enact local change, and local activists are keenly 
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aware of the power differentials. Yet, for a variety of reasons, which I will 
elucidate in this chapter, most of them have been unable to tap into global 
networks of media, funding, and activism.
Malala Yousafzai: The Celebrity vs. the Activist, and the Censoring 
of Drone Warfare
In the discourse on iconic global women activists, Malala Yousafzai is now 
a household name. Having graced the covers of books, women’s rights bro-
chures, and been the subjects of several documentaries, the name Malala 
evokes not only an individual but a symbolic figure. Malala Yousafzai was 
born in 1997 in the Swat Valley in Pakistan near the border of Afghanistan, 
where as a child my family and I spent time as refugees during the Soviet 
Occupation. At the age of 11, in 2008, she started writing a blog for BBC 
Urdu about life under the Taliban, which gained attention in Pakistan. 
Adam Ellick from the New York Times picked up on the story and made 
a documentary about her the next year called Class Dismissed: The Story of 
Malala.2 She became a regional symbol of resistance to the Taliban, which 
of course put her in danger in the Taliban- dominated region where she 
lived. Yet it was in 2012, when she was shot at 15 years of age by the Taliban 
on a school bus, that she became a global figure. Following the shooting 
and her subsequent recovery in a Birmingham, UK hospital, Malala was of-
fered multiple book deals, speaking engagements, and became the subject 
of additional documentaries, which culminated in her winning the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 2014. In fact, the UN General Assembly declared her 16th 
birthday “Malala Day.”3
Following her recovery, Malala’s speeches were primarily focused on 
the power of education to equip girls, no matter where they lived, with 
the tools to move beyond their economic and cultural circumstances. In 
fact, Malala herself emphasized the global relevance of her message by 
noting in her 2013 speech to the UN: “Malala Day is not my day. Today 
is the day of every woman, every boy and every girl who have raised 
their voice for their rights.” And when accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, 
she noted, “I tell my story not because it is unique but because it is not. 
It is the story of many girls.”4 While Malala herself attempted to draw 
attention to the tragically ordinary fact that girls like her suffer disen-
franchisement every day at the hands of corrupt governments, the me-
dia persisted in promoting a narrative that emphasized her extraordinary 
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quality as a women’s rights activist who embodied resilience, bravery, and 
heroism. With the publishing of her memoir, I Am Malala, which sold 
1.8 million copies worldwide,5 Malala became a ubiquitous name in the 
global consciousness.
On the one hand, Western media outlets, NGOs, and public schools 
mobilized Malala’s image and her writing and speeches as a kind of extraor-
dinary aberration— as a unique story of female bravery that one does not 
often see in places like Pakistan or Afghanistan. On the other hand, Paki-
stani media outlets and public figures were quick to say that she had “sold 
out,” and that in fact the global embrace of her as an extraordinary heroine 
erases the heroism of thousands of Pakistani women who resist the domi-
nant social and political order every day, and who do suffer while doing 
so— if not through suffering a bullet to the head, then through other forms 
of gender- based violence. In fact, the global embrace of Malala sparked 
outrage and skepticism among the Pakistani middle classes.6 While her 
blog and the rapid proliferation of social media platforms at the time of 
her shooting certainly contributed to the transnational circulation of the 
shooting, there are deeper forces at play.7
The ways in which the United States has used Pakistan as a battleground 
for its ongoing War on Terror in Afghanistan is widely known. The status 
of women has functioned in critical ways for the ongoing justification of 
militarization and development projects (which often go hand in hand, as 
noted by scholar Jennifer Fluri [2012]). The shooting of Yousafzai was also 
mobilized by U.S. government branches in order to justify ongoing drone 
strikes in Pakistan, which the Obama administration ramped up in 2009 
under the U.S. military and the Central Intelligence Agency in order to de-
stroy the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership.8 In fact, even the Pakistani lib-
eral elite have used Yousafzai’s shooting to encourage U.S. intervention in 
Pakistan. Following the shooting, one Pakistani citizen at a vigil held up a 
sign that said “Drones kill so Malala can live,” a statement that bought into 
sharp focus the neoimperial logic that drone attacks against the Taliban are 
the most effective mechanism to protect children like Malala. What the 
sign did not point out was that as of 2014, between three to four thousand 
people have been killed by drones in the Af-Pak region.9 Time magazine 
columnist Joe Klein defended drone attacks on MSNBC’s Morning Joe, 
shortly after Malala’s shooting,10 stating that these attacks were preemptive 
ways to protect “our” children, adding, “The bottom line is: In the end, 
whose four year old gets killed?” The shooting of Malala then, was also a 
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way for the U.S. global media infrastructure to justify the ongoing use of 
drones in Pakistan by pointing to the brutality of a force like the Taliban.
It is notable that Malala herself has vehemently spoken out against the 
U.S. drone campaign. In meeting with President Barack Obama in 2014, 
she noted in a statement, “I thanked President Obama for the United 
States’ work in supporting education in Pakistan and Afghanistan and for 
Syrian refugees. I also expressed my concerns that drone attacks are fuel-
ing terrorism. Innocent victims are killed in these acts, and they lead to 
resentment among the Pakistani people.”11 Despite this honest plea for the 
United States to reconsider its drone program, the White House statement 
on the meeting left out this part of the discussion.12
Rather, the statement focused on Malala’s activism around girls’ edu-
cation.13 In more recent years, Malala has also spoken out against global 
political violence, including the Israeli state’s targeting of Gaza, having 
pledged $50,000 to rebuild Gaza schools.14 She has also spoken out about 
the injustices faced by Rohingyan refugees and Palestinian children, having 
tweeted in December 2017, “Today I am thinking of Palestinian and Ro-
hingya children— and all around the world still struggling to achieve Anne 
[Frank]’s dream of freedom. #HumanRightsDay.” And in more recent years, 
she has condemned the Taliban for their ongoing persecution of civilians 
in Afghanistan.15 In more recent months, Malala has publicly critiqued the 
Trump campaign’s remarks about implementing a Muslim travel ban, calling 
it prejudiced, noting, “Well that’s really tragic that you hear these comments 
which are full of hatred, full of this ideology of being discriminative towards 
others.”16 And yet these statements, as much as they remain couched within 
the more humanitarian language of education, freedom, and children’s well- 
being, were only given coverage by a handful of news sources.
I seek to critique the global perception of Malala’s work not to discredit 
it. In fact, the Malala Fund and other initiatives she and her family run 
have made impressive contributions to the construction of girls’ schools 
in Pakistan. The Malala Fund, for example, provides educational opportu-
nities to former domestic workers, children fleeing conflict, and provides 
school supplies for girls’ schools affected by flooding.17 In 2014, the Min-
istry of Finance of Pakistan signed an agreement with the UN Educational 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation that would allot $7 million from the 
Malala Fund toward an education project that would focus on rural areas 
of Pakistan.18 What I am interested in disaggregating is why it is that only 
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a sliver of Malala’s work is being given global media attention and along 
what lines are certain types of activism distinguished from each other to 
the point where recognition and access to resources shift? The case of Ma-
lala also draws our attention to the ways in which a particular victimhood 
subjectivity is a precursor for getting educational, professional, and medi-
cal benefits from Western powers. It is certainly no coincidence that, as of 
2017, Malala began studying at Oxford University and she and her family 
are now living in Birmingham. The fact that she and her family retained 
Edelman, a top PR firm that has represented companies like Microsoft and 
Starbucks, to help in managing media requests, and that she regularly gives 
speeches and interviews, and meets with world leaders, have all contributed 
to what some media experts call “The Malala Machine.”19
Therefore, it would be a misreading of Yousafzai’s advocacy to say that 
it has been completely subjected to the misappropriation and misuse of 
the U.S. military industrial complex and the global media infrastructure to 
which it is tied. It is important to acknowledge her incredible agency when 
explaining her advocacy, postshooting. She has made the decision to accept 
media requests, and has figured out a way to remain connected to Pakistan 
and expand her message globally while still living in the United Kingdom. 
Nevertheless, in addition to the dangers of the hypermilitarization stance 
that Yousafzai’s shooting has been mobilized toward, it is also important to 
see how she has been treated as more of a persona and less as a person. In 
other words, her activism has been mobilized to further the trope of the 
Muslim woman victim rather than as part of a longer life history of enact-
ing social change.
Malalai Joya: A Critical Voice in the War on Terror and 
Afghanistan’s Puppet Regimes
Tracing the trajectory of how Joya’s activism was perceived by Western 
political and social institutions reveals stark similarities but also important 
differences with her counterpart. Comparatively, Joya’s messages remained 
underrecognized by Western media outlets, but when they were, they were 
seen as threatening and overly political. Joya was born in 1978 in Farah 
Province, near the border of Iran, where, as a child, she and her family 
became refugees during the Soviet- Afghan War. Joya gained international 
recognition after making an impassioned and daring three- minute speech20 
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denouncing the crimes of Afghan warlords during a 2003 Loya Jirga (or 
public assembly) to ratify Afghanistan’s new post- 9/11 constitution. As a 
24- year- old elected female delegate, she committed a politically and so-
cially subversive act by denouncing mujahedin leaders for killing thousands 
of civilians during the Civil War following the Soviet exit in 1989. The 
video captured on cellphone cameras and professional cameras by journal-
ists was broadcast on almost all Afghan television and radio stations and 
went viral on social media platforms in countries with high Internet use. In 
the video, we can see and hear the warlords become increasingly outraged 
as they forcibly remove Joya. The chief of the Loya Jirga, Sibhatullah Mo-
jaddedi, a U.S. and Saudi government funded Islamist leader, also makes 
a vitriolic rant against her in which he calls her an “infidel and a commu-
nist.”21 Shortly after this speech, he also made a statement that women are 
not suited for public office.
Joya’s speech resulted in national and regional recognition, garnering 
her both praise among Afghan women’s activists and disdain from male 
warlords and government officials who sought to uphold the status quo. 
In 2005, she was elected as an official member of Afghanistan Parliament, 
representing Farah Province. In 2007, the same warlord MPs voted to 
suspend her after she continued to question their legitimacy to serve in 
public office and demanded they be tried for their war crimes. Following 
this speech, Joya also gained global recognition, as she became the subject 
of multiple media requests and documentaries. In 2009 she published her 
book, A Woman among Warlords: The Extraordinary Story of an Afghan Who 
Dared to Raise Her Voice.
The political force of her work also appears in how she explains what 
true self- determination would mean for Afghanistan, which did not always 
sit well with mainstream media outlets. In one interview with CNN in 
2009, Joya responds to an interviewer’s question as to why she was expelled 
from Parliament by highlighting that she simply told the truth about the 
US- backed regime which is just a “carbon copy” of the Taliban, but under 
the guise of “democracy,” and that the government was being run by war-
lords who were no better. The interviewer, Heidi Collins, eventually took 
issue with Joya’s calling the U.S. presence in Afghanistan an “occupation,” 
and continued to press Joya on how effectively Afghan security forces have 
defended the people, implying that the U.S. presence was necessary for 
Afghanistan’s security. Joya responded by saying that even in Kabul, where 
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there is an abundance of foreign troops, safety has not been realized. I want 
to suggest that there is a ceiling to how much recognition Joya’s activism 
received internationally— that while the United States and Western media 
have lauded her efforts to speak against Afghan politicians and the legis-
lature, at a certain point her critique crossed a threshold, which resulted 
in very material consequences. In 2007, Joya publicly blamed the United 
States for civilian deaths in Afghanistan and for allying with corrupt re-
gimes in Afghanistan that have actively sought to silence Afghan women.
The consequences of her public statements were drastic. In 2011, Joya 
was sponsored by two New York City– based organizations, the War Resis-
tors League and the South Asia Solidarity Initiative, to promote the launch 
of her U.S. book tour, but she was denied visas multiple times. On the eve 
of what was supposed to be a three- week speaking tour, Joya was denied 
a visa to enter the United States. The U.S. embassy officer noted the fol-
lowing reasons: “She is ‘unemployed’ and lives ‘underground,’” failing to 
recognize that her living underground is a result of her having to hide from 
possible assassination attempts by the various religio- tribal forces from the 
Taliban to U.S.- backed warlords to various Islamic extremist sects.
The proliferation of social media, political blogs, and other digital plat-
forms over the past 10 years has not necessarily translated into greater 
exposure for people like Joya, at least in the Euro- American context. Here, 
the stark differences between Joya and Yousafzai are explicit— while one 
could not even get a visa to enter the United States for a temporary stay, 
the other has been given permanent protection by the United Kingdom 
and the opportunity to study at Oxford University, as well as investment 
of multiple forms of economic and social capital to get her message across. 
Meanwhile, Joya’s lack of interest in promoting girls’ education within a 
corrupt political system in the name of women’s liberation has led to her 
fading from the Western media spotlight.
Malalai Kakar: An Unrecognized Advocate  
for Afghan Women’s Rights
Malalai Kakar was a lieutenant colonel and head of the Crimes Against 
Women Unit in the police department of Kandahar, a conservative south-
ern province in Afghanistan, which, like the North- West Frontier Province 
in Pakistan, is a Taliban stronghold. She came from a family of police of-
290 • global digital cultures
Revised Pages
ficers and investigators. She took a stance against traditional patriarchal 
and misogynist practices such as child marriages and domestic abuse in 
a region known as a hotbed of religious and tribal extremism. As a re-
sult, major national media institutions and women’s rights organization 
picked up on her work, and she became an iconic and respected figure 
throughout the Af- Pak region for her bravery. Globally, she achieved a 
limited amount of exposure only after the Taliban assassinated her outside 
of her home in September 2008. Prior to Kakar’s death, there were only 
a few Western and international reports about her work, hence she had 
not crossed over globally in the way Yousafzai or even Joya have. After her 
death, there were more international stories and reports commemorating 
her short life’s work including two short documentaries, but they did not 
circulate in established mainstream venues as did Yousafzai or Joya’s films 
and books. She did not travel much outside of Kandahar, which is a difficult 
area for international and even local journalists to travel to. The few video 
stories and news stories have circulated solely in online venues with limited 
“clicks” and “hits.”
Yet Kakar’s image, one in which she is seen wearing a blue burqa and 
pointing a gun, was used by the far right U.K. group Britain First for one 
of their many Islamophobic, anti- immigrant, and prowar campaigns and 
gained much traction online. The image is overlaid with a warning in red, 
“Terror attack: Severe. An attack is highly likely.” A right- wing Australian 
senator subsequently used the altered Britain First image for a “ban the 
burka” campaign. The poster equates Islam with terrorism.
According to Laura Slezic, the photographer, she took the picture as 
Kakar was preparing to rescue a teenager who had been kidnapped. She 
readied her pistol and threw on her burqa over her national police uniform. 
Slezic, who was moved by Kakar’s strength and compassion, was horrified 
by the appropriation of her image: “To see an image of her and all she 
represents used this way is such an insult to her and her family and all the 
women in Afghanistan. I don’t even have the words to describe it.” Yet, 
despite copyright laws, she has little recourse as the poster has been shared 
over 50,000 times on Facebook. As Haras Rafiq, outreach officer at the 
Quilliam Foundation, a counterextremism think tank, has stated, “Social 
media is playing a key role in radicalizing both Islamists and the far right. 
In order to attract more followers and get more “hits,” “clicks,” and “likes,” 
these groups will appeal to the basest human desires inciting misplaced 
fear, violence, and revenge.22
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Malalai of Maiwand: A Figure within the Rubble  
of Erased Women’s Histories
The final Malalai also known as “Mother Malalai” or “Malalai of Maiwand” 
is a folkloric ethno- national hero among Afghans and Pakistanis. Malalai 
played a pivotal role in the second Anglo- Afghan War in 1880 in the Battle 
of Maiwand, in Kandahar Province, which was under the control of then 
British India. Although there are various accounts of her exact role in the 
battle, the general consensus in oral stories and Afghan history books is 
that she rallied a demoralized Afghan army on the verge of retreat and near 
surrender to retain their honor as enshrined in the codes of the Pashtun-
wali (or Pashtun ethical code) and continue to fight. She raised the Afghan 
flag and proclaimed that dying under the fire of the British artillery was an 
honor. She was killed in battle by the British army, but the Afghan army 
emerged victorious in that battle. In some versions, her role in the battle 
is more active as she participates in directly fighting the British army. My 
primary school in Kabul, where my mother was a teacher, was also named 
Malalai after this venerated figure. Her name has been enshrined within 
many institutions like schools and hospitals in Afghanistan as well as in 
folklore and poetry. In fact, Malala Yousafzai has stated that she is named 
after this historical heroine, and cites her struggle against the British in her 
biography I Am Malala. Her grave has become a shrine where people visit 
from near and far to pray. Not surprisingly, she does not appear anywhere 
in the fastidious archives of the British. While Malalai of Maiwand is a 
historical figure, her story reminds us of the fact that the erasure of strong, 
politically active Afghan women who attempted to resist the status quo is 
not unique to U.S. imperial discourses. This erasure was a key tool that 
British colonial forces used in order to make the case that Afghanistan was 
a backward country whose women were oppressed and, more significantly, 
did not have the tools to liberate themselves.
Conclusion
The case of the four Malalais is one window into understanding the politics 
of recognition that operate in the media’s consumption of Afghan and Pak-
istani women’s activism, in an age of war, militarization, and development. 
It is clear that each Malala(i) comes from a set of different conditions of 
possibility, economic, social, and political, and these all contribute toward 
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producing different outcomes in the ways their activism get recognized 
and circulated locally and transnationally. However, they all share the qual-
ity of having been co- opted by U.S. government discourse and officials as 
well as American media as embodying the oppressed Muslim woman who 
is victimized by her native culture, and made more rescuable by outside 
powers and occupying forces.
Gender has always been a contentious issue in Afghanistan and Paki-
stan. As this chapter has illustrated, there is an equally long history of inter-
nal cultural contestations between progressive reformers and conservative 
elites. It is often through gendered contestations that attempts at setting 
and defining national/cultural/ social identity, often in the singular, occur. 
Yet during the “War on Terror” era it has become challenging for human 
rights activists from South Asia to challenge religious extremism, specifi-
cally the rise of Islamism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As the case study 
of the four Malalais shows, activists from the region are often co- opted as 
spokespeople to support Islamophobic and xenophobic agendas that spur 
hypermilitarization and hate mongering against their own fellow South 
Asian immigrants in the West and innocent civilians in the east. 
Thus the goal of this chapter is not to hide issues of gender and sexual-
ity that people in Afghanistan and Pakistan grapple with. It is important 
for the local and international activist and development aid community to 
continue to support gender- based projects and fight discriminatory prac-
tices and violence against women and other marginalized groups in the 
region. Despite the accelerating drumbeat of war to free and liberate Af-
ghan, Pakistani, and Muslim women, since the start of the longest running 
U.S. war, there has been little media coverage of these issues, which have 
persisted. Indeed, it was only during the precursor and lead- up to the “War 
on Terror” that the Western media floodgates opened, evident in the pro-
liferation of fiction films, television programs, documentaries, books, and 
news that focus on women’s plight under purportedly repressive Islamic 
regimes.
To be sure, digital media have played a central role in the circulation 
of the dire situation and plight of Afghan and Pakistani women. Malala 
Yousafzai would have never become the icon she is without her blog. Ma-
lalai Joya’s historic speech went viral after it was captured on cellphones. 
The death of Farkhunda Malikzada, an Afghan woman publicly beaten 
and killed by a mob in Kabul in 2015, also went viral because of by-
standers and perpetrators recording events on their mobile phones, thus 
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launching a movement to curb fanatical and misogynistic mullahs and 
religious leaders. The members of RAWA (Revolutionary Association of 
the Women of Afghanistan) and T2T (The Second Floor) have directly 
credited social media as the platform that helped them reach wider allies 
locally and internationally.
Yet we also have to interrogate the celebratory claims that digital media 
has created a global village that evens out power imbalances and gives a 
platform to the marginalized and disenfranchised. At the same time that 
digital media have been foundational to the rise of these human rights 
movements, they are far from the empowering panacea that allows for in-
dependence and self- presentation. Digital media are as entangled in the 
infrastructures of empire as traditional media networks.
To begin with, we must take into account lack of Internet penetration 
and the fact that the vast majority of Afghans and Pakistanis do not have 
the literacy or financial means to access the limited digital media infra-
structure. In Afghanistan, Internet penetration and infrastructure is at a 
mere 5 percent.23 It is also important to highlight the dominance of the 
English language on the Internet. More than 50 percent of websites in 
the world are in English. This also causes problems in self- representation 
and crossover of information to the broader global public sphere. While 
more Pakistanis than Afghans speak English, the vast majority of both 
countries’ people do not speak English. Moreover, during the early years 
of the Taliban regime, even for those transnational feminist organizations 
who genuinely sought to help, their overreliance on digital media as a por-
tal to understanding the on the ground situation of Afghan women often 
precluded their endeavors. Lacking cultural access, Western feminist orga-
nizations directed their attention to and gathered their information from 
the same few websites of Afghan women’s organizations that were available 
in English. Digital media indeed served as a cross- cultural bridge, yet it 
was a very narrow bridge with limited access to a wider cross- section of 
Afghan society.
Finally, it is worth noting that established media institutions and circuits 
remain just as crucial, if not more so, than social media. Joya is redeemed 
by the success of the international journalist reports, films with high cross-
over in the international film festival and broadcast markets, and subse-
quent books. Traditional networks of activism and methods of promotion, 
such as film festivals and book tours, are still very effective in building a 
base, solidarity, and recognition nationally, regionally, and across cultures.
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